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ABSTRACT 
 
This work is an attempt at Marxist biblical scholarship. It seeks to add to a growing list of 
works from African biblical scholars that employ insights from the social sciences, Marxist 
analytical categories in particular, to shed light on, and better understand the social life of 
ancient Israel. It uses Marxist analysis to facilitate a dialogue between the political economy 
of ancient monarchic Israel and that of post-colonial Zimbabwe, with a view to an inclusive 
economic ethics.  
 
A Marxist reading of social life in ancient monarchic Israel reveals a class divided society in 
which the upper classes seized the institution of the state to further their own class interests. 
A picture that emerges from that society is of a tiny elite parasitically living off the sweat and 
toil of the peasants. Physically devastated by corvée labour, impoverished by onerous tribute 
and taxation, and having lost property and family to debt instruments, the hardworking 
peasants rue the day their ancestors accepted the tributary state, with its monopoly of the 
legitimate use of violence and ideo-theologies that support and legitimate the status quo; that 
support and legitimate the luxury that they see being displayed wantonly by their rulers.  
 
Like the sons and daughters of Israel they read about daily in their bibles, without stopping 
for a moment to reflect on their social life, the peaceful hardworking Zimbabwean masses, 
decimated by poverty, fear and state-sponsored brutality, yet unable to change their story, 
unwilling to mobilise and stage a citizen’s revolution, have resigned to fate, hoping that the 
God of the Hebrews will listen to their cries and avenge their blood, sweat and tears. From 
the highs of the defeat of white racist supremacy to the lows of recording the second highest 
rate of inflation in recorded history, from being the second most advanced economy on the 
continent south of the Sahara, to rank among the poorest on earth, from its citizens being 
proud white collar employees, to beggars and vendors on the streets of neighbouring 
countries, yet their rulers and patronage networks unashamedly display their extortionate 
wealth in broad day light, no one in their wildest imagination would have thought that just 
two decades into independence, the country would descend into a predatory and brutal police 
state in which its leaders would join hands with the military to terrorise any form of dissent, 
torture tens of thousands, murder thousands of their own people who hold a different opinion 
from theirs, as the country tethered on the brink of becoming a failed state. Regarded as a 
pariah by the international community, industry having been decimated by hyperinflation and 
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shortage of foreign exchange, the country would be abandoned by more than half of its 
skilled workforce, but only after the ruling politico-military elite and its patronage networks 
had looted the state coffers empty. With social services having virtually collapsed, citizens 
would die of avoidable diseases such as cholera. The picture that emerges from Zimbabwe is 
of a defeated and confused citizenry, scratching their hands trying, but failing, to get answers 
to what has led them to be in this sorry state. 
 
Although separated by millennia, a Marxist reading of the two political economies shows 
striking similarities in terms of stratification, primitive accumulation of wealth by the upper 
classes and their apparent insensitivity to the plight of the masses. A biblically-inspired 
economic ethics that extols community and advocates an option for those who have fallen on 
the wrong side of the political economy is what the exploited in both contexts want to hear.   
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CHAPTER ONE: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and motivation  
 
On 18 April 1980, Zimbabwe was born amid much pomp and fanfare after a revolution that 
ended white minority settler colonialism. The second most industrialised economy in Africa, 
south of the Sahara, with probably the most educated citizens in the region, was surely poised 
for massive economic growth that would result in the upliftment of the majority of its citizens 
from poverty. The newly-born nation was expected to become a beacon of hope and a breath 
of fresh air on a continent where poverty, civil conflicts and dictatorships reigned supreme. 
For those of a socialist persuasion, the second phase of the democratic revolution, namely to 
launch a socialist democratic state with the workers and the peasants as the vanguard and 
motive forces of the revolution, was almost inevitable. On it were pinned the hopes of the 
southern African region. Why not when the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic 
Front (ZANU PF), the party that had won the first democratic election resoundingly, had 
since 1977 invoked Marxist-Leninist ideology. Unfortunately, the petite bourgeoisie that 
came to power had other ideas. In spite of its rhetoric, the revolution did not encompass a 
socialist revolution. It became obvious right from the Lancaster House Conference that no 
socialist revolution was going to take place when the African petite bourgeoisie leadership 
went to bed with imperialism and aggressively started courting international finance capital. 
It soon became clear that wealth accumulation by the African nationalist movement, 
mimicking their white settler precursors, was the priority, not socialist revolution. The 
socialist revolution ran aground.   
 
The African nationalist petite bourgeoisie leadership steered the nation towards full-blown 
capitalism, which culminated in the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB) 
sponsored programme was an absolute disaster for the economy. It exacerbated 
underdevelopment and increased poverty. The net effect of ESAP was a general crisis of 
legitimacy followed by an increasingly militant citizenry. The working class together with 
various social movements developed class consciousness and coalesced around the 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to take collective political action to bring about 
socio-political and economic change. Sensing defeat, ZANU PF resurrected its liberation war 
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tactics to unleash untold violence on opposition members, supporters and sympathisers. The 
anti-developmental parasitic ruling elite had turned into a leviathan, feasting on its citizens. 
 
Nobody would have imagined that only twenty years into independence, the land would be in 
a sorry state, ravaged by poverty, easily avoidable diseases, mass unemployment, runaway 
inflation and a predatory state that would terrorise, torture, maim and kill its own citizens. As 
if that was not enough, the power elites and their patronage networks would suck the 
government coffers dry, becoming extremely wealthy in the process. Opposition political 
parties, private media and human rights organisations would allege massive electoral 
irregularities; the  torture, murder and displacement of thousands of opposition supporters. 
The picture that would emerge from the tiny southern African country was that of an 
impoverished citizenry totally scared of its leadership. This seems to have the hallmarks of a 
political economy of terror.  
 
The same situation seemed to obtain in ancient monarchic Israel. The transition from a loose 
tribal organisation to a monarchic state in ancient Israel resulted in a reconfiguring of social 
relations and ownership of the means of production. The traditional tribal norms of mutual 
aid among kinsmen were thrown out of the window as the privileged elite sucked the 
surpluses from the peasants to sustain a privileged lifestyle for themselves and their 
patronage networks. Class became more important than kinship relations. Through debt 
slavery, the peasants lost their property and even their very selves and became slaves, toiling 
not for themselves, but for the heartless landowners and money lenders. A tiny fraction of the 
population that was not at all involved in production controlled virtually all the wealth in 
ancient Israel while the real producers were strangled by economies of extraction. This does 
look like a political economy of terror. 
 
By “political economy of terror” in this work is meant one in which a tiny minority elite has 
seized the means of production, and it is this minority that determines what is produced, by 
whom, for whom and who gets what share of it. It is one in which the hardworking majority 
are deprived of the fruits of their labour and are wallowing in abject poverty while the elite 
live in conspicuous consumption. It is characterised by an elite that is indifferent to the plight 
of the masses.  It is characterised by a paradox: it is the best of times for the minority and the 
worst of times for the majority. In a political economy of terror, the ruling elite that enjoy 
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state power use the state to serve their own accumulation interests and can easily use state 
power to repress the masses to carry out their will. It is a situation in which the impoverished 
majority are scared of their rulers. It is these factors that will form the bedrock of our analysis 
of the two political economies. 
 
Using Marxist economic analysis, this work argues that in spite of the numerous differences 
between ancient polities such as ancient Israel and modern capitalist states such as post-
colonial Zimbabwe, there are enough parallels to warrant a serious cross-cultural comparative 
study between the two contexts. For example, both polities are characterised by forms of 
extraction of resources by the ruling and upper classes at the expense of the lower classes. By 
their very nature, centralised polities survive on extraction from the proceeds of the sweat of 
the citizenry. Marxists argue that the state is a site of accumulation by the ruling and upper 
classes. The struggle for control of the state is a struggle for control of resources. Whoever 
controls the state automatically controls its resources. Furthermore, the two are also 
comparable because of the constant class struggles between the two classes which are evident 
in both political economies. From a dialogue between these two political economies, we are 
able to construct an inclusive economic ethics informed by biblical principles. However, the 
economic ethics is not so much a blueprint but is rather a motivation and vision for economic 
transformation.  
   
The state features prominently in this work. This has been necessitated by the fact that the 
political economies are political economies of a “state.” And the nature of the political 
economy is determined by the nature of the state. As Bob Jessop (2012:5) argues, the state is 
central to Marxist analyses - not only with regards to political power in narrow terms but also 
to class power more generally - because the state is seen as responsible for maintaining the 
overall structural integration and social cohesion of a “society divided into classes,” such as 
ancient monarchic Israel and post-colonial Zimbabwe. However, biblical scholars have 
largely shied away from a detailed analysis of the “state” as a form of socio-political 
organisation. Christa Schaefer-Lichtenberger (1996) has done some scientific analysis of the 
state. So has Norman K. Gottwald (2001). But by-and-large, the “state” qua state has not 
been of interest to biblical scholars. It is taken for granted that ancient monarchic Israel was a 
“state” among other Near Eastern “states”. This work seeks to add to this limited list of works 
from biblical scholars that detail the so-called ancient Near Eastern “state.” 
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This work goes beyond a mere economic analysis of ancient monarchic Israel and post-
colonial Zimbabwe which would be confined to a narrow framework of economic science. 
Economics relies on the limited concepts of agents of economic change which are limited to 
the abstract categories of the entrepreneur, the consumer and at times the state but only as it 
relates to the economic functions of the state, e.g. regulation or legislation (Mentan 
2010:xvi). It is not enough simply to ask how the economy is doing, how much Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) is coming in and by how much the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
is growing. That does not go far enough.  Political economy, on the contrary, looks farther 
and wider. It analyses the role of class and power relationships with regards to ownership and 
allocation of resources. Such political factors are crucial in determining economic outcomes. 
According to Gottwald (1993:18) it involves who decides what is produced and who benefits 
from production. These, in our view, are pertinent questions which ought to be asked in a 
society. While numbers of growth may not be unimportant, political economy probes issues 
of the ownership of the means of production behind those numbers and distribution of the 
national income and wealth. Furthermore, the economic and the political are deeply inter-
twinned that it is more fruitful to treat them together rather than separately. Thus we speak of 
political economy, for the economy is unavoidably political.  
 
1.2 Research Questions 
 
When dealing with political economies that are separated by several millennia, one needs to 
be careful not to just pluck them out of their contexts and put them alongside each other. The 
question that immediately comes up is: is it possible for the two political economies to 
dialogue with each other given the obvious differences between them? Related to this is: how 
can Marxist analysis help to facilitate that dialogue? It is when these has been answered that 
the most important question can then be answered: can a dialogue between ancient monarchic 
Israelite and post-colonial Zimbabwean political economies contribute to an inclusive 
economic ethics? What are the markers of this economic ethics?  
 
Since this research work has two parts, ancient Israel and Zimbabwe, further questions come 
from each of the parts. What was the nature of the political economy of monarchic Israel and 
how can Marxist analysis help to shed light on this political economy? To what extent can it 
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be labelled a political economy of terror? Some more questions will also be answered when 
we trace the history of the political economy of monarchic Israel. After two centuries of 
relative equal access to the means of production, what necessitated the community to 
abandon a loose socio-political organisational structure that guaranteed them freedom and opt 
for a state system when it was obvious that the ruling elites would oppress the peasant 
majority? With the emergence of the state which of course needed peasant surpluses to 
survive and thrive, what mechanisms were used by the ruling elite to extract peasant 
surpluses? With time it does seem that the new political economy had a terrible impact on the 
peasants who were barely making ends meet, yet still continued to pay their taxes and 
perform corvée labour. What is it that made them to continue to pay taxes and provide labour 
when they were that impoverished?  
 
Another set of questions emanate from a discussion of “the state.” What factors led to the 
emergence of the pristine states in human history? In what sense can the ancient Israelite 
monarchy and indeed any other ancient polity be called a “state”? If ancient Israel was a 
“state,” could it have been a “state” in the same sense as post-colonial Zimbabwe is a “state”?  
In other words, how do ancient polities differ from modern states? Because of groupings or 
federations of states such as the African Union (AU) and European Union (EU), does the 
state still have a future? Is it not likely to go the way of the city-state or the empire? What is 
the Marxist understanding of the state, that is, its origins, role and nature? 
 
A few questions need to be answered on post-colonial Zimbabwe. What was the nature of the 
political economy of that country that qualifies it to be labelled a political economy of terror? 
How can Marxist analysis help to shed light on this political economy? What mechanisms did 
the power elites and their patronage networks use to bankrupt the state and enrich 
themselves? How is it that an economy, which was full of promise at independence in 1980, 
descended into such miserable depths as to rank among the poorest on earth? Was the misery 
of the country self-inflicted or there were other more powerful external forces involved?  
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1.3 Objectives  
 
 The objectives of this study are: 
 To determine if the ancient monarchic Israelite and post-colonial Zimbabwean 
political economies can dialogue with one another, that is, if they are comparable 
 To employ Marxist analysis to facilitate a dialogue between the two political 
economies 
 To investigate the origins, nature and future of the state 
 To investigate the nature of the political economy of ancient monarchic Israel and 
ascertain the extent to which it can be labelled a political economy of terror 
 To investigate the nature of the political economy of post-colonial Zimbabwe in order 
to ascertain if it can be described as a political economy of terror  
 To construct an inclusive economic ethics from a dialogue between ancient monarchic 
Israelite and post-colonial Zimbabwean political economies  
1.4 Theoretical framework - Marxist analysis 
 
This work is an attempt at Marxist biblical scholarship. The contributions of Marxist theory 
have been ignored and at worst dismissed on ideological grounds by Western biblical 
scholars, to the detriment of Western biblical studies. It is only recently that its contributions 
have started to be more appreciated as offering explanatory and exegetical resources to 
biblical scholarship (cf. West 2011; Boer 2003, 2008). Indeed Marxist analysis can provide 
sustainable resources for a study of monarchic Israel. Marxist biblical tools illuminate our 
understanding of a number of aspects of the Israelite political economy. For example, they 
shed light on how the Israelite pre-state tribal society came about as a result of a social 
revolution of the peasants against the Canaanite city-state political economies of terror. 
Marxist tools also help to highlight the significance of the economy in socio-political 
transformation. The importance of the economy in the rise of the monarchy, in the political 
decisions and strategies taken by successive kings and in the division of the monarchy need 
not be underestimated. Marxist theory’s emphasis on the history of nations and societies as a 
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history of class struggles is also very important for this study. This enables us to understand 
the dynamics of the struggles.   
 
On post-colonial Zimbabwe's political economy, Marxist theory will help shed light on the 
internal dynamics of that system as a constant struggle between the free market oriented 
ruling petite bourgeoisie and the expectant peasants. Marxist theory also helps us to see the 
bigger picture in some high-profile corruption cases that have been unearthed (e.g. the 
Willowvale scandal and the War Victims Compensation Fund [WVCF] abuse). It points 
towards problems associated with neo-liberalism, class rule and how the state is an instrument 
and a site of accumulation for the ruling class (Hattingh 2014). In other words, for the 
emerging elite in post-colonial Zimbabwe, the state offered the most viable way to amass 
private wealth, most of the times on a very large scale. Corruption is part of capitalism as a 
system and the system feeds and thrives on it. Corruption oils the wheels of capitalism. In 
fact capitalism breeds and fosters corruption which, in its turn, requires corruption to continue 
to exist and thrive. Thus we can begin to appreciate why the ruling African petite bourgeoisie 
that grabbed power in 1980 spoke loudly about being socialists while embarking on policies 
that reinforced capitalism. Furthermore, the decision to implement the disastrous ESAP 
should be seen against this background. It was only in a free market capitalist environment 
that their accumulation agenda would be realised. 
 
The Marxist categories of mode of production, class and ideology will be useful in better 
understanding the ancient Israelite and post-colonial Zimbabwean political economies. 
 
1.4.1 Mode of production 
 
According to Roland Boer (2002:108), mode of production is the ultimate category for any 
Marxist criticism. David Jobling (2005:192) adds that the greatest theoretical debt which 
biblical studies owes to Marxism is the understanding of historical modes of production. 
Maurice Godelier (1980:6) defines mode of production as  
 
a specific combination of determinate productive forces and of determinate social 
relations constituting both material and social conditions, and the internal material 
and social structures through which society acts upon its natural environment in order 
to extract from it a series of socially useful goods (emphasis added).  
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In this general sense, mode of production refers to the whole reality of a particular historical 
era that includes culture, economics, ideology, class, politics, philosophy, religion, law etc. 
(Boer 2002:108). In this sense, a mode of production is a particular combination of the forces 
and relations of production that determine the structure and form of a society's economic base 
(Simkins 1999:126). The reference of the concept mode of production thus ranges from the 
specifics of the tools and processes employed in production, to the area of final consumption, 
posing the questions about what is produced, how it is produced, and by and for whom? 
(Maisels 1990:262).  
 
Over and above the means for making a living, mode of production also includes the 
relationships involved: who owns the means, how is production organised, who controls the 
product and how is it distributed, and who consumes what part of it? (Leacock and Lee 
1982:7). Relations of production, according to Jessop (2012:5-6),  
 
comprise social control over the allocation of resources to different productive 
activities and over the appropriation of any resulting surplus; the social division of 
labour…; and class relations grounded in property relations, ownership of the means 
of production, and the form of economic exploitation.  
 
Godelier (1980:6) simplifies it, defining relations of production as  
 
all social relations whatsoever, which serve a three-fold function: first, to determine 
social access to and control of resources and the means of production; second, to 
redistribute the social labour force among the different labour processes and to 
organise these processes; and third, to determine the social distribution of the product 
of labour.  
 
Thus relations of production determine the economic use that is made of the means of 
production, the division of productive labour, the forms of appropriation and distribution of 
the social product, and the value of the surplus in relation to the costs of reproduction and the 
utilisation of the surplus (Friedman 1974:446). Forces of production comprise of three 
elements, namely, instruments of production, labour power and objects of labour. Instruments 
of production refers to the actual labour process of how work is done, that is, tools, facilities, 
apparatus etc. Forces of production determine the possibilities and the constraints of the 
productive process, but the specific patterns of allocation and stratification are determined by 
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the social relations of production (Godelier 1977:36). While the role of productive forces in 
producing social change is important, however for this work the social relations of production 
are crucial for they determine the choice of productive forces and their use in production.  
 
Applying the concept of relations of production to pre-state Israel reveals that the peasants, 
who are the direct producers, are simultaneously the consumers. Yet in monarchic Israel, the 
political superstructure plays an important role in land ownership and in the expropriation of 
surplus value from the peasants. It decides the ownership and use of the means of production, 
the division of labour and the distribution of its fruits. There is now a disjuncture between 
producers and consumers, between production and disposition of the surplus (Maisels 
1990:299). The state and economic elites, key actors in ancient Israel, have a say on what is 
produced, by what means, where, by and for whom.  
 
In our view, mode of production provides the most comprehensive category for 
understanding the political economy of ancient Israel. Charles Keith Maisels (1990:274) 
argues that the value of the concept does not lie in the fact that it offers yet another list of 
types of systems but rather that it focuses on “a set of systematic and analytically revealing 
interconnections” (italics in original). We thus argue that the concept of mode of production 
may serve as an enlightening model for analysing the social structure and economy of 
monarchic Israel. It readily corresponds to the socio-political and economic realities of that 
society. 
 
1.4.2 Class 
 
Another Marxist analytical category that is central to understanding social relations, and 
therefore the ancient Israelite political economy, is social class. Gideon Sjoberg (1960:109) 
defines a social class as  
 
a large body of persons who occupy a position in a social hierarchy by reason of their 
manifesting similarly valued objective criteria. These latter include kinship affiliation, 
power and authority, achievements, possessions, and moral and personal attributes. 
Achievements involve a person's occupational and educational attainments; 
possessions refer to material evidences of wealth; moral attributes include one's 
religious and ethical beliefs and actions; and personal attributes involve speech, dress 
and personal mannerisms. 
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Class is determined by the relation of people in a given society to the mode of production. 
The class-divided society is composed of at least two strata: an upper stratum comprising the 
monarch, his relatives and the aristocracy, and a lower stratum including, among others, 
smallholders and tenants (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:637). The former can also be called 
non-producers, exploiters, the dominators or the ideologically superior, while the latter are 
the producers, the exploited, the dominated, or the ideologically inferior. The exploiters are 
non-producers yet exact surplus from the exploited.  
 
Gottwald (1993:4) notes that classes should not be viewed as strata laid down in layers, one 
on top of the other, but should rather be viewed as  
 
contending forces in a common field of ever-shifting action seeking to secure their 
vital interests as they understand them, the dominant class clearly being “one up” in 
its command over surplus labour value, political power, and ideological supremacy.  
 
Within Marxist tradition, notes Boer (1998:8-9), class is inconceivable without conflict and 
violence: a class is defined by being in opposition with another and class conflict is a primary 
motor of history. In this class struggle, producers and non-producers battle to increase, 
diminish, or arrest the appropriation of labour surplus.   
 
Marxists often debate whether the state is the exploiting class or that it serves as an 
instrument of the exploiting classes such as landlords and merchants. In conventional Marxist 
theory, the state is not the exploiter. The state is distinct from class and is indeed generated 
out of class conflict (Boer 2007:33). Furthermore, the state is not identical with the ruling 
class. Rather, the ruling class seizes the state as an instrument for pushing its own agenda. 
The idea of the state as instrument raises a question of whether it is an autonomous structure, 
with interests of its own not necessarily equivalent to the interests of the dominant class in 
society. In his theory of the relative autonomy of the state, Nicos Poulantzas (1978) argues 
that the state might indeed have a substantial degree of autonomy, but nevertheless, it remains 
for all practical purposes the state of the ruling class. In his conquest theory, Franz 
Oppenheimer (cited in Claessen and Skalnik 1978:9) views the state as an instrument of 
oppression, designed to confirm social inequality. However, Gottwald (1993:155) suggests 
that the state in its tribute-collecting function was the primary, and perhaps even exclusive, 
expropriator of the subject classes in monarchic Israel. The king could not, however, be the 
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sole beneficiary of the extraction of the peasants’ surpluses. Rather, high ranking civil, 
religious and military leaders, and merchants, as non-producers, also lived off the peasants’ 
surpluses.  
 
In Marxist analysis, one necessary function of the state - by definition - is to contain class 
conflict and to undertake other policies in support of the dominance of the non-producing yet 
surplus-appropriating and property-owning classes (Miliband 1983:65). In such a class-
divided society, it is the responsibility of the state to maintain the overall structural 
integration and social cohesion without which the contradictions and antagonisms might lead 
to “the mutual ruin of the contending classes” (Jessop 2012:6). When class conflict between 
the exploiters and the exploited becomes intense, the state and the exploiting non-producers 
develop explanations that legitimate their extraction of the producing peasants’ surpluses 
(Gottwald 1993:148). Such extraction can be justified from the point of view of service to the 
common good, an ancient custom, or as a demand of the gods. The exploiting classes do not 
want the appropriation to appear as an arbitrary intervention based on brute force but wants it 
to be seen as a transaction that is good for the social whole or in keeping with the will of the 
god(s). Apart from resisting the expropriation of their surplus labour value, the exploited 
peasant producers may also argue to the contrary that it is a moral and religious good that the 
appropriation of surplus labour value be lessened or be stopped completely. This is the 
beginning of what Marx calls “class consciousness,” an awareness by the oppressed of their 
situation and the need for collective political action to bring about social change.  
 
Through class consciousness, the oppressed see themselves as one unit that together can stand 
up to their oppressors, revolt and change their situation. The story of the confrontation 
between the elders of Israel and Jeroboam over reducing the burden of corvée labour and 
taxation, which led to the split of the Israelite monarchy (1 Kings 12), can be understood in 
this way. It seems that this onerous form of surplus extraction and corvée labour had become 
a widespread class grievance, and class struggle had reached boiling point. Internal 
contradictions had accumulated to bursting point. Rehoboam’s refusal to budge opened up 
cracks along the fault lines of social contradiction and the northerners revolted. 
 
The concept of class is also useful to understanding Zimbabwe’s social relations. As the 
country moved away from independence, it does seem that ethnicity seemed to matter less 
and less as class became more important. Feeling neglected by the party they had put in 
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power, the veterans of the 1970s war of liberation mobilised themselves and were able to 
march to President Robert Mugabe’s residence to demand that he addresses their plight or the 
country would be ungovernable. The pauperisation of the war veterans had become a 
widespread class grievance which forced them to take action. The government obliged. The 
formation of the MDC around the working and the middle class should also be seen in the 
light of class consciousness. This class became aware of its deteriorating socio-economic 
situation and coalesced around the newly formed political movement to take collective action 
to bring about political change.   
 
1.4.3 Ideology 
 
In a mode of production characterised by relations of domination and exploitation, the role of 
ideology is quite central. Antonio Gramsci has argued that for acceptance and legitimation, 
states rely on variable combinations of force and what he calls “hegemony”. While force 
involves the use of a coercive apparatus to bring the masses into compliance with the mode of 
production, by contrast, hegemony involves the successful mobilisation and reproduction of 
the “active consent” of the oppressed by the oppressors through the exercise of political, 
intellectual and moral leadership (Jessop 2012:9). Ideology justifies the exploitation of the 
ruling classes while pacifying the exploited from rising up against their oppressors (Jessop 
2012:9). That way, they can keep paying their taxes even to the point of starving themselves. 
One of the chief tools for accomplishing this acceptance and legitimation in ancient societies 
was religion. In other words, political power was bolstered by the ideological power of 
religion.  
 
Marxism places religion in the area of ideologies - the intellectual constructions whose real 
significance is in economic and social relations which they reflect or hide (Bonino 1993:108). 
Religion provides the false consciousness that blinds people to the true nature of the mode of 
production that expropriates their surplus labour value. The role of ideology is to justify the 
subordination of the many by the few. Religion is instrumental in providing moral 
justification for the total social order. However, Jan Rehmann (2011) brings a nuanced view, 
arguing that there is much more to be found in Marx’s critique of religion than the traditional 
rejection of religion as ‘‘false consciousness’’ or as a mere instrument of manipulation in the 
hands of the ruling classes. He argues that the young Marx did not content himself with a 
rejection of religion, but rather developed a dialectical understanding of religion as a field of 
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conflicting tendencies, adding that the older Marx transformed the critique of religion 
inherited from Feuerbach into a critique of commodity, money, and capital fetishism 
(Rehmann 2011:144). Thus, after his departure from Feuerbach, the proper object of the 
young Marx’s critique of religion is the capitalist mode of production (Rehmann 2011:148). 
 
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (2006: 64) remarked in their famous formulation:  
 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, that is, the class 
which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual 
force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal has control 
at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally 
speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.  
 
For Itumeleng Mosala (1993a:55), ruling class ideology refers to the desire and attempts by 
the dominant classes of society to establish hegemonic control over other classes through a 
rationalising universalisation of what are in effect sectional class interests. In other words, the 
ruling elite projects its own narrow interests as interests of the whole society. The hegemony 
of a class, according to Antonio Gramsci (cited in Mosala 1993a:55), means that a class has 
succeeded in persuading other classes to accept its own ideas and values. The values and 
interests of society as a whole are too easily identified with the values and interests of the 
ruling classes in maintaining their position and privileges. Thus in the same vein, Bruce G. 
Trigger (2003:285) argues that politics is the contest for public endorsement of private or 
sectional interests. 
 
According to Max Weber (cited in Sjoberg 1960:224), the power of the ruling elite is 
transformed into authority through appeal to absolutes and appeal to tradition. The appeal to 
absolutes is a claim to legitimisation by outside forces independent of human action (Sjoberg 
1960:224). Anthropologists have long argued that the upper classes appeal to supernatural 
support to enhance their authority and frighten the lower classes into obeying them (Godelier 
1986; Steward 1949; White 1949). The rule of the monarch and the existing socio-political 
and economic structure are justified on the basis of being in accordance with the will of 
god(s). Objections to state rule and non-compliance with the decisions of the rulers would not 
be seen as rebellion against the human rulers but as rebellion against the gods and this will be 
met with the warrants and sanctions of religion. Religion is in this case a means of 
intimidating the masses and therefore an instrument of social control. Ideology seems to have 
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played a central role in the longevity of the Davidic dynasty. The historicity of the event 
aside, Nathan's prophecy regarding the eternal rulership of the Davidic house (2 Sam 7) sheds 
light on the significance of religion in maintaining peace and stability in ancient Israel. It 
seems the prophet was aware of the fragility of the Davidic kingdom due to many interested 
parties from without the royal family. To prevent chaos, he pronounced that Yahweh had 
informed him that the House of David was to rule forever. Since it was a divine proclamation, 
any rebellion would not be seen as rebellion against the Davidic house, but a rebellion against 
Yahweh. Nathan can be viewed as an example of the many court prophets that kings 
appointed to craft religious ideologies that had political implications, and act as the 
monarchs’ propagandists. 
 
Ezra Chitando (2005:221) has observed that from the late 1990s political and religious 
discourses in Zimbabwe overlapped. ZANU PF appropriated religious texts and themes to 
justify its seizure of white owned farms. Both Christianity and traditional religions were 
employed in support of what they called the Third Chimurenga (revolution). Thus it was 
common for ordinary people on the streets to justify, not just the seizure of white farms by 
quoting religious themes, but also to justify why President Mugabe and his ZANU PF should 
continue to rule.   
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
From the beginning of modern biblical scholarship, the dominant interpretive process has 
been the bipolar or comparative paradigm. African biblical scholarship has also been largely 
bipolar, that is a comparative methodology that facilitates a parallel interpretation of biblical 
texts or motifs and supposed modern or African parallels, letting the two illuminate one 
another (West 2007:247). The bipolar approach delineated two poles or stages within the 
exegetical process namely, the text and context. However, scholars began to notice that the 
comparison of text and context is a mediated process, involving a third pole, that of 
“appropriation” (West 2013:1). Thus, the emergence of the “tripolar” approach. It points out 
the three poles of biblical interpretation as the biblical text, the context, and the act of 
appropriation which mediates between text and context. It is the appropriative reader who 
enables the textual pole and the contextual pole to dialogue. The third pole is as important as 
the other two. Appropriation is a mutual dynamic relationship which involves an interactive 
engagement between the textual and the contextual poles. Jonathan A. Draper (2002:13) talks 
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of biblical interpretation as a conversation; a two-way process in which each of the two poles 
interrogates each other and involves “talking back to the text,” interrogating it and even 
reading against the grain. 
 
The context of the biblical exegete should be given priority because it is his social, economic, 
political and cultural context that makes him to read the text in certain way. As Draper 
(2002:16) notes, our social location determines what questions we ask, what tools we use to 
interpret the text and what counts as an answer from God. My social location also constructs 
ideological orientations which also constitute my engagement with the text. My context as a 
Zimbabwean biblical reader of a Marxist orientation will influence my reading of the political 
economy of monarchic Israel to identify issues of tyranny, exploitation and suppression of 
human rights. Where some see prosperity in the political economy of monarchic Israelite, I 
see exploitation and impoverishment of the masses.   
 
The biblical text and the post-colonial Zimbabwean context do not, on their own, participate 
in a conversation. With respect to the biblical text, the socio-historical method of analysis 
will be used to locate ancient monarchic Israel in its historical context. Monarchic Israel will 
be treated as one among the smaller ancient Near Eastern tributary kingdoms of the Iron Age. 
Marxist theory will be used to analyse and to understand the nature and dynamics of the 
political economy of post-colonial Zimbabwe (contextual pole). The two are brought into 
conversation with each other through a Marxist liberationist mode of appropriation.  
 
1.6 Limitations 
 
This study has two limitations. The first one relates to the use of the text and has two parts. It 
does not focus on a specific biblical text or texts as a basis for understanding the Israelite 
monarchy. The second part of this is that it does not adopt a historical approach in which 
biblical characters like Elijah, Elisha, Saul, David and Solomon are regarded as historical 
figures who did as they are said to have done in the biblical text. Quite the contrary, it adopts 
a socio-scientific approach. That is, in its exposition of the political economy of monarchic 
Israel, it reiterates what is generally known of monarchies from the broader ancient Near 
Eastern environment. It treats ancient Israel as having a similar culture to that of the other 
nations in its environment, and therefore an Israelite monarchy was no different from the 
surrounding monarchies.  
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The other limitation relates to the nature of the economic ethics that emerges from the 
dialogue of the two political economies. We do not intend it to be a blueprint that solves the 
economic problems of the world. There is clearly no scientific economic theory in the 
modern sense in the biblical text (Meeks 1989:3). Rather as Gottwald (1993:341) argues, the 
ethical force of the bible on issues of economics will have to be perspectival and 
motivational, rather than prescriptive and technical. Following from this is the obvious 
difficulty of comparing an agrarian pre-industrial and pre-capitalist system with a modern 
capitalist and industrial society. The differences are significant. Thus apart from the resources 
that the biblical text provides, we are quite alive to the limitations of using it with regards to 
extracting an economic ethics for our contemporary world and its systems.   
 
1.7 Structure of thesis 
 
The thesis is made up of eight chapters. It begins with a general introduction in Chapter One 
in which the background and motivation of the study, as well as the theoretical framework 
and research methodology are briefly sketched. Key research questions, the objectives and 
limitations of the study are also provided. 
 
Chapter Two discusses what we will call the “early state” as a form of socio-political 
organisation. It seeks to explore the various theories on the emergence of the state, its nature 
and characteristics, as well as problems of definition.  
 
With that background and building on Chapter Two, Chapter Three zeroes in on the ancient 
Near Eastern state and an attempt is made to explain its origin. A discussion of the city-state 
as a form of early state takes place before the chapter leaves the broader ancient Near Eastern 
environment to focus on ancient Israel. The myth that Israel was unique in the ancient Near 
East is dispelled. The place of ancient Israel in the ancient Near East is affirmed. The 
cataclysmic upheavals that took place in the Late Bronze Age, leading to the demise of the 
great powers of the day and the emergence of Israel, are discussed. The chapter then 
discusses the socio-political and economic structure of pre-state Israel and concludes with the 
(re)turn of Israel to the tributary mode of production with the adoption of the monarchy as a 
form of socio-political organisation.   
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Chapter Four is one of the three core chapters. It discusses the political economy of 
monarchic Israel which we will describe as a “political economy of terror.” The place of the 
king in this political economy is analysed. The Marxist categories of mode of production, 
class, and ideology will be used as the lenses to view the political economy of monarchic 
Israel. Focus will also be on the mechanism used for the appropriation of the peasants’ 
surplus by the state and the landed elites that led to the impoverishment of the masses. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the prophetic critique of this political economy of terror. 
 
The next two chapters prepare the ground for a discussion of the political economy of post-
colonial Zimbabwe. Chapter Five focuses on the “modern state.” Its origins, nature and future 
are discussed, as well as its difference from the early state. Challenges of definition will also 
be discussed. Chapter Six is on the political economy of post-colonial Africa. It looks at the 
drama that has been unfolding on the continent since the end of colonial rule, as well as 
external constraints to Africa’s progress and development.  
 
Chapter Seven, another of the three key chapters, traces the political economy of Zimbabwe 
from the colonial era through the Lancaster House conference to 2017 the historic year in 
which veteran dictator President Mugabe was removed from office. It looks at the key 
moments and events of this period, exposes the primitive accumulation by those in the 
corridors of power and their strong arm tactics to silence the masses, and concludes that the 
political economy of post-colonial Zimbabwe is indeed a political economy of terror. 
 
Chapter Eight, the third of the key chapters, brings the two contexts to the table to dialogue 
with one another. From this dialogue, a biblically derived economic ethics will emerge and 
we will discuss the nature and limitations of this ethics.  
 
The thesis ends with a summary of the key elements of this work. It will indicate the extent to 
which the objectives of the work have been achieved. It will end with suggesting some areas 
for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EARLY STATE 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Human beings have lived in small-scale societies without a state system for about two million 
years of their existence on earth. It was only about five thousand years ago that humanity 
began to organise itself into larger socio-political units, a process that continued 
progressively, leading to the formation of the first known state in about 4000 BCE (Carneiro 
1970:733). The state is, thus, a very recent form of socio-political organisation. As Friedrich 
Engels (1972:232) puts it, the state has not existed from all eternity and there have been 
societies which have managed without it, which had no notion of the state or state power. For 
most of its history, humanity functioned without even a primitive form of state. Thus the 
period in which human beings have been organised into states is a minute part of the entire 
history of the human race.  
 
But since its emergence, it has engulfed virtually the entirety of humankind. It has probably 
been the single most important socio-economic and political force and the most powerful, 
continuously authoritative, and most inclusive organisational structure ever developed in the 
history of the universe. More than ever before human beings now live under the shadow of 
the state (Miliband 1970:1). It has become so powerful and controlling that it is impossible 
not to be aware of its presence or be affected by it. It has come to dominate humanity so 
much so that no power on earth is above or comparable to it. Whatever humanity wants to be 
or attain, either individually or corporately, mainly depends on the state’s approval. While it 
controls them, it is also for its control that humans compete. As a socio-political system, it 
dictates how its subjects ought to behave, what they should do and what they should not. It 
demands unfailing respect from its subjects and causes greater inequity among them than any 
known earlier system. It forces human beings to give up so much of their freedoms to 
subordinate to it. It literally moves mountains and re-directs rivers, and it has on occasion 
sent thousands, even millions, to their deaths (Cohen 1978:1).    
 
What it is and what it does, why, how and under what conditions such a powerful and 
pervasive structure has come to be, and what value it has for its subjects has claimed the 
attention of scholars for a long time. Paradoxically while scholars have produced volumes on 
government, public administration, bureaucracy, political parties, voting behaviour and 
political authority, the remarkable thing is that the state qua state, as a subject of political 
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study, has not aroused such interest from the scholarly community (Miliband 1970:1-2). Of 
course, many of these works have included a discussion on the nature and role of the state, 
but the state itself has received marginal attention. In fact, many theorists did not see it as 
worth of scholarly investigation. In the early 1950s, David Easton (cited in Miliband 1970:2) 
for example, wrote “neither the state nor power is a concept that serves to bring together 
political research”. Proposing that the idea of a state is a source of mystification that it should 
be excluded from social analysis, Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown (cited in Abrams 
1977:75) argued that the concepts of government and politics are all that is needed for a 
sufficient conceptual understanding of the political. 
 
Recently, however, the state has been rediscovered and “brought back in” for scholarly 
enquiry. This rediscovery of academic interest in the study of the state has taken place at a 
time of widespread loss of intellectual faith in its proficiency, leading some critics to suggest 
that the state might as well be on its sunset (Pierson 2004:1). In fact, talk of the “end” of the 
state is quite fashionable in the academic world. There is a widespread conviction that the 
state will cease to be the chief source of political authority in the near future because it will 
give way to and be replaced by new forms of authority and community which go beyond the 
inherited divide between the local and the international (Bartelson 2001:1). Groupings of 
nations such as the United Nations (UN), EU and the AU, are said to be developing en route 
to becoming larger socio-political and economic organisations, with the result that the state 
will sooner or later enjoy a fate similar to that of the tribe, the city-state, and the empire in 
history (Bartelson 2001:1). But there is more: critics are increasingly condemning the state as 
inefficient and undemocratic and not worthy of the citizens’ sacrifices. Furthermore, the state 
is accused of not being independent but succumbing to pressures from the markets and 
international or global networks.  
 
Does the state have a future? Are we witnessing the twilight of the state or simply the 
metamorphosis of old powers into new forms? (Pierson 2004: 3). It does seem like the state 
will be around in the foreseeable future. If anything, there seems to be renewed interest in the 
sovereignty of states such that some of the groupings of the states (such as the EU) are in 
danger of breaking up as the states assert their sovereignty. 
 
In this chapter, focus is on the “early state”, as an object of scholarly enquiry. The “modern 
state” shall be dealt with in Chapter 5. Following Henri J.M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik 
 
 
  20 
(1978), the term “early state” will be used to refer to the initial beginnings of a centralised 
polity whose mode of production is agrarian and pre-industrial. We shall discuss the 
definitional challenge, how scholars from various ideological persuasions have accounted for 
the origins of the state and its defining characteristics. By so doing, it is believed that 
sufficient foundation would have been laid for a discussion on the ancient Israelite state and 
its political economy. 
 
2.1 The early state 
 
The “early state,” according to Lawrence Krader (1978:5) refers to the initial stage of the 
evolution of the pre-capitalist non-industrial state. Comparative studies (cf. Krader 1968; 
Claessen 1970) demonstrate that the structure, functioning and evolution of early states of all 
times and places display an amazing degree of uniformity (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:5). 
This is because the challenges posed by organising groups of people with different access to 
the means of production, as well as organising communication and defense, and the need to 
find ideological justifications for a given situation are in all cases similar (Claessen 1981: 60-
61). The fact that early forms of state organisation display certain universal features makes us 
argue that it is possible to come up with an acceptable definition of the early state as well as 
delineate some of its key features. While the latter may be a fairly simple task, the former is 
not as easy as it appears. But before delving into these undertakings, it is proposed that a 
determination of the probable origins of the early state be undertaken in case that might shed 
some light on or anticipate some  challenges of definition and nature of the early state.  
 
2.1.1 Origins of the early state 
 
Although it was the most far-reaching political development in human history, there is no 
single universally acceptable theory on the origin of the state. Theories of the origin of the 
state are fairly modern. Classical writers like Aristotle and Plato, did not concern themselves 
with an explanation of the origins of the state because they considered it natural since they 
were unfamiliar with other forms of socio-political organisation (Carneiro 1970:733). 
However, by exploring the world, Europeans became aware that countless peoples around the 
world lived, not in states, but in independent small scale groups such as villages and tribes. 
That was an eye-opener which made the state appear less natural, and therefore in need of 
explanation (Carneiro 1970:733). Analyses of the state have been done by all kinds of 
 
 
  21 
scholars: philosophers, historians, political scientists, archaeologists, sociologists, 
anthropologists and biblical scholars, as they tried to shed light on the problem from their 
own discipline.  
 
Robert L. Carneiro (1970:733) divides theories of state origins into two broad categories: 
“voluntaristic” and “coercive.” Elman R. Service (1978:21) labels them ‘integrative” and 
“conflict” theories. It should be borne in mind that even though we consider them here as 
qualitatively different, in actuality these categories are not mutually exclusive. We are 
concerned with characterising theories, not actuality. Each of the two has several sub-types. 
A growing number of contemporary scholars appear to avoid clear identification with one 
side or the other of this theoretical controversy, probably because there seems to be the 
growing awareness that each side has some validity (Cohen 1978:7). In similar fashion, 
looking for our own concise theory of state origins in this work will be an exercise in futility. 
Rather, we evaluate some of the leading theories on the origins of the state under this loose 
classification. 
 
2.1.1.1 Voluntaristic theories  
 
Voluntaristic theories hold that, at some point in their history, certain groups of people 
willingly and spontaneously gave up their individual autonomy and united with other smaller 
groups to form a larger socio-political unit called a state (Carneiro 1970:733). Though 
voluntaristic theorists do not deny the existence of such factors as inequality, force, conflict 
or exploitation, their emphasis is on the emergence of the state as a useful association of 
people who benefited from cooperation and from an effective central government (Claessen 
and Skalnik 1978:17). Scholars who hold this view stress that the state was well-received and 
supported by its subjects as a solution to problems that demanded more centralised 
coordination of the polity. For would-be subjects of a state, centralised government offered 
protection and security, as well as mechanisms for settling disputes. In exchange, the subjects 
would show absolute loyalty to the state. For these benefits, the subjects were ready to make 
certain sacrifices. For them, the benefits of the state outweighed the burden it imposed on 
them.  
 
Perhaps the most popular of the voluntaristic theories is what Carneiro (1970:733) calls the 
“automatic” theory. According to this theory, the invention of agriculture automatically 
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brought about a food surplus, which enabled certain individuals to divorce themselves from 
food production to become specialists, such as potters, weavers, smiths, etc. thus creating a 
division of labour. From this specialisation there developed a political integration which 
united a number of autonomous groupings into a state (Carneiro 1970:733). A major 
weakness of this theory is the assumption that agriculture produces a food surplus.  
Agriculture does not automatically produce a food surplus as most agricultural peoples of the 
world would testify. Carneiro (1970:734) notes that virtually all agricultural Amazonian 
Indians in aboriginal times did not produce a food surplus. More importantly, a food surplus 
on its own does not automatically lead to the formation of a state; a society with a huge food 
surplus might remain a chiefdom.  
 
Another voluntaristic theory of state origins is the “hydraulic hypothesis” (also called 
“irrigation hypothesis”), which was first proposed in the 1930s and popularised by Julian H. 
Steward (1955). Steward reconstructed a succession of stages of the evolution of 
communities from hunting and gathering level to the state, namely hunting and gathering, 
incipient agriculture, formative period (of the state), regional florescence, initial conquests, 
dark ages and cyclical conquests (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:10). In Steward's opinion, 
irrigation made possible the leaps from one stage to the next because it led to the 
concentration of large numbers of people who needed organisation and coordination. In the 
end it led to state formation. Though Steward acknowledges that conquest played a role in 
some of the stages, he regarded it as an effect rather than a cause of this development 
(Claessen and Skalnik 1978:11). It is Karl Wittfogel (1957) who was the most enthusiastic 
defender of this theory. According to him, in certain dry areas, where villagers practised 
subsistence agriculture, a time arrived when they saw that it would be to the good of all to 
give up their individual autonomies and merge their villages into a single large political unit 
capable of carrying out large-scale irrigation (Carneiro 1970:734). The effective management 
of large volumes of water necessarily required efficient organisation. A “hydraulic economy” 
characterised by the division of labour, intensive cultivation and cooperation on a large scale 
inevitably developed with the state eventually assumed the managerial role (Wittfogel 
1957:22). Thus the officials appointed (or self-appointed) to administer such extensive 
irrigation works became the leaders of the nascent state (Carneiro 1970:734).   
 
Both Steward and Wittfogel’s hypothesis that irrigation is the cause of state formation has not 
been proved to be of nomothetic value (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:11). There are many 
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examples of states that emerged without irrigation works, and conversely there are many 
societies that had irrigation works but did not cross the threshold into states (cf. Claessen and 
Skalnik 1978:11). Irrigation does not necessarily require hierarchy to operate. In three of the 
areas that Wittfogel cites as illustrating his “hydraulic hypothesis” - Mesopotamia, China, and 
Mexico - archaeology has shown that states developed long before large-scale irrigation 
works (Carneiro 1970:734). Eva Hunt and Robert Hunt (1978:114ff.) also argue that 
irrigation is neither a necessary nor a sufficient cause of the development of the state. Thus, 
as a cause of the development of the state, irrigation seems inadequate. This does not, 
however, mean that the development of irrigation works does not have any influence on the 
evolution of political systems. The organisation and control of extensive irrigation works is 
often closely related to political power (Smith 1969; Downing and Gibson 1974), while the 
involvement of political leaders with irrigation systems frequently leads to an escalation of 
bureaucratic or managerial leanings. 
 
In his Origins of the state and civilisation (1975), Service points out that in the stages leading 
up to the establishment of a state, political leadership is often associated with personal 
qualities, rather than with economic differences. The emergence of this type of leader is often 
accompanied by the development of reciprocal and redistributive actions (Service 1975: 292). 
The leader's position in the society is strengthened by doing the job well (Service 1975:293). 
He avers that warfare among neighbours gives people an appreciation of the protection that 
centralised leadership offers. He gives examples of the defensive measures taken against 
raiding nomads in northwest China and Mesopotamia which stimulated the growth of walled 
towns, intensified agriculture and the rise of powerful centralised governmental systems 
(Service 1975:259, 271). He adds that people accept more centralised polities because of the 
utility of such a system in the face of outside dangers (Cohen 1978:46). The benefits of being 
part of the society obviously outweigh the alternative. The need for protection under these 
circumstances is obvious; as a result of this it was better to be a member of the state than not 
to be one (Service 1975:299). The problem with Service’s theory is how such “charismatic 
positions” were transformed into “offices.” 
 
The best known voluntaristic theory is the so-called “social contract” theory, which is 
associated with Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It is well known that we do not need to narrate it 
here. It is now known that no such contract was ever subscribed to by human groups in 
history. The theory is today nothing more than a historical curiosity (Carneiro 1970:733). 
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Another voluntaristic theory is by Robert H. Lowie (1922) who proposed that the 
“association”, that is, a number of people acting together voluntarily, might have led to the 
formation of the state. As an example he mentioned the “clubs” of the Indians, which played 
a leading role in organising the buffalo hunt and showed great skill during the hunting season 
(Claessen and Skalnik 1978:10). A centralised power could have developed from this type of 
association. However, Lowie did not give a detailed explanation of how the state came to be 
from these clubs. In order to account for the origin of the state we might have to look 
elsewhere. 
 
2.1.1.2 Conflict theories  
 
It is a demonstrable fact that state formation involves innumerable conflicts According to 
conflict theories increased centralisation of institutions of governance arises out of 
competition between groups competing for access to scarce resources leaving one group 
triumphant. This can come through conquest, through increasing population density that 
presses on resources forcing one group to take power, or through the possession by one or a 
few kin groups of traditionally privileged access to resources not granted to other groups 
(Cohen 1978:6).  
 
Warfare has been proposed as a cause of statehood. Hebert Spencer (1967) suggested that the 
organisational know-how required by warfare, its hierarchy and command spread from the 
military to society. In his view, outstanding warriors become kings and bring military 
discipline to government. He cites the rise of the Mongol empire under military leaders as a 
good example of how war can lead to statehood. When a group triumphs over others, then its 
leaders develop a system of governance and administration over the area. Keith F. Otterbein 
(1970) added weight to this theory arguing that warfare demands absolute obedience to 
leaders. He observed that obedience and subordination are quite prevalent among the military 
and concluded that subordination within the military leads to subordination within the 
political community, which supports further development of the military (Otterbein 1970:28). 
According to Spencer (1967:37), military organisation is the model for political organisation 
and military hierarchy and its insistence on discipline and subordination are the basis of 
government when carried over into peace time. Ronald Cohen critiques this theory on the 
grounds that subordination, obedience and discipline are also found across many areas of 
uncentralised social and political life, such as in hunting, religious ceremonies, family life, 
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etc. and asks why we should attribute increased subordination in government to only one 
institution at the pre-state level while disregarding others (Cohen 1978:45-46). Furthermore, 
a number of scholars (e.g. Fried 1967; Service 1975) suggest that societal evolution comes 
first, and then provides a basis for the increased scale, frequency, and success of warfare. 
Citing specific cases, they argue that a more disciplined and organised social group produces 
larger armies, better defense against external aggressors, and kindles the use of warfare as a 
form of inter-societal relations (Cohen 1978:46).  Thus, warfare is stirred by statehood, and 
as Service (cited in Cohen 1978:46) suggests, warfare follows state formation.   
 
There can be little doubt, however, that in one way or another, warfare played an important 
role in the rise of many early states. Archaeological evidence of war is found in the early 
stages of state formation in Mesopotamia, Egypt, India, China, central Africa, Polynesia and 
Middle America to name only a few (Carneiro 1970:734). With the Germanic kingdoms of 
northern Europe especially in mind, Edward Jenks observed that it is almost obvious that all 
states owe their existence to warfare (Carneiro 1970:734). Jan Vansina also shows that state 
after state in central Africa arose as a result of successful warfare (Carneiro 1970:734). 
Obviously warfare is not the whole story. Although its causal connections to state formation 
are complex, we believe that it is an important factor (Cohen 1978:46). In fact, Cohen 
(1978:46) argues, there does seem to be anthropological evidence for the possibility that war 
can, under the proper circumstances, fuel a development that can turn some loosely organised 
groups into a centralised state.  
 
The “conquest” theory was first promulgated by Ibn Khaldun with a concern for the dynamic 
relations between nomadic and sedentary societies (Service 1978:24). Other theorists (e.g. 
Oppenheimer 1909) were impressed with Darwinian conflict and the idea of “survival of the 
fittest,” which they used as a basis for their version of the conflict theory. Relevant for this 
work is emphasis on conquest as the permanent subjugation of losers by winners that gives 
rise to the basic repressive forms of the state. In his well-known Ueberlagerungstheorie 
(1909), Franz Oppenheimer (cited in Claessen and Skalnik 1978:10) averred that the state 
was an instrument of oppression, designed to confirm social inequality. In his view, however, 
this inequality originated in the conquest and subjection of one people by another. Coming 
very close to Engels, he argued that this subjection had no other purpose than the economic 
exploitation of the defeated (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:10). He further argued that because 
of their organisational abilities and speed, the pastoral nomads were able to conquer and 
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subject the sedentary agriculturalists, who accepted their defeat and subjugation and paid 
tribute to the conquerors (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:10). The organisation needed to 
accomplish this was the state. In his criticism of this theory, Lowie (cited in Claessen and 
Skalnik 1978:10) argued that conquest did not always lead to state formation. Furthermore, 
some states developed without any conquest of another group of peoples. Many studies have 
shown internal developments leading to the emergence of the state, or in which peaceful 
contacts between neighbouring peoples resulted in state formation (cf. Lewis 1966; Cohen 
1974). Granted, conquest could mark the origin of early states, the relevant internal 
conditions also had to be present for the state to come into existence (Khazanov 1978:83). 
This leads us to the conclusion that while the development of the state was impacted by 
conquest in some cases, conquest cannot be the only mechanism responsible for state 
formation. 
 
The “class-struggle” hypothesis of the origin of the state was popularised by Lewis H. 
Morgan (1877) who characterised ancient societies as communistic, without commerce and 
private property, social classes of rich and poor and despotic monarchs. Improvements in 
technology saw increased productivity which in turn led to private property, economic classes 
and the state. Impressed by Morgan’s work, Marx and Engels expanded on his ideas. Engels 
hypothesised that initially there existed only common ownership of the means of production 
but as societies improved their technology, increased their production and traded the resulting 
surplus, there arose middlemen, entrepreneurs, capital, thus culminating in economic classes 
(Service 1978:25). The surplus was appropriated for the benefits of those who no longer 
participated in food production. He characterised the merchants and middle men as “veritable 
parasitic plants,” who, while “skimming the cream of the production”, rendered only minor 
services in return, and in this way gathered enormous riches, which gave them great influence 
in society, and made possible their ever growing influence on production (Claessen and 
Skalnik 1978:7). The state arose when the need arose to protect a developing private 
property. Thus, the state emerged for the purposes of preserving a class society. It arose in the 
thick of the fight between the classes from the need to keep class antagonisms in check 
(Claessen and Skalnik 1978:6). The influence of military force, war, and conquest played a 
considerable role in Engel’s theory. The repressive state attends to the political bolstering of 
this society, erecting a structure to preserve the class interests of the rich. Engels argued that 
society is powerless to contain the irreconcilable antagonisms and class contradictions within 
it. He writes,  
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… in order that these antagonisms and classes with conflicting economic interests 
might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it became necessary 
to have a power seemingly standing above society that would alleviate the conflict, 
and keep it within the bounds of "order;" and this power, arisen out of society but 
placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it, is the state (Engels 
1884).  
 
What is significant and worth noting is the relationship between the development of private 
ownership of the means of production and social classes on the one hand, and the origin of 
the state on the other. While for voluntaristic theory, social stratification is coterminous with 
state formation, for conflict theory, stratification precedes state formation.  
 
Service (1978:25-26) critiques the class-struggle hypothesis on the ground that examples are 
lacking in the ancient world of a situation where commodity production and private wealth 
were likely pre-conditions for the class system or the primitive state. After surveying ancient 
societies from around the world, Service (1975:284-285) finds little or no support for the idea 
that early states originate from the efforts of the dominant groups in society using coercive 
force, or threat, to protect its unequal rights over resources. Once it comes into existence, as 
an evolved form of socio-political organisation, the early state is clearly stratified, and a 
ruling class does, ubiquitously, have unequal access to coercive power and wealth. It would 
seem, therefore, that this and other Marxist theories describe the results rather than the causes 
of state formation (Cohen 1978: 51). 
 
The class-struggle theory has been taken over and argued at length by Morton H. Fried who 
has argued that a stratified society is one in which members of the same sex and equivalent 
age do not have equal access to the basic resources that sustain life (Fried 1967:186). 
According to Fried (1967:191), stratification appears the moment the communal means of 
production is replaced by private ownership. The most important factor responsible for this 
transition, in his view, is growing population pressure on the resources (Fried 1967:204). It is 
this unequal access to resources that is the essential condition for the evolution of statehood. 
Those that have such access have to protect it. To do so they must use force and stabilise the 
differential relations to resources by means of a system of centralised government that makes 
them into a ruling elite. As he puts it, the state receives its key impetus from the need to 
protect the stratification system (Fried 1978:39). The extent of internal disputes and conflicts 
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caused by this inequality is so great that the kin-organised social system cannot cope; hence 
an increasing emphasis is placed on non-kinship repressive mechanisms and it is precisely 
these mechanisms that mature, coalesce, and form the state (Fried 1967:225). The primary 
functions of the state are thus internal and external maintenance of a specific order of 
stratification (Fried 1967:235).  
 
Fried was impressed by the need of the dominant class to control access to scarce resources 
and believed that the state emerges out of actions by the powerful to restrict access to 
resources and sustain their control (Cohen 1978:15). He suggested that the state is the 
organisation developed to maintain, if necessary by force, the unequal access to basic 
resources. Stratification is thus coterminous with the state as to be synonymous with it. For 
this reason, Fried does not provide any instances of a stratified society that has not yet 
acquired its state apparatus or that seems to be in the process of forming it (Service 1978:27). 
The state is a supreme integrative apparatus above the level of kinship institutions which 
integrates societies, by preventing disintegration by repressions of various kinds. Such 
repressions are its main function and, thus, its reason for coming into being (Service 
1978:28). Fried’s theory was applied by Conrad P. Kottak (1972) to the development of the 
state in Uganda and he observed how factors such as increasing population, changes in the 
means of subsistence, and the development of a market economy went together with the 
development to a stratified society and finally to the state. 
 
Service sees a problem with Fried’s theory. He notes that while most ancient societies and 
states were stratified, however, these strata were not based on differences in wealth, forms of 
property, or differential access to strategic resources (Service 1978:32). Quite the contrary, he 
argues, the difference was in political and religious power, and this power was so absolute 
that it did not need to be buttressed by economic advantage (Service 1978:32). More 
importantly, Service (1975) argues that there is a dearth of known cases of social 
stratification prior to statehood. He argues instead that those conditions leading to centralised 
government bring with them the development of a ruling class. In this sense social 
stratification is a result, not a cause, of state formation (Cohen 1978:7). Service (1975:276-
278) also thinks that it is organisation, not population pressure, that provides the means and 
impetus to statehood. For him population growth and food scarcities are enablers not causes 
of social complexity. However, we will argue in the next chapter that with regards to the rise 
of the ancient Near Eastern state, stratification preceded state formation. We will also warm 
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up to the idea that the upper classes will always want to protect their possessions, thus the 
need for a state. 
 
2.1.2 Analysis of theories of state origins  
 
A close examination of the state formation theories sketched above is rather like a projective 
test in that it provides more insight into the theorist than into the reality itself (Cohen 
1978:141). Conflict theorists see warfare, conquest, inequalities of power, and access to 
resources as having important causal priorities in pre-state systems. Those from the other side 
look to voluntary association and the positive spin-offs of belonging to a centralised polity as 
having causal effect on the emergence of the state. While voluntary theorists are clearly most 
impressed by the benefits of statehood, the later stress its cost and inequalities. Theorists are 
often successful in proving that their theory is correct for the cases they have studied, but 
when one tries to apply these theories on a global scale, their inadequacy becomes apparent 
(Claessen and Skalnik 1978:3). None of these factors is sufficient to produce centralisation or 
is always and everywhere a precursor to state formation. History and ethnography can be 
found to support or refute all of the theories. In many instances, hypothesised causes can be 
shown to be consequences rather than antecedent correlates of this evolutionary sequence 
(Cohen 1978). 
 
What is needed, in our view, is a more synthetic position in which state origin is viewed as a 
systemic process in which changes in one factor trigger a chain reaction of changes in a set of 
related factors, culminating in the emergence of a state (Cohen 1978:142). State formation 
can be viewed as an output of any number of the factors. Viewed this way, state formation is 
a process in which many variables are interlinked. The initial impetus could be population 
pressure, conquest, defense, internal strife, protection of privileges by a higher ranking group, 
or the benefits to be derived from subordination to centralised authority (Cohen 1978:8). 
Whatever sets off the process tends as well to set off other changes which, no matter how 
different they are to begin with, all tend to produce similar results (Cohen 1978:8). It is this 
similarity of result that has muddied causality. Similar result implies common antecedents. It 
is now clear that there are multiple and varied roads to statehood. Each set of factors, or any 
particular factor, once it develops, stimulates and feeds back onto others which are then made 
to change in the general direction of statehood. Although its roots may be multiple, once a 
society or group of them start developing toward early statehood, the end is the same, no 
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matter where it occurs. This can explain why early states so far removed from one another as 
Inca Peru, ancient China, Egypt, early Europe, or pre-colonial West Africa have so many 
striking similarities of organisation, culture and society (Cohen 1978:70). States arose 
independently in different places and at different times. Where appropriate conditions 
existed, the state emerged (Carneiro 1970:733).  
 
But probably a more serious critique of all these theories from a Marxist perspective is that 
they equate the state with the ruling class. The state is not synonymous with the ruling class. 
Rather it arises out of the conflict between the ruling class and the peasants. This point will 
be given more flesh in the discussion of the “modern” state in Chapter Five.  
 
2.1.3 Problems of definition 
 
The foregoing discussion on the origins of the state seems to imply that we are clear about 
what a state is. However, that is very far from being so. We have come to take the “state” for 
granted as an object of political practice and political analysis while remaining quite 
amazingly unclear as to what it is (Abrams 1988:55). We think that we know the state when 
we see it, yet it is extremely difficult to bring it under some brief but generally acceptable 
definition (Pierson 2004:5). For all the interest in the state, the very simple task of 
establishing what we mean by the “state” remains elusive. Indeed, at times our sense of the 
importance of the state and its contemporary problems appear to be matched only by an 
inescapable frustration at its sheer ungraspability (Pearson 2004:1). In attempting to define 
the state, we encounter a confusing range of options, including even dropping the idea of the 
state altogether (Pierson 2004:2). Scholars are unanimous that the state is complex and a little 
fuzzy around the edges (Pierson 2004:1). A universally acceptable definition does not as yet 
exist and this leads to a situation whereby almost every scholar comes up with his or her own 
definition, which differs slightly from the already existing ones, although some of them can 
be grouped into “schools” with a similar approach (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:3). That way, 
it is practically impossible to arrive at synthesis. 
 
An issue that further frustrates efforts for a good definition of the state is that when non-state 
systems are compared with state systems, there is no fine line dividing the two. The transition 
from a loose kin-based socio-political organisation to a state was not clear, simple or sudden. 
The general picture in case studies from all over the world appears to be that of early states 
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developing gradually from earlier organisational forms. Tendencies towards statehood were 
evident long before the early state came into existence. A complex social structure is already 
present in earlier non-state systems. Centralising tendencies are found long before the 
emergence of the centralised state while many characteristics of pre-state phases such as, 
communal ownership of land, allegiance to family or clan heads, also outlived the pre-state 
organisational forms (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:621). In her study of the early Yoruba state, 
Natalia B. Kochakova (1978) talks of the “dualistic character” of the state to indicate that 
aspects of both tribal and class societies were present. Aron Ia Gurevich (1978), in his study 
of Norway, also argues that it is not possible to accurately delineate the phases of state 
formation because the aspects of an earlier phase are very much alive in the later phase. 
Estellie Smith (cited in Claessen and Skalnik 1978:622) expresses the same view adding that 
the simpler socio-cultural organisational forms have not vanished, but have adapted to the 
emergent reality. 
 
For this reason, it is not possible to pinpoint the exact moment of the emergence of the state 
in this evolution process. We cannot tell when or where the decisive “step” into statehood 
was made (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:620). The early state did not just make a sudden 
appearance. Neither was it invented nor discovered by somebody (Krader 1978:104). In the 
same vein, William G. Sumner and Albert G. Keller (cited in Fried 1978:37) argue that 
 
it is no longer possible to think of the state as a conscious invention, suddenly 
introduced as an antidote to confusion and chaos. The state must have evolved from 
rudimentary and inchoate beginnings, by a process of growth that was so slow as to 
have been all but imperceptible. Even if the full record of that development were 
available, we would not be able to say precisely when the state began (italics added).  
 
2.1.3.1 Definitions of the state  
 
According to Cohen (1978:2) definitions of the early state can roughly be grouped into three. 
There are those that emphasise social stratification, those that emphasise authority structures 
and/or information processing, and those that highlight diagnostic traits. The first category of 
definitions is the Marxist school which highlights the relationship between the rise of state 
and the formation of permanent social classes. Although this category is traced to Rousseau, 
it was popularised by Marx and Engels. Fried developed their ideas further. Social 
stratification is regarded as a universal feature of early state. Valued goods, services, and 
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positions in a stratified state are enjoyed differentially. The power elite are well-off while the 
rest of the population struggle to make ends meet. The state is an instrument of control, 
created and used by the ruling classes to maintain control over the means of production and 
maintaining themselves in power over the lower classes (Cohen 1978:33). They also regard 
the state as an instrument for protecting the privileges of the ruling classes (Krader 1968:25). 
Rousseau (cited in Cohen 1978:33) argued that the state was originally created by the rich to 
protect themselves against those who could attack them. He saw the state as promoting 
inequality between rich and poor thus putting the latter into perpetual labour, slavery and 
wretchedness (Cohen 1978:33). Marx and Engels see the state as a correlate of class 
formation developed by the upper class owners of the means of production to protect the 
interests of their privileged class (Krader 1968:25). Fried (1967:186) takes the same route and 
defines the state as “a centralised governmental system that emerges inevitably from any 
system of institutionalised inequity in which the leaders, or ruling group, have special access 
to those resources that sustain and enhance life.” The strength of the Marxist understanding is 
that the ruling class domination by use of the state is a universal characteristic of early states. 
A more detailed discussion of the Marxist theory will be made in Chapter Five. 
 
The second category of definitions, those that stress authority structures, is traced to Leonard 
T. Hobhouse et al. (1915) who defined the state as a hierarchical and centralised authority 
system in which local entities lose their autonomy and become districts subordinated to the 
centre (Cohen 1978:34). Related to this approach but somewhat different is the “information-
systems” definition of Henry T. Wright and Gregory A. Johnson (1985) which views the state 
as a total decision-making organisation in which specialised administrative centres make 
decisions affecting the actions of lower level settlements and their activities. Wright 
(1978:55-56) writes that  
 
a state can be recognised as a society with specialised decision-making organisations 
that are receiving messages from many different sources, recording these messages, 
supplementing them with previously stored data, making the actual decision, storing 
both the message and the decision and conveying decisions back to other 
organisations. 
 
For him political systems with such an organisation contrast with those in which relations 
between the society’s component organisations are mediated only by a generalised decision-
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maker and with those in which relations between component organisations are exclusively 
self-regulating (Wright 1978:56). He adds that a state is a socio-cultural system in which 
there is a differentiated, internally specialised decision-making sub-system that regulates 
varying exchanges among other sub-systems and with other systems (Wright 1978:56). 
Wright and Johnson regard all political and social life as a series of transactions or 
information flows in which higher levels of decision making affect lower levels of the 
authority structure (Cohen 1978:3). For them, an organisation must have at least three levels 
of hierarchy to function as a state in which information is stored, processed, summarised and 
transmitted so that information at the top affects behaviour at lower levels of hierarchy 
(Cohen 1978:34). The problem with defining states as centrally organised hierarchies is that 
this classification will also include pre-state polities. This definition cannot distinguish 
clearly between such organisational forms as chieftaincy or tribe and statehood. 
 
The last category of definitions, those that highlight diagnostic traits, lumps together as many 
common characteristics of early centralised states as possible. For example, after a 
comparative analysis of twenty one pre-capitalist state formations from all over the world, 
Claessen and Skalnik (1978:640) define the early state as  
 
the centralised socio-political organisation for the regulation of social relations in a 
complex, stratified society divided into at least two basic strata, or emergent social 
classes - viz. the rulers and the ruled - whose relations are characterised by political 
dominance of the former and tributary obligation of the latter, legitimised by a 
common ideology of which reciprocity is the basic principle. 
 
The problem with this type of definition is that it is almost impossible to come up with a set 
of traits that applies to more than a few societies (Cohen 1978:3). This further turns the 
definition of an early state into a generalised model of a particular form of political system. 
The more numerous the traits, the more difficult the list is to apply. Having looked at issues 
of definition, it is fitting to begin to focus on the ancient Near Eastern state as the larger 
context within which ancient Israel was located. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  34 
 
2.2 The ancient Near Eastern state as early state 
 
As noted above, the “early state” refers to the state in the pre-capitalist non-industrial era of 
the evolution of political society. It was also noted that early forms of state organisation 
displayed certain universal features. There is therefore justification in viewing the ancient 
Near Eastern state as an “early state.” Using literature from the ancient Near East itself and 
from comparative societies elsewhere in human history, it is possible to determine what the 
ancient Near Eastern state might have looked like, that is, its organisational aspects and 
institutions. But before embarking on that task, it is important to discuss the three types of the 
early state as distinguished by Claessen and Skalnik (1978). These are: the inchoate early 
state, the typical early state, and the transitional early state.  
 
2.2.1 The inchoate early state 
 
The inchoate early state is one in which kinship and family ties still dominate political 
relations and succession to high office is for the most part hereditary (Claessen and Skalnik 
1978:641). Communal ownership of the means of production is dominant and social 
differences are offset by reciprocity and close contacts between the rulers and the ruled 
(Claessen and Skalnik 1978:23). Full-time specialists are rare; the judicial system still lacks 
codified laws, and there are no special professional judges. The rudimentary nature of the 
governmental machinery causes ad hoc decisions and the personal presence of the monarch is 
often necessary. In similar fashion, remuneration of the officials is not systematised. In an 
inchoate early state, trade and markets are of only local importance. Taxation systems are not 
fully developed and taxes are neither regular nor accurate but are mostly ad hoc. These taxes 
consist for the greater part of voluntary gifts and occasional labour for the state, neither of 
which are either very regular or accurately defined (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:641). 
 
2.2.2 The typical early state 
 
An early state is considered to be “typical” if the ties of kinship are offset by territorial ones. 
There is competition, and appointment to office counterbalances the principles of heredity of 
office (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:23). Non-kin office holders begin to play a leading role in 
government administration, while salaried bureaucrats become common (Claessen and 
Skalnik 1978:23). Private ownership of land is still very limited, but state ownership is 
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gradually becoming important. Trade and markets are developed at the supra-local level. A 
start towards codification of laws and penalties is found and formal judges are present. 
Regular tribute, partly in kind and partly in services, is exacted, and major works, organised 
by government functionaries, are being undertaken with the aid of compulsory labour 
(Claessen and Skalnik 1978: 641). 
 
2.2.3 The transitional early state 
 
The transitional early state is one in which government administration is dominated by 
appointed officials and where kinship influences have been demoted to peripheral aspects of 
government (Claessen 1978:23). Salaried bureaucrats dominate and the governmental 
machinery is becoming relatively independent from the ruling class. The development of 
overtly opposed classes begins to make itself manifest. At this stage, trade and markets play 
an important role while private ownership of the means of production is the norm (Claessen 
and Skalnik 1978:589). In this phase, laws have been codified, and justice is administered by 
professional judges. The taxation system has developed to ensure regular flow of taxes 
(Claessen and Skalnik 1978:641). Prerequisites for the development of a full-blown state are 
now in place. 
 
This categorisation seems quite tempting. However, as noted earlier, it is difficult to 
distinguish the early state from earlier pre-state forms, especially chiefdom. Most of the 
characteristics listed for each of the stages are already found in one form or another in earlier 
stages of development. Service (1975:150) argues that some of the forms we have here 
classified as inchoate are actually chiefdoms when classified on a different set of criteria. As 
with the distinction between the state and earlier forms, it is equally difficult to point out the 
exact moment when a polity evolves from the inchoate to the typical early state or from the 
typical to the transitional early state. Furthermore, not all of the criteria will apply specifically 
to only one type. Thus a criterion can be present in two or even all three types. For example, 
between heredity and appointment there exists an entire scale of gradual degrees of transition, 
from the dominance of kinship ties to the dominance of appointment (Claessen 1978:589). 
The same also applies to many other aspects such as the presence of salaried full-time 
specialists or the taxation system. The only distinctive criteria, Claessen (1978:589) argues, 
seem to be those of the emergence of a market economy, private ownership of the means of 
production as well as the open social antagonisms of the transitional early state. 
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2.3 Characteristics of the early state 
 
From various case studies of the early state from different times in history and different 
places of the world, it is possible to identify some general characteristics of the early state. 
Here we will not make strong historical claims. However, we make fairly strong sociological 
claims about the nature of those societies. 
 
2.3.1 Social stratification 
 
It does seem that in all early states there is a division of the population into rather broad, more 
or less stabilised categories of a hierarchical nature, based on status and/or power (Claessen 
1978:546). We can distinguish at least three social categories. At the helm of the early state is 
the ruler and his kin. Below these is the nobility. These might have included specialised 
professionals like priests, traders, artisans and military leaders. At the lowest rung are the peasants. 
These are smallholders, that is, people who work their ancestral or communally owned land. Other 
studies include slaves, right at the bottom of the social ladder. It is to be noted that these social 
categories are not cast in stone as they vary from one place to the next. Some studies show up to 
twelve social categories (cf. Claessen 1978:546). However, there seems to be scholarly 
unanimity on the presence of a sovereign and kin, an aristocracy and smallholders in early 
states. In the Marxist tradition, there are two basic social classes, that is, the rulers and the 
ruled, or the producers and non-producers, or the oppressors and the oppressed. The ruled are 
those who are directly engaged in food production while the rulers are not directly involved. 
The direct producers labour and toil for both themselves and for those whose relation to social 
production is either indirect or non-existent (Krader 1978:93). Surplus labour product from the 
producers reaches the power elite in the form of taxes, tribute or gifts, and is used by the 
“willing non-producers” for their own upkeep and the maintenance of the administrative 
apparatus (Claessen 1978:588). The monarch bequeathed gifts to his favoured subjects mostly 
for patronage purposes.  
 
According to Skalnik (1978:614), this mode of surplus appropriation did not bring much 
wealth to the power elite, which seems to imply that there was not much difference between 
them and the producers in terms of their standard of living. As a result, it did not provoke 
much protest from the exploited majority, thus, he argues, it would not be possible to talk of 
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“class struggle” in the early state because the antagonistic social classes were yet to be fully 
developed (Skalnik 1978:614). Hence, it is proper to speak of “emergent” social classes. 
Exploitation was rather discreet and largely invisible in the context of a common ideology of 
reciprocity and mutual aid. Furthermore, Claessen (1978:588) argues, stratification was not 
based on the ownership or control of the means of production since this ownership or control 
was an uncommon phenomenon and of very little significance for the attainment of a high 
status in the early state (Claessen 1981:60). Service (1978:32) agrees, adding that these 
classes were not based on differences in wealth or “differential access to strategic resources” 
but the difference was in political and religious power. This however, is not to deny the 
existence of social stratification in the early state.  
 
As a result of social stratification, state life and political culture were witnessed and enjoyed 
only by the ruling class while the villagers engaged in food production and lived their lives 
separately from the state and were barely affected by it. Their role was to keep the state 
machinery alive by supplying it with food and labour. Once the tax had been collected from 
them, they totally forgot about the court, and were in turn forgotten by the sovereign (Krader 
1976:114).  
 
2.3.2 Centralisation 
 
Another key feature of the early state was a centralised governing nucleus, composed of the 
monarch, his family, advisors, high-ranking bureaucrats and military leaders. It had the power 
to maintain law and order and to prevent fission. There seems to have been a headquarters, 
rather than a capital city in the usual sense of the word, which was the centre of government. 
There the court was located and there the monarch and his inner circle resided and worked 
from. From this centre, laws, decrees and regulations were issued by or in the name of the 
sovereign and citizens were expected to obey them (Claessen 1978:586). Disobedience had 
consequences. The management of state affairs was done by the bureaucracy comprising 
officials, priests, nobles, etc. (Cohen 1978:35). The monarch performed the functions of both 
the legislature and the judiciary. In reality lawgiving and the enforcement of laws are quite 
complex processes and one always finds informal influences on lawgiving. Codified laws and 
formal judges were found in some, but not all, of the early states. The maintenance of law and 
order seems to have been based more on authority, and much less on force (Claessen 
1978:587).  
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2.3.3 Position of the ruler 
 
The monarch was the very pivot of the early state and was in many cases identified with the 
state (Skalnik 1978:614). In almost all studies of the early state, the basic characteristic of the 
monarch is his sacral status. He was believed to be connected with the supernatural, and as 
such he was elevated high above his people. He mediates between the living and the dead for 
the welfare of the realm and to do this, he sometimes performed rituals, and in some cases he 
was a high priest who offered offerings on behalf of his people. Genealogies in the early 
states had an important functional role to play. In most cases, they were mentioned not only 
in connection with the assumed divine origin of the monarch, but also in prescribing the 
relationship among the social classes, thus in a way rationalising the prevailing social order 
(Claessen 1978:557). The health and well-being of the king is connected to the fertility of the 
land and the domestic animals. The monarch is also the guarantor of natural order. The 
sovereign was thought to be endowed with supernatural powers, and thus that the functioning 
of the society depended on him (Skalnik 1978:606). He protects his people against evil forces 
and other misfortunes, such as witches, diseases, poverty and anarchy. The ruler’s 
benevolence was shown by the gifts he presented to his subjects. The kings of early states 
usually rewarded their brave soldiers with honorific titles and parcels of land (Kurtz 
1981:193). The relationship between the ruler and his subjects was seen as a reciprocal one in 
which the people supplied food, goods and services to the ruler, who in return provided 
protection from foreign aggression, misfortune and natural disasters. 
 
2.3.4 Independence 
 
The early states were independent, which means that they were not answerable or subordinate 
to other states or monarchs (Claessen 1978:539). However, they could be conquered and 
occupied by another state for some time. The early state had enough power to put down 
separatist tendencies and prevent fission, as well as the capacity to defend itself from external 
aggressors. The monarch was the supreme commander of the military and as such a protector 
of his people. A close connection often existed between the king and the military. The king 
acted either as a military leader himself, or appointed a member of his family or a close ally 
as leader of the army. As the centre of the state, the king was protected by a bodyguard. A 
standing army was also a key feature of the early state. The king’s subjects were obliged to 
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perform military service. The early state monopolised the legal use of physical force and 
ensured that no persons, or groups, other than those authorised by the king or his appointees, 
resorted to physical force for the pursuit of their individual goals (Skalnik 1978:608). All 
military power was deployed in the name of the king, and consequently in that of the state 
(Skalnik 1978:608). 
 
2.3.5 Territory 
 
Every early state made a claim to a certain territory. Isaac Schapera (cited in Claessen 
1978:537) notes that every corporate social group in fact had a territory that it called its own. 
The people residing in the early states were considered as subjects of those states. Each of 
these territories was occupied by people from different tribes and clans who recognised the 
presence of some sort of political unity extending to the boundaries of that territory (Claessen 
1978:537). In most of the cases there were natural frontiers delimiting the territory. However, 
the concept of territory in ancient times appears to have been rather vague, and embraced the 
relationship between the population and its territory. It can be noted how in most early states 
the rule over a particular territory is closely related to the rule over the people living in it 
(Claessen and Skalnik 1978:18). Claessen and Skalnik (1978:18) point out that the concept of 
territory seems to cover something more than just a piece of land on which people live. The 
early state extended its sway over people who either had residence, or had been born in its 
territory (Claessen and Skalnik 1978:18). People seem to belong to a state by the mere fact of 
being born, or permanently residing in its territory (Claessen 1978:586). As the state grew, it 
became multi-ethnic as it absorbed peoples from other ethnic groups. Some ethnic groups and 
their territories could change from one state to another in the event of conquest. Thus 
citizenship of a particular state could be acquired or lost. At times these ethnic groups could 
have a semi-separate existence within the state, loosely tied to it and to the central 
governmental. The ethnic groups that made up the state were each associated with a 
particular locality.  
 
2.3.6 Population 
 
For a polity to qualify to be a state, it had to have big enough a population to make possible 
social categorisation, stratification and specialisation. Claessen (1978:586) notes that this 
appears to be too vague as a criterion, as earlier non-state polities can such a population and 
in its place he proposes population density as a criterion. Case studies indeed confirm that all 
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early states had a higher population density than non-states under similar conditions. The 
challenge would be to give even the vaguest estimate of the minimum number of people that 
a polity would need to qualify to be called a state. Joseph B. Birdsell (1973) suggests 500 as 
the minimum number of people needed for a state to exists, adding that as soon as that 
number is exceeded, a government based on face-to- face relations only will no longer be 
possible, and some form of organisation will become necessary unless fission takes place.  
  
2.3.7 Legitimation 
 
A key aspect of the early state’s survival and continued existence is legitimacy. Legitimation 
is the process by which the office of head of state and the state bureaucracy acquire support, 
either directly or indirectly through acquiescence (Kurtz 1978:182). The early state is a fusion 
of structural oppositions which has not yet completely subverted local sources of solidarity 
and allegiance (Cohen cited in Kurtz 1978:170). These local sources of power, such as 
kinship groups, are a threat to the survival of the fragile early state because it has not yet 
justified to its members, especially influential members of the pre-state era who have lost 
their influence as a result of the formation of the state. For this reason, the early state must 
work vigorously to attain it by attempting to shift the allegiance of its citizen from the local to 
the state. To this end, it quickly moves to take over some of the functions and roles that used 
to be performed by tribal leaders, such as education of children, regulation of marriage and 
military conscription.  
 
The state needs the support of the majority of the citizens if it is to be governable and keep 
the parts together. As soon as the state is established, it uses a number of tactics to acquire 
enough power to enable it to survival. It will develop a system of laws to justify its existence 
and its actions. Thus the law is very crucial for the attainment of legitimacy. This political-
legal structure is then saturated with divine sanctity derived from its religion (Kurtz 
1978:170). With these apparatus in place, the rulers embark on a program of political 
socialisation which involves benevolence, control of information and terror (Kurtz 1978:170). 
The process to attain sufficient legitimacy as to avoid the blatant use of force is a long 
process which may entail the creation of a new ideology and value system and the 
mobilisation of all state institutions and the population in the service of their survival (Kurtz 
1978:182). Marc J. Swartz (cited in Kurtz 1978:182) argues that a political system that is 
based on either coercion only or on consensus only is a myth because states will always 
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employ a combination of both, for the state must be at once both feared and loved. Claessen 
and Skalnik (1978:633) doubt that the survival of the early state depended primarily on force, 
arguing that legitimacy on the basis of consensus and the pursuit of a balance of power policy 
seems to have been decisive. Donald V. Kurtz (1981:183) adds that its survival depended 
largely upon the skill by which the rulers used their power to appease and pacify the 
populace.  
 
The role and power of religion was crucial for the survival and continued existence of the 
early state. Religion validates the authority and power of the ruling class and its right to act 
(Kurtz 1978:186). By creating a myth of the origin of the royal house, which was sometimes 
“improved” on in the course of the state's existence, the foundation for a state religion was 
laid (Skalnik 1978:606). The state would develop a theology to support its authority, giving it 
a legitimacy that is omnipotent and supernatural. Values and ideology propounded by the 
state machinery are disseminated through propaganda and a variety of media - education, 
state rituals and ceremonies, etc. to attain the “consent of the governed” (Kurtz 1978:187). 
Religious officials play a leading role in popularising the state ideology. The state religion 
gives a sacred quality to the state saturating it with sanctity. Real and legendary heroes who 
embody state values are created from the distant past and myths and legends extolling their 
virtues in support of state values and ideology are disseminated (Kurtz 1978:186).  
 
Even with regards to state benevolence, Wittfogel (cited in Kurtz 1978:186) suggests that 
state policies which outwardly appear to benefit the people actually cannot be considered 
benevolent. Any benevolence by state functionaries is designed as part of this process to 
explicitly maintain the power and prosperity of the ruling class. State benefits, such as food 
distribution during drought, serve to demonstrate the power of the state and implant in the 
citizens a sense of dependence on it (Kurtz 1981:193). They are a subtle aspect of the 
socialisation process that shifts the allegiance of the citizen to the state.  
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have examined theories on the origins of the early state. We have also 
looked at the types of the early state as well as the important characteristics of the early state. 
We believe that sufficient basis has been laid upon which one begins to understand the 
Israelite “state” as an early state. It is important to emphasise that in spite of the fact that we 
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were generalising, and that we are well aware that the historical process in each individual 
state was unique, we believe, however, that it is possible to discern a number of general 
patterns, in the total range of historical processes. This enables us to locate the early state 
more firmly within the general framework of the evolution of human society. In the next 
chapter, focus is on monarchic Israel as an early state.  
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CHAPTER THREE: RISE OF THE ISRAELITE STATE 
3.0 Introduction 
 
In the previous Chapter, we discussed at length the emergence of the state as a form of socio-
political organisation some five thousand years ago. Through a comparative analysis of the 
state in different geographical areas and of various historical epochs, we argued that there is 
no single cause for the emergence of a state. Rather, we suggested a multiplicity of causes in 
varying combinations. We also saw that the early state passed through three stages, namely, 
the inchoate, typical and transitional.  
 
Having laid this foundation, in this chapter we look at the Late Bronze ancient Near East and 
attempt to ascertain the cause of the demise of the regional superpowers and breakdown of 
the city-state system during that period. We also discuss the emergence of tribal Israel, more 
specifically, how and where the inhabitants of the new settlements of the hill country came 
from. It would be proper to expose the political economy of these people before they form a 
state. This will lay the foundation for the discussion on the political economy of monarchic 
Israel in the next chapter. A discussion that is also important in this chapter, is that of the 
place of Israel in the ancient Near East - was she one like the other states or she was among 
them but not like them? The chapter will conclude with a possible determination of the 
factors that led to the rise of the ancient Israelite state. In this chapter, Marxist analytical 
categories begin to feature. 
 
3.1 Emergence of the ancient Near Eastern state 
 
Ancient Near Eastern politics cover a massive period extending over nearly three thousand 
years, from the so-called dawn of civilisation all the way to the Hellenistic era. The history of 
the Ancient Near Eastern state forms half of all recorded history, about 2 500 years. Over this 
long period, numerous centralised polities arose from Mesopotamia and Egypt, to the Syro-
Palestinian corridor, to Anatolia, and also to Iran and Greek Macedonia. It is in this region 
that Egypt and Mesopotamia, the two most known of the few locations in the world where 
pristine states emerged. From the valleys of the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates rivers, the state 
system spread over the vast ancient Near East, partly by conquest and partly by imitation 
(Gottwald 2001:113). Before the emergence of the state as a form of socio-political 
organisation, autonomous small-scale societies had ordered themselves in non-hierarchic 
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forms for many millennia. Unlike the pristine states of Egypt and Mesopotamia whose 
existence owed to big rivers, the secondary states that emerged later all over the region 
depended on rainfall agriculture.  
 
As everywhere else, the exact moment and circumstances in which pre-state societies in 
Egypt and Mesopotamia crossed the threshold into the state form remain a mystery. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to give definitive 
answers to questions of the sequences of events that led to the emergence of the state or to 
isolate a single factor that triggered this chain of events. It seems there was a cluster of 
factors that may have worked in varying combinations, from situation to situation (Gottwald 
2001:115). A handicap to our knowledge about the emergence and triumph of the ancient 
Near Eastern state is that the state had a monopoly on writing and all that we know is from 
the perspective of the rulers, so that very little is written about the criticisms and organised 
opposition of the ruled (Gottwald 2001:116). Almost nothing is written about the individual 
and groups that opposed the state and about the alternatives they may have suggested and 
even tried to implement. The exception would be the glimpses provided by the Old 
Testament on pre-state Israelite resistance to centralised political system. We may assume 
that such resistance to statehood was a common feature of ancient Near Eastern politics. 
 
Under the influence of the evolutionary hypothesis, research prior to the latter part of the 
twentieth century tended to view the move to statehood as natural and inevitable. Modern 
scholarship has since disproved that notion. Research suggests that the move towards 
statehood and the consolidation of centralised organisation was not that smooth and that some 
societies did not follow the evolutionary course. Quite the contrary, there were devolutions, 
interruptions and detours in many societies. Some societies were on the brink of statehood 
but they failed to consolidate the state system and reverted to decentralisation. Furthermore, 
the late appearance of the state in human history that extends millennia seems to argue 
against the inevitability of the state. If it were natural and inevitable, the state surely ought to 
have emerged thousands of years before it finally did. Moreover, when it finally did, it was 
only in a handful of places. If its existence were natural and inevitable, we would have 
expected it to emerge in numerous places. 
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The fact that the state emerged in some societies and did not emerge in others seems to 
suggest that the “state generating environment” was ripe in the cases in which it emerged. It 
might be possible to identify some of the state-generating factors. The social environment in 
which the state appeared displayed density of population, concentrations of agrarian and 
natural resources, and complex social organisational patterns that hierarchic control could 
attempt to coordinate and dominate with a growing measure of success (Gottwald 2001:119). 
Once entrenched, the state was so powerful as to invade and replace decentralised forms of 
socio-political organisation and, once embarked on, could not easily be reversed or modified. 
Where a state was emerging, the rulers who were implementing it and the ruled did not know 
where the new system was taking them because they did not have a pre-established model on 
which to base their experiment. Gottwald (2001:119) suggests that in this case we should 
think in terms of "incremental" or "creeping" statism. In Egypt, statehood seems to have 
taken place incrementally rather than in a single stroke with the unification proceeding from 
the south to the north (Gottwald 2001:128). 
 
In our discussion on the general theory of state origins, we were warming to a combination of 
the warfare and/or conquest and social class theories as having greater cogency in explaining 
the emergence of states. To recap, a combination of the warfare and conquest hypotheses 
hold that warfare results in the victorious people dominating the defeated, and the outstanding 
members of the military who would have brought about victory at the battlefront become the 
rulers of the nascent state. According to Gottwald (2001:116), the grain of truth in a 
combination of these theories is that once militaristic states exist, non-state peoples are 
exposed to conquest and, to avoid it, they are tempted to adopt a centralised polity to counter 
the states that threaten them. The granting of kinship to Saul after the victory in battle seems 
to confirm that a charismatic leader who gives them victory is given power to establish 
permanent political power. 
 
The class-struggle hypothesis maintains that a group within the community who had 
personally appropriated communal property, or who were aspiring to do so instituted the state 
to legitimate and defend their project of self-aggrandisement (Gottwald 2001:115). The merit 
of its claim is that the state as an organisational structure, involving an executive head and an 
administrative bureaucracy, depends upon the support of a privileged stratum of the populace 
whose favoured position is protected and reinforced by centralised authority and power in a 
kind of synergistic cycle that aims at self-perpetuation (Gottwald 2001:116). The elites will 
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gladly welcome a centralised political system since it will guarantee the security of their 
wealth and persons. Furthermore, political power will give them access to more resources. 
Taken together, these three theories suggest a fusion of force and persuasion that enabled 
some members of a society, in which all shared in approximate benefits of production, to 
separate themselves sufficiently from prevailing communal norms and practices to take 
command of a surplus of authority and power that successfully transcended and subordinated 
the dispersed “lesser” authorities of society at large (Gottwald 2001:118). We will apply 
these theories to the emergence of the Israelite state. 
 
3.2 City-state as ancient Near Eastern state 
 
A close analysis of the state in the ancient Near East will reveal that there were two types of 
state that appear to have been associated with that period: city-state and territorial state. It is 
important at this stage to briefly look at the city-state as a form of ancient Near Eastern state 
and see to what extent it was similar to and differed from territorial state. According to Bruce 
G. Trigger (2003:92), a city-state was comparatively small, consisting of a single urban 
primary centre surrounded by agricultural land containing smaller units of settlement. City-
states were generally small both geographically and demographically, and it seems that all the 
elites knew one another personally (Trigger 2003:103). In contrast, territorial states were 
larger in size and were governed through a multilevel hierarchy of provincial and local 
administrators. Large territorial states sometimes had a number of large cities and the 
administrative city could move from one to the next. The difference between these two, 
Trigger (2003:92) argues, is not just the size of territories but also the nature of their urban 
centres and in their economic and political organisation. 
 
Contrary to theorists who see a unilinear evolution in which city-states and territorial states 
constitute successive stages in the development of larger and more complex polities, Trigger 
(2003:92) views these as alternative forms of political organisation. Joyce Marcus (cited in 
Trigger 2003:93) argues that the first states to appear were territorial states, which later broke 
apart to into clusters of city-states. In her view it was unlikely that a group of chiefdoms 
could evolve directly into city-states. The persistence of both types for long periods in 
various places seems to suggest that both types of state are alternatives as opposed to stages 
in the development of more complex societies (Trigger 2003:93). City-states often differed in 
size and in concentration of their settlement. Rich and powerful ones grew very big both 
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geographically and demographically. Each polity usually had a centrally located capital city 
which provided protection against attacks from neighbouring city-states (Trigger 2003:99). In 
some of the larger and more populous city-states, the capitals were surrounded by smaller 
administrative centres and numerous subordinate farming villages. In city-states, cities were 
considerably more populous than those of territorial states. Most of the city-state population 
was concentrated in the main urban centres because of the greater protection they offered 
against intercity conflict. Cities were normally walled to protect citizens and property from 
attack. In an environment where warfare was rife, farming families lived in the main urban 
centres and worked land close to their communities (Trigger 2003:100). In fact most people 
lived full-time in cities and worked on the land during the day and went back to the urban 
area in the evening for the night.  
 
Early city-states were usually adjacent, self-governing and formed in proximity to each other. 
There was economic and cultural interdependence among adjacent city-states. City-states 
were generally self-sufficient in food production. But for exotic raw materials, they depended 
on inter-city trade which also provided luxury goods and prestige items that were coveted by 
the elites (Trigger 2003:101). It was much easier for regional economies to emerge among 
smaller city-states that were very close to each other. There was economic, religious and 
cultural interdependence among city-states, especially as these related to upper class culture. 
As everywhere else in the region, the elites in neighbouring city-states tended to intermarry 
for strategic political and economic reasons. Warfare was a constant feature among city-
states. It was waged over farming land, rights to water, and control over weaker states that 
were a source of tribute. City-state systems frequently produced “hegemonic city-states,” that 
is, one or more city-states that dominated their neighbours militarily and imposed tribute on 
their defeated neighbours, as well as making minor border adjustments (Trigger 2003:113, 
125). Hegemonic states often grew richer and more powerful and their urban centres 
expanded as a result of the tribute from conquered city-states. There is no evidence, however, 
that hegemonic states interfered with the routine internal administration of conquered states 
(Trigger 2003:125). No matter how wealthy they grew, city-state rulers had much lesser 
surpluses at their disposal than did those of territorial states. 
 
As a rule, the monarch was the head of state in each city-state. However, in some cases power 
was shared among different institutions and heads of leading families and conflicts seem to 
have been resolved in councils (Trigger 2003:103). It does appear that divine powers ascribed 
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to the monarch were less extensive as they were in territorial states and this seems to be 
explained by regular contact that the monarch had with his people. The more regular the 
contact was between the king and his people, the less divine the king was viewed by his 
subjects, and vice versa. The development of cities was strongly promoted by the elites who 
used them to pursue their personal and collective interests. Various specialised functions 
were concentrated in the city for the convenience of the upper classes. It gave them easy 
access to all the goods and services they required and enabled them to monitor specialised 
activities in ways that increased their power and well-being (Trigger 2003:122). The artisans 
also lived and worked in urban centres in order to be close to their elite clientele and to 
suppliers of the exotic raw materials. The presence of large numbers of artisans in a single 
urban community encouraged craft specialisation. In addition to palaces, major temples and 
markets were also located in the centres of cities.  
 
A question that needs to be asked is how the city-state elites got their livelihood. It seems that 
they appropriated surpluses from their subjects – agricultural and pastoral, as well as from 
artisans and other skilled professionals - to sustain a privileged way of life for the monarch 
and the officials responsible for various roles in the state. City-states also participated in 
inter-city trade with each other. This was mostly trade in luxury goods that were coveted by 
the elite but were not manufactured locally. It seems to have brought substantial wealth for 
the power elite. Conquered city-states paid tribute to the hegemonic city-state. Though there 
are some differences between the city-state and territorial state as they appeared in the ancient 
Near East, we feel that their extraction of the surplus of the peasants and artisans, together 
with the trade with other such polities justify us in treating them together with the territorial 
state as the “ancient Near Eastern state”. Thus by “ancient Near Eastern state,” we refer to 
both or either of the two.   
 
3.3 Israel in the ancient Near East 
 
Earlier scholars tended to view the Israelite states as unique among the ancient Near Eastern 
states. They saw Yahweh religion as the reason behind the uniqueness of the Israelite socio-
political life. Israel was a chosen nation and so Yahweh separated it from all the other nations 
of the earth, they argued. However, drawing on the rich reservoir of ancient Near Eastern 
studies, it can now be said with certainty that Israel was not unique among ancient Near 
Eastern states. The Israelite states of Israel and Judah were situated and fit in perfectly in 
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their ancient Near Eastern milieu. Their socio-political and economic structures and strategies 
were typical of their era and location. Israel’s political experience was roughly parallel to that 
of her neighbours, so much so that Israelite and non-Israelite politics may be able to 
illuminate one another (Gottwald 2001:26). Philip F. Esler (2006:192) argues in the same 
vain that using social-scientific insights to investigate the ancient Israelite socio-political life 
shows that it was imbedded in the culture of the broader ancient Near East.  
 
Israel was not one of the pristine states but was a secondary state that came on the scene after 
the state system was nearly two millennia old in the wider environment. As a late-emerging 
secondary state, it was an heir of statist socio-political organisation which it was exposed to 
during its formative years (Gottwald 2001:120). Because Israel always interacted with other 
states in its environment, and at times was dominated by them, we should understand the 
structures and strategies of those states as they formed a political matrix for the specifically 
Israelite political trajectory. Ancient Israelite politics is the politics of the ancient Near East. 
This is the slice of the “world-historical time” that provides the necessary perspective for 
viewing ancient Israelite politics (Gottwald 2001:113). Thus, to better understand the 
experience of Israel, it is important to view it within the wider context of contemporary 
Ancient Near Eastern cultures. Ancient Israelite politics is a subsection of the larger family of 
regional states. Without paying a blind eye to innovation, however, we can recognise many 
characteristics of Israelite society that were typical of other states in the region (Gottwald 
2001:150).  
 
Viewed in this ancient Near Eastern context, Israel and Judah were similar to other smaller 
states of Syria-Palestine and little differences aside, the political organisation of the states of 
the region was similar. Within the context of international politics, they were an insignificant 
player (Gottwald 2001:150). This is demonstrated by their recurrent defeat to major powers, 
such as Assyria, Egypt and Babylon. To compare Israel with her neighbours is not to stress 
how much or in what ways Israel might have “borrowed” from other nations of the region, or 
to attribute Israelite uniqueness to her religion. Rather, the purpose of the comparison is to 
understand Israelite life as only a part of the much broader ancient Near Eastern society. 
Where there are gaps in Israelite traditions, the knowledge from other Ancient Near Eastern 
states will cover up.  
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Geographically, Israel’s location was both commercially and militarily significant. The major 
highways that connected the Nile and Tigris-Euphrates valleys, and those connecting South 
Arabia and the Mediterranean coast, passed through Palestine along a thin corridor between 
the sea and the desert (Gottwald 2001:150).  On this land bridge, the regional powers met and 
clashed (Chaney 1996:146). Its location made it both a buffer zone for Egypt against foreign 
aggression and the staging area for Asiatic super powers to launch invasions of Egypt. 
Therefore, control over Israel was a major goal of the super powers seeking to control the 
interconnection of roads that met on the Syro-Palestinian corridor (Gottwald 2001:151-152). 
 
3.4 The ancient Near East in the Late Bronze Age (ca. 1550 - 1200 BCE) 
 
In the Late Bronze Age Levant, Cyprus and Mycenaean Greece, local societies were under 
city-states which put heavy burden of taxation and forced labour on the peasants. The small 
states of the Levant were generally under control of the Hittites or the Egyptians. But with the 
ushering in of the Iron 1 period (ca. 1200 BCE), the situation changed dramatically. The 
period witnessed the deterioration and demise of the major powers of the region. With the 
downfall of the Mycenaean world around 1200 BCE, Canaan was robbed of its most 
important trading partner (Kuhrt 1995:385). In Mycenaean Greece, the citadels suffered a 
decline and eventually destroyed and abandoned while in Cyprus too, there are signs of 
destruction round about 1200 BCE, followed by cultural changes (Kuhrt 1995:385). The 
Hittite Kingdom was obliterated round about 1200 BCE save for one or two of its subject 
kingdoms while Mesopotamia was split into the rival states of Kassite Babylonia, Assyria, 
and Mitanni (Kuhrt 1995:385). Around 1150 BCE, Egyptian supremacy over the southern 
Levant finally collapsed as it retreated from its Asiatic empire and by the early 11th century, 
it had withdrawn within to its narrowest frontiers, having lost control over Sinai and Nubia 
(Kuhrt 1995:385). Most Late Bronze Age cities in Syria-Palestine were destroyed around 
1200 BCE. Ugarit was also destroyed around this time, and the site not reoccupied.  
 
Excavations in many Late Bronze sites show a visible decline of urban population and 
general impoverishment of the population throughout the region during this period (Frick 
1977:186). Documentation in Syria and Anatolia virtually ceases round about 1200 BCE and 
in Mesopotamia too, there is shrinkage in political power and prestige (Kuhrt 1995:394). It is 
not until the tenth century before there is evidence of real recovery in the region. A dark 
cloud seems to have descended on the entire region, and when the historical picture clears 
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again, a re-configuration of the politics of the region has taken place (Kuhrt 1995:386). The 
decline of an empire or the destruction of a city can easily be explained. But for a whole wide 
region to experience such dramatic change at about the same time, clearly suggests that there 
was a crisis. Trevor Bryce (2005:344) argues that the fact that this decline and destruction of 
the major centres of the region happened at about the same time seems to suggest a series of 
widespread upheavals and disasters, which led to, or helped precipitate, the downfall of the 
major centres in the region. What dynamics might have caused such wholesale change? 
 
Traditionally, the upheavals and disasters have been attributed to the invasion of the 
mysterious “sea peoples”. Two Egyptian sources speak of the unbeatable sea peoples who 
conquer and plunder anyone and anything on their way (Kuhrt 1995:387). This description 
must be taken with a pinch of salt. The Egyptian kings might have been exaggerating the 
strength of the enemy to make their victory even sweeter. More recently the attribution of the 
destruction to the sea peoples has faltered. Kuhrt (1995:386) argues that the problem with the 
sea peoples revolves around their identity, that is, we can neither say who they were nor 
pinpoint where they came from. If we were able to establish their identity, then it could be 
possible to establish their movement. But if it is not possible to know who they were, then it 
is hard to see whence, where, how, when and why they moved (Kuhrt 1995:392). 
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to establish evidence of an “invasion” of people from 
outside. Another factor that casts doubt on the “invasion” hypothesis is that except for Ugarit 
most of the major centres of the region either continued to exist in a diminished form or were 
quickly reoccupied (Joffe 2002:430). Moreover, nothing beyond two Egyptian sources 
suggests invasion or anything other than localised conflict as contributing to their 
deterioration and destruction (Joffe 2002:430). Itamar Singer (cited in Bryce 2005:343) 
argues that rather than emphasise the role of outside invaders, more weight should be given to 
the symptoms of inner decline and disintegration. 
 
The contribution of invaders to disruption and collapse of these civilisations was limited. 
Rather, as Alexander H. Joffe (2002:429-430) argues, a plausible interpretation sees a variety 
of factors at work, including a collapse of affluent economies and international trade 
throughout the region, highly localised collapse of political and settlement systems, and both 
small and large-scale migrations and resettlement. Niels Peter Lemche (1996:116) adds that 
the crisis arose not so much because of internal structural problems in the small political 
communities of Syria and Palestine, but was rather occasioned by an international crisis 
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involving the great powers of the day. The migration of the sea peoples whoever they were, 
must be seen as a result of mounting economic problems caused by an over-extension of the 
political superstructures of the Late Bronze states which strained their resources to such an 
extent that  they could easily be upset (Kuhrt 1995:392). In the final analysis what collapsed 
during this period was the international system and its interdependent network of local city-
states (Joffe 2002:431). 
 
The mode of production in the Late Bronze ancient Near Eastern city-states was clearly 
tributary. In this system, the upper classes appropriated the greater part of the surplus labour 
product of the lower classes. In such a situation of exploitation, wealth and power accrue 
disproportionately to those who are able to claim and dispose of what others produced 
(Gottwald 1993:4). The peasant populace on whose productivity the city-state elite depended, 
resented heavy taxation and forced labour imposed on them. Ruthlessly exploited and pushed 
to the brink, they rather formed and/or joined bands of pirates and brigands that moved in 
several directions at times wreaking havoc on the formerly wealthy, now tottering, city 
centres in order to survive (Kuhrt 1995:393). The movements and operations of these bands 
were, however, relatively small in scale and independent of each other. Runaway peasants 
and outlaws banding together to form marauding groups of bandits (the apiru of the Amarna 
letters) should be seen as symptomatic of an underlying, long-term socio-economic 
discontent (Kuhrt 1995:393). George E. Mendenhall (1962:73) has suggested that the 
Amarna letters represent a process of the “withdrawal”, not physically or geographically but 
politically of large population groups from any obligation to the existing political regimes, 
and therefore the renunciation of any protection from these states. If we insert the sea peoples 
into this political picture, then we can see them as another one of the signs of general collapse 
and disintegration, but not its cause (Kuhrt 1995:393). The sea peoples would then be only 
one of a number of pointers to a complicated series of interlinked problems and changes that 
had been developing for some considerable time. Ultimately, the cataclysmic upheavals must 
be sought inside the socio-political and economic structures of the region.   
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3.5 Emergence of Israel 
 
With the collapse of Late Bronze empires and their economies, the waning of the closely 
connected city-state system and the demise of their hated tributary mode of production, a new 
phase of ancient Near Eastern political life emerges. The decline of the imperial powers gave 
opportunity for local populations to shift and reconfigure. The collapse permitted new 
identities and political systems to emerge and assert themselves. The various groups gained 
greater freedom of manoeuvre, favouring the development of an alternative political economy 
characterised by politically looser societies and polities with multi-power actors (Gottwald 
2001:133). Local farming communities acquired greater autonomy, while industry and 
commerce were in the hands of “free-floating” artisans, merchants and nomadic traders. This 
development offered freedom of movement and enterprise and brought some relief from the 
burdensome tribute to the majority of people who laboured on the land. 
 
Taking advantage of the political vacuum caused by the withdrawal of the once-mighty 
Egyptians and disintegration of the city-state system, a new entity called “Israel,” burst onto 
the scene, composed of people who do not appear to have been there earlier. The equally 
small polities of Ammon, Moab and Edom also arose on the mountains and plateaus of 
interior Palestine, and by 1000 BCE, most coastal sites were inhabited by the Philistines. 
Joffe (2002:426) calls these “ethnic states.” These, he argues, are not types or stages in an 
evolutionary scheme, but are novel and historically contingent political systems. What was 
the composition of this polity called “Israel” that gained control over the hill country and 
from where did its inhabitants come? What were the shared goals and bonding structures of 
Israel’s social system in comparison with those of other social system from which it emerged 
and against which it was counter-posed (Gottwald 1985:277)? Scholars are generally agreed 
that the hills of Palestine were sparsely populated during the Late Bronze Age when Egypt 
controlled the region. There is also agreement that during the subsequent Iron I period, many 
new settlements appear in the highlands, both in the Cisjordan and on the plateau of 
Transjordan. Where did these new settlers come from? 
 
Three theories have been suggested with regards to the emergence of Israel. The first two are 
the conquest model and the immigration model. These have been exhaustively outlined 
elsewhere (cf. Vengeyi 2013; Gottwald 1985) and so will not be repeated here. It is 
Gottwald’s social revolution hypothesis which has cogency with Marxism, and which 
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includes aspects of the conquest and immigrations models, that we think better explains the 
emergence of Israel in Canaan.  
 
From a Marxist perspective, stratified societies usually experience intense class struggles 
between the proletariat underclass (peasants) and the powerful bourgeoisie (upper classes), 
leading eventually to an underclass revolution (Sparks 2007:589). We suspect that this is 
what might have happened in Iron 1 Palestine. As noted above, Late Bronze Palestine had 
been a structure of city-states under Egyptian imperial domination, the dominant mode of 
production being tributary. The Egyptians had established military bases throughout the 
region and appointed Egyptian administrators to collect tribute from the native rulers who in 
turn passed on the burden to the peasants. It was, thus, a double layer of tribute extracting 
structures: the native rulers subordinate to the pharaohs and the native peasants immediately 
subordinate to their rulers and indirectly to the Egyptians (Gottwald 1979:212). Mendenhall 
(1962:203) describes a peasant as “one whose labour yields produce enjoyed by others” and 
adds that peasants were politically-economically marginal elements of society from whose 
produce the elite drew their life. The Egyptian presence in Palestine was a stabilising factor 
for the city-state elites for it kept the peasants in line and at the same time served as a 
guarantee of protection from other city-states. It also fostered a favourable climate for inter-
city trade, so vital a factor in maintaining a high level of culture and luxury for the privileged 
upper classes (Gottwald 1979:394).  
 
The withdrawal of the Egyptian imperial control did not do much to alleviate the plight of the 
peasants as taxation and forced labour continued. For the peasants it did not matter whether 
their surpluses were appropriated by Pharaoh or by the native city-state rulers; it was in either 
case an exaction that cost them and which they resented bitterly (Gottwald 1979:213). This 
expropriation caused outright dissatisfaction among the oppressed lower classes who had 
either to comply with their obligations to the local elites, rebel or flee. Rebellions against the 
exploitative city-states were quite frequent. Elites from other city-states often encouraged 
rebellion and chaos in neighbouring city-states because they saw an opportunity to weaken 
rival states and to seize control over their territory and resources (Gottwald 1979:398). The 
Amarna letters also record the internecine warfare of city-state against city-state. Rival rulers 
thus played upon the social unrest in their opponents' state and were ready to capitalise on the 
grievances of the peasants who suffered under heavy tribute (Gottwald 1979:398).  
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For those who could not take the exploitation anymore, “withdrawal” from the system was 
the only viable solution. This “withdrawal” was a declaration of independence from 
obligations imposed on villagers by the city-state elites and consequently a surrendering of 
the protection afforded by the city in favour of a reliance on the tribal system of defense 
(Frick 1997:99). Added to the equation were the apiru, who are depicted everywhere as 
having a negative stance toward the existing social and political structures and carry with 
them the aura of potential threat to the established order and seem ready to exploit any 
weaknesses in that order to their own advantage (Gottwald 1979:213). From the numerous 
texts available, the apiru have several connotations that range from robber, fugitive, refugee 
and rebels, who threaten the dominant order and specialise in guerrilla-like tactics (Vengeyi 
2013:65). It should, however, be noted that the line between apiru as organised military and 
brigand bands, and the village agriculturalists and pastoralists was probably a rather indistinct 
one, becoming less and less distinct as central authority crumbled (Gottwald 1979:408). 
Obvious Vengeyi (2013:56) is even more emphatic arguing that contrary to the widely-held 
view that they were nomadic in nature, it is now conclusive that most of the people 
designated as apiru actually came from the sedentary population and not from among the 
nomads. He adds that they were not confined to one society of the ancient Near East. Rather, 
each society of the region that had this exploitative tributary mode of production produced its 
own apiru.  
 
Vengeyi's description of the apiru is quite helpful in that it sees the apiru not as nomadic 
foreigners from some unidentified place of origin or from the desert fringes, but rather as 
exploited sedentary lower classes of the city-states who had withdrawn from their societies 
(at times even physically) and would later cooperate again with the authorities (or return for 
those who had physically left) should conditions in their homelands improve (Vengeyi 
2013:57). In the meantime, some left their homelands to be labourers for wages in other 
states, including serving in foreign armies as mercenaries. Others turned to raiding the 
wealthy upper classes for survival. On their own, the apiru bands were not strong enough to 
unsettle the established order because they showed no signs of operating as a united force. 
They rather remained splintered in their support for various feudal states or factions 
(Gottwald 1979:406). Competing city-state elites hired apiru troops in their armies. As city-
state power declined further, the apiru bands became an increasingly important power factor. 
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Apiru bands regularly multiplied in number as they were joined by streams of fugitives 
fleeing the city-states, to the hill country that was scarcely under city-state control. The 
peasants who gathered out of Israel to join David (1Sam 22:1) as freebooters indicate how an 
apiru group could recruit and assimilate large numbers of newcomers around a strong band 
leader (Gottwald 1979:406). The exodus group set foot in Palestine at this time of upheaval 
and “withdrawal” from the mainstream city-state controlled society by the heavily-taxed 
lower classes. Mendenhall (1962:79) argues that the exodus group was a very small group; 
possibly the biblical tradition of seventy families might not be too far from historical reality. 
It seems that prior to the arrival of this group, the apiru lacked class consciousness and a 
possibility of reorganising their socio-economic and political existence on non-feudal lines, 
something that could have been pivotal in replacing the status quo. Their prior resistance 
seems not to have reached the point of common intention of overthrowing the socio-
economic and political set-up (Vengeyi 2013:65). That seems to have been one of the most 
significant contributions of the exodus group. The now autonomous former slaves, who had 
run away from the grip of the exploitative Egyptian empire presented an immediate appeal to 
the restless lower classes. Gottwald (1979:214) argues that what was attractive about this 
incoming group was the central feature of its religion, Yahwism, which celebrated the 
actuality of deliverance from socio-political bondage and promised continuing deliverance 
whenever Yahweh's autonomous people were threatened. In fact the very origin of Yahweh 
religion is inseparably connected with the process of historical and political liberation. 
Yahweh religion became the ideology that would motivate and mobilise the distinct groups in 
overthrowing the unjust system. Yahwism became a powerful catalyst in energising and 
guiding the broad coalition (Vengeyi 2013:74). Given their similar historical circumstances 
and a common vision for the future, the various groups naturally merged. 
 
In contrast to the state religions of the ancient Near East which derive from earliest mythical 
times, Yahweh religion had a historical underpinning and did not, from the beginning, have 
the function of legitimating and stabilising the status quo (Albertz 1994:47). Rather, as the 
symbolic world of a social outsider group fighting for its right to life, it served to provide 
internal solidarity for this group and to detach it from a social order which they regarded as 
unjust, in the direction of a future social integration which made possible a freer and more 
equitable social life (Albertz 1994:47). While the ancient Near Eastern religions had a royal 
trajectory, in contrast Yahweh religion had a liberation trajectory. The royal trajectory speaks 
in myths of unity, speaks a language of continuity (royal institutions), appears to be fostered 
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by and valued among urban “haves” and tends to be socially conserving with a primary 
valuing of stability (Brueggemann 1993:215). In contrast, the liberation trajectory prefers to 
tell concrete stories of liberation, speaks a language of war and discontinuity, appears to be 
fostered by and valued among peasant “have nots”, tends to be socially revolutionary, focuses 
on the justice and righteousness of God's will (Brueggemann 1993:215). 
 
A Marxist reading of the Bible is related to the liberation trajectory. Religion (ideology, as 
Gottwald calls it) is viewed as a social product, an intellectual construction whose real 
significance is in the economic and social relations (Bonino 1993:108). In other words, 
Israelite socio-economic relations had priority over Yahweh religion. However, Yahweh 
religion also had a crucial role to play, not simply as a legitimator, but as a “facilitator” of the 
egalitarian movement (Brueggemann 1993:215). Thus, Yahweh was a “function” of the 
egalitarian movement. Here we have a god who had proved his divinity in a liberation from 
state oppression and had bound himself exclusively to a group from the lower classes 
(Albertz 1994:77). He was a deity who was equally concerned both to deliver his people from 
tributary dominion to communitarian freedom and to prosper them in their struggle to extract 
a living from the highlands (Gottwald 1993:84). Naturally, he was going to be the god of the 
alliance. We may not be far from the truth in assuming that Yahweh was immediately seized 
by the other groups of the alliance as an invaluable reinforcement to their world of religious 
symbols (Albertz 1994:77). 
 
The merging of the groups and the adoption of Yahwism as the religion of the coalition seem 
to have happened smoothly and without any hurdles because the former Egyptian forced 
labourers and the former marginal and lower class Canaanite peasants both had similar 
interests. They had both been freed from state-sponsored oppression and both were dreaming 
of a form of society that would enable them to live as freely and unencumbered as possible. If 
there was to be no church unity, neither side would tolerate church merger (Mendenhall 
1962:79). The Israelite-Canaanite polarisation can be understood as a result of the shift in 
terminology. As soon as the Canaanite lower classes joined the alliance, Gottwald (1979:214) 
argues, they were no longer seen as Canaanites, but Israelites. Henceforth, he maintains, the 
term Canaanite was used to refer to the city-state oppressive structure, with its ideologically 
supportive Baal religion, which continued in the cities of the plains and whose culture tended 
to creep back into Israel as the first generation fervour subsided (Gottwald 1979:214). In the 
hill country and wilderness regions which were hardly under city-state control, whenever 
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they were strong enough, the coalition would fend off their oppressors and form tribal rule by 
elders in deliberate rejection of centralised political rule by kings (Gottwald 1979:214). 
Indeed while archaeological evidence suggests that the highlands of central Palestine - where 
the Israelites first settled - were thinly inhabited during the Late Bronze Age, there is an 
explosion of highland settlements around 1200 BCE (Sparks 2007:588, 589). It seems the 
Canaanite overlords in the tottering palaces of the plains were too weak to contain the revolt 
effectively in the hill country, and the coalition takeover went ahead with success.  
 
From now on, the “exodus from Egypt” became a metaphor for all kinds of successful 
resistance to oppression by each of the different groups of this emerging polity on the 
highlands of Canaan. The Canaanite peasant “insiders”, in overthrowing or escaping from 
their city-state rulers had, like the “outsiders” from Egypt, overthrown their “pharaoh”, and 
they had been delivered in their own “exodus” (Gottwald 1985:287-288). Because the 
endpoint of the Yahwist (J) and Elohist (E) narratives (within traditional source critical 
terms) is the establishment of the nation of Israel, they visualise the Israelites of the exodus as 
embracing all the people of Israel whose descendants went on eventually to occupy Canaan 
(Gottwald 1993:276). Viewing the emergence of Israel in this way, one gets the picture that 
early Israel was a coalition made up of diverse groups: marginal Canaanite peasants, apiru 
mercenaries, tribally organised farmers and pastoral nomads, itinerant craftsmen, and the 
exodus group. Israel should not be understood as a group of geographical outsiders but as 
socio-political outsiders, who were only geographically present but not permitted to share in 
the shaping of their own destiny in the city-state ruled Canaan (Brueggemann 1993:203). 
Their marginality was socio-political and economic rather than geographical.  
 
As Mendenhall (1962:87) notes, Israel was formed by an “intentional bond between persons 
in an intolerable situation,” oppressed people with an alternative vision of social order were 
able to reject the religious, economic, and political obligations to the city-states. In early 
Israel we see people in alliance against the tributary system attaining autonomy and carrying 
on their life so as to guarantee their livelihood, defend themselves against external 
aggressors, and keep themselves in good books with their new god Yahweh (Gottwald 
1993:xxv). Together they won freedom over the city-states and developed an alternative 
counter-society that would enable them to live a life that they wished. In his peasant revolt 
model, Mendenhall (1962:73) argues strongly that there was no massive invasion of Palestine 
by outsiders, no genocide, no serious displacement of the population, no large scale driving 
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out of population, only of royal administrators, at the beginning of Iron 1 Israel. In fact 
Gottwald (1985:284) argues that the indigenous population of the Israelite coalition made up 
at least eighty percent of the coalition.  
 
Mendenhall (cited in Brueggemann 1993:204) has suggested a rethinking of the notion of 
“tribe” with reference to early Israel, arguing that “tribe” is not to be understood as a natural 
ethnic grouping but as “an intentional community deliberately committed to a different 
ideology and a different social organisation” (Brueggemann 1993:204). Thus the tribes of 
Israel were historical, not natural. They did not come about because of necessity or nature, 
but through historical deliberate decision-making. The bond of relationship should be defined 
in sociological rather than biological terms (Frick 1977:198). Gottwald (2001:170) avers that 
what happened in early Israel was a “retribalisation” process which means that the settlers did 
not have a single pre-existent social organisation but developed their own by building on the 
kinship ties of various groups and improvising additional social networks as needed. 
However, if we propose as we have done, that the majority in the coalition were Canaanite 
peasants, then the concept of retribalisation might be difficult to maintain. 
 
Gerhard Lenski’s research (cited in Gottwald 1993:41) has confirmed that this model of 
peasant unrest and revolt, culminating in revolutionary change has ample precedent in 
history. Studies of agrarian societies in both Europe and Asia have shown that peasants in 
these societies who were unhappy with their situation often blamed the upper classes and the 
discontent often led to violence, ranging from sporadic actions by individuals to widespread 
mass uprisings (Gottwald 1993:41). 
 
3.6 Pre-state Israel 
 
The overthrow of the Canaanite city-states went hand-in-hand with the collapse of their 
tributary mode of production. The coalition had to come up with an alternative mode. The 
social revolution produced what Gottwald (1993:xxv) calls a “communitarian” mode of 
production which was at odds with the tributary system, both in ideology and practice. 
Marshall D. Sahlins (1968:75) calls it the “domestic” or “familial” mode of production 
because of the strategic position assumed by individual households. Henceforth, we will call 
it the “familial” mode of production. The new mode of production renounced statehood and 
retained economic power in the hands of villagers. In charge of its own land and the 
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economic means of production, the community organised its own production, distribution and 
consumption. The producers were the same as the consumers who enjoyed the fruits of their 
onerous collective labour. Taxation and forced labour were completely eliminated. After they 
refused loyalty to the state system that taxed and conscripted them, they themselves 
endeavoured not to extract tribute from one another (Gottwald 1993:351). The idea of 
political power concentrated in one individual or a tiny group of elites, was out of the 
question. Having become independent, they were determined not to impose the same power-
centred and status-centred society like the one they had escaped from (Mendenhall 1962:77). 
Thus the socio-political and economic system which this alliance developed was a counter-
model to the city-state system. In short, it was anti-state. 
 
The Old Testament narrative traditions about pre-state Israel retain (whatever their 
redactional history) a representation of a community among whom social power was broadly 
distributed in local settings. An essential feature of politics among this people is 
decentralisation and absence of any central political authority. Political functions were 
diffused throughout the social structure or focussed in temporary ad hoc role assignments 
(Gottwald 1985:286). The development of authority outside the household is extraordinarily 
weak. Permanent political institutions end at the local or at most at the tribal level. Primary 
leadership fell to tribal representatives. At its founding, Israel deliberately resisted specialised 
political offices. In times of crises, and existing arrangements unable to resolve it, military 
judges were chosen to command forces from the local community. Such appointments were 
temporary and would lapse once the crisis was over. The military leaders reverted to being 
ordinary citizens after overcoming the crisis. In a time of crisis, participation at a communal 
cause was voluntary and there was no power to compel a group or individuals to become 
involved (Albertz 1994:74). There was no compulsory recruitment into the army. Participants 
themselves had to agree to a military action. Mobilisation for participation in the army could 
not take place from above, only from below. In times of peace villages acted separately and 
independently of each other. This experiment was a form of democracy which at the end of 
the day depended on the consent of the people involved. 
 
There are two political institutions that seem to have had roles in this community. These are 
זְ ֵק ִנ ים (elders) and the הְ עקִ֜ יר ְ ְַנ ֵי ֵׁ֨י (men of the city) or a tribe (Albertz 1994:73)  The former were 
heads of families and clans while the latter appear to be an assembly of legally free, 
economically independent men (Albertz 1994:73). In important issues, the הְ עקִ֜ יר ְ ְַנ ֵי ֵׁ֨י had the 
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final say, for example in calling up an army (Judg 11:1), accepting strangers (Judg 19:22), or 
in matters of war and peace generally (1Sam 11:10). Social norms barred influential members 
of the community from appropriating the surplus of individual producers for personal gain or 
from creating a communal surplus fund that they could unilaterally impose and administer 
(Gottwald 2001:113). 
 
The absence of central political institutions was not an inability to form them, but was an 
expression of a deliberate political concern. This coalition was premised on a deliberate 
political choice which was opposed to domination. Institutionalisation of political power was 
allowed only when the survival of the families was under threat, even then, it was only 
temporary. The aim of the coalition was to deliver a very high degree of freedom for its 
members. This also found expression in the name that the coalition gave itself. The name 
“Israel” (God or El rules), was a confession, that is, only God, not a human being, should 
rule. In a society in which members deliberately desist from a central political authority for 
the sake of their right to freedom and in so doing dissociate themselves from the monarchical 
structure of domination, such a name was very appropriate (Albertz 1994:76). The coalition 
wanted a type of society which made it possible for its members to live as freely as possible. 
This desire for freedom is also reflected in the type of god the coalition chose as its sole 
deity. The god EI had been known to the Canaanite peasants as a symbol of their liberation 
movement and their opposition to domination (Albertz 1994:77). Given Yahweh's nature, as 
described above, we may not be far from the truth in supposing that Yahweh became fused 
with El, thus the god of Israel. Early Israel was an ecumenical faith, a catholic religion, 
whose purpose was to create unity among disparate groups and to deliver freedom to 
previously oppressed peoples (Mendenhall 1962:86). The recognition of Yahweh by the 
alliance members was from now on critical for the structure and functioning of the alliance. 
 
Because of their histories, the nature of their deity and the raison d'être of this society, it is 
little wonder that there was no religious legitimation of political rule whatsoever. Because 
Yahweh himself was the ruler, he prohibited the establishment of any central political 
authority (Albertz 1994:78). Bound to a nonhuman overlord by covenant and the solidarity of 
the newly formed community, they set about fashioning a deliberate alternative social 
ordering (Brueggemann 1993:203). It is for the same reason that Israel, unlike Moab and 
Ammon, did not establish a monarchic state at an early stage, but continued in its 
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decentralised structure for two centuries (Albertz 1994:79). It is also against this background 
that Gideon’s rejection of the crown should be understood: 
 
I will not rule over you, 
neither shall my son rule over you: 
the lord shall rule over you (Judg 8:23).  
 
Of course this statement may have been written with the later problems of the monarchy in 
mind but it indicates the connection which already existed in the tribal alliance between the 
exercise of divine lordship versus human lordship (Albertz 1994:78). 
 
Another distinctive feature of the early Israelite society is lack of social stratification because 
of equally minimal economic and political differentiation. The alliance devised a whole host 
of social mechanisms for effective insulation against accumulation of political and economic 
power. Where influential members of society showed tendencies towards chieftainship or 
petty kingship, they were fiercely resisted (Gottwald 1985:287). Power was widely 
distributed and levelled in many groups and institutions so as to work against ambitious 
power and wealth seekers. 
 
The א י  בְ נת was the basic economic unity which had its own inalienable ריחֲלֵֵׁ֨ . It produced the 
basic means of subsistence for its members and consumed all, or nearly all, of what it 
produced (Gottwald 1979:292). Surplus was used mainly for storage as guarantee against the 
devastating famines that might strike at any time. Although assigned to it, the piece of land 
did not “belong” to the household as such. It was handed down from generation to generation 
but it was never sold (Lev 25:34). The story of Naboth's vineyard (1 Kings 21), especially the 
fact that the king was willing to respect Naboth’s ר יחֲל ֵֵׁ֨ , sheds light on the seriousness with 
which this system of land tenure was understood. Because the land belonged to the whole 
village and nobody had title to it, it was there for the sustenance of the whole village, hence 
the custom of allowing the needy, to sustain themselves by picking up ears and collecting 
grapes left behind by the harvesters (cf. Deut 23:24-25, 24:19-21; Lev 19:9-10). The א י  בְ נת 
was economically autonomous in the sense that it did not owe any of its produce to higher 
authorities in the form of taxes which had heavily burdened the subjects of the city-states 
(Gottwald 1979:292). The surplus labour product was not handed over to or shared with any 
centralised political apparatus. It was for the consumption of the family that produced it. Of 
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course there was an obligation to extend aid to another א י  בְ נת in need, but this was more a 
matter of reciprocal exchange than of commercial transaction.  
 
Social security nets of mutual aid were revived and extended to the larger groupings. 
Solidarity was required of the members of the larger kinship group or close relatives if a 
family got into economic hardship. Whenever self-sufficiency of the א י  בְ נת was threatened, 
the ר יל יפ ְי קה stood by to offer relief. It was incumbent on Israelites to advance loans to needy 
בָא י  בְ נת without charging interest. Provisions for the socially vulnerable (widows, orphans, 
strangers) were insisted on. The name that the community gave itself referred not just to a 
religious community but to a self-determining society whose main concern was survival and 
a good life (Gottwald 1985:288). Mutual aid was intended to protect and prosper the loose 
alliance in the harsh climatic conditions and aggressive political forces. They also bonded 
together to maximise productive labour and to provide self-defence. The socio-economic 
relations were egalitarian in that every member was assured of equal access to resources by 
means of their organisation into extended families, clans and tribes (Gottwald 1985:285). The 
social relationships were structured according to a system of patrilinear kinship groups, real 
or fictitious (Albertz 1994:73). 
 
Just as there was no central political institution, there was equally no central cultic institution. 
Contrary to Martin Noth, who argued for the existence of a central sanctuary, biblical 
traditions about pre-state Israel show a multiplicity of sanctuaries which existed side by side. 
Cultic autonomy and decentralisation went with political independence and decentralisation 
(Albertz 1994:83). The decentralisation of the cult brought it much closer to the people than 
was the later state religion in which Yahweh was hidden behind thick walls and curtains. 
Evidence points to the existence of a communal cult and a family cult in which the family 
worshiped its family god(s). Like the political and cultic institutions, the legal system was 
also decentralised. There is evidence of decentralisation and plurality. There was no central 
secular or religious authority which could have crafted legal norms or made binding legal 
decisions for the whole community (Albertz 1994:91). Local justice was in the hands of the 
זְ ֵק ִנ ים who applied customary law to cases involving community members. In such cases, they 
had an ad hoc meeting at the gate (hence “justice at the gate”) and tried to arbitrate between 
the parties involved. The verdict was purely arbitration and without executive force, it 
depended on being accepted by the parties involved. It does seem that where customary law 
could not settle the dispute there were people who were approached in difficult cases. These 
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included the judges, successful commanders like Jephthah (Judg 12:7) or those with 
charismatic gifts like Deborah (Judg 4:4f). It seems that these were respected and trusted 
members of the community who were probably regarded as incorruptible (Albertz 1994:91). 
For extremely serious cases, the elders and the popular assembly seem to have been 
responsible. They would constitute themselves a cultic community for a sacral judgment to 
condemn crimes worthy of death and to carry out the death penalty by stoning (cf. Josh 
7:13ff; 1 Kings 21:9ff). 
 
In concluding this section, we reiterate that the familial mode of production was consciously 
chosen by people who deliberately rejected centralisation of power and its exploitative 
tributary mode of production and created their own egalitarian society which would promote 
the ideals of freedom that the city-states had denied them. The traditions of liberation which 
the exodus group brought to the alliance contributed immensely towards directing the 
community towards enjoying a higher degree of freedom (Gottwald 1985:284). 
3.7 Rise of the Israelite state 
 
What sets the two Israelite states apart from the other nations of the region is that they 
detailed life in their pre-state society as well as the reasons that led to the formation of a 
monarchic state, which information is notoriously lacking in other ancient Near Eastern states 
(Gottwald 2001:152). Thus from these later accounts, we can attempt a historical 
reconstruction of pre-state Israel and what might have necessitated the move to statehood. 
What is also distinctive about Israel is that she enjoyed two hundred years of independent life 
without a state and the exaction of tribute that it later adopted with the evolution to statehood.  
For those two centuries, Israel sought to achieve the cultic, military, socio-economic, and 
jural coordination of a new society without recourse to the repressive and extractive 
institutions of central government and social stratification (Gottwald 1993:383). 
 
But the experiment with this primitive form of democracy was not to last for ever. Israel soon 
found herself in a position where she had to reorganise her political economy and adopt a 
new mode of production. The way to go was the familiar territory, where she had been before 
and where the other nations around her were. Within about two centuries, the Israelite tribes 
had gone full circle. What necessitated this “return to Pharaoh”? Was it because the 
alternative mode of production that the tribes had opted for had inherent weaknesses that 
made it unworkable or it was being deliberately undermined by certain elements within the 
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society who had their own self-enriching agenda? Could it be that the honeymoon of 
independence from Egyptian and city-state oppression had ended with the early generations 
and that subsequent generations began to wake up to the reality that the alternative was not as 
effective as their ancestors had initially imagined? Or, was it because of external forces 
beyond its control? How is it that it had been able to hold the society together for such a 
fairly long time?  
 
Earlier scholars, taking the biblical account as historical and relying on a single-factor 
explanation for state emergence, hypothesised that the formation of the monarchy in Israel 
goes back to the Philistines, who had become powerful on the coastal plain and were posing a 
serious threat to the highland settlements of Israel. Their iron weaponry and mobile strike 
force made them effective fighters (Gottwald 1985:319). The threat had become too strong 
for the voluntary tribal fighters of the coalition that they had been defeated many times by the 
well-organised and well-equipped Philistines in the course of which the Ark was captured 
and probably the cultic centre of Shiloh was destroyed (Albertz 1994:108). It became clear to 
the majority of the population that Israel had to radically transform her social organisation if 
it was to effectively deal with this threat. Saul, who had proved himself against the 
Ammonites, was given the opportunity to lead and defend the people as king (1Sam 11). 
Thus, according to this hypothesis, it was a single external factor that led the elders and the 
men of the city to seriously consider abandoning their resistance to a permanent central 
authority (Albertz 1994:108).  
 
Rainer Albertz (1994:108) critiques this theory on the basis that it leaves unexplained why 
the state could still be accepted by parts, at least, of Israelite society beyond the time of the 
Philistine threat. More seriously, in our discussion on the emergence of the ancient Near 
Eastern state above, we dismissed single-factor explanations as inadequate. Though 
important, we argued that the military factor cannot be taken in isolation from other forces at 
work. We also cast serious doubt on the adequacy of external factors. We rather suggested 
that for a state to emerge there should be some “state-generating factors” in place and these 
are for the most part internal. In similar vein, Gottwald (1993:132) argues that a revolutionary 
institutional change, such as the transition from a tribal society to a monarchic state,  
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is prepared by internal as well as external factors and that such polities seldom, if 
ever, have arisen solely because of an external threat unless they are conquered 
outright and institutional changes crudely imposed, the internal factors prove crucial 
in shaping what changes will occur and how they are brought about. 
 
If an external factor played any part, it was merely the “trigger” that hastened the formation 
of the state that had already been prepared for by internal factors that may not appear on the 
surface of reported events (Gottwald 2001:172-3). 
 
Furthermore, the hypothesis that once Saul was chosen as military leader, an Israelite state 
would follow is fallacious. We have already dismissed the argument that it would be 
“natural” or “inevitable” for tribally organised societies and chiefdoms to evolve into states. 
There have been many instances in history of tribally-organised peoples uniting under a 
single military commander but without forming a state system. Like the appointment of the 
so-called “judges” in Israelite pre-state traditions, tribally-organised societies may choose 
charismatic leaders in the face of challenges and crises that cannot be resolved by existing 
social organisation (Gottwald 2001:173). Thus tribes are not steps to statehood. Quite the 
contrary, a well-balanced tribal system, even with a strong redistributive chiefdom, tends to 
resist the concentration of dispersed social power in state organs (Gottwald 2001:173). What 
then were those internal factors that brought about the “state-generating environment” in the 
tribally-organised Israel? 
 
Land was the basic means of production in ancient Israel. The initial honeymoon period after 
the triumph of the coalition was characterised by relative social equality and each family 
seems to have secured its own piece of land. However, there were factors that were beyond 
the control of the alliance, such as the diversity of terrain, soil type and climatic conditions. 
Furthermore, drought, disease, inadequate labour force and ultimately deaths might have 
affected some families more than others. A combination of these negative factors may have 
resulted in some families falling behind others. Thus, while some families produced surpluses 
beyond their subsistence needs, others could not produce enough to feed themselves. In his 
conception of the “clientelistic” mode of production which he thinks was the dominant mode 
in monarchic Israel, Ronald A. Simkins (1999:125) disputes the notion that pre-state Israel 
was an egalitarian society, arguing that no known society has ever had a completely 
egalitarian social system. He further sees the assumption often made that the kinship relations 
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functioned to regulate and diminish social and economic inequalities as not supported by 
ethnographic studies (Simkins 1999:133). For him, egalitarian principles were in the 
ideological sphere, while the reality on the ground was characterised by social and economic 
differentiation even within extended kinship units. Studies also show that it is quite common 
for members of the same clan to exploit one another for personal gain.  
 
Furthermore, although the ethic of the tribes of Yahweh was premised on providing mutual 
aid to families in need, the village or tribal system may not have been equal to the task of 
monitoring adherence to it. Even if it was possible, there was no way of coercing members to 
adhere to the ethic. There are indications that some wealthy men had become ambitious that 
they were tempted to use their wealth for patronage purposes. The noble vision of the 
coalition to achieve and maintain an approximate social equality among all its members was 
in danger of not being realised. Simkins (1999:135) maintains that as inequality intensified 
and with it the formation of patron-client relationships, the relations of production and 
distribution cut across kinship boundaries. Patrons and clients were now determined, not by 
kinship relations, but by control and access to needed material resources and only those who 
entered into patron-client relationships were able to benefit directly from them. One's loyalty 
and obligation were no longer with the kinsmen but with their patronage networks. Patronage 
placed kinsmen in competition with one another for access to resources and for control of 
large client bases (Simkins 1999:135). 
 
It is quite probable that some wealthy men may have shown their ambitions to leadership of 
the tribal alliance. According to Gottwald (1993:132), there is evidence in the pre-state 
traditions of “outcroppings of elitism” that welcomed the monarchy as a way to strengthen 
and legitimate their privilege. Gale A. Yee (2003:32) agrees, adding that certain successful 
landowners were in favour of a state system because it would advance their interests. Gideon 
is offered the kingship (Judg 8:22-23) and his son Abimelech attempts to establish a petty 
kingdom based on Shechem (Judg 9). In fact, Frick (1977:116) argues that the traditions 
regarding the offer of kingship to Abimelech and Gideon may well have been a proposal to 
return Shechem to the city-state pattern of government with a local king. Nabal is pictured as 
a man of wealth in flocks and most probably agricultural holdings too (1 Sam 25:2-3, 8). It is 
quite probable that certain families and tribes were making claims to dominant social power 
based on their greater prosperity and enlarging regional influence (Gottwald 1993:133). 
According to Gary Stansell (2006:96), concerning the relation of wealth and power in an 
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agrarian society, the principle obtains that wealth could often be converted into political 
power. Due to fertile land and relative protection from political and military pressure, the 
Joseph tribes and Judah, seem to have prospered more than the tribes in Galilee and 
Transjordan (Ramantswana 2017) and consequently it is likely that the families of Saul and 
David (from the two regions) were wealthy families who saw control over the state apparatus 
as a way to consolidate and improve their position far more assuredly than under the tribal 
system (Gottwald 1993:133).  
 
That David could gather a substantial number of followers during his period of banditry (1 
Sam 22:1-2) suggests that economic inequality had already been entrenched in the tribal 
society. Moreover there are reports of abuses of priestly privileges by Eli's sons (1Sam 2:12-
17) and of bribery and of perversion of justice by Samuel's sons (1Sam 8:1-3). The 
monopolisation of leadership positions by such families would cover up their abuses from 
public scrutiny. This seemed to frustrate the aim of the loose federation to achieve some 
degree of equality among its members. We can begin to see the function of a patronage 
system. The patronage system would benefit the leading and wealthy families of Judah and 
the Joseph tribes who could easily mobilise their clients for support.  
 
 
These fissures may not have been deep enough in themselves to cause the transition from the 
tribal alliance to a state. However, the end of the shelf life of the tribal alliance began to 
approach with the movement of the Philistines into Israel, threatening the security and 
interests of the emerging economic elites and powerful families. With tighter military 
discipline, improved body armour, and a mix of weaponry and tactics better suited to 
mountainous warfare, the Philistines attacked Israel with the aim of laying claim to the grain-
growing breadbasket of the highlands by subjecting Israel to vassal status (Gottwald 
2001:175). The Ammonites and Moabites were also threatening Israel in Transjordan. Israel 
surely had to drastically transform her socio-political and military system if she was to 
effectively deal with the threat. 
 
The “constant externally-driven rhythm of being a farmer one day and a soldier the next” 
(West 2011:4) was a great inconvenience to the men of means who were desperate to secure 
their wealth and increase productivity. However, because here is a society whose operating 
principle was freedom and thus opposed to any form of domination, especially by a political 
elite, we suggest that 1 Samuel 8 is indicative of serious contestation within the society as an 
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alternative political economy is being debated (West 2011:5). No doubt, the emerging 
economic elites who had amassed considerable wealth and the leading citizens, who had 
gained considerable influence in the tribal society, were at the forefront of advocating for an 
alternative socio-political and military set up which would protect their economic interests 
and position themselves at the heart of state power. In similar vein, Fried (1978:39) argues 
that it is this unequal access to resources that is the essential condition for the evolution of 
statehood. Those that have such access have to protect it. Thus, the state receives its key 
impetus from the need to protect the stratification system (Fried 1978:39). 
 
It is not possible to say exactly at what point the tribal alliance crossed the threshold into a 
state and we do well not to think of the transition from the tribal society to state as an 
instantaneous and sweeping transformation but as an incremental development (Gottwald 
1993:131). Marx reminds us of the slow and relentless grind of material conditions in 
bringing about change (West 2011:5). We, thus, argue for a slow and gradual introduction of 
state institutions. A protracted process of conflict and accommodation between central 
government and tribal society is proposed (Gottwald 1993:131). Rather than conceive of a 
“leap” into monarchy, it is more accurate to imagine state institutions as “creeping up” on 
Israel by increments (Gottwald 1993:134). This is consistent with the record in Samuel-Kings 
which shows a steady increase in the extension and consolidation of state power. Though the 
Saulide model of central political authority fell short of statehood, it was still compatible with 
the structure of tribal organisation and religious traditions of Israel (Albertz 1994:109). Saul’s 
permanent power base was limited to his modest residence in his home town of Gibeah (1 
Sam 22:6), a small staff in which his relative Abner was the army commander (1 Sam 
14:50f), and a limited army which was probably made up of his clients from his tribe of 
Benjamin and other nearby tribes (1 Sam 10:26; 14:52; 16:20f). Such a description fits 
perfectly what Claessen and Skalnik (1978) call inchoate early state. 
 
But with David, the traditions show a form of central authority that was quite different from 
that of Saul. David is said to have established a state apparatus with its administrative centre 
at Jerusalem, thus setting the scene for a rapid build-up and consolidation of central political 
authority. According to Albertz (1994:110), that effectively made him a city-king of 
Jerusalem on the Canaanite model. He now has a capital city, unlike Saul who had a 
headquarters. We begin to see a sort of a bureaucracy in operation. The troops are now loyal 
to him, rather than to the tribes. He conducts a modest building program. The Davidic 
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monarchy could be what Claessen and Skalnik (1978) call the typical early state. The 
Solomonic monarchy as contained in the biblical record shows what Claessen and Skalnik 
(1978) call a transitional early state. The tribal decision-making structures and kinship 
influences were swept aside and relegated to marginal aspects of government. A full-fledged 
bureaucracy was in operation. 
 
Thus these traditions show a slow adoption of state institutions. Putting aside historical 
questions, what the texts reveal is an incremental development of state power. There were 
many gradations in the movement from the incipient state to the full-scale state and many 
opportunities for arrested growth, retrogression, and collapse (Gottwald 2001:183). Instead of 
a jump to a state, the traditions imply eroding tribalism together with creeping or incremental 
statism (Gottwald 1993:174). Imagining a process of conflict and accommodation between 
state and tribe can enable us to understand many aspects of the Israelite monarchy. It is 
probable that it was in the military sphere that the state system won its quickest and most 
lasting victory when the tribal volunteer gangs and warriors were re-organised into a standing 
professional army, what Weber (cited in Gottwald 1993:135) calls the “demilitarisation of the 
peasantry.”   
 
The preceding discussion has shown that the internal conditions of inequality had prepared 
the ground for the rise of the monarchy. These conditions of inequality had contributed 
significantly towards the making of the “state-generating environment.” They contributed to 
the fertilisation of the monarchic seedbed out of which the Israelite state arose. In fact, the 
rise of the monarchy presupposes significant inequalities across Israelite society. The 
Philistine threat only triggered a situation that was already ripe for the transition from the 
tribal society into a state. This explanation accords very well with Gottwald's military and 
social class theories for the rise of the Israelite state. The social classes within the tribal 
community who had appropriated communal property, or who were aspiring to do so 
favoured the establishment of a state to protect their wealth, legitimate and defend their 
project of self-aggrandisement. The military provided the occasion for the victorious 
community to grant political power to those of their members who had achieved military 
success (Gottwald 2001:118). 
 
The weakness, however, of this theory and indeed many other theories on the rise of the state 
from a Marxist perspective is that of equating the ruling class with the state. In other words, it 
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leads to the conclusion that this concentration of power in the charismatic leader or in a small 
group is the development of the state (Boer 2007:37). Thus the exploiting class is the same as 
the state. Boer then attempts his own hypothesis highlighting the three nodes of what he calls 
the “sacred economy.” These are the village commune, the temple-city complex and the 
formation of the despotic state (Boer 2007:36). He argues that the state is not the same as the 
temple-city complex nor is it the same as the chieftain or despot and the small group of 
exploiters around him, rather, the state arises in the conflict between the social stratification 
between this group and the village commune (Boer 2007:37). The major contradiction existed 
between the village commune and the temple-city complex because of extractive economics, 
most notably in tribute. It is in this conflict that the Israelite state arose. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have dismissed the notion of the uniqueness of ancient Israel. We argued 
that Israel fits in well in its ancient Near Eastern context. We also noted the upheavals that 
happened in the Late Bronze ancient Near East resulting in the disintegration of the great 
powers of the region and their civilisations. With this waning of their imperial influence 
small polities, such as Israel, Moab and Edom emerged. We argued that Israel emerged as a 
coalition of marginal groups of society that all had one concern, to live freely without the 
heavy taxation and forced labour and the institutions that were capable of imposing these 
burdens on them. Defeating the tributary mode of production, they introduced their own 
familial mode of production. We noted that egalitarianism would guide the coalition for the 
next two centuries. The bubble of freedom and egalitarianism was not going to last forever. 
Increasing social and economic inequality resulting from differential access to the means of 
production, among other factors, put a strain on the noble vision and, slowly but surely, the 
nation was on its way back to the tributary mode of production. It is predominantly the 
internal condition of social and economic inequality that slowly prepare the road to statehood. 
The external Philistine threat was but a trigger that precipitated state formation that had been 
prepared for by internal factors. The introduction of the state in ancient Israel meant a 
different political economy and a different mode of production. It meant a native tributary 
mode of production in which the power elite taxed and indebted their own people. In the next 
chapter, we focus on the political economy of monarchic Israel. We will attempt to determine 
to what extent that political economy can be labelled a “political economy of terror.” 
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CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MONARCHIC ISRAEL 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
The evolution from a decentralised socio-political organisation to a monarchic state gave rise 
to a new mode of production. The transition meant that political power would be vested in the 
hands of a single individual. Whereas decision-making in the old order was done by a 
collective, in the new dispensation such powers were monopolised by the monarch. Of 
course, he would not rule single-handedly but would be assisted by a whole host of 
bureaucrats and advisors. Since he and his staff claimed to be indispensable to the lives, 
peace and prosperity of their people, the same people were supposed to be grateful and in 
return take care of their rulers’ needs. Unfortunately for the peasants, the rulers would not 
come cheap. From their meagre surpluses, the peasants were expected to pay various forms of 
taxes and provide labour as demanded by the rulers. The transition left the work relations of 
the majority of the villagers largely unchanged, but it laid a heavy burden of taxation and 
tribute on the fruits of their labour. To what extent were the peasants willing to hand over 
their decision-making powers to the monarch? More importantly, to what extent were they 
willing to hand over the fruits of their sweat to their rulers? What mechanisms were used by 
the rulers to extract the peasants’ surpluses?  
 
In this chapter, we look at the political economy of monarchic Israel, paying attention to the 
Marxist categories of mode of production (including relations and forces of production), class 
and ideology. We will also look at the concept of kingship and he role of the city in the 
political economy of the two Israels. We leave aside historical questions of whether they 
might have been a David, a Solomon, an Omri, a Jerusalem or a Samaria. Rather, through a 
social-scientific analysis of what statehood was like in the broader ancient Near Eastern 
environment of which ancient Israel was part, as well as glimpses from the prophetic critique 
of contemporary society, and attempts by reform movements to introduce legislation to right 
the wrongs of their society and regulate social relations, we can form a fairly accurate picture 
of the political economy of monarchic Israel. We will discuss the main features of that 
political economy to ascertain to what extent it can be labelled a “political economy of 
terror.” 
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4.1 Kingship and primacy of state power 
 
A chief feature of any state is the pre-eminence of state power. The ancient Israelite states 
were the most authoritative institutions within their societies, with powers to command and 
coordinate the functions and resources of the other spheres of society (Gottwald 2001:144-
145). Political power radiated outward from the governing centre, which included the king 
himself, members of the royal family, chief officers and advisors, to the periphery. While 
symbolically the king stood above and represents the whole society, he was also the leader of 
the upper classes. Trigger (2003:147) argues that one of his most important functions was to 
unite that group and protect and promote its socio-political and economic interests. The states 
were monarchic bureaucracies in which supreme authority was vested in the person of the 
king rather than in some collective (Trigger 2003:71). These administrations were more 
“patrimonial” than “bureaucratic” in the sense that the officers did not serve an abstract 
“state” but were personal servants of the king. Likewise, Weber (cited in Schaefer-
Lichtenberger 1996:86) notes that these ancient states can best be classified as patrimonial 
states. Patrimonial administration served primarily to provide for the king and his household 
(Schaefer-Lichtenberger 1996:86). Appointment to office depended on one’s relationship 
with the ruler, and the officials served at the pleasure of the ruler. Most of the highest and 
most crucial positions in the regime were occupied by sons and other close male relatives of 
the king.  
 
Kingship in the ancient Near East was by-and-large hereditary. In some states, the custom 
was that the eldest son succeeded the father, but this was not always followed. In other states 
the incumbent chose his successor hoping that his choice would be respected. In Israel and 
Judah, there does not seem to have been an established rule on royal succession. Even if it 
may have been assumed that the eldest son should succeed the father, this did not prevent 
other pretenders from seizing the throne. Ambitious sons seem to have made efforts to 
convince the general population that they were the right candidate for the job (e.g. 2 Sam 
15:1-6; I Kings 1:5). Usurpations by members of the broader royal family were also frequent. 
There were also other domestic power centres, such as merchants, landholders, priests and 
bureaucrats who had an interest on the throne. Usurpations often characterised the transition 
between kings as contending parties among the socio-political and economic elites jostled for 
control of state power and state resources. In ancient Near East, the death of a king was a 
highly critical moment. This is a time when several pretenders to the throne usually rose up 
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and fought until one triumphed. Aware of this, kings at times designated an heir to ensure a 
peaceful transition. Even then, conflict over the succession could still break out upon the 
king’s death, with different factions of the power elite supporting rival candidates. To further 
ensure a peaceful succession, the ancient Near Eastern king sometimes installed his preferred 
heir as co-regent during his own lifetime. It does seem that Solomon was David’s co-regent 
and was being groomed to take over the throne once David died (1 Kings 2:1; 1 Chr 23:1-2). 
Adonijah, aware of that and feeling that the throne was rightfully his, tried to impose himself 
upon the people (1 King 1:5). In some cases, the succession had to be sanctioned by a deity, 
whose will was determined by diviners. The role of Samuel in anointing kings (e.g. Saul in 1 
Sam 10 and David in 1 Sam 16) and of a young prophet in anointing Jehu (2 Kings 9) seem to 
point in this direction. In other cases, decisions about succession were made either by 
representatives of the royal family or by powerful members of the upper class. Some kings 
were approved by popular approval. While in most states male monarchs were preferred, 
females however, occasionally ruled in others, usually during moments of crises, and in 
Egypt, their reigns were regarded as contrary to the normal order (Trigger 2003:74). 
 
Ancient Near Eastern states were highly volatile and could easily break up into various parts. 
The division of the united Israelite kingdom following the accession of Rehoboam is 
suggestive of this volatility. In order to secure and hold political power, rulers had to wield a 
combination of both persuasion and force. Resorting to brute force alone could be 
counterproductive and suicidal, as the resultant dissatisfaction could lead to rebellion and the 
fall of a regime. The common assumption that ancient Near Eastern states were unadulterated 
"oriental despotisms" as Wittfogel (1957) suggested is problematic. To be sure, many states 
were more or less authoritarian but they were not totalitarian despotisms. It is doubtful that 
kings dominated their societies as totally as they boasted in their edicts and inscriptions, art, 
and architecture (Gottwald 2001:147). To the contrary, Skalnik (1978:610) argues that 
despotic traits developed in the ideological sphere rather than in actual reality, although they 
could be very marked in the latter as well. He adds that the lives of the peasants in the 
villages were hardly affected by the rulers, except for those living close to the court (Skalnik 
1978:612). In some kingdoms, the monarch would on occasion travel around his kingdom 
and would that way reach many of his subjects. But once the royal entourage has left, life 
would resume its normal routine for the villagers. They would forget about the sovereign and 
he would also forget about them. On the other hand, we should be careful not to regard those 
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regimes in which councils or assemblies of leading citizens may have played a consultative 
role as “democracies.” They still exhibited authoritarian tendencies.  
 
The king was regarded as responsible for the common good in his kingdom. His duties 
included ensuring prosperity of his realm, maintaining internal peace and order, defending his 
kingdom from foreign aggressors, settling disputes and managing relations with the deities 
(Trigger 2003:74). Maintaining domestic peace and order required ensuring that peasants 
remained acquiescent to the state, producing surpluses and paying obligatory taxes and rents. 
It also involved mediating and resolving conflicts among the elites that had a potential of 
threatening the unity of the fragile state. The king was also the commander-in-chief of the 
army. As the chief judge serving symbolically as the highest court of appeal, it was his 
responsibility to uphold justice in the kingdom (Gottwald 2001:178). It appears, however, 
that the actual administration of justice was done by judicial officers in the villages and 
towns.  
 
The ancient Near Eastern king was the most important connection between humans and the 
deities on which the welfare of both society and the universe depended (Trigger 2003:79). 
The kings claimed close association with the deities, and in some cases, they were believed to 
have divine powers. For this reason, the monarchs were frequently ascribed divine or semi-
divine status. In Egypt, kings claimed to be the earthly manifestation of the gods. This might 
be because of the massive size of the state which made direct contact between the ruler and 
the majority of his subjects very limited (Trigger 2003:79). In Israel, the relationship between 
the (Davidic) king and Yahweh quickly came to be considered a special one. The king was 
Yahweh's son (Ps 2:7; 2 Sam. 7:14), his first-born (Ps 89:27) and his anointed (Ps 2:2; 18:50; 
20:6). Within the framework of Zion Theology, the Davidic king seemed to guarantee the 
security of his people and his land. He was regarded as the embodiment of the strength and 
vitality of his kingdom and according to Trigger (2003:79) this led to an emphasis on the 
health and vigour of the reigning monarch. In some states, kings claimed to be descendants of 
major gods. The enthronement ceremonies were believed to transform kings into 
intermediaries between humans and the gods. As individuals, kings remained human and 
mortal, but as incumbents of a sacred office they were set apart from all other humans as a 
result of having acquired unique supernatural powers (Trigger 2003:87). The setting apart 
from other human beings was not just abstract but was also demonstrated in the physical 
location of the king’s palace right at the centre of the city, away from the commoners in the 
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periphery. Forming one complex with the palace was the temple which served as the personal 
chapel of the monarch.  The palace-temple complex was right at the centre of the city and the 
splendour of the city was seen in the splendour of the palace-temple complex. It was in the 
city that both the power and piety of the king were evident.  
 
4.2 Mode of production in monarchic Israel 
 
In his modelling of the ancient Near Eastern economy, Boer (2007, 2015) describes it as 
“sacred economy” by which he means a system in which the economy operates and is 
understood in terms of the sacred rather than the political. He suggests “theoeconomics” as 
the economic logic behind the sacred economy (Boer 2007:39). What is most significant for 
this work are what he calls regimes of allocation and extraction. Allocative economic patterns 
depend on the allocation and reallocation of labour and the produce of labour, while 
extractive economic patterns refers to the appropriation of the produce of labour by those 
who do not work, the willing unemployed - the ruling classes and their hangers-on (Boer 
2015:1). The regimes of allocation have been discussed with reference to pre-state Israel. 
This chapter is by-and-large devoted to the regimes of extraction.    
 
The move from a tribal social organisation to a monarchy was a change from the dominance 
of a familial mode of production to that of the tributary mode of production. The tributary 
dislodged the familial mode of production and became the dominant mode throughout 
monarchic Israel. Scholars often think of the monarchy replacing tribalism except for 
survivals in religious beliefs and nostalgia for past social life (Gottwald 1993:135). The 
reality however, is that the state must adapt and come to terms with the continuing forms of 
socio-economic life among the peasants who have their own social practices (Gottwald 
1993:135). Thus we can postulate a scenario of contestation and accommodation between 
state and tribe. One can safely say that the dominant familial mode of production of pre-state 
Israel did not die out with the introduction of the monarchy. The communitarian spirit, social 
relations and practice of early Israel continued to function in the monarchic era. Not even the 
strongest tributary state could successfully suppress communitarianism among its people in 
the villages. Gottwald (1993:xxvii) adds that the domination of the tributary mode of 
production in the ancient Near East was always an overlay on a communally oriented masses. 
Simkins (1999:134) adds that the new mode of production appropriated, and was transformed 
by, the earlier one. It is also true, however, that the rise of the tributary mode of production in 
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monarchic Israel stood in conflict with the earlier familial mode of production, which it 
eventually incorporated. The tributary mode had an upper hand but economic and political 
battles were waged all the time to try to reclaim communitarian ground lost to the upper 
classes (Gottwald 1993:345). It was dominated every now and then, yet reasserting itself 
once again. This is reflected, for example, in the social criticism of the prophets and by the 
formulations of reform movements. 
 
While tributary was the dominant mode of production in monarchic Israel, it was in no way 
the sole mode in operation for it cannot account for all the production in that society. A 
number of subsidiary modes of production can also be seen in monarchic Israel. In fact, 
various modes of production can and do co-exist in a given society at any given time. Within 
any dominant mode of production other modes of production may co-exist as survivals or 
forerunners. Following this line, Poulantzas (cited in Jameson 1981:95) argues  
 
every social formation or historically existing society has in fact consisted in the 
overlay and structural co-existence of several modes of production all at once, 
including vestiges and survivals of older modes of production…as well as 
anticipatory tendencies which are potentially inconsistent with the existing system but 
have not yet generated an autonomous space of their own (italics in original).  
 
Thus, other subordinate modes of production were also functioning in monarchic Israel. 
Simkins (1999:134) for example, strongly argues that the dominant mode of production in 
monarchic Israel was what he calls the “clientelistic” mode of production based on patronage. 
Boer (2007:41) however, feels that it is far better understood as one element in a larger 
economic system, for patronage is also found in other economic systems. Mario Liverani 
(2005) suggests the “palace-temple” as the dominant mode of production in the ancient Near 
East including Israel. Roger S. Nam (2012:141) observes that the temple economy in 
Jerusalem stood in the tradition of ancient Near Eastern temple economies which collected 
foods and received tribute, had cultic priests and personnel to support them. However, while 
the palace-temple might have been dominant in Mesopotamia and Egypt because of their 
massive institutions and large populations, in Israel it was most certainly a subordinate mode 
which was not large enough to dominate the other modes of production (Simkins 1999:139). 
Even in those pristine states of Mesopotamia and Egypt, Igor Diakonoff (cited in Liverani 
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2005:49) argued that that the temple properties covered only a part of the city's entire 
territory, leaving the rest of the territory in the hands of subsistence agriculturalists.  
 
The “trade-tribute” mode of production has also been suggested for ancient monarchic Israel. 
This mode comprises the appropriation of all external sources of wealth whether from long-
distance trade, tribute from military conquests, or taxes on transit trade (Simkins 1999:139). 
John Holladay (1998:383-386), for example, argues that the transit trade out of the Arabian 
Desert contributed considerably to the Jerusalem fiscus. Taking the realities of ancient Israel, 
trade-tribute does not seem to have been prominent. David Hopkins (1996:136-38) questions 
both the extent of Judah's control of and the income generated by this trade, at least in the 
early monarchic years. Boer (2007:42) argues that trade, in the absence of a market economy 
(as was the case in ancient Israel), was a tiny part of the total economy. Trade in ancient 
Israel was a very limited exchange of luxury goods among a small ruling classes facilitated 
by merchants, and a limited exchange of basic goods among the peasants. He adds that the 
appearance of an odd merchant or two or the bartering of a sheep for a couple of leeks does 
not make for a market economy (Boer 2007:42, 43). Writing about transit trade, Moshe Elat 
(cited in Chaney 1993:253) notes that while it paid dividends for the monarch, its influence 
on the economy of Israel was limited. Thus we can safely say that trade-tribute functioned to 
complement other modes of production.   
 
4.3 Class in monarchic Israel 
 
Another key Marxist analytic category that can help us understand the political economy of 
monarchic Israel is that of social class. According to Gottwald (1993:4) social classes exist 
whenever one social group is able to appropriate the surplus labour product of other groups. 
Using this definition, we can identify two broad social classes in monarchic Israel: an upper 
class made up of the political elite and their professionals (administrative, religious, and 
military officials) as well as the large landholders and merchants. This is the dominant 
surplus appropriating class. The second is a lower class comprising of peasant farmers, 
artisans, priests, unskilled workers and slaves. These constituted the dominated tribute-
bearing class. The former is a class of producers while the latter does not produce but leaves 
off the labour of the former. The relationship between the two classes was one of domination 
and exploitation with the result that wealth and power accrued disproportionately. The upper 
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class can further be subdivided into two: the ruling class and a slightly lower layer of lower 
officials and artisans. 
 
In early states, socio-economic inequality was never questioned. According to Trigger 
(2003:142), egalitarianism was a feature of despised marginal and peripheral societies, such 
as pre-state Israel. Inequality was viewed as a normal condition. Virtually every aspect of the 
social structure - family, economy, religion, education - was based on differential power. 
Membership of a class was determined primarily by birth even though it could also be 
determined by royal or upper class recognition (Trigger 2003:165). Every child was born into 
and socialised by a family that belonged to a certain social class and was therefore aware of 
his social position in relation other classes. Obedience to those above one’s rung on the 
ladder of social recognition was reinforced in the home and in social life. Every child knew 
where exactly he belonged on the social ladder and interacted with those of similar rank. 
Ideas of inequality and obedience to authority were inculcated right from early childhood. 
The social structure in ancient Israel was so rigid as attested by little upward social 
movement. That one elite family would continue in an influential position for generations is 
one indication of this handicap toward upward social mobility (Sjoberg 1960:137). The belief 
was that a person was innately superior because he was born into a family that had the right 
to rule. Biological superiority sets the upper classes apart as unchallengeable and their actions 
and decisions are not to be questioned.  
 
The rigidity was also seen in the lower classes’ unquestioning acceptance of the status quo. It 
seemed a given that the elite were the sole determiners of what is right and good for a society. 
In their never-ending struggle for survival, the peasant classes had no time to seek to change 
the oppressive system and so resign to its lot. The lower classes seemed to accept the status 
quo so that the society would continue unchanged for a long time. Where the primary concern 
of the majority was mere survival, the prospects of change were not promising. The idea that 
the lower classes were capable of making meaningful judgements on the social discourse was 
uncommon. The reality of power was to be protected from challenge by the lower classes and 
these were not supposed to have access to the symbols of power.  
 
The institution of marriage played a crucial role in reinforcing the existing social class 
structure. Marriage in ancient Israel, as in the rest of the ancient Near East, was a family 
affair. It was an arrangement between the families, rather than a union of two souls (Sjoberg 
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1960:146). It was primarily for the benefit of the two families rather than for the pleasure of 
the two individuals involved. The reputation and position of the family in the community 
were associated with and enhanced by the marriage partners it secured for its children. The 
family was the main actor because the name and position of the entire kin group were at 
stake. Parental control over the marriage process helps to stabilise the society’s class system 
(Sjoberg 1960:146). The elites tended to marry people of similar status and it seems 
marriages with members of the lower classes were considered inappropriate (Trigger 
2003:162). High-level diplomatic marriages to reinforce political alliances in line with the 
principle of benefit to the family, rather than the individual, were a staple of ancient Near 
Eastern politics (Gottwald 2001:181). King Ahab’s marriage to Jezebel and King Solomon’s 
marriage to Pharaoh’s daughter ought to be understood against this background. The upper 
classes married their children to high-ranking administrative and military officials for their 
support. Thus marriage was a way developing networks that united the upper classes against 
the commoners. This also had a consequence of restricting vertical social mobility. One of the 
roles of the larger kinship group was to keep alive ties - real or imaginary - with the past, 
which ties reinforced the family’s status. The crafting of genealogies was of fundamental 
importance for the execution of that role. By appealing to powerful ancestors, the authority of 
the family was legitimised and families could justify their claim to present superiority on the 
basis of their ancestors’ eminence (Sjoberg 1960:161). By implication, other families ought 
to acknowledge their superiority and their right to rule.    
 
Class was also evident at religious festivals. These also served as a vehicle to highlight the 
significance and indispensability of the ruling classes. Certain religious festivals required the 
participation or at least the presence of large numbers of people. These public rituals were not 
innocent religious assemblies. Trigger (2003:521) argues that apart from serving to reinforce 
the collective identity of society, they also served to reaffirm the hierarchical organisation of 
the state by stressing the key role that the upper classes played in representing society as a 
whole in its relations with the supernatural. The legal system also functioned to reinforce the 
power and privileges of the ruling elite and to put the lower classes in their real position. The 
control of the justice system by the elites meant that poor peasants are less likely to get 
justice. While the legal system had to be protected from being discredited as a result of 
obvious corruption and abuses, it functioned, behind claims of impartiality, as a not very 
subtle instrument of intimidation and control in the hands of the upper classes (Trigger 
2003:238).  
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4.4 Regimes of extraction 
 
The exercise of power in the ancient Near East, as anywhere else, also entailed having 
centralised control of the economy. The key political decision making powers over the use of 
the land (the major means of production in an agrarian society) and distribution of the surplus 
was vested in the monarch. In reality this meant taxing powers without which the ruling 
classes could not have prospered. Extractive economic patterns function to enable non-
producers to extract produce from producers. In technical Marxist terminology, this living off 
the labour product of others is called “exploitation” (Gottwald 1993:147). Someone else 
appropriates the value of a labourers’ excess production. This labour product beyond the 
subsistence needs of the labourer is called “surplus product” which is also “surplus value.” 
Through taxation, the exploiters exact the labour product of the producer, thereby denying 
him the use or exchange of that object (Gottwald 1993:147). Though the terms “tax” and 
“tribute” are often used interchangeably when dealing with wealth transfer, the two are 
different. Tax refers to the wealth transfers from individuals or groups to states while tribute 
refers to transfers between states (Trigger 2003:376). By calling it “tributary” mode of 
production in this work, the term tributary is taken to refer to the payment of all forms of 
taxes.   
 
Wealth in early states such as Israel and Judah constituted of agricultural surpluses. The 
primary location of economic activity was not the city or palace but the village where the 
peasant toiled on the land, growing crops and keeping animals. The economy rested on a 
broad base of subsistence peasant farmers, estimated by Boer (2017:6) to have been about 
90% of the population. The peasant was not an agricultural entrepreneur who produced for 
the market but for his family. Peasants carried out their daily activities needed to ensure a 
minimum level of subsistence and also practised, risk-reducing and forward-looking tactics 
that sought to ensure long-term survival of the kinship group (Boer 2015:54). Diversity in 
terms of the animals kept (cattle, goats and sheep) as well crops grown, was for the sake of 
survival in the face of threats of drought, pestilence or disease. It is the peasant surpluses that 
the ruling classes which controlled the state, expropriated from them through taxes, which 
had to be paid to the state. Boer (2015:153) cautions that we should not think of “surpluses” 
as if they were luxuries, over and above the needs of everyday life, without which one could 
easily live. In the ancient world there was no real “surplus” in the modern sense of the term. 
Rather these were marginal surpluses intended for risk aversion by the peasants who lived 
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just above the subsistence level. These surpluses were mainly tucked away for use when 
natural disasters struck as they sometimes did a couple of years in a row. The surpluses 
collected from each individual farmer might have been small, but multiplied across the 
kingdom, the total was considerable.  
 
The dominant tribute-imposing classes consisted of the political elite - native and/or foreign - 
and their administrative, religious, and military officials, together with the landholding, 
merchant, and small manufacturing elites who were in close proximity to state power who 
extracted surplus from the peasant producers (Gottwald 1993:6). When Israel and Judah still 
enjoyed statehood, it was the domestic elite that expropriated the peasants’ surpluses. But 
with the defeat of the two kingdoms, their rulers also had to pay huge amounts in tribute to 
the foreign rulers which had to be sucked out of the peasants (2 Kings 15:19-20; 18:14-15; 
23:33-35). For the peasants, imperial domination of their states meant that they were now 
subjected to double taxation: by the foreign rulers and by the native elites.  
 
The land in early states such as Israel was not “owned” by the peasant farmers as such even 
though individual peasant households possessed and used it. It was owned by the state. The 
villagers had “use ownership.” The state's ownership gave it rights to collect tax-rent for its 
use (Simkins 1999:130). Through these taxes, the state frequently intruded into the peasant 
households and expropriated a sizeable portion of their labour products. Those in control of 
the state siphoned off the farmers’ surpluses to support themselves, the state and other non-
producers. Douglas E. Oakman (cited in Gottwald 1993:359) suggests that anywhere from 75 
to 90 percent of a peasant’s annual produce could go towards payment of taxes and interest 
on loans. In emergencies, the king could proclaim a special tax (2 Kings 15:19-20; 2 Kings 
23:33-35). Peasant farmers did not amass much wealth, even though they created the bulk of 
the wealth. A small number of privileged people estimated by Marvin L. Chaney (1986:55-
56) to be no more than two percent of the population, and institutions such as palaces and 
temples controlled up to half or more of the total wealth. The surplus labour product was 
appropriated by the ruling elite who, apart from not producing, plainly disdained physical 
labour. The surplus value could be hoarded by the non-producer who appropriated it, or it 
could be dispensed to other non-producers who provided various goods and services to the 
extracting non-producer. It could also be used for public works, defense, or for public 
religious ceremonies. In the later monarchy, it was also used to pay tribute to the suzerain 
states. At times it could be used to improve the conditions of production so that a larger 
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surplus value would be extracted at a later date (Gottwald 1993:148). Corvée, indentured and 
slave labour were universal in the ancient Near East and these were also used to enrich the 
elite. The Israelite king had a right to call on his subjects to perform corvée labour on his 
estates, state building projects as well as serve in the military.   
 
While the peasants were living in conditions of near starvation, the upper classes would have 
liked them to increase their production so that they in turn would get more wealth through 
taxation. However, it was in the self-interest of the rulers to ensure that the villages produced 
enough for expropriation and yet not threaten the sustainability of village agriculture from 
which they depended. Wise monarchs had to take care not to alienate the majority of the 
peasants by letting avaricious tax collectors abuse the tax system, which had the potential of 
triggering resistance. Weber (1976 (1896): 63-64) observed that hereditary rulers generally 
preferred a “prudent and durable rate of exploitation” and security of revenues to trying to 
maximise capital accumulation. The monarchs were well aware that when such behaviour got 
out of hand, it encouraged social unrest and threatened to destroy the fragile states. 
Mesopotamian kings detailed instances of popular unrest because of economic exploitation 
and efforts to counter such unrest by freeing debt slaves and pronouncing reprieves on debts 
that involved the pledging or loss of land (Postgate 1992:195). In Israel, the policy of debt 
easement was also promulgated while other forms of economic exploitation were also kept 
under control. A wise monarch thus had the task of protecting the privileges of the upper 
classes and at the same time ensuring that the peasants were not excessively exploited or 
disaffected to the point that they would undermine peace and order. It does not however, 
seem that these measures were effective as the exploitation continued unabated and peasants 
continued to wallow in poverty.  
 
Farmers must surely have resented seeing most of the fruit of their hard labour being carried 
away by non-producers. From Egypt we learn that farmers regularly attempted to hide 
portions of their harvest so that it would not be taxed (Trigger 2003:376). Tax collectors 
sought to prevent this by forcing farmers who claimed to have produced less to reveal their 
hiding places (Trigger 2003:376). We might not be far from the truth in assuming that in so 
far as they could, Israelite peasant farmers attempted to evade taxation by hiding some of 
their surplus produce. When they could get away with it, tax collectors extracted the largest 
possible surplus from the peasants and embezzled some of the produce for their own pockets. 
The upper classes also competed among themselves for the peasants’ surpluses leaving them 
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only the barest subsistence necessary to remain productive. As a result of taxation, peasants 
suffered a decline in their standard of living and were brought closer and closer to the brink 
of starvation as they struggled to meet state demands for their labour and produce. But how is 
it that two percent or less of the total population would succeed to sustain their privileged 
position, their autocratic rule, and show apparent lack of concern for the impoverished toiling 
peasants? And how is it that the majority would allow to be impoverished by the state to the 
point of near starvation? It is to the role of ideology that we now turn. 
 
4.5 Ideology 
 
On its own, coercion was never sufficient to maintain peace and order in society. Internal 
peace and order of Israel and Judah depended on the villagers feeling reasonably well served 
by their rulers and on their readiness to respond to state demands without the use of 
disproportionate coercion (Gottwald 2001:233). The monarchs were well aware that resorting 
to brute force alone (that is, use of power without authority) to get consent of the peasants to 
pay taxes and provide corvée labour in states that were not very cohesive and for the most 
part an amalgam of structural oppositions, and thus fragile, would not always succeed. 
Furthermore, because the people had experienced freedom from taxation and corvée labour 
for two centuries and also because state power had been contested right from the beginning, 
justifying that power, let alone the excessive appropriation of the peasants’ surpluses by the 
rulers, was going to be a huge challenge. We must assume that serious reflection on what 
made power rightful in such a society ought to have taken place. The elites were therefore 
inclined to “soft power” with a predominantly religious justification.  
 
Peasants would rarely give up their surpluses willingly; yet tax had to be exacted by the state 
and corvée labour provided. To do this the rulers had to uphold a socio-economic order which 
persuaded the peasants that, despite the expropriation of their surpluses, it made their lives 
more prosperous and secure than they would be in its absence. The elites should have 
convinced the exploited that the state was indispensable and that without it life would be the 
Hobbesian “nasty, brutish and short.” They wished to maintain the fiction that they were 
doing so for the benefit of all, that they represented the aspirations of everyone, and that the 
state itself was neutral or at least God-given (Boer 2015:137-8). Thus legitimation of the 
regime's right to rule could be achieved by providing leadership perceived as advantageous to 
a majority of the peasants, or at least to those influential subjects who once exercised power 
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in the pre-state era. Through an appropriate ideology, reinforced by coercion, the elites 
induced the peasantry to increase its production and persuaded even those subsisting on the 
very margins of existence, under conditions of near starvation, to increase their production 
and surrender their produce to the state (Frick 1977:14). Since peasants in early states 
depended on the state for defence from external attack and the maintenance of internal order, 
they were prepared to tolerate and at least minimally support a state that could do this. The 
peasants seem to have tacitly acknowledged that without domestic peace and order and 
defence against foreign attacks that the state provides, everyday life would be far worse for 
them. They would have been grateful for the services that the state provided, and in return 
pay their taxes and provide labour to the upper classes for these benefits. They would have 
been prepared to do this if they believed they were not extortionate and were imposed 
reasonably equitable. 
 
The ideological superstructure also functioned to strengthen the nuclear family at the expense 
of the tribe or clan by emphasising the importance of the conjugal bond between husband and 
wife (Simkins 1999:137). Yehudi A. Cohen (1969) has persuasively demonstrated that early 
states exercised control over sexual behaviour as a means of political control. Sexual 
violations such as premarital sex, adultery and incest are viciously condemned and in some 
cases capital punishment is prescribed (Cohen 1969:662) This, he notes, was meant to 
weaken local corporate groups by strengthening conjugal bonds. Given that an early state has 
not yet completely subverted local sources of solidarity, allegiance and authority, Cohen 
argues, strong, emotional conjugal bonds of the nuclear family are emphasised (cf. Genesis 
2:22-25) because they are beneficial to the centralised state, unlike corporate kinship groups 
which can be a source of rebellion (Cohen 1969:661). Using insights from Cohen’s work on 
her study on the laws in Deuteronomy 19:1-25:19, Naomi Steinberg (1993) concluded that 
the laws functioned to serve the interests of political centralisation. Only in the laws in 
Deuteronomy 19-25, she goes on, does one find laws that emphasise centralised authority 
over local political boundaries. The Deuteronomic law code moves social boundaries away 
from the kinship structure of the pre-state period, in order to reduce local authority, which 
was perceived as potentially threatening to the emerging state (Steinberg 1993:369). In a 
social system where lineage had previously been of primary importance, the local kinship 
relationship had to be subverted, lest individuals would unite and rise against the state 
(Steinberg 1993:366). In a study of the patriarchal narratives and genealogies in Genesis, 
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Robert R. Wilson (1977:193-95) notes that they functioned to incorporate all Israelites within 
a single extended kinship group. He concluded that rather than serving to rank one tribe over 
another, they functioned ideologically to express the unity of Israel. All Israelites are 
presented as equal members of the family of Jacob. By exalting the unity of Israel, the 
genealogies and patriarchal narratives served to weaken tribal and clan loyalties (Simkins 
1999:137). 
  
The elite had thus to legitimate the state, make the peasants believe that it was an 
indispensable institution which they should support even to the point of sacrificing their 
entire agricultural surplus. This does not, however, mean that ideological claims made by the 
elites were blindly accepted. The overtaxed and defrauded peasants resisted the tax burden. 
The narrative of the division of the united Israelite monarchy (2 Kings 12) gives insight into 
the resistance and defiance of subjects of ancient states to onerous taxation and heavy corvée. 
Yet by-and-large, from their meagre surpluses they continued to pay their obligatory taxes 
and perform corvée labour as demanded by their rulers. The little surpluses in good years - 
when rains were good and the pests away - enabled the households to pay their taxes and to 
survive during bad times which were always lurking around the corner. But when bad years 
occurred more frequently - due to drought, pestilence or disease - then the crops would wilt, 
the herd depleted, and then there was no food for the household’s own consumption and no 
surplus to pay the tax. Decimated by hunger, the desperate head of the house was left with no 
alternative but to turn to loan sharks for survival loans which made the difference between 
life and death. 
 
4.6 Debt slavery 
 
Charging interest on loans was a common practise in the ancient Near East. In Israel, the law 
forbade the charging of interest on loans to fellow countrymen (e.g. Ex 22:25; Lev 25:36-37; 
Deut 23:19-20). As long as the peasant farmers of the pre-state era enjoyed the fruit of their 
own arduous collective labour and were bound together in a covenant of mutual aid, they 
would assist those who would have fallen on hard times without charging interest. But with 
the introduction of taxation, the peasants could no longer afford the luxury of helping their 
kith and kin. With the emergence of the monarchy and the development of private property, 
communal norms and ideals were gradually pushed to the side. Tribal authority was 
weakening as social stratification increased. The tribal norms on usury were largely ignored 
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by the money lenders among the upper classes who had become rich through the peasant 
taxes and rent on use of their lands. They were eager to give loans at usurious interest rates to 
desperate peasant farmers who had no choice but to accept. Taking a survival loan, for 
example, a bucket of grain for consumption or sowing put them into debt because of the 
staggering interest rates. Some loans were raised on the value and security of the next harvest 
(Premnath 1988:51). But if the crops failed in a bad season, then the peasant sank deeper into 
debt. Some loans would be repaid through working on the estates owned by the loan sharks. 
This of course meant reduced time of working on their own fields, leading to an increased 
dependence on the loan sharks (van De Mieroop 2007:170). But most of the time, to get a 
loan, the creditor demanded collateral from the borrower. For that, the peasant farmer only 
had his ancestral land, his person and his family members. At first, the farmer would give his 
piece of land as collateral. But as the interest piled up and the debtor was not in a position to 
redeem his pledge, the land was forfeited to the loan shark. The extended family might have 
been willing to offer support to prevent the forfeiture of the land, but it is most likely that 
they simply did not have the means to do so. Foreclosure on collateral was at the discretion of 
the lender. The former peasant family would continue to labour on the same patrimonial land 
that they once worked for generations but they now worked it as landless hired labourers. 
Only the labour was theirs. Labour and land ownership which had all along been inseparable 
went separate ways. As patrimonial lands were lost to unpaid debts, most peasants became 
tenants or hired labourers while others did whatever jobs were available. Life for the peasant 
families became increasingly difficult as the loss of land and indebtedness intensified. Over 
and above normal taxation, usury was a second and more brutal instrument for peasants’ 
surplus extraction.   
 
With their land gone and still needing more loans to go by, the former smallholder farmer 
still had some more to give up. A free individual had the right to pledge himself (Lev 25:39) 
or a family member as collateral (Lev 25:31). Should he default on the loan repayment, the 
pledged family member would automatically become a servant of the moneylender (cf. 2 
Kings 4:1f). The debtor would serve the creditor for six years (Ex 21:2) or until the debt was 
paid up. The pledged family members would in turn go the way of the land that he previously 
owned. A new beginning after years of slavery for debt became very difficult. Ultimately, he 
was forced to surrender or sell himself to become a property of the extremely merciless large 
landowner. Foreclosure upon the lands and family members involved the judiciary which 
would have been expected to take a cue from the tradition of consensus justice in the village 
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courts and safeguard the interests of the peasants. But because the justice system, like the 
state, had been captured, and was to all intents and purposes an instrument at the service of 
the rich and powerful landowners, the corrupt courts approved the foreclosures viewed as 
illegal by the peasants (Chaney 2006:148). Just as taxation was done by the state, it is most 
probable that money-lending was a state-administered activity or was done with the blessing 
of the state (Gottwald 1993:155-6). If so, then the very taxes that the peasants paid were 
returned to them at usurious interest rates. Thus the elites appropriated peasant surpluses in 
two systemically linked ways: a state tax-rent which in turn gave rise to a credit system. The 
pauperisation of the peasantry necessitated by heavy tax-rent generated gave birth to credit 
system. As Gottwald (1993:153) puts it, the tax-rent initiated a process of surplus extraction 
so disruptive of the peasant economy that it necessarily created a secondary means of 
extraction by credit-debt payment. Two factions of the ruling class can be identified by how 
they acquired peasant surpluses: the functionaries appropriated tax-rent while latifundiaries 
benefitted from the debt-credit system. 
 
Mac Van De Mieroop (2007:170) hypothesises that what the large landowners needed the 
most was labour, which was always in short supply. A shift in the mode of production of 
necessity required a corresponding adjustment to the supply of labour. And so, debt 
instruments served to draw in cheap labour into the pool by making peasants indebted to the 
money-lending landed elites. Over and above reducing previously free peasant farmers to 
landless wage labourers or debt-slaves, usury also served to consolidate land ownership in the 
hands of large landowners (Chaney 1986:68). It served as a major means of accomplishing 
both land consolidation and the pauperisation of the peasantry (Chaney 2006:148). More and 
more peasant land was getting concentrated in fewer and fewer hands of the large 
landowners, with devastating consequences for the peasant majority. 
 
4.7 Latifundialization 
 
Latifundialization refers to the process of land accumulation in the hands of a few wealthy 
landowners at the expense of the peasants (Premnath 1988:49). The beginning of 
latifundialization can be seen already during the emergence of the monarchy when certain 
categories of state officers were paid through land grants (prebends).  It does seem that 
prebends accompanied the office, rather than actually owned by the officials. The king had at 
his disposal vast tracks of land which he acquired through a variety of ways. Apart from 
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patrimonial land, it seems land that had been abandoned by its owner for a long period of 
time automatically became property of the king (cf. 2 Kings 8:1-6). The king also seems to 
have had the right to take over lands belonging to condemned criminals (cf. I Kings 21). 
Conquered lands from the surrounding peoples automatically became the king’s. With so 
much land at his disposal, the king seems to have dished out parcels of land to his favoured 
bureaucrats and to his patronage networks. Some of it was let out to villagers who paid half 
or more of their total produce to the crown in the form of taxes and rents for the use of the 
land (Chaney 1986:61). This was in sharp contrast to the pre-state era where peasants had 
plots of land, probably used for both cultivation and residence, which might have been owned 
by the whole village and periodically redistributed so that no single family could monopolise 
the best arable land (Premnath 1988:53). The officers who received prebends seem to have 
been cushioned against the vicissitudes of regular drought and pestilence. Their large estates 
coupled with their close proximity to the centre of political power and access to corvée labour 
could have made them fairly wealthy in a short period of time such that they were able, from 
their surpluses, to advance survival loans to poor peasants who would have fallen on hard 
times. Furthermore, the absentee landowners benefitted immensely from the phenomenon of 
“rent capitalism” in which they charged massive rentals on landless peasants not just for use 
of their land but also on each of the factors of production, such as water, seed and draught 
animals. As the system intensified, available resources were increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of the absentee urban-based landowning wealthy loan sharks who wanted to become 
even wealthier.  
 
Most peasant farmers had their plots in the highlands while the lowlands were already in the 
hands of the elite. As the peasant lands were foreclosed upon and joined together to form 
large estates, Chaney (1993:251) observes a shift to the specialised cultivation of cash crops. 
On the estates in the lowlands were grown wheat while on the highlands vines (for wine) and 
olives (for oil), ideal commodities for export because of their value per unit of weight or 
volume. These commodities were coveted by the ruling elites at home and abroad. In 
exchange for this triad - wheat, olive oil and wine - the ruling classes got military equipment 
and luxury goods which benefitted them but did not at all benefit the majority. The increased 
production of wine and oil seems to suggest thriving international trade. However, this was 
virtually a royal monopoly which was limited to luxury goods whose distribution was limited 
to the urban elite (Frick 1977:16). The more the imports of luxury goods meant more and 
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more exports which in turn meant heavier taxation and rent on the peasants. Exports 
competed directly with peasant sustenance forcing the elites to increase the cultivation of the 
three major export crops. Chaney (2006:148) sees the development of what he terms 
“command economies” in which the elites usurped the peasants’ power to determine their 
own priorities and techniques of agricultural production and literally coerced them to 
abandon growing their staple grains and grow the three crops of choice through incentive or 
coercion.  
 
Whereas in the pre-state era, the distribution of goods was determined by need, under the new 
system, distribution was determined by power, especially power over control of land use, 
markets and the credit system (Premnath 1988:52). State policy seems to have encouraged the 
“efficient” cultivation of the three preferred crops for export and elite indulgence, thus 
eroding the risk-spreading mechanisms of peasant agriculture. The elites could proclaim a 
heavy tax on grain produced “inefficiently” by peasant farmers in an effort to coerce them to 
grow the preferred crops. This pressure to grow the three preferred crops concentrated risk 
and severely affected the sustenance of the peasants, directing them to loan sharks whose 
loans at staggering interest rates left many peasants living on the margin. For their staple food 
crops, they were forced to buy from the market where the merchants falsified scales and 
rigged measures, making the peasant farmers lose even the more. As the amount of land 
owned by the landlords increased, the number of land owners constantly declined and the 
economic gap widened between those who owned land and those who merely worked on it. 
Furthermore, the real producers who worked the land were not at all benefiting from the fruits 
of their own hard labour. Rather, impoverished as they were, they still bore the brunt of 
heavy taxation. They hovered perennially on the brink of economic ruin. With all this wealth, 
the landowners retreated to the city to enjoy their wealth in splendour with the result that 
absentee landlordism increased. A discussion of the city in Israel and the ancient Near East is 
important at this stage. 
 
 4.8 Living large in the city in monarchic Israel 
 
The tax-rent from the peasant farmers found its way into the city allowing for the 
concentration of the surplus product. The city could only exist when the state was able to 
extract the surplus from the farmers in the form of taxes. Without the little surpluses from the 
hard working subsistence farmers it is inconceivable that a city could have developed.  It was 
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a dependent rather than an independent variable that could not survive without the produce of 
the villages, thus the city’s gratitude to the peasant farmers. Indeed Yohanan Aharoni (cited 
in Frick 1977:78) includes nearness and ease of access to agricultural lands as one of the 
main reasons which determined the choice of a city site in ancient Israel. In spite of rapid 
urbanisation in monarchic Israel, the economy remained for the most part agricultural. Frank 
S. Frick (1977:92) notes that the ancient Israelite city should be viewed as part of a total 
rural-urban or city-village system which included the “mother city” together with its 
“daughter villages” and the city’s fields. A rigid rural-urban dichotomy is not applicable to 
ancient monarchic Israel. We should rather think in terms of interdependence and intimate 
connection of the urban and the rural because the two formed a natural economic unit. Frick 
(1977:13) argues in favour of a “commuting” pattern in which the city’s lower classes left the 
city in the morning to spend the day working on the fields and then returning to the city for 
the night. The city was, as it were, a “bedroom community.” It was walled and provided 
defense against foreign aggressors. It appears the villages were unwalled and dependent on 
the walled city for security. Frick (1977:93) cites a passage in the KRT text from Ras Shamra 
which shows city dwellers working outside the walls of the city and in time of danger, an 
alarm would be sounded, and in response, the workers would rush inside the city.   
 
Though they owned the estates, the elite were urbanites who preferred to live in the city than 
on the country estates. It does seem that the supervision of the estates was outsourced to 
managers while the landlord lived in the city with little or no direct contact with the labourers 
who made it possible for him to live a life of luxury (Sjoberg 1960:112).  Commanding the 
means to extract surpluses from a starving peasantry and barking orders via the managers, the 
elites were far removed from the grinding misery of the peasants. They were concentrated in 
urban areas to ensure their dominance over the whole society and to reinforce their privileges 
as a group rather than be scattered all over the country estates. In spite of their contestations 
as a class, the elites in early states, such as the two Israels, had many characteristics in 
common, including control of a hugely unequal amount of the wealth and cooperation in 
defending their privileges and dominance in opposition to lower-class discontent. In this 
social order with little surplus and very few opportunities for economic expansion and 
upward mobility by the lower classes, the upper classes used their economic and social power 
to reinforce their social position. Permitting lower classes access to certain scarce goods and 
services would simply undermine its own status. There was therefore a need to ensure that the 
symbols of status were not encroached on by the lower classes. Residing in close proximity to 
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one another enabled them to bond together and to grow interpersonal contacts. Interaction 
among them enabled them to make cohesive policy and enhanced their collective 
representations. By so doing they influenced the decisions of the powers-that-be and thus 
preserved their privileged position. The stiffness of the class system set up overwhelming 
obstacles to the dissemination of knowledge among the classes. This enabled the elite to cut 
themselves socially from the peasants and to promote the power and authority of their class. 
Location in the city also enabled them to access a variety of goods and services from 
merchants and craftsmen among others.    
 
Most important for this work on the discussion of the city is Sjoberg’s observation that 
perhaps the most salient feature of the ancient city is the all-pervasiveness of its stratification 
system, above all the rigid class structure (Sjoberg 1960:108). The city’s familial, economic 
and political structures are difficult to imagine without reference to social class. Differences 
between social classes are all too obvious to notice in the city. The distinctiveness of personal 
attributes makes it easy to identify one’s class. In a society where the elite wear “designer” 
clothing and the peasants, rags, one’s dress immediately betrays one’s class. Class is also 
evident in the different linguistic patterns used by the various classes in the city. Upper class 
speech is markedly different from that of the lower classes in vocabulary, grammar and 
phonology (Sjoberg 1960:128). The educated elite use formal lexical and grammatical forms 
shaped after the standard written language that the illiterate peasants rarely have the 
opportunity to acquire, thus further reinforcing the rigid class structure of the ancient society.  
While in physical form the Israelite city bore a close resemblance to the acropolis of the 
typical Greek city, its socio-political function was, however, different. Whereas the acropolis 
of the Greeks served as the defensible civic centre of a democratic community, Frick 
(1977:87) notes that the layout of the Israelite citadel, particularly at Samaria, makes it quite 
explicit that the area within the citadel wall was not a civic centre, but rather an exclusive 
enclosure for the rulers (Frick 1977:87). He adds that the layout within the citadel was 
spacious and the rooms were big. The citadel served to symbolise the huge social distance 
between the ruling elite on the one hand, and the commoners on the other. The citadel in the 
Israelite city, as elsewhere, was the palace where the king and his top administrative staff 
lived (and worked), but also contained the royal cemetery (Frick 1977:88). The burial of the 
rulers within the city also served to set them apart from the common people who were buried 
outside the city walls. In his analysis of an excavated rock-cut bench Mount Zion tomb, 
 
 
  93 
(Hopkins 1996:129) concluded that it offers the clearest indicator of social hierarchy in 
ancient Israel. Hopkins (1996:129) suggests that the tomb and the grave goods were 
associated with the burial practices of the wealthy. Even in death, the ruling elite maintained 
their status. 
 
The city, it should be noted, was primarily a site of consumption, rather than a centre of trade 
and commerce. From the wealth that they accumulated, the elite indulged in conspicuous 
consumption and enjoyed a lavish lifestyle that completely set them apart from the lower 
classes. This flamboyance reinforced their power and authority (Trigger 2003:152; Sjoberg 
1960:118-9). In fact, as Trigger (2003:89) notes, ancient Near Eastern kings legitimated their 
claims to power through lavish lifestyles. The wealth of the monarch was a sign of his social 
greatness and of the power of his kingdom. Irrespective of the extent of their power, the elite 
lived in splendid palaces, wore magnificent clothes and elaborate jewellery, and had many 
officers at their service (Trigger 2003:89). The upper classes used goods that were made by 
highly skilled artisans often imported or from imported materials. As a result of international 
commerce, the art and literature of the high cultures of the region flowed into Israel for the 
elites. It is quite possible that they became lovers and collectors of fine art, archaeological 
objects and interesting reproductions (Silver 1983:104). They embarked on massive building 
projects and richly furnished them on the template of the architecture from the major powers 
of the day. They also entertained lavishly and bequeathed rare and prized presents on their 
visitors and faithful supporters. Sumptuous marriage ceremonies were the order of the day for 
the elites when they married off their children.  
 
Such conspicuous consumption evoked admiration and awe from the lower classes, rather 
than envy or bitterness. The lavish display of wealth helped deepen the aura surrounding the 
elite. On the religious front, ancient Near Eastern monarchs built massive temples, made 
extravagant sacrifices to their gods and presided over lavish rituals. The public rituals 
revealed the wealth, power and privileges of the upper classes who controlled these events. 
The temple had become a site of wanton display of elitism and wealth (Silver 1985:22). 
Putting aside historicity, the description of King Solomon’s temple in 1 Kings 6 gives insight 
into the extravagance that kings were willing to display on temples. Clearly the elite were 
successful in securing a luxury and privileged life for itself. The best that their society had to 
offer and what luxuries could be imported from the surrounding nations were for them 
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(Sjoberg 1960:220). Their lives had more in common with the ruling elite of other ancient 
Near Eastern kingdoms than with their peasant subjects.  
 
But while the rich were basking in splendour and luxury, the situation was getting worse for 
the encumbered poor who were as landless as they were jobless. The elites had used the law 
of credit cleverly and without paying any heed to the welfare of the peasant majority to 
become wealthy. Through systematic exploitation of the peasants, the privileged classes 
prospered and became extremely wealthy while the majority of the toiling peasants were in 
dire straits. The Israelite society had created and sustained a situation where some got far 
more than they needed while others got nothing. The peasants agonised at the hands of the 
elites, who were bent on perpetuating their own wealth. As so often in history, the greatest 
riches went hand-in-glove with utmost poverty (Ahlström 1993:121). Prosperity brought with 
it severe differentiation between the peasants, and the nouveaux-riches absentee landlords, 
living in cities as large dealers  and high grade bureaucrats, exploiting their privileged 
economic position to the detriment of the population as a whole (Yeivin, cited in Silver 
1983:75). Regardless of the wealth of the kingdoms, the condition of the peasants never 
improved, but if anything, got worse. Economic “growth” and “development” had produced 
deep economic and political inequality leading to the impoverishment of the masses. 
Bureaucrats, merchants, and big landholders prospered while the peasants, the source of their 
wealth were pauperised. This selective distribution of resources was enforced by the state and 
law and justified by ideology, more especially religion. The deep social divisions were 
replicated and solidified over time. This fuelled extreme bitterness and grievance, and eroded 
the morale of the majority (Gottwald 1985:323). Caught up in rounds of state manpower 
drafts and taxation, crushed beneath the load of accumulated debts, subject to onerous tribute, 
and physically devastated by wars, the sole authentic sources of Israel’s wealth, its 
agricultural economy, and its courageous labouring peasants, were decimated to the point that 
they could no longer sustain the superstructure of the state (Gottwald 1993:311-12).  
 
The Elijah-Elisha cycle in the books of Kings give us access to the severe deprivation of the 
peasantry. In these stories, famine and death stalk the peasants. They narrate how the 
prophets met the basic life needs of villagers who were suffering under royal abuse and 
famine (Gottwald 1985:351). The prophets performed miracles on behalf of the poor who 
would not get justice from the justice system. The stories seem to have been intended to 
advocate the cause of defrauded and wronged who, abandoned or even victimised by the elite 
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were repeatedly brought to the attention of the authorities by prophetic intervention 
(Gottwald 1985:352). In his study of "enemies" in the book of Psalms, Gerald T. Sheppard 
(1993:381-382) observes that the psalms vividly describe wicked people in their society who 
abuse widows, strangers and orphans and sees prayers not as a silent agony, but a form of 
protest, complaint and indictment done publicly in the presence of the audience to which the 
enemies belong. The unnamed enemies could probably have been members of the 
exploitative upper class. Gunther H. Wittenberg (1991) has challenged the traditional view 
that wisdom has its origin at the court, suggesting rather that its setting is among the “people 
of the land.” Scholars have long observed that while royal interests are absent from the 
collections of proverbial sayings, however, most of the sayings and admonitions in Proverbs 
display an “agricultural ideal” (Wittenberg 1991:155-156). Furthermore, the agricultural ideal 
is clearly articulated in Proverbs and later in Job where the hero of this drama is a wealthy 
farmer and not a royal scribe. Wittenberg goes on to say that while agriculture is extolled in 
wisdom literature trade and commerce are rejected as sinful.  It would therefore seem strange 
that wisdom teachers at the royal school in Jerusalem should have warned their students 
against money-lending and commerce (Wittenberg 1991:157). He concludes that the most 
plausible setting of wisdom is not the court but the Judean “people of the land” (Wittenberg 
1991:157). If Wittenberg’s reconstruction is correct, then it points to a system of enslavement 
for debt that was fuelling intense resentment among the peasants. The eighth century prophets 
emerged to critique this political economy of terror that had led to the mass impoverishment 
of the peasantry. 
 
4.9 Prophetic criticism of Israelite political economy 
 
Whether as men of God called to condemn this political economy, or as a group of rival elites 
jostling for control of political power and resultant resources, for the prophets, the Israelite 
political economy is a political economy of terror. The prophets criticise how the greedy 
ruling elite in cohorts with the judiciary was systematically expropriating the land of 
villagers, becoming extremely wealthy and displaying it flamboyantly in a lavish conspicuous 
consumption economy (Gottwald 1985:356). The prophets attack the rampant economic 
expansion of the great landowners, who acquire all the land until they are the only 
landowners (Is 5:8; Mic 2:1f). Isaiah 5:8 suggests sweeping accumulation of land in the 
hands of a few that deprive the peasants. The joining of house to house, and field to field 
clearly refers to the formation of large estates by absorbing neighbouring plots of land. The 
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punishment for the rapacious motives of the landowners to reap a bumper harvest through the 
efficient cultivation of the crops of choice, will be a total failure of the crop (Is 5:10). The 
prophets also criticise the uncontrolled hunger for more and more land which forces out the 
peasant farmers from their ריחֲלֵֵׁ֨  (Am 8:4; Mic 2:9). The system of credit and pledges is also a 
subject of serious criticism. The heartless manipulation of the law of credit which leads the 
poor into slavery for debt (Am 2:6; 8:6) is severely criticised. For only tiny debts, the loan 
sharks require a disproportionately big pledge. In their view the whole debt system is 
downright theft and plunder (Is 3:14; Mic 2:2; 3:2; Jer 5:27; Am 4:1). Micah 3:2-3 compares 
the loan sharks to savage butchers and voracious cannibals who treat people like animals 
ready to be consumed. Through the credit system, they tear the skin and flesh from the 
peasants and then eat it. 
 
The prophets also condemn the inconsiderate life of extravagance which the upper classes 
engaged in at the expense of the poor. What is extorted as tax-rent from poverty-stricken 
fellow countrymen is invested in well-built houses and vineyards for the power elite. The 
prophets are enraged by extravagance and extreme riches of a minority juxtaposed with a 
majority wallowing in abject poverty. The elite are accused of building fine town houses for 
themselves out of cut stone (Am 3:15; 5:11). They spend most of their time feasting (Is 5: 11-
12; Am 6:1-7) and pompously display the pledges that they have taken (Am 2:8). Women of 
Samaria are compared to well-fed “Cows of Bashan” (Am 4:1). In the book of Amos, urban 
luxury and extravagance is on every page. While the peasants do not even have a piece of 
land to call their own, the rich have separate residences for winter and summer (Am 3.15). 
They lie on ivory beds and cushions, eat fattened lambs, and use the finest oil (Am 6:4-6). 
There is also mention of perfume (Am 6:6), as well as music and singing (Am 5:23; 6:5). The 
Israelite justice system is not spared. Judges are bribed by the rich to rule in their favour even 
when they are wrong (Is 5:20, 23; Am 5:12; Mic 3:9, 11). In the view of the prophets, the 
justice system is simply a partisan instrument of oppression for the ruling class (Albertz 
1994:165). The state justice in the capital is even worse; the helpless and the widows are 
victimised and denied justice (Is 1:23; 10:1f). The prophets see the plight of the poor majority 
as a fault of the minority who are getting richer and richer, and pronounce judgement in the 
name of their God. Yahweh, in their view, will not accept the injustice being done to weak by 
the strong. Their God is on the side of the weak and oppressed. What the prophets find 
lacking in the Israelite political economy is מ יש ְי קה and ִֶדֶק (Is 5:7; Am 5:7, 24; 6:12; Mic 3:1, 
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8, 9). According to Albertz (1994:166) what these two terms mean is a just balance of 
interests for the well-being of all, a social solidarity which secures basic rights for all 
Israelites. In the eyes of these men, the future of the kingdoms of Israel is ultimately decided 
on the presence or absence of מ יש ְי קה and ִֶדֶק. In their view, a society that is so broken and torn 
asunder does not have a future unless the power elite accept and acknowledge their guilt and 
change their behaviour (Albertz 1994:167).  
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
In the foregoing discussion we noted how the city elites, themselves non-producers, extracted 
the surplus agricultural produce from the peasant majority who were the direct producers. We 
also saw how the intensified combination of surplus extraction and debt led to the 
impoverishment of the peasants. The picture that emerges from this discussion is of a 
centralised state living parasitically off the poor peasants. It is a picture of a rapacious and 
insensitive urban elite bent on increasing its wealth, by hook or crook, at the expense of the 
exploited hard working peasants, struggling to access the bare necessities of life. From our 
reconstruction of the political economy of monarchic Israel, it becomes apparent that we are 
dealing with a political economy of terror. In the next chapter, we discuss the modern state. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE MODERN STATE 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, we looked at the “early state”, its emergence and nature, thus implying that the 
state system was already prevalent in antiquity. Then in Chapter 4, we spoke of the ancient 
monarchic Israel as a “state” among other ancient “states”. By taking Israel, and indeed any 
other ancient polity, as a state, is it implied that ancient Israel was a state in the same way as 
21st century Zimbabwe or South Africa is a state? If not, what is the difference between those 
polities of antiquity and modern states? Is there any justification for having the descriptor 
“modern”? In this chapter, we will look at the “modern state,” that is, when it emerged, its 
nature and its future. We will also have a detailed discussion of the Marxist understanding(s) 
of the state. This chapter will conclude the discussion of the “state” that we sought to do right 
at the beginning of this work. 
5.1 The Modern state 
 
The modern state has literally swept the world. It is the most powerful, continuously 
authoritative, and most inclusive organisation in the history of the human species (Cohen 
1978:31). Virtually every square inch on the world map is the territory of some state, so are 
the minerals beneath it, the airspace above it and the waters surrounding it. There can hardly 
be a rocky outcrop anywhere which has not been claimed by at least one state (Pierson 
2004:10). We live in a world divided into states and each and every single person lives in a 
state, and is, at least formally, subject to a state (Eriksen 2005:397). More still, the state as a 
form of socio-political organisation, has been around for a while for it to box our political 
imagination. We thus do not have the intellectual tools and resources to imagine ourselves 
living without the state. We are so familiar with the state system that we cannot even imagine 
an alternative model of socio-political organisation. It is actually difficult now, if not 
impossible, to conceive of human life without the state. It penetrates virtually every facet of 
our mortal lives. Our lives begin and end within the state’s borders.   
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Given the importance of the state for modern life, it is not surprising that scholars should 
devote considerable time to its analysis. Yet from being at the centre of scholarship during 
the early 1900s, it became a victim of much criticism until it almost disappeared from 
political science in the English-speaking world towards the middle of the last century. While 
this was not the case though in France, Germany and Italy, it was in Britain and the United 
States that the academic climate was not receptive of a discussion on the state (Vincent 
1987:1). The term was, as it were, excommunicated from scientific vocabulary and virtually 
disappeared from the professional academic lexicon. Theorists wrote about governments, 
legislative behaviour, political system, voting, leadership, interest groups, bureaucratic 
politics, almost everything but “the state" (Krasner 1984:223).  The state was viewed as 
something that does not exist, a mystification and something not worthy of any serious 
scholarly effort. Gill (2003:1) avers that this may partly have been a response to experiences 
of the horrors of the state, especially of Nazi Germany. For example John Dewey (cited in 
Vincent 1987:2) wrote: “The moment we utter the words “the state” a score of intellectual 
ghosts rise to obscure our vision.” For George Sabine (cited in Bartelson 2001:77), the state  
commonly denotes no class of objects that can be identified exactly, and for the same 
reason it signifies no list of attributes which bears the sanction of common usage. The 
word must be defined more or less arbitrarily to meet the exigencies of the system of 
jurisprudence or political philosophy in which it occurs.  
 
Carl Joachim Friedrich (cited in Bartelson 2001:92) adds: 
We may go so far as to assert that the state does not exist. There are governments, 
peoples, countries, there are kings, parliaments, dictators, parties and concentration 
camps, but there is no evidence in support of the idea that some sort of holy unity, 
some mystical transcendence need be attributed to them. 
 
However, the state came back with force to be an object of scientific enquiry due to the 
growing calls in the 1970s and 80s to “bring the state back in”.  
5.1.1 Modern state as double-edged sword 
 
The state has been a double-edged sword to humanity. While it has brought massive 
improvements to human life - the development of the rule of law, of democratic forms of 
government with broad franchises, of constitutional constraints on governments, of divisions 
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of powers, and of the institution of norms of tolerance - it has also inflicted terrible suffering 
on its citizens (Morris 2002:4). In more ways than one, the exercise of political power in 
many parts of the world has become less brutal and exploitative than before the emergence of 
the state system. Furthermore, states have given humanity many opportunities to achieve their 
ambitions and dreams. However, the evils of the modern state have been striking and 
appalling. The state has become the site, if not agent, of extraordinary evil. The past century 
and its two world wars and man-made calamities, all sanctioned by, or at least condoned by 
the states, has painfully brought to the fore the potential for evil that the states have. Reports 
of conditions of life in the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin, in China under Mao Tse-tung 
and in Iraq under Saddam Hussein painfully remind us of the evils raw state power can 
commit. The current situation and the jostling for power in Syria should also be viewed in 
this way. The brutal oppression of majorities in the colonies by the minority governments, the 
persecution of citizens by their own governments in the post-colonial states and by military 
dictatorships have left many disgusted by the state system. One only needs to look at the 
situation in Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam, Darfur in Sudan under Omar al-Bashir, 
Zaire under Joseph Mobutu and Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe, to mention a few classical 
African cases, to condemn the state system in toto.  
 
The desire to control state power has also brought immense suffering to humanity. The 
suffering that the people of South Sudan have endured since 1955, first to secede from the 
north and then the civil conflict thereafter, shows how states and the desire to control state 
power has led to indescribable suffering of citizens. To these should be added the exploitation 
and other forms of systematic oppression prevalent in the contemporary capitalist world with 
the blessing of the state. States provide the environment conducive for the systematic 
exploitation of individuals in capitalist states. In fact, as we shall see when we look at the 
Marxist understandings of the relationship of the state to capital, there is a sense in which in 
contemporary globalisation, the state is an instrument in the hand of big business and dances 
to its tune. For critics of the state system, its costs are, in the long run, substantially greater 
than the benefits.  
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5.1.2 Emergence of the modern state 
  
The majority of theorists regard the state as a very recent phenomenon, a feature of the 
modern era (e.g., Tilly 1975, Vincent 1987, Hinsley 1986, Poggi 1990, Morris 1998, Milliken 
and Krause 2003). Of course, there are others who claim that the state had already emerged 
several thousand years before modernity. For example, Joseph Strayer (cited in Morris 
1998:51) has argued that “in the centuries between 1000 and 1300, some of the essential 
elements of the modern state began to appear,” and by 1300 it was evident that the dominant 
political form in Western Europe was going to be the sovereign state. Strayer’s conclusion 
seems too confident and sweeping. The argument appears too simplistic and unilineal as to 
render the state’s triumph almost inevitable. But as discussed in Chapter Two, the emergence 
of a state was not inevitable. Thus it is our argument in this work that the state is a modern 
phenomenon. 
 
The emergence of the modern state is commonly and simplistically dated to the 1648 Peace 
of Westphalia, which marked the end of the bloody Thirty Years' War, one of the bloodiest 
conflicts in the history of Europe. According to Michael Vaughan (2011:1), the Peace of 
Westphalia overturned the medieval system of centralised religious authority and replaced it 
with a decentralised system of sovereign, territorial states. The Treaty secularised 
international politics by separating it from the Roman Empire, anchoring it instead on the 
tenets of national interest and reasons of state. The peace might appear, therefore, to have 
terminated the pope's claim to universal authority and confirmed the diplomatic independence 
of secular rulers (Croxton 1999:572). The territorial sovereignty of the states of the Holy 
Roman Empire was recognised and the princes of the empire became absolute sovereigns in 
their own jurisdictions.  
 
Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr (1981:47) agree: 
 
The end of the Thirty Years War brought with it the final end of the medieval Holy 
Roman Empire. Authority for choosing the religion of the political unit was given to 
the prince of that unit and not to the Hapsburg Emperor or the Pope. No longer could 
one pretend there was religious or political unity in Europe. Authority was dispersed 
to the various kings and princes, and the basis for the sovereign state was established. 
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Derek Croxton (1999:573) however argues that the claim that the Peace of Westphalia 
marked the end of Europe organised as a Christian community under the authority of pope or 
emperor is, greatly exaggerated. For him, the origins of sovereignty may only be located 
around the peace of Westphalia as a consequence of the negotiations, not of an explicit or 
implicit endorsement of the idea of sovereignty in the terms of the treaties (Croxton 
1999:591). 
 
However, it is generally agreed that it was around this time that a number of absolute 
monarchs consolidated their territories and concentrated political power in their own hands. 
But to wield both the civilian and military aspects of that power simultaneously, they set up 
an impersonal bureaucracy and a tax system needed for its survival and support. Martin van 
Creveld (1999:415) notes that the rules put in place for the bureaucracy could not be 
arbitrarily violated without risking a breakdown of the whole system. Thus power was slowly 
but surely changing hands, moving out of the monarch’s hands into the bureaucracy, thus 
resulting in the rise of the state proper. Understood in this way, the modern state is an almost 
French and British (European) creation, and which took its now familiar form around the 
18th and 19th centuries. Van Creveld (1999:18) adds that the state is, in many respects, an 
expression of modernity and many of its aspects presuppose features of the modern world. 
 
As with the emergence of the ancient state, state centralisation or intensification of state 
power was a long drawn out process. The process that resulted in the emergence of the 
modern state evolved at a snail’s pace, from the late medieval forms of socio-political 
organisation. The process proceeded in an enormously complex fashion over roughly five 
hundred years (Milliken and Krause 2003:3). From Western Europe, the state form of social 
organisation spread to the whole world as the European colonisers and later the Americans 
incorporated much of the world into overseas empires. The European state form was spread 
across the globe in the carry bag of imperialism (Gill 2003:191). In whatever they did, their 
aim was not to spread the state form of political organisation. Rather, they were on a mission 
to build political units which would enable them to rule the conquered territories from the 
imperial centre and make it easy for them to loot as much as they could from the colonies. 
Undermining traditional structures, all their systems – economic and political – were 
designed to serve the needs of the metropolis through supplying them with raw materials and 
cheap labour for industrialising Europe and for consumption. The break-up of the colonial 
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empires during the decolonisation process had an effect of universalising the European state 
form.  
 
As colonialists were leaving their colonies, they left in place state structures modelled upon 
those at home (Gill 2003:191). The new nationalist leaders, most of whom had been educated 
in the West or had been caught up in the western ideas, inherited the state form from their 
former colonial masters as is, and made it their socio-political organisation. Japan, China, 
Turkey, and other countries that had not been colonised, also adopted the state form. By the 
1970s, all states, including former colonial masters, former colonies, communists and those 
never engaged in imperialism, had adopted the state model as it had developed in Western 
Europe and the state system had become the dominant form of socio-political organisation on 
the globe. The entire world became occupied by independent states that, more or less, 
recognise each other’s existence and right to exist. Its triumph had become all but complete. 
Charles Tilly (1990:183) sums it thus:  
 
National states won out in the world as a whole because they first won out in Europe 
whose states then acted to reproduce themselves.  
 
Understood in this way, the state is a recent phenomenon. Gianfranco Poggi (1990:25) argues 
that although one often speaks of “the modern state” strictly speaking the adjective “modern” 
is tautological. This is because the features that are characteristic of the “modern state” are 
not to be found in any political entities other than those which began to develop in the early-
modern phase of European history. Henceforth, we will speak of “states” or “state”, dropping 
the qualifier adjective “modern” when referring to these modern polities. 
5.2 What is a “state”? 
 
The paradox is that although this is one of the most simple questions to be asked, yet it is 
elusive and probably the most problematic question in political sociology. We often think that 
we know what the state is, yet it is extremely difficult to describe it in some brief but 
generally acceptable definition. As a complex and contested concept, the state involves 
problems of meaning and application. Vincent (1987:3) notes that this is because of its 
ambivalence - its certainty and yet its elusiveness. It has a tendency to sip in and out of many 
practices and concepts with ease. The concept is many-sided and is vague around the edges.  
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In an attempt to define the state, we come across a puzzling range of options, including a case 
for dropping the idea altogether. A number of theorists, from differing political traditions, 
dodge this problem by refusing any explanatory value to the category of “the state”. Even 
more, empirically minded political scientists focus on “governments” and the “political 
system”, abandoning the suspiciously metaphysical realm of “the state” for institutions and 
practices (Pierson 2004:4). Those who are quite critical of the prevailing social order, 
especially those of a Marxist orientation, argue that talk of the state actually serves to conceal 
the exercise of political power. 
 
In his unpacking of the state, Philip Abrams (1988) rejected the dominant view of the state as 
a distinct social unit separated from and “located” over and above the social (Mentan 
2010:9). According to Abrams (1988:58), “the state is not the reality which stands behind the 
mask of political practice but is itself the mask which prevents people seeing political 
practice as it is.” He suggests that we abandon the state as a material object of study whether 
concrete or abstract while continuing to take the idea of the state extremely seriously because 
for him the internal and external relations of political and governmental institutions (the state-
system) can be studied effectively without postulating the reality of the state (Abrams 
1988:58). According to Michel Foucault (cited in Pierson 2004:4), the state may be no more 
than a composite reality and a “mythicised abstraction.” What matters for him is not so much 
the state as the much more generic practice of the “art of governing” and the corresponding 
idea of governmentality. The state is nothing more than a site of the practice of governing. 
Thus for him, to focus attention exclusively upon the state is to fail to capture the full range 
and intensity of governing practices that permeate and mediate the entire body politic 
(Pierson 2004:5). 
 
Ralph Miliband (1970:49) emphasises the non-entity of the state, arguing that the “state” is 
not a thing; that it does not exist and what “the state” stands for is a cluster of institutions of 
political and executive control and their key personnel: the government, the bureaucracy, the 
military and the police, the judiciary, and parliament (Abrams 1988:71). Together these 
institutions constitute the state’s reality, and may be called the “state system.” Thus for 
Miliband, attempts at studying the state as if it were a real thing only contributes to the 
persistence of an illusion. In the same vein, Heinz Lubasz (cited in Vincent 1987:6) states 
that  
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the first thing to be said about the modern state is that it does not exist and never has 
existed. What has existed historically is a great number of modern states, with very 
varied constitutions. 
 
Max Weber has also contributed to the definition of the state. Control over the means of 
violence is for him the defining characteristic of the state. He argues that ultimately, the 
modern state can be defined only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it as to every 
political association, namely; the use of physical force. He thus defines the state as “a human 
community that claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory” (Weber 1970:78). Based on Weber, Tilly (1975) argued that tax extraction for 
military purposes is the main driver for the rise of the state. Military purposes necessitated the 
process of tax extraction, which in turn necessitated the process of establishing bureaucratic 
staff to extract tax, and to manage and coordinate the flow of revenue to the state (Mentan 
2010:12-13). Tilly (1975:70) concludes that  
an organisation which controls the population occupying a defined territory is a state 
in so far as (1) it is differentiated from other organisations operating in the same 
territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralised; and (4) its divisions are formally 
coordinated with one another (Tilly). 
 
Following Tilly, Theda Skocpol (1979) regarded tax extraction as the main driver of state 
building, but put emphasis on the administrative and coercive organisation as the most 
important aspects of any state. The state for her is thus  
 
a set of administrative, policing and military organisations headed, and more or less 
well coordinated by, an executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts 
resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and 
administrative organisations (Skocpol 1979:29). 
  
Although he saw coercion as an important aspect of the state, Michael Mann (1988) did not 
consider it the be-all and end-all of the state. Instead, he emphasised the monopoly of the 
legislative and the centralised functional institutions, as the basis of any state (Mentan 
2010:13). Consequently, he defined the state as  
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a differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying; centrality in the sense 
that political forces radiate outwards from a centre to cover; a territorially demarcated 
area, over which it exercises; a monopoly of authoritative, binding rule-making, 
backed up by a monopoly of the means of physical violence (Mann 1988:4). 
 
From the above survey, it appears there are as many definitions as there are scholars. It does 
look like we are faced with the same scenario as when defining what we termed the “early 
state”. Perhaps we should look at those features that are typical of the state as it developed 
from the 16th century. Probably we might be able to isolate these and use them as the basis for 
formulating a definition of a state. 
5.3 Characteristics of the state 
 
In the earlier polities are already found some of the features of the state form of social and 
political organisation, such as distinctness from other forms of governance and from society 
generally, increasing centralisation of political authority, increasingly determinate realms or 
territories, integration of a number of different communities and associations (Morris 
2002:27). But as the evolution progressed, certain features that are now typical of the state 
became clear. It is to these that we now turn. We do not, however, claim that the following 
list is exhaustive. Rather our claim is fairly modest. It is that these are the most common traits 
that easily come to mind when one thinks of the “state.” And these constitute a background 
against which theorising on the nature of the state takes place. 
5.3.1 Sovereignty 
 
A state is a sovereign entity. Sovereignty is a key attribute of the state. Francis H. Hinsley 
(1986:1) defines sovereignty as “the idea that there is a final and absolute authority in the 
political community,” with the proviso that “no final and absolute authority exists 
elsewhere.” The basic meaning of sovereignty (or autonomy) of the state, is that the state has 
exclusive control over a portion of the earth, over which it exercises jurisdiction and law 
enforcement, and whose integrity it is committed to protecting against encroachment from 
any other political power. Autonomy in fact means the ability to produce one's own rules - 
auto nomos in one’s territory. Sovereignty is both internal and external. Internally it means 
that there is no authority higher than the state. The state’s authority is final. The citizen 
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cannot appeal against the state to any other authority; the state is supreme and its will cannot 
be retracted (Gill 2003:5). The state has the final word. Each state has complete authority 
within its boundaries and no other actor may oppose the will of the sovereign state (Pierson 
2004:10). Within its territory, the state has no rivals. Being sovereign, the state refuses to 
share its functions with others but concentrates all of them in its own hands. Graeme Gill 
(2003:4) notes that sovereignty is crucial to the state because it elevates the state to a position 
of superiority in the society and constitutes the recognition of its right to make binding 
decisions upon those who live within its bounds. Within its realm, its authority is exclusive 
and the state claims to be the ultimate and sole source of political power.  
 
Externally, sovereignty means that other states recognise the authority of a state within its 
borders and accept that that state can speak for and act on behalf its citizens in international 
affairs (Gill 2003:5). External sovereignty is the international recognition of the domestic 
sovereignty of a particular state (Gill 2003:5). It is a claim of independence of states from one 
another. States, even sworn enemies, acknowledge one another’s existence, at least through 
their own understanding of their boundaries and jurisdiction. Relations between states are not 
structured, monitored and sanctioned by a higher power, for no such power exists: the state is 
the highest level locus of power present in the modern political environment (Poggi 1990:24). 
Sovereignty, James N. Danziger (1991:131) argues, is the key element in the legal concept of 
the state and is a basic assumption of international politics and is reflected in a fundamental 
principle of the UN - the sovereign equality of all member states. This essentially means that 
before international law, Zimbabwe is equal to Britain, Holland, Israel and China, for 
example. 
 
While sovereignty has legal standing and moral force in international law, the reality of 
international politics, however, is that a state’s sovereign rights depend ultimately on 
sufficient power to enforce the state’s position. It is not likely that, when major national 
interests are at stake, China will yield to Burundi merely on the state’s sovereign rights. 
Immanuel M. Wallerstein (1993:502), in similar vein, argues that no state in the interstate 
system, even the single most powerful one at any given time, is totally autonomous – but 
obviously some enjoy far greater autonomy than others. This is why, for example, the United 
States could invade Iraq and Afghanistan in spite of their presumed sovereignty. In the world 
of states, the powerful “core” states tend to violate other states' sovereignty.  
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With the emergence of the sovereign state, international relations, that is, relations between 
states, became possible. Prior to this, there was no foreign affairs or distinction between 
internal and external. The pre-modern polities such as Babylon, Egypt, Assyria, Rome and 
Greece, did not see themselves as existing side by side with other such entities and as making 
up with these a wider system analogous to the state system, rather each empire saw itself as 
having political charge of the world as it conceived of it (Poggi 1990:25). This claim of 
sovereignty is a distinguishing feature of the state vis-à-vis pre-modern polities. 
5.3.2 Citizenship 
 
A key feature of the state is a new type of political relationship – citizenship. According to 
Poggi (1990:28), citizenship means that individuals at large possess (among others) 
specifically political capacities, interests and preferences, the exercise of which allows them 
to affect to a greater or lesser extent the content of state activity. It entails rights and 
privileges as well as duties and obligations vested in individuals with respect to the state. Gill 
(2003:196) adds that citizenship is not simply a political category, but implies a whole range 
of social and economic rights and responsibilities as well as those that inhabit the political 
arena. The state expects and demands the loyalty of its citizens and inhabitants of its territory. 
Citizenship also entails participation. Generally, citizens have a right to actively participate in 
certain aspects of the state's activity (e.g. electoral participating).   
 
Although the notion of citizenship was known since ancient times, it was however a socially 
restrictive concept which, before the advent of democratic politics, was used to exclude a 
substantial percentage of the population from participating in political life (Gill 2003:194). 
Only with the French Revolution did it take on a mass, national character. Even then, this 
mass character had little substance until democratic politics transformed the state political 
process. Citizenship was devoid of meaning if it did not entail participation in the political 
life of the state. The advent of democratic politics expanded participation to all social classes 
and from then citizenship as a socially inclusive concept made sense. The state-populace 
relationship was fundamentally altered such that the affairs of the state came to be considered 
as relevant not only to the society’s power elites but to every member of the state. Every adult 
member had a right to have a say over the decisions made by the rulers. The state ceased to 
be a class-based concept and instead became a mass concept, just as earlier it had been 
transformed from a royal elite concept into a national concept (Gill 2003:195).  
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Until recently, citizenship was typically exclusive, that is, one belonged to and swore 
allegiance to one and only one state. To this day, a number of states still do not allow 
multiple citizenship. Citizenship is not always easily renounced. Some states forbid or limit 
emigration, and for others citizenship is inalienable (Morris 2002:15). Citizenship is, for the 
most part, not fully optional. It is difficult not to be a member of some state. Citizens of a 
state are the main subjects of its laws and are obliged to obey them by virtue of their 
membership. 
5.3.3 Territoriality 
 
The state is a geo-political entity, which occupies a clearly defined physical space over which 
it claims sole legitimate authority. A state has an address. Poggi (1990:22) argues that the 
state does not have a territory, it is a territory. In other words, the state has territorial 
integrity. According to Danziger (1991:131), the doctrine of territorial integrity holds that a 
state has the right to resist and reject any aggression, invasion, or intervention within its 
boundaries. States wage war in defence of their territorial integrity, even at times over 
seemingly valueless tracts of land or uninhabitable islands, apparently oblivious to the costs 
and very limited benefits (Pierson 2004:9-10). States lay claim not just to jurisdiction over 
the land and the people who inhabit it, but also to the minerals that lie beneath it, the coastal 
waters that surround it, and the airspace above it (Pierson 2004:10).  
 
The state exercises its authority only within its boundaries which are clearly defined and 
recognised internationally. But outside these boundaries, it possesses no authority. In 
principle, no state has authority in another state’s boundaries. Domestic affairs of a state are a 
concern of that state only. Other states or groups of states have no jurisdiction in domestic 
affairs of that state. Its powers are exercised over all the people who live within its borders 
and no one else. The state’s laws also apply to all who find themselves within its boundaries. 
Anyone who finds themselves within its borders is automatically under its jurisdiction and is 
under obligation to obey its laws. The borders of a state create an “inside” (us) and an 
“outside” (them). 
 
The territorial basis of the state marks it from the pre-modern polities whose power and 
authority were more functionally than geographically defined. Governance was not territorial; 
it was largely “rule” over persons, qua individuals. Gill (2003:6) is particularly impressed by 
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the combination of sovereignty and territoriality that he argues that while many organisations 
claim sovereignty, in no other type of organisation apart from the state is this defined 
territorially. The territorial limits of premodern forms of socio-political organisation were set 
by ill-defined frontiers rather than by clearly demarcated borders (Giddens 1985:49-50). 
Their boundaries were not borders as such, but were mere frontiers which were determined 
by the fluid extent of their influence. Penetration of the “state” into the ruled was very weak. 
Political rule was concentrated at the centre while the periphery was more a source of tribute 
than the object of permanent and tightly managed administration. Friedrich Kratochwil 
(1986:35-36) adds: 
 
Imperial boundaries did not operate to demarcate areas of exclusive jurisdiction on the 
basis of shared practices and mutual recognition of rights, but to keep the environment 
safe through the establishment of clients and the control of trade. 
 
Local governance systems had considerable autonomy as long as the subjects remained loyal 
to the centre, satisfying and honouring its political and economic expectations. 
 
As discussed with reference to the notion of sovereignty, territoriality is not cast in stone. A 
state’s defence of its territorial integrity at times depends on its capacity and political power. 
Wars are often fought over borders, with one state claiming quasi-jurisdictional interests 
beyond its borders. 
5.3.4 Monopoly of the legitimate use of violence 
 
As already mentioned, for Weber, what distinguishes the state from any other organisation is 
its monopoly of the legitimate use of force and coercion in its jurisdiction. This is what 
Vladimir I Lenin (cited in Poggi 1990:73) had in mind when he characterised the states as 
“bodies of armed men” and when he declared “a standing army and police are the chief 
instruments of state power” (cited in Skocpol 1979:26). Collins (1975:181) also defines the 
state with reference to the way in which violence is organised. For him, the state consists in 
individuals in possession of firearms and other weaponry and willing to put them to use and 
these individuals claim the monopoly of such use. The state is, in the first instance, the army 
and the police (Collins 1975:181). If it is to stay in business, a state must have organised 
military might, for establishing and maintaining its status externally as a sovereign entity 
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among others on the international scene (Poggi 1990:73). The state’s monopoly of the means 
of violence means that domestically, it must also be able to enforce its commands, and 
prevent its members from using violence against one another in their private spaces. The 
instruments of violence are there to support its legitimacy if it is questioned and to ensure 
observance of the laws and the maintenance of order when they are infringed.  
 
Peter Berger (1963:69) adds his voice: 
 
The ultimate and, no doubt, the oldest means of social control is physical violence . . . 
Even in the politely operated societies of modern democracies the ultimate argument 
is violence. No state can exist without a police force or its equivalent in armed might. 
This ultimate violence may not be used frequently. There may be innumerable steps in 
its application, in the way of warnings and reprimands. But if all the warnings are 
disregarded, even in so slight a matter as paying a traffic ticket, the last thing that will 
happen is that a couple of cops show up at the door.  
 
Apart from this dominance of force, what distinguishes the state from other polities that 
might use violence is that the state possesses a monopoly of the legitimate use of such 
coercion. The use of violence is legitimate only if it is either permitted or prescribed by the 
state. Only the state has the right to use violence to enforce the laws and decisions of society. 
Individuals are prevented from using violence because differences are settled by the state. 
Those who exercise violence within a state may do so only under the express permission of 
the state. Thus violence is “licensed” by the state. 
5.3.5 Depersonalisation of power 
 
Political power in a state is depersonalised. This means that it is vested in offices rather than 
in persons as such. It means duties are done by individuals, not qua individuals, but in their 
capacity as office bearers. The office holders do not operate on their own behalf or own 
personal interests, but on behalf of the public interests their offices have been set up for 
(Poggi 1990:75). In short, the person acts on behalf of the state. An aspect of the 
depersonalisation of state power is the personification of the state. A state is personified when 
it is said to perform functions. That way, it is given a status which is equal to a subject which 
acts. For example, acts in law are attributed to the state as though it were a distinct entity 
acting. As a corporation, it has an independent persona, is recognised by law and capable of 
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behaving as if it were a person in making contracts, owning property, defending itself etc. 
(van Creveld 1999:416). The explanation of the personification of the state, argues Vincent 
(1987:8) lies in the fact that the individuals holding state offices do not (or should not) act in 
their private capacities and do not personally own their offices or the power, yet they still act 
for the state. Hence the more conventional term civil servant, or better still, “servant of the 
state.”  
 
Because the state is depersonalised and bureaucratic, its institutions endure over time, in 
particular, they survive changes in leadership or government. Government is not the same as 
the state, but it carries the authority of the state. Distinguishing the state from the government 
allows the changes and removal of governments to proceed while still maintaining the 
continuity and legitimacy of the social order (Vincent 1987:31-32). If the two were identical, 
each removal of government would entail a crisis in the state. Vincent (1987:21) maintains 
that the really crucial formal feature of the state, which has most continuity and certainty in 
all states, is that it is a “continuous public power.” This understanding seems close to the 
etymology of the word “state,” from the Latin stare, to stand, and status, standing or position. 
Status also connotes stability or permanence, which is carried over into “estate”, the 
immediate ancestor of “state” (Morris 2002:37). 
 
This state structure is not a monolithic machine, but a mishmash of institutions, agencies, 
organisations and bodies. As the public power, the state symbolises offices and roles which 
carry the authority of the state. Most states are functionally divided into executive, judiciary 
and legislative arms, while each of these is further divided into distinct units and departments. 
The institutions do not themselves constitute the state; they are its agents. Though highly 
differentiated, the state structure is however, bound together by ties of centralism. In fact the 
state is a highly centralised means of administration and control. The different parts do not 
exercise their own authority, but only that authority which flows to them by virtue of being 
part of the state. 
 
The depersonalisation of the state power means that the state is an abstract entity which is 
neither a single person nor a community; is not identical with either the rulers or the ruled 
(van Creveld 1999:1). On the other hand, it includes them both and claims to stand over them 
both (van Creveld 1999:1), but it is independent of and separate from both (Bartelson 
2001:34). It is distinct from its agents and institutions. The state is a bureaucratic form of 
 
 
  113 
organisation in which relations of authority are hierarchical. Its offices and institutions are 
structured in a clearly defined hierarchy with clear lines of accountability. This bureaucratic 
organisation is run by formal rules designed to ensure its smooth functioning. Office holders 
are professional full-time officials. The structure is characterised by specialisation and 
organisational differentiation from other bodies. There are objective rules and standards that 
are meant to be applied in all decision-making so as to remove personal or partial 
considerations from the process. 
 
The distinction between the person of the ruler and the office and institution he occupies is 
for Morris (2002:37) one of the features distinguishing modern polities from earlier 
kingships. Quentin Skinner (cited in Bartelson 2001:34) adds that what characterises the state 
is that its power, not that of the ruler is the basis of government. This in turn enables the state 
to be seen as the only source of law and legitimate force within its boundaries, and as the 
only object of its citizens’ allegiances. Writing of Medieval Europe, Morris (2002:36) notes 
that political power was highly fragmented and decentralised. Allegiances were multiple, 
largely personal and no clear hierarchy of political authority was discernible. The complexity 
of relations of authority means that rule was, for the most part, indirect and institutions did 
not penetrate society in the ways characteristic of our states (Morris 2002:36). Considerable 
power was in the hands of local governors and administrators. Thus, governance was largely 
through intermediaries. Tilly (1975:24-25) also emphasises direct rule as a distinguishing 
feature of modern states. Direct rule is related to the penetration of society by the state. The 
state is relatively pervasive and it penetrates its area of jurisdiction legally and 
administratively in a way that earlier polities did not. In fact, notes Gill (2003:194), the 20th 
century saw the expansion of the state to its greatest limits, penetrating further into society 
and controlling more of the lives of the people who lived under it than ever before.  
 
Paying particular attention to the notion of governance, Jean Dunbabin (1985:277) observes:  
 
What distinguishes government (the state) from personal control is its unremitting 
character. To be governed is to be subjected to the regular pressure of an authority 
operating according to fixed rules. In the full sense of the word, it is arguable that 
nobody was governed before the late 19th century. 
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Unpacking the concept of depersonalisation of state power reveals the state as “a particular 
form of political organisation that constitutes a unitary public order distinct from and superior 
to both ruled and rulers, one that is capable of agency” (Morris 2002:45). 
 
This brief exposition of the key features of the state - a sovereign entity, having authority 
over inhabitants of a defined territory, with a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, a 
public order distinct from both the ruled and ruler, with highly centralised institutions - 
clearly confirms the modernity of the state and thus we cannot talk of a “state” earlier than 
the 16th century. Most scholars now agree that the state is a comparatively recent 
phenomenon in the history of human existence. 
 
Since this work has a Marxist bias, we might need to pose for a moment to listen to what 
Marx and the various strands of Marxism have to say about the state.   
 
5.4 Marxist understanding of the state 
 
Marx is one of the greatest and most influential theorists of all time and his insights on 
anything, including the state, is of interest. Yet he was by no means a great theorist of the 
state. He never undertook a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the state as such. It is 
extremely difficult to get a clear unitary theory of the state from the diverse writings of Marx 
and Engels. Vincent (1987:147-8) avers that the emphasis of Marxism has not been to 
understand the state qua state, but rather to explain it as a result of a more fundamental 
reality, which is economic in character. As a consequence, there is no scholarly agreement on 
what constitutes a Marxist theory of the state. To put it crudely, there is no such thing as 
orthodox Marxism. Poulantzas (1978:8) emphasises that no one can presume to behave as the 
keeper of holy Marxist dogmas and texts.  
 
The debate on the Marxist state theory has given rise to a range of theories each of which is 
based on some understanding of the Marxist tradition, but differing in its understanding of 
what counts as Marx’s political writings. Attempts to arbitrate between the competing 
theories by returning to the Marxist classics are an exercise in futility, not only because the 
classical texts themselves are incomplete but also because they are vague and often self-
contradictory (Mentan 2010:10). Thus, as long as Marx’s writings remain the point of 
reference for the development of state theory, a number of positions are tenable from within 
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the intellectual canon and the canon itself cannot provide a basis for arbitrating among the 
competing theories (Mentan 2010:10). Thus, there is no general Marxist theory of the state 
because there certainly can never be one (Poulantzas 1978:20). 
5.4.1 Origins of the state 
 
As noted in Chapter Two, the emergence of the state is traced by Marxists to the material and 
historical developments of human society. A fundamental weakness of most theories on the 
emergence of the state is the assumption that its rise is coterminous with the rise of a ruling 
class. In other words, they argue that as the elite forms, so does the state. The state in this 
case is equivalent to, and identical with, the ruling class. Far from it. The state is the product 
of particular social conditions, whereby society is divided into opposed social classes (Krader 
1978:5). The ruling class did not arise with the state and cannot be identical to it. Rather the 
ruling class seized the machinery of state, sought to make itself identical with the state, and 
turned it into a weapon to exploit the lower class (Boer 2015:134). Lenin (cited in Boer 
2015:134) argues that the state is a signal that class antagonisms cannot be reconciled. The 
fact that a state exists shows that class conflict is irreconcilable. The existence of the state is 
an admission that society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself that 
it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel (Pierson 2004:7). 
The state is a product of class conflict and not an imposition upon people from outside (Boer 
2015:134). The state is not a means of mediating and bettering conflict to within acceptable 
limits. It is a sign that class antagonism between the economic interests of classes is beyond 
redemption. Given the irreconcilable conflict and the oppressive character of the social order, 
preservation of order is maintained against the interest of one class. Those who have seized 
the machinery of the state pretend to be there for the service of all. As an organ of class 
domination and oppression of one class by another, it aims to create an “order” which 
legalises and perpetuates this oppression by moderating the collisions between classes (Lenin 
1932:9). Thus from this we can deduce that for a state to emerge, society ought to be 
stratified. This will lead to conflict between the elites and the lower classes. The state then 
emerges out of the conflict between the two classes. The ruling elite use it to preserve their 
own class interests at the expense of the lower class. 
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 5.4.2 Nature of the state 
 
As noted above, the discussion on the nature of the state within Marxism has produced a wide 
range of competing theories. Jessop (2012:4) notes that different Marxist approaches locate 
the bases of class power primarily in the social relations of production, in control over the 
state, or in intellectual hegemony over hearts and minds. There is, for example, no consensus 
on the relationship of the state to social classes. Is the state captured by one social class that 
uses it to further its own ends at the expense of other social classes, or it is an autonomous 
entity which has its own interests? If the former, how does the state captors maintain their 
hold on the state and how is it that the other social classes accept the status quo? In short, 
what is the relationship between the state, power and social classes? 
 
5.4.2.1 Instrumentalism 
 
The first understanding of the relationship between the state, power and social classes is 
instrumentalism which sees the state mainly as a neutral tool for exercising political power. 
Whatever class that controls this tool will use it to advance its own interests. Instrumentalists 
regard the state as a “state in capitalist society”. Miliband (1969:23) argues that the ruling 
class of a capitalist society, by virtue of the economic power emanating from its ownership 
and control of the means of production, is able to use the state as an instrument for its 
domination of society. The state has no existence, purpose or interests of its own, 
independent of those of the dominant class and it is thus a product of class interest rather than 
an organisation with its own independent purpose (Gill 2003:10). The apparent neutrality of 
the state is seen as functional for capitalism because it masks the exploitation of a class-
divided society, and in crisis situations, the state’s repressive nature against the working class 
and marginal sectors of capital in favour of monopoly capital is always revealed (Cox 
1985:65). 
 
One important point of this critique of the state, notes Jens Bartelson (2001:118) is to 
demonstrate that the state is not an embodiment of universal interest, but is ultimately 
derivative and expressive of certain interests in society, in this case, economic interests of the 
ruling class. The view that the state is a neutral entity which stands for the general interest is 
not just an illusion, but part of the politico-philosophical folklore used by the dominant class 
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to legitimise its dominance and to reproduce the mode of production that makes its 
dominance possible (Bartelson 2001:127). 
 
Jessop (2012:7) maintains that the state itself has no inherently capitalist form and performs 
no necessarily capitalist functions despite the dominance of capitalist relations of production. 
Any functions that the state performs for capital are because pro-capitalist forces happen to 
control the state and/or because securing social order also happens to secure key conditions 
for rational economic calculation (Jessop 2012:7).  If that same state apparatus were to be 
found in a different system and controlled by other forces, it would perform different 
functions. Poulantzas (1978:12) sees instrumentalism as viewing the state as equivalent to 
political domination in the sense that each dominant class constructs a state according to its 
requirements, bending it at will to suit its own interests, thus making every state merely a 
“class dictatorship.” It is a bendable instrument that is controlled by external forces to 
achieve their ends. There is very little, if any, autonomy because the state is captured and 
turns to the ends of its captors.  
 
Engels (cited in Mentan 2010:5) avers that the state, ever since its origins, was always the 
state of the dominant class, and its main purpose was to secure the rule of that particular 
class. The state in the era of globalisation is the state of the dominant class – the big 
capitalists - and it is overtly a defender of the capitalist system. Even when the state may 
appear to have a degree of political neutrality, adds Andrew Cox et al. (1985:66), this is just a 
deception to mask the dominance of the state by the interests of the dominant class. The state 
under capitalism is thus nothing but an instrument for the exploitation and repression of the 
working class to ensure class domination. It is a repressive tool serving the interests of the 
ruling class. In Marx’s own words (cited in Cox 1985:53), “the executive of the modern state 
is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.” Karl 
Kautsky, once described by Lenin as the “Pope of Marxism”, shares the same view arguing 
that “the modern state is pre-eminently the instrument intended to guard the interests of the 
ruling class” (Pierson 2004:60).  
 
Miliband (1970:49), like many Marxists, denies the reality of the state, arguing that what the 
state stands for is a number of particular institutions - the government, the judiciary, the 
administrative apparatus, and parliamentary assemblies, etc. - which, together, constitute its 
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reality, and which interact as parts of what may be called the state system. For him “state 
power” lies in these institutions, and it is through them that power is wielded, in its different 
manifestations by the people who occupy the leading positions in each of these institutions 
(Miliband 1970:54). In this sense, the state serves the interests of the economically dominant 
class, which controls the civil bureaucracy as well as the military and police apparatus. In 
pursuing its policy, the state becomes fully guided by the interests of this class. In short, 
instrumentalism argues that state actions directly serve the interests of the ruling elites. The 
assumption that government is an autonomous, monolithic, self-contained organism, that 
political power always checkmates economic power by intervening on the side of the 
underdog is untenable and unfortunately no more than a fond hope (Mandel 1974:510-11). 
The state is then clearly the instrument of rule by the dominant capitalist class. 
 
However, some scholars within the Marxist tradition feel uncomfortable with this crude, 
directly instrumental approach. According to Gill (2003:10), reducing the state to a 
manifestation of deeper social forces, is misleading. He writes: 
 
Certainly there will be instances when the state is used by other groups for their own 
ends. The state can be captured by particular groups and their agenda imposed upon 
it; but this does not happen all the time (Gill 2003:10). 
 
The state has the potential for pursuing policies that are in its own interest or that are in the 
interests of the broader society. The state's quest for order and peace may encourage it to 
make concessions to lower classes at the expense of dominant classes, while its desire for 
external security may lead it into policies which will negatively impact the dominant class or 
may even lead it to restructure domestic society in order to effectively compete 
internationally (Gill 2003:10). State and dominant class interests do not always coincide, and 
the state has the capacity to maintain its autonomy. Furthermore, there are also situations 
when the state acts as more of an arbiter between competing groups instead of pursuing its 
own policies. Thus in principle the state is an autonomous entity which remains so unless and 
until it is captured by some sectional forces.  
 
In critiquing the instrumentalist view, Skocpol (1979:27) argues that the state has interests of 
its own not necessarily equivalent to the interests of the dominant class in society. She goes 
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on to argue that instrumentalism makes it virtually impossible even to raise the possibility 
that fundamental conflicts of interest might arise between the existing dominant class or set 
of groups, on the one hand, and the state rulers on the other (Miliband 1983:65). 
5.4.2.2 Relative autonomy of the state  
 
Not content with viewing the state as a mere instrument to serve the interests of those who 
own the means of production, Poulantzas, in his theory of the “relative autonomy of the 
state”, notes that the state may indeed have a degree of autonomy from the interests of the 
ruling class, but, nevertheless, it remains for all practical purposes the state of the ruling class 
(Miliband 1983:64). Poulantzas’ formulation regards the state as having only a relative 
autonomy and never a true autonomy. True autonomy cannot be possible. The state is 
regarded as a capitalist state because it has an inherently capitalist form and therefore 
functions on behalf of capital. Whoever controls the state is irrelevant because it embodies a 
prior in-built bias towards capital and against the subaltern classes. The very structure of the 
state means that it organises capital and disorganises the working class. The relative 
autonomy of the state is in fact functionally necessary because of the institutional separation 
of polity and economy in capitalism. 
 
While recognising that policies against the dominant class and other sections of capital were 
possible, Poulantzas insisted that when this occurs it would always be functional for the long 
term survival and hegemony of monopoly capital (Cox 1985:70). He argues that in the short 
term, the dominant class might lose out to reformist political movements, or even to 
genuinely revolutionary working class movements, but in the final analysis, these attacks on 
the nature of capitalism would be defeated due to structural and ideological constrains 
operating to preserve capitalism (Cox 1985:70). The state may sometimes act against the 
immediate economic interests of the dominant class when the needs of long-term capital 
accumulation require an economic price to be paid (Pierson 2004:62).  
 
As Miliband has done, so does Poulantzas, proclaim the unreality of the state. Observes 
Abram (1977:72): 
 
It is not for him (Poulantzas) a ‘real, concrete singular’ object, not something that 
exists ‘in the strong sense of the term’. Rather, it is an abstraction the 
 
 
  120 
conceptualisation of which is a ‘condition of knowledge of real-concrete objects’. In 
this context we might say that the state is the distinctive collective misrepresentation 
of capitalist societies. Like other collective (mis)representations it is a social fact - but 
not a fact in nature. Social facts should not be treated as things. 
5.4.2.3 Hegemony 
 
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas. The class, which is 
the ruling material force in society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. 
The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the 
same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, 
the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it,  
 
so wrote Marx in The German Ideology (cited in Miliband 1970:250). In the same work he 
speaks of intellectuals as the thinkers of the dominant class; its active, conceptive ideologists  
 
who make the perfecting of the illusion of the class about itself their chief source of 
livelihood, that illusion being the view of its interest as the common interest of all 
members of society, put in an ideal form; it [the ruling class] will give its ideas the 
form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones. 
 
Impressed by the significance and impact of ideas in a mode of production, Antonio Gramsci 
conceived the state as an instrument in the hands of the dominant capitalist class and for 
serving its purposes, but he expanded the means of social control to include ideological 
means alongside the coercive ones. He introduced the concept of “hegemony”, by which he 
meant “a mode of social control through which one group exerts its dominance over others by 
means of ideology” (Mentan 2010:12). Gramsci argued that class domination is achieved 
through a multidimensional process of coercion and consent. For him states are based on 
variable combinations of force and hegemony. While force involves the use of a coercive 
apparatus to bring the dominated classes into conformity and acquiescence with the 
requirements of a specific mode of production, he argued, hegemony involves the successful 
mobilisation and reproduction of the active consent of subaltern groups by the ruling class 
through the use of intellectual, moral and political persuasion and leadership (Jessop 2012:9).  
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While coercion secures state domination over society, for Gramsci (cited in 
Mentan:2010:12), it does not however, secure state hegemony. To achieve hegemony over 
society, coercion should be complimented by ideological means of domination. Only this 
would enable the state to gain the support of the subordinated groups. Hegemony, for 
Gramsci, represents a discreet form of domination. The bourgeois system’s real strength does 
not lie in the violence of the ruling class or the cohesive power of its state apparatus, but in 
the acceptance by the ruled of the conception of the world which belongs to the rulers (Fiori 
1970:238). The masses are co-opted and suppressed by means of ideational domination. 
Bourgeois hegemony shapes the personal beliefs, convictions, norms and aspirations of the 
proletariat. An ideological consent can, thus be acquired without any force. Gramsci was not 
so much interested in whether the base determines the superstructure or the other way round. 
Rather, he attempted to subtly integrate consciousness with materialism. 
 
Gramsci’s point of emphasis is that ideology plays an important role in determining 
economic structures and that bourgeois society is not simply controlled by brute force, but by 
consent. Bourgeoisie ideology is internalised by the masses to occasion consent and 
legitimation. In his definition of the state, the idea of active consent comes out clearly. He 
defines the state as “the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the 
ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active 
consent of those over whom it rules” (Miliband 1971:244). The state is, therefore, not just an 
apparatus for domination, Vincent (1987:167) explains, but it is a vehicle of intellectual 
dominance which actually produces a response from the masses.   
 
Class struggle is also clearly noticeable in the realm of ideas. The state is a site of struggle for 
intellectual ideas and debate. The war of ideas is as significant as any class conflict in the 
factory. Revolution did not mean outright confrontation, but is rather an intellectual scheme. 
Each class produces its own intellectuals who formulate its own ideas about self-
consciousness. The bourgeois hegemony ought to be countered intellectually by proletarian 
hegemony. The emphasis on the role of ideas and human consciousness and their effect on 
the economic base of society, make up Gramsci’s distinct contribution to the Marxist 
discussion on state, power and social classes.   
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5.4.3 Criticism of Marxist understandings of the state 
 
We have already noted the critique of instrumentalism. However, most of the criticisms of 
Marxist conception of the state are applicable to virtually all the various strands of Marxism. 
Jessop (2012:13) argues that in privileging class domination, Marxists marginalise other 
forms of social domination, for example, patriarchal, ethnic, racial, hegemonic masculinities, 
interstate, regional or territorial, among others. Marxist analyses are also criticised for 
exaggerating the structural coherence of class domination while being blind to its disjunctures 
and contradictions. The idea of a unified ruling class contradicts the messiness of actual 
configurations of class power (Jessop 2012:13). This messiness and complexity is often 
ignored by Marxist theorists. Marxist understandings of the state are also accused of being 
extremely reductive in that they conceive the nature of the state-society relationship to be 
rooted in the economic structure (Mentan 2010:14). Bo Strath and Rolf Torstendahl (cited in 
Mentan 2010:14) argue that the form of any state is not the outcome of the interest of a 
specific class or that of state agents. For them, the state cannot be reduced to the interest of 
state agents, rather, the form of the state is the outcome of the reciprocal influences of social 
classes and social agents. This means that the state is influenced by the interest of different 
classes within society. Thus for them while the state is autonomous, it is also influenced by 
society (Mentan 2010:14).  
 
5.5 Future of the state 
 
The coming of globalisation ignited a debate on the resilience of the state. Some scholars 
argued that some super-national forces would take over the role of the state, while others felt 
that the state would survive the onslaught of globalisation.  
 
5.5.1 Theory of state decline 
 
There has been a litany of eulogies on the state: the crisis of the state, the decline of the state, 
the eclipse of the state, the retreat of the state and even the end of the state. The central theme 
of all these works is that the states have lost control of their territorial boundaries, national 
economies, currencies, and even their cultures and languages and that power is shifting from 
the state to the global markets, transnational corporations (TNCs), and international channels 
of communication (Mentan 2010:24). Writing at the beginning of the century, Bartelson 
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(2001:1) observed a widespread conviction that the sovereign state is unlikely to remain the 
main source of political authority in the future. He observed that the state seemed challenged 
by new forms of authority and community which go beyond the divide between the domestic 
and the international, and that it would ultimately be replaced by new forms of political life. 
Singing from the same hymn sheet, others have argued that globalisation is undermining 
states and seems to cast doubt over the future of the state (Cerny, 1996; Ohmae, 1995; 
Castells 1996, 1997, 1998). Globalisation seems to threaten and undermine state autonomy 
and even eliminate the need for the state altogether.  
 
Critics of globalisation argue strongly that global and other transnational forces are 
increasingly usurping the power of states to determine their own fiscal and economic policies 
with states increasingly reduced to adjusting their national economic activities to the 
pressures of the global economy. Policy options available to states are also said to be severely 
restricted. Through removing the boundaries of states as real obstacles to the flow of capital, 
commodities and ideas led by TNCs, it is becoming increasingly difficult for individual states 
to regulate the economic activity that goes on within their jurisdictions. In a way, the state is 
increasingly unable to determine the fate of its own citizens. Decisions made in corporate 
headquarters in the rich Western  states about where to invest or where to withdraw 
investment from can have enormous consequences for national economies in terms of the 
balance of payments, employment, economic growth and even survivability (Gill 2003:228). 
Such decisions are made without considering the best interests of the peripheral country but 
of the corporations. More often than not, TNCs have an upper hand in dealing with states. 
Writing about trade blocs such as the EU and the TNCs, Ronald Steel (1997:5) argues that 
they are: 
 
little more than giant trade groups whose purpose is to increase the flow of commerce. 
They do this by eliminating government regulations and ignoring international 
frontiers. Their purpose is to make governments irrelevant. What is novel about them, 
and a telling mark of their power, is that they have enlisted governments to do this 
work for them. Governments are being reduced to the role of traffic cops, ensuring 
that everyone follows the regulations that are, of course, written by and for the most 
powerful corporations. 
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The role of TNCs is thus seen as denying states the power to decide the sort of economic 
activity that is conducted within their boundaries and under what conditions. By handing over 
their power to TNCs, states give up much of the capacity to structure their trade profiles. 
 
Added to these, Richard F Schultz (1995:76) observed an increase in the visibility of several 
non-state actors which include extreme ethno-nationalist movements, religious radicals, local 
militias, international criminal organisations and terrorist organisations, among others, some 
of which effectively defy and openly challenge government sovereignty in many parts of the 
world. He concluded that these developments result in the disintegration of state structures 
and authority, growing instability, and the inability of the states to govern (Schultz 1995:76). 
Accordingly, globalisation is viewed as compromising the authority, the autonomy, the nature 
and the competence of the state and by so doing it reduces the effectiveness of government 
which, in turn, undermines the legitimacy and authority of the state (McGrew 1992:87ff). In 
the end, we may soon not need states. 
5.5.2 Theory of the resilience of the state  
 
The theory of the resilience of the state points to global problems such as increasing 
economic and social inequality, persistent international financial instability, and global 
environmental and demographic pressures, and argues that the state is the only force that can 
provide the structures of authority necessary to cope with the persistent claims of competing 
societal groups and to ensure social justice and sustainable development essential to public 
order and stability (Yannis 2003:66). 
 
State resilience theorists have challenged the claim that globalisation is in any real sense 
toppling the power of the states. While not necessarily denying the power of TNCs, they 
maintain that this does not, however, necessarily mean a decline in a state’s activity, let alone 
lead to the death of the state. Tatah Mentan (2010:24) argues on the contrary that states are 
the principal agents of globalisation as well as the guarantors of the political and material 
conditions necessary for global capital accumulation and movement. The forces of 
globalisation are heavily dependent on the state for their ability to function and their 
sustenance. Gill (2003:248) emphasises that the markets, TNCs, Non-governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), media companies and all the other institutions that push globalisation 
need to have some guarantees from the state that their investment is safe. Perhaps more 
importantly, states are also crucial in the operation, and at times success, of these forces. 
 
 
  125 
TNCs are reliant upon states for some of the means by which they function: law and order, 
the stabilisation of property rights, communications infrastructure, preparation of labour 
supply (through education and training), and economic support (Gill 2003:248). Thus the 
corporations which are at the heart of globalisation, both in its economic and ideological 
strands, rely upon their respective states not only for their basic conditions of existence, but 
for their very capacity to pursue global strategies (Gill 2003:248). States actually help to 
structure the way globalisation operates.  
 
Mann (1993) cautions against the belief that a change in the international circumstances in 
which states operate is part of a process whose end will be “the death of the state”. He admits 
that states have certainly lost many of their capacities, but adds that the state remains the 
single largest and most decisive economic factor. States have become important economic 
actors in terms of ownership, production, employment, regulation and redistribution. Paul 
Hirst and Grahame Thompson (1995) doubt that there really is a new phenomenon of 
“globalisation,” insisting that states have always faced powerful transnational forces and that 
in spite of these, they retain significant governing capacities and policy discretion. 
Furthermore, there are a couple of strategic areas of state activity, such as military and 
national security, in which the “withdrawal” of the state is much less marked. In the conduct 
of military and national security policy, the state remains fiercely jealous of its sovereign 
powers (Pierson 2004:175). Eric Hobsbawm (1994:577) argues that a major lesson of the past 
century is that the state or some other form of public authority representing the public 
interest, is more indispensable than ever if the social and environmental iniquities of the 
market economy were to be countered or even if the economic system was to operate 
satisfactorily. 
 
There is plenty of evidence for the lasting importance of the state in its traditional form. 
Globalisation will not lead to the death of the state for states are still important for it to 
function. It is clear that states are far from withering away even though they do operate 
within a significantly reconfigured landscape (Pierson 2004:163). States are diversifying and 
developing. Though they now exercise much less control over their external economic 
environment, it seems far-fetched to argue for the withering of the state. Undoubtedly, “the 
death of the state” is an immeasurably long way off. The state is not going away. 
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we have looked at the emergence of the state, its nature and future. The 
characteristics of the state: sovereignty, citizenship, territoriality and depersonalisation of 
power differentiate the state from ancient pre-modern polities. We have also discussed the 
Marxist conception of the state. Using the common threads of the Marxist understandings, we 
will see in the next chapter how the state has been used by the African elites that control state 
power and their financial backers and the owners of capital to advance their own interests. 
Having done this, we now set out in the next chapter to analyse the political economy of post-
colonial Africa. 
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CHAPTER SIX: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF POST-COLONIAL 
AFRICA 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
On 6 March 1957, Ghana gained independence. It was a watershed date that marked the 
beginning of a new era for Africa. Ghana’s independence was watched and admired around 
the globe. No other African event had previously attracted such attention. Nor was there an 
occasion when the excitement was so strong. Ghana convinced and inspired the rest of the 
continent that colonialism can and must be defeated. The winds of change gathered 
momentum throughout the continent. One country after the other threw away the yoke of 
colonialism amid much euphoria and to the world’s ovation. One by one, the African new 
states emerged. For some it was through a hard fought all-out-war while for others it was 
partly through negotiation and popular pressure. South Africa would be the last to throw 
away the chains of apartheid, some thirty-seven years after Ghana attained independence. The 
liberation of Africa from imperialism was apparently over. 
 
But the euphoria of independence was not going to last forever as the independent states 
came face-to-face with the reality of nation and state building. The difficulties ahead were 
overwhelming. Sooner rather than later a mood of despondency about Africa had taken hold. 
In quick succession, the post-independence states succumbed to military coups and 
dictatorships, to periods of excessive violence and to economic collapse. One after the other, 
African leaders failed to deliver programmes to alleviate the plight of their people. The 
freedom which many a citizen had dreamt of and had suffered for, had all but evaporated like 
morning dew. What may account for this sorry state that the continent has found itself in not 
long after independence? Could it be that there were structural issues within the state system 
as such that made failure inevitable? Was it because of some inbuilt characteristics of the 
African societies themselves that undermined nation and state building even before they got 
off the ground? Could it be because of sabotage from the former colonial masters?  
 
In this chapter we look at the political economy of post-colonial Africa. We are interested in 
the drama that has been unfolding in the political economy of the continent since the 
beginning of the post-colonial period. Interest is also in the external constraints to 
development that ensured that the African states did not completely shake off the chains of 
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colonialism. It is not scholarly honest to blame all the problems of the continent on the 
internal systems and weaknesses. This chapter is basically an overview which will set the 
scene for the discussion on the post-colonial Zimbabwean political economy in Chapter 7. 
The chapter makes extensive use of the excellent voluminous journalistic work of Martin 
Meredith (2005). Before an exposition of the political economy of post-colonial Africa, we 
will give a brief overview of the pre-colonial Africa, the scramble for Africa by the European 
imperialists, and the situation of Africa under colonialism. This is done to show the historical 
roots of the crisis that post-colonial Africa would struggle with. 
 
6.1 Overview of pre-colonial African governance systems 
 
Before colonialism, the vast continent of Africa was not a tabula rasa. It was inhabited by 
over a hundred million people (MacKenzie 1983:1) of many ethno-linguistic groups 
organised in a variety of socio-political systems. More than 2 000 languages were in use in 
pre-colonial Africa. Some societies were large empires with complex systems of government 
ruled by kings some of whom had near absolute powers. Egypt, Nubia, Axum, Songhai and 
Munhumutapa were some of the pre-colonial empires. The king was the chief executive, 
chief law-maker, and chief judge (Mentan 2010:21). Given the size of the empires, the 
monarch had advisors and other officials who helped him carry out his functions. Like other 
empires elsewhere, large and powerful African kingdoms could collapse or weaken due to a 
variety of reasons, such as weak leadership, internal insurrection, loss of an important source 
of power or attack from outside aggressors.  
 
Over and above large empires some societies were organised in smaller centralised polities 
which resembled the empires in the system and practice of governance and concentration of 
power in the hands of a monarch and a tiny upper class (Mentan 2010:21). Maintenance of 
these smaller polities was dependent on the kingdom’s ability to have a strong military, a tax 
apparatus and control of trade, where it existed. Many Africans lived in “stateless” societies, 
that is, societies without a well-defined and complex or centralised governance system. 
Mentan (2010:22) suggests that about a third of Africans lived in stateless societies when the 
coloniser arrived. These were a kind of pre-colonial democracies in which the elders held 
social, economic, and political power. Some were governed by a council of elders that was 
composed of the influential elderly people in the community. Although some of the stateless 
societies had a system of chiefs, most of them actually did not. Chiefs were usually chosen by 
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the elders of the community on the basis of their reputation of contributing to the common 
good (Mentan 2010:23). As such, chiefs in such societies were more or less ceremonial 
leaders. Where there was no chief, a council of elders governed the community. Stateless 
societies had checks and balances that ensured that no one person or group gained too much 
power over others. Organised in clans and tribes and operating on the basis of social norms, 
stateless societies, like pre-state Israel, had an arsenal of mechanisms that ensured that law 
and order were upheld in society as well as social safety nets that ensured that the vulnerable 
were taken care of and that no one starved. Colonialism decimated all that. 
 
6.2 The scramble for Africa 
 
Prior to the end of the nineteenth century, Europeans viewed most of Africa as “empty”, 
legally res nullius, a no-man’s land (Pakenham 1991:xv). They had known only small and 
isolated trading posts on the coast line. Their knowledge of the vast African inland was very 
limited. Africa to them was more of a coastline than a continent (Meredith 2005:1). But all 
that was to change. After several centuries of dealing with the African coastline, European 
imperialists suddenly moved in to take control of virtually the entire continent and politicians, 
who had hitherto resisted the temptation to move into Africa, suddenly embarked on a an 
uneasy task of partitioning its territory (MacKenzie 1983:2). They moved onto the continent 
which to them was filled with empty spaces and occupied it in virtually its entirety. John M. 
MacKenzie (1983:2) argues that the scramble for Africa was the most dramatic instance of 
the partition of the world, and it sent out political, economic and social shock waves, which 
are felt on the continent to this day. Mentan (2010:23) avers that the changes brought by 
colonialism explain why the history of Africans is integrally linked with the history of 
colonialism.   
 
Already there were growing tensions and rivalries among European imperialists over 
territories. Concerned that inter-imperialist rivalry could lead to outright conflict on the 
continent, Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor, called and hosted the notorious Berlin 
Conference in 1885 to bring order to the land grabbing proceedings. The colonisation of 
Africa was a manifestation of the extension of competition between the European states 
beyond Europe and local European conflicts were now being played out on a global scale 
(Gill 2003:192). The aim of the conference, according to Mentan (2010:28), was to ensure 
each imperialist power an unimpeded and unmonitored freedom to loot as much as they could 
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in their assigned territory. In this land scramble, imperialist states hoped to increase their 
power, wealth and prestige. Africa was sliced up like a cake, the pieces swallowed by five 
rival nations (Pakenham 1991:xv). In spite of being such a momentous initiative for the 
continent, not a single African was invited to the conference.  
 
The maps that the negotiators used to slice up Africa were largely inaccurate; large areas 
were described as terra incognita (unknown land) and they often resorted to drawing straight 
lines on the blank map, totally disregarding traditional monarchies, chiefdoms and other 
African societies that were in existence (Meredith 2005:328). Straight lines based on 
geographical lines of latitude and longitude, formed over a third of the continent’s borders. 
Arcs were also frequently used. In most cases, societies were torn apart, tribes and nations 
were separated with imperial contempt. For example, the Bakongo people were divided into 
three: French Congo, Belgian Congo and Portuguese Angola; Somaliland was also divided 
into three with each of the three powers - Britain, Italy and France - taking its loot (Meredith 
2005:1). No less than 190 cultural and linguistic groups were dissected by the colonisers. 
Hundreds of diverse, independent and unrelated social units, with no common history, 
culture, language or religion, some of which were fighting each other were put in the same 
territory. For example, Nigeria contained as many as 250 ethno-linguistic groups which had 
virtually nothing in common, putting together Muslim and Christian populations in covert 
hostility. The hostilities between the Buganda and Bunyoro in Uganda were not considered as 
they became fellow became citizens in the same territory. Belgian officials identified six 
thousand chiefdoms in Belgian Congo (Meredith 2005:1). In Rhodesia the Ndebele and 
Shona were put in one territory in spite of the hostility between them.  
 
When the dust of the scramble had settled, more than ten million square miles of African soil, 
tens of thousands of its polities and over one hundred million peoples had fallen to European 
rule and had been re-grouped into forty colonies and protectorates in little over a decade 
(MacKenzie 1983:1; Meredith 2005:2). Overnight, formerly hostile and antagonistic groups 
became fellow citizens. Blood relatives found themselves living on different sides of the 
border, as citizens of different countries. Existing kingdoms and empires were obliterated by 
the destructive swipes of the colonial machine gun. The Basuto, Tswana of Bechuanaland, 
and the Swazi begged the Queen of England for her protection fearful of the encroachment of 
white settlers into their kingdoms and became protectorates. With the defeat of the Germans 
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in the First World War, its colonies were shared out among Britain, France, Belgium and the 
Union of South Africa (Meredith 2005:7). 
 
Africans in most parts of the continent resisted European occupation. Resistance in Kumasi 
was brutally suppressed by the British. Samori Touré of the Mandingo Empire waged a long 
remarkable campaign of close to a decade against the French. The Shona and Ndebele fought 
tenaciously against white settlers in what became known as Chimurenga/Umvukela. The 
worst form of savage brutality was shown by the Germans in South West Africa, where they 
annihilated more than 75% of the Herero people to stamp out resistance between 1904 and 
1908 in what qualifies to be the first genocide of the last century. Resistance against 
European occupation continued for decades to come. But the superior European fire power 
coupled with the sheer brutality of the imperialists won the day and consolidated the 
occupation of the territories. Dozens of resisting African leaders were killed during 
confrontations, while others were executed or sent into exile (Meredith 2005:3). By the 
1930s, the whole continent, except for Ethiopia which successfully resisted Italian 
occupation, was under colonial rule. The conquest and occupation of Africa completed the 
enslavement of Africans which began two centuries earlier with the brutal and savage 
Atlantic slave trade (Brooke-Smith 1987:3). Thus were born the modern states of Africa. The 
state model of socio-political organisation developed in Western Europe was imposed on the 
continent. For the next century, Africa would be under the yoke of colonialism.  
6.3 Africa under colonialism  
 
While colonial rule did not last for long, its impact on the continent was devastating and is 
still being felt to this day. The aim of European imperialism on the continent has always been 
about economies of extraction requiring access to cheap labour and raw materials. The 
imperial bourgeoisie has always viewed Africa as simply a geographic terrain that offers 
opportunities for the prosperity of global capitalism. The colonial state was set up as an 
instrument for dominating and integrating the continent into the internal capitalist system 
through supplying it with raw materials (Mentan 2010:xi). Its aim was to advance the 
interests of the metropolitan bourgeoisie at the expense of the African. The colonial economy 
was designed to serve the needs and to meet the demands of industrialising Europe (Gill 
2003:191). As a result, the colonisation of Africa substantially contributed to the prosperity 
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of Europe. As Mentan (2010:28) points out, Africa bled so that Europe could have a river of 
wealth flowing through her.  
 
Political and economic life in the colonies was shaped by structures imposed by the colonial 
powers. The colonies as part of the empire were tied together into a system with its centre in 
the imperial power and whose rationale was the prosperity of the imperial power. In this 
sense, all structures and processes in the colonies were shaped by imperial imperatives, and 
all were part of the one system (Gill 2003:192). Mentan (2010:24) argues that the prime 
legacy of colonialism was the integration of colonies into the international capitalist 
economy. Since then, the extroversion of Africa, whereby its economy was oriented to meet 
the needs of other people in other places continues to this day (Carmody 2011:3).  
 
With the partition of Africa, the formerly disparate tribes and social groupings merged into 
pseudo-states. The imposition of the Westphalian state system resulted in the wiping out of 
existing African kingdoms and empires as viable forms of socio-political organisation. 
Africa’s traditional structures were undermined, ignored or looked down upon with disdain as 
the colonialists imposed theirs. The majority of the inhabitants did not identify with the states 
and did not have a say whatsoever in their governance. The people never dialogued their 
differences as a basis for federating. They never talked to each other about a political union. 
They woke up one morning and saw themselves conscripted into geo-political constructs they 
never chose nor bargained for (Mentan 2010:29). 
 
The collective African psyche was deformed and ripped apart, something from which it is yet 
to recover. Indigenous peoples were not only dispossessed of their lands but also of their 
histories. The histories and cultures of African people were demonised and labelled inferior, 
backward, peripheral, and doomed to extinction, "by the dogma of colonialist notions of 
progress and civilisation'' (Tauli-Corpuz 1993:10). In fact pre-colonial Africa was regarded as 
pre-historic and so the history of Africa became “the history of the white man in Africa”. 
Africa’s cultures experienced the trauma of rapid and enforced change which often tied 
Africa with unavoidable bonds of dependence. The African had to forfeit his language and 
adopt the coloniser’s. Europeans decided how best they could break down traditional social 
and economic networks for more efficient social control and resource extraction (Mentan 
2010:169).   
 
 
 
  133 
Colonialism, by and large, involves the brutal conquest of one people by another. The 
European colonial capitalist state was not a neutral institution. If we are to apply the 
structuralist understanding of the state (as discussed in Chapter 5), we would view the 
colonial state as having an inherently capitalist bias. The agencies of the state (army, police, 
government departments, judiciary and parliament) were never neutral bodies governing in 
the interests of all. Rather they were at the service of monopoly capital and could not even 
hide their bias. Colonialism created an exceedingly exploitative, insensitive and oppressive 
state. When workers went on strike demanding higher wages and improved working 
conditions, that was viewed as a stumbling block to capitalist expansion and so the full wrath 
of the repressive state apparatus would be unleashed on them. The colonial state was there to 
protect the interests of the ruling minority capitalists by any means necessary, including by 
brutal violence. Laws were actually made to protect those who had both capital and power.  
 
Because it was aimed at furthering the interests of capital, the European bourgeoisie state was 
exclusive. It was a club of the elite that decided public policy without any consultation. 
Democratic values were suppressed, at best, ignored. Its prime concern was with maximising 
profits and the general extraction of surplus to satisfy the interests of the metropolitan state 
and dominant classes. To do that, it relied on extreme brutality and used its military power to 
unleash violence on African communities without hesitation. As Mentan (2010:176) notes, 
the political and economic structures of the colonial state were conditioned to meet the 
repressive as well as the exploitative needs of the imperial states, leaving the former African 
territories unable to develop after the fall of the colonial empires. 
 
The colonial state was an external creation and external determination by capitalist 
globalisation. It was not, therefore, an African creation, and so not an African state. This, no 
doubt, had enormous implications for the political economy of the post-colonial African state. 
 
6.4 Post-colonial African state 
 
6.4.1 Moment of triumph 
 
“Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added unto you,” the founding father 
of Ghana and the continent’s first independence leader, Kwame Nkrumah, is quoted as saying 
(Meredith 2005:141). Once independent, the continent was widely expected to make 
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unprecedented progress. Expectations were very high; the sense of excitement had been 
raised to ever greater heights by the sometimes exaggerated promises of nationalist leaders 
campaigning for power, promising to provide education, medical care, employment and land 
for all (Meredith 2010:141). The honeymoon of independence was indeed memorable. Riding 
the crown of popularity, African leaders, stepped forward with energy and gusto to tackle the 
tasks of development and nation-building. They devised ambitious plans to lift their people 
out of poverty and ignorance.  
 
Given the range of difficulties that Africa faced at independence, the progresses made in the 
two decades after 1960 were incredible. The greatest strides were made in the development of 
human resources; in particular, in educating and training Africans. The World Bank (WB 
1981:13) notes that student population increased from 36 to 63 percent of the age group at the 
primary level, from 3 to 13 percent at the secondary level, and from virtually zero to 1 
percent at the university level during the first two decades of independence. The bank 
observed:  
 
The African record is unique; nowhere else has a formal education system been 
created on so broad a scale in so short a time (WB 1981:13). 
 
The health sector also registered notable successes. Infant mortality rates dropped from 38 to 
25 per thousand, while life expectancy increased from 39 to 47 years (WB 1981:13). The 
number of medical and nursing personnel per capita doubled in spite of a massive increase in 
the population.  
 
Roads, railways, ports and other important infrastructure were built at an unprecedented rate. 
Road-building received special attention, both for its economic effects and because of its 
ability to link and unify the disparate nations. The number of vehicles tripled in a space of 
two decades. Post-independence Africa was opened up with extraordinary speed. Millions of 
formerly isolated villagers now had access to cheaper transport, which created new options 
and opportunities for them. Independence also brought to Africa a cultural revival. African 
music, art and literature, freed from colonial disdain, expanded into new forms. African 
artists excelled and took to the world stage. The study of Africa - its history, archaeology, 
sociology, religion and politics - became a serious discipline at universities around the world 
as they set up departments of African studies. 
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Given the vast mineral resources that Africa was known to possess, the potential for 
economic development seemed unlimited. The World Bank economist, Andrew Kamarck, 
concluded in 1967:  
 
For most of Africa, the economic future before the end of the century can be bright 
(Meredith 2005:142). 
 
To the African leaders, agriculture was not able to provide the engine of economic growth. 
They thus envisaged a move from low-productivity agriculture to high-productivity 
manufacturing. Nkrumah remarked: 
 
The circle of poverty can only be broken by a massively planned industrial 
undertaking (Meredith 2005:144). 
 
The gods of the rain seemed to be celebrating with the continent and were very generous with 
the rains. Rainfall which is a key factor in determining Africa's fortunes was propitious. 
Throughout the 1950s, good rains boosted agricultural production. In 1961 Lake Chad and 
Lake Victoria reached their highest levels in the twentieth century (Meredith 2005:142). 
 
The young nations were also assisted substantially by Western governments, who provided 
substantial amounts of aid. Meredith (2005:142) notes that the level of aid to sub-Saharan 
Africa in the form of grants or cheap loans from Western Europe and North America alone 
reached more than $1 billion in 1964. Africa’s significance was seen by how the rival powers 
jostled to court the newly independent states into their ideological corner during the Cold 
War. The continent was too valuable a prize to lose. While the former colonial powers sought 
to strengthen the special relationship they had formed with their former colonies, the Eastern 
bloc sought to gain influence in the new states. The Western world was suspicious and 
distrustful of any links between Africa and the Eastern bloc. Echoing Harold Macmillan's 
earlier view, United States President John F Kennedy in 1962 said: 
 
We see Africa as probably the greatest open field of manoeuvre in the worldwide 
competition between the [communist] bloc and the non-communist (Meredith 
2005:142).  
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For their ideological stance, most African governments chose what they called “African 
socialism” though it was not properly defined. They claimed that African societies 
traditionally included many indigenous aspects of socialism: the communal ownership of 
land; the egalitarian character of village life, collective decision-making and extensive 
networks of social obligation (Meredith 2005:145). President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, a 
leading advocate of African socialism remarked: 
 
We in Africa have no more need of being converted to socialism than we have of 
being taught democracy. Both are rooted in our past, in the traditional society which 
produced us (Meredith 2005:145).  
 
Africa's increasing international confidence and ambitions became evident in 1963 when over 
thirty countries established the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to provide Africa with a 
powerful independent voice in world affairs. The organisation was launched with high ideals 
and a mishmash of aims, which included the liberation of southern Africa from white 
minority rule.   
 
6.4.2 Constraints to economic development and nation/state building 
 
The difficulties that stood in the face of African states were enormous. Yet the resources 
available to governments to address these challenges and uplift Africans out of poverty were 
limited. Africa was the poorest and least developed region in the world. Only a few islands of 
modern economic development existed across the vast continent, most of them restricted to 
coastal or mining areas. Much of the inland remained severely undeveloped, remote and cut 
off from the modern world. Africa's huge physical size and dispersed population created 
transport needs and problems. The majority of Africans lived in rural areas. In 1945 there 
were only forty-nine towns on the entire continent. More than half were in North Africa: 
ten in Egypt, nine in Morocco, four in Algeria, one in Tunisia, and one in Libya; eleven 
others were in South Africa (Meredith 2005:152). Basic infrastructure - roads, railway, 
ports, and communication systems - was scant and did not penetrate the hinterland. Nearly a 
third of all Sub-Saharan countries are landlocked, relying on long links to the sea, hundreds, 
even thousands of kilometres by the shortest land route.  
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Much of the economies of the emerging African states had been developed in accordance 
with the needs of colonial powers. These economies were heavily dependent on foreign 
markets, as well as on external supplies of capital and technology. Their aim was therefore 
not for the development and upliftment of the indigenous communities but for the benefit of 
the imperial bourgeoisie. Furthermore, trade and industry were largely owned or controlled 
by foreign corporations. To all intents and purposes, the modern economy consisted largely 
of European-run mining enclaves and islands of settler agricultural activity. The economy of 
the natives was insignificant, producing very little for the market. In 1975 there were only 
eighty African-owned shops in Maputo, the capital of Mozambique (WB 1981:9). African-
owned and operated enterprises with more than ten employees were extremely rare, even in 
the relatively advanced economies of Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe (WB 1981:9). Thus, at 
the beginning of the post-colonial period most Africans were outside the modern economy. 
Manufacturing, on which so many hopes for development were pinned, was only a small 
percentage of the GDP. Except for mining and trade, foreign investors found little to attract 
them to the continent: the risks were high while the markets were tiny (Meredith 2005:153).  
 
A 1950s UN study noted that over seventy percent of the land under cultivation was devoted 
to subsistence crops, while less than ten percent was for export (WB 1981:12). African labour 
was, likewise, overwhelmingly concentrated on subsistence farming. Except for Southern 
Africa which had as much as ten percent of the population engaged in paid work, on the rest 
of the continent, there were probably no more than ten million African wage earners during 
any part of the year in 1960 (WB 1981:12). The dominance of subsistence farming presented 
obstacles to the development of agriculture. Farmers had to be induced to produce for the 
market, adopt new crops, and take new risks. Furthermore, established farming systems, 
which had evolved over centuries, had to be overhauled if production was to increase. New 
crops, more productive farming techniques, new methods of crop rotation and seed protection 
were generally unknown.  
 
Added to this were the African climate and geography, which are often harsh and variable. 
Africa is pre-eminently tropical. The equator cuts across the continent, a fact which creates 
special obstacles to development. African soils are for the most part thin, deficient in organic 
nutrients, and in general only moderately fertile, thus producing limited yields (Meredith 
2005:150-151; WB 1981:12). Rainfall is generally inadequate on a continent that heavily 
relies on agriculture. Well-watered areas are only about one quarter of the total; elsewhere, 
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rains are inadequate in volume and highly variable in time (WB 1981:12). Periodic droughts 
were a constant hazard, and could sometimes last for a number of years. Good soils were 
often in the hands of white settlers or big TNCs. The tropical climate is especially hospitable 
to bacterial and parasitic diseases and to endemic diseases such as malaria and bilharzia. 
 
One of the most critical challenges of the immediate post-independence years was the dire 
shortage of skilled human power throughout the continent. There was a great reliance on 
expatriates throughout the continent. University trained human power was even more scarce. 
In most sub-Saharan African countries, over three quarters of skilled professionals were 
expatriates. Senior executive and technical jobs in government were also dominated by 
expatriates. Zaire was left without a single African doctor, lawyer, engineer, or army officer 
at independence (WB 1981:9). In the upper ranks of the civil service, only three Congolese 
out of 1 400 officials held posts, two of which were recent appointments (Meredith 
2005:101). Even in Nigeria, a country with one of the most advanced education systems, 
Africans held fewer than 700 of the 3 000 senior posts in the civil service until the mid-
1950s, while in Senegal, 1 500 French technical experts occupied almost all of the top jobs in 
1961 (WB 1981:9). Where there were large numbers of white settlers, for example, Kenya 
and Tanzania, even fewer Africans were skilled. In these two cases, fewer than twenty 
percent of high-level civil service posts were occupied by African in the early 1960s (WB 
1981:9). The scarcity of skilled labour force at the time of independence had adverse effects 
on public administration and industrial development.  
 
Underdeveloped human resources can be partially explained by the fact that advanced 
education was still largely unavailable to most Africans: local facilities did not exist or, 
where they did, African enrolment was often restricted. In the late 1950s, less than 10 000 
African students were attending universities at home or abroad (one student per 20 000 
people). In fact, very few countries had more than 200 African students in university. As was 
the case at higher education level, the number of high school graduates was also limited. By 
1960, the total of university graduates in Zaire was thirty (Meredith 2005:101). In the late 
1950s, the entire sub-Saharan African region produced only 8 000 secondary school 
graduates per year (WB 1981:10). In fact, only three percent of high school age students were 
being educated at secondary school level in Africa in 1960, while only about one-third of the 
student-age population at primary level went to school. At the end of the 1959-1960 
academic year in Congo, only 136 children completed secondary education (Meredith 
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2005:101). Only sixteen per cent of the adult population in Africa was literate (Meredith 
2005:151). Thus, most Africans were predominantly illiterate and innumerate at 
independence.  
 
Just as educational and training needs were not being met, so too were health needs 
neglected. In 1960, for example, there was just one physician for every 50 000 people in Sub-
Saharan Africa as compared to one per 12 000 in other low-income countries (WB 1981:10). 
Life expectancy was lower than the average for all low-income countries (39 years compared 
with 42), and child death rates were substantially higher (39 per thousand compared with 23) 
(WB 1981:10). Attempts to control prevalent tropical diseases in many parts of the region by 
colonial governments were largely restricted to major urban centres leaving out the majority 
of rural people. The devastating effects of disease and sickness lowered the productivity of 
the workers and the ability to be innovative. 
 
Meanwhile, Africa’s population was growing rapidly, adding new challenges and stretching 
government services to the limit. On average, each woman in Africa contributed six children 
to the next generation. Between 1950 and 1980, Africa's population tripled, with nearly two-
thirds of the increase occurring in rural areas, aggravating land shortages (Meredith 
2005:152). Driven by landlessness and poverty, and attracted by prospects of a better life, 
millions migrated to urban areas, especially capital cities. The result was that the urban 
population in Africa expanded much faster than on any other continent. In thirty five African 
capitals, the population increased at an annual rate of 8.5 percent (Meredith 2005:152). This 
means that the population doubled every ten years. Most urbanites lived in slums and squatter 
settlements which lacked basic amenities like tap water, sanitation and electricity. For the 
majority, there were no prospects of employment. 
 
6.4.3 The state in crisis 
 
After the euphoria of the independence era had died down, so many hopes and ambitions 
began to fade. Africa was in trouble. Not long into independence, the continent came to be 
spoken of only in negative terms. Scores of states were torn apart by war. Coups became the 
order of the day. One country after another fell into dictatorship. Even the founding fathers 
who once enjoyed massive popularity, turned against their own citizens. The majority of 
Africans enjoyed neither political rights nor freedoms. Dissent could no longer be tolerated in 
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many parts of sub-Saharan Africa. The boundaries between the party and state became 
blurred in most parts of post-colonial Africa. Some states had lost control of sizeable parts of 
their territories, even entire provinces, to terrorist groups, guerrillas and dissidents. Economic 
growth ground to a halt as the ruling elites raided state coffers at will. The politics of 
patronage took root. For the dictators in power, it was their time to eat.  Many states could no 
longer afford to pay civil servants. The education and health systems in most countries 
literally collapsed. Factories closed. Unemployment skyrocketed and the youth left their 
countries in their millions for greener pastures in neighbouring countries. The ambitious ones 
and those closer to Europe, risked their lives using unconventional means to reach Europe. 
Hundreds of thousands drowned in the Mediterranean as they sought to enter the Promised 
Land of Europe. Millions at home were living in conditions of extreme poverty. In many 
cases, the state remained an empty title, never having got its feet on the ground, it simply 
failed to function (Meredith 2005:331).  The future could be spoken of only in pessimistic 
terms. We highlight some of the key features of the political economy of post-colonial Africa. 
 
6.4.3.1 Economic growth and development 
 
After an initial period of growth, however, African economies faltered, then went into decline 
(WB 1989:1; WB 1981:2; UNCTAD 2001:3). The World Bank noted in 1989 (WB 1989:1) 
that the earlier progress made was now being eroded and that overally Africans were almost 
as poor as they were thirty years earlier. The inflation and recession of the mid-1970s’ world 
economic crisis hit the region with greater impact than any other region. Economic 
performance deteriorated rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Slow overall economic 
growth, sluggish agricultural performance coupled with rapid rates of population increase, 
and balance-of-payments and fiscal crises were dramatic indicators of economic trouble in 
that period (WB 1989:2). Between 1960 and 1979, per capita income in nineteen countries 
grew by less than one percent per year, while fifteen countries recorded a negative rate of 
growth of income per capita (WB 1989:2). In the 1989 report, the World Bank (WB 1989:2) 
noted that by 1987 sub-Sharan Africa, a region of 450 million people had a total GDP of 
around $135 billion, more or less the same as that of Belgium, which had only ten million 
inhabitants.  
 
Output per person rose more slowly in sub-Saharan Africa than in any other part of the world 
particularly in the 1960s, and even slower in the 1970s (WB 1989:3). Of the thirty countries 
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classified by the UNCTAD as the poorest in the world, twenty were African and of the 36 
countries listed in the World Bank's World Development Report in 1981 as "low income" (a 
per capita income of less than $370), almost two thirds were African (WB 1989:3). A twenty 
percent increase in production registered during the 1960s was wiped out by a decline of 
similar proportions in the 1970s. Unlike many countries in other developing regions which 
managed to restore growth after the 1980s, stagnation and decline continued in the region 
during the first half of the 1990s. Food production per person was stagnant in the first decade 
and actually declined in the next due to a sharp increase in population. Imports of food grains 
(wheat, rice, and maize) rose by nine percent per year since the early 1960s. This reinforced 
food dependency and food aid also increased substantially. Since about eighty percent of the 
population earned its income from agriculture, the drop in production in that sector meant a 
real income loss for many of the poor.  
 
The initial spurt of industrialisation soon petered out. While manufacturing output in the 
1960s grew by eight percent a year, it grew by only five percent in the 1970s (Meredith 
2005:279). By the 1980s, much of Africa was facing “de-industrialisation” as foreign 
investors shunned the continent and looked to more promising markets in Asia and Latin 
America. Moreover, Africa’s exports are heavily concentrated on primary products, in sharp 
contrast to the exports of East Asia, which consist predominantly of manufacturing. Poor 
yields due to periodic droughts and labour intensive farming methods meant that farming 
became an increasingly unattractive business. Faced with low producer prices, inadequate 
marketing systems, poor extension services, lack of investment in rural areas, and shortages 
of credit facilities, farmers deserted in droves, some heading for urban areas while others 
resorted to subsistence agriculture (Meredith 2005:280). 
 
The situation was worsened by the debt crisis that kept on battering the continent. During the 
decade between 1970 and 1980, sub-Saharan Africa’s external debt rose from $6 billion to 
$38 billion; by 1982 it had reached $66 billion and a year later it was standing at $86 billion 
(Meredith 2005:282).  Many countries had debts amounting to forty percent or higher of their 
annual national income. In 1982 arrears reached almost $10 billion. The impact on ordinary 
citizens was devastating. So sharp was the continent’s economic decline during the 1980s that 
it became known as “the lost decade.” By the mid-1980s, most sub-Saharan Africans were 
poorer than they had been at the time of independence (Meredith 2005:368). In country after 
another, the standards of living nosedived. Crippled by debt, mismanagement and corruption, 
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the African state could no longer afford to provide basic services to the citizens. Basic 
infrastructure deteriorated. Inflation was galloping. The drastic erosion of civil service 
salaries wrecked what was left of the humanity of civil servants. Brain drain left the states in 
desperate need of skilled workers. Between 1960 and 1987, it is estimated that over 100 000 
skilled professionals left the continent to work abroad (Meredith 2005:368). As the crisis 
deepened, the middle class was impoverished and pushed into the informal parallel market, 
smuggling, semi-legal and other illegal activities just to make ends meet. In Zaire, the parallel 
economy was estimated to be a lot bigger than the official economy (Meredith 2005:369). 
The majority of the country’s minerals were smuggled out of the country by the elites in 
business and politics and by armed dissidents who controlled huge areas of the country.  
 
By the 1990s, the continent was in a sorry state. Compared to other parts of the world, Africa 
was dropping further and further. Hospitals and clinics ran short of medicines and equipment; 
schools lacked textbooks; factories closed because of lack of raw materials or spare parts for 
machinery; shops were plagued by shortages; electricity supplies were erratic; 
communication systems broke down; unemployment soared; living standards plummeted 
(Meredith 2005:283). Ghana graphically represented the collapse of the African states. From 
a strong agricultural economy with substantial cash reserves, a well-skilled human resource 
base and a competitive parliamentary system at independence, the country reached near 
bankruptcy and was devastated by five military coups (Wunsch and Olowu 1990:1). Public 
services collapsed as skilled personnel left the country in thousands. Only thirty percent of 
the bus fleet were on the road while twenty percent of locomotives were on the railways 
(Meredith 2005:283). Ghana became a wasteland, crumbling in ruins. Cote d’Ivoire had also 
registered  impressive growth figures of more than seven percent per annum in the immediate 
post-independence period. It was being referred to as “a miracle;” but the miracle 
spectacularly disintegrated and became a nightmare. 
 
With tax revenues meagre because of a dwindling tax base, shunned by banks abroad and 
facing bankruptcy, and with nowhere else to turn to, African governments, beginning with 
Senegal in 1979, surrendered their economies to the Bretton Woods institutions by adopting 
the suicidal structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that prescribed liberalisation, 
deregulation, and privatisation of economic activity in search for a solution to economic 
decline. In all, thirty-six governments in the sub-region entered into some agreements with 
the World Bank and the IMF in the 1980s. The aim, argues Meredith (2005:370), was to get 
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governments to shift from consumption, so favoured by the elites, to investment. The result 
of the structural adjustment programmes was an absolute disaster for the continent. Barely 
any African country exited from such programmes with success, establishing conditions for 
rapid, sustained economic growth (WB 1981:5). 
 
After a decade of structural adjustment, per capita income in the region was lower than it had 
been in 1960 while growth per capita in the 1980s contracted by an annual rate of 2.2 percent. 
Foreign aid doubled during the 1980s, from $7.6 billion a year to $15 billion precipitating 
donor fatigue. At the end of the 1980s, the World Bank admitted that economic reform alone, 
without an accompanying political reform was not going to produce the desired result. 
Henceforth, the West emphasised, not just economic conditions, but also political ones. 
 
6.4.3.2 Political fragility 
 
Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:5) argues that one of the fundamental questions the broader 
African national project was preoccupied with was how to forge national consciousness out 
of a multiplicity of ethnic groups enclosed within the colonial state boundaries. Indeed 
welding a variety of different peoples, speaking different languages and at different stages of 
political and social development into nations, was always going to be difficult for African 
leaders. By throwing diverse peoples together without considering their histories, ethnic 
conflicts were inevitable and these continue to destabilise the continent. Hostility between 
different ethnic groups has become a particular problem both within and between states in 
Africa. Furthermore, once they had established themselves, various European administrations 
deliberately played off ethnic groups against one another (Danziger 1991:142). Many post-
colonial African countries have witnessed a litany of conflicts which pitted tribe against tribe, 
people against people. 
 
The newly independent African states were not “nations,” lacking any ethnic, class or ideo-
logical cement to hold them together. They had no strong shared historical and social identities 
upon which to build (Meredith 2005:154). Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Cote d’Ivoire was 
aware of it: 
 
 
We have all inherited from our former masters not nations but states, states that have 
within them extremely fragile links between ethnic groups (Meredith 2005:154). 
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The anti-colonial cause had provided a unity of purpose and for some time, the emerging leaders 
had exploited a variety of grievances among the populations to galvanise support for the 
cause. They had subdued and silenced alternative narratives that would be detrimental to the 
project at hand. But once the euphoria of independence began to subside, so did those 
suppressed loyalties, imaginings and ambitions came thrusting to the surface. For some it 
was quite clear from the beginning that nothing else, apart from the drive for independence, 
could unite them. 
 
Yet at that time, it was a widely-held belief that once the new states started to focus their 
energies towards nation-building and economic development, ethnic loyalties would disappear. 
 
I am confident that when we have our own citizenship, our own national flag, our own 
national anthem, we shall find the flame of national unity will burn bright and strong 
(Meredith 2005:157).  
 
So declared Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Nigeria's first Prime Minister, during a debate over 
the motion for independence. Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea shared the same optimistic 
sentiment: 
 
In three or four years, no one will remember the tribal, ethnic or religious rivalries 
which, in the recent past, caused so much damage to our country and its population 
(Meredith 2005:157). 
 
Yet, as history was to show, the optimism was divorced from reality. It was just a matter of 
time before the demon of ethnicity started to rare its ugly head, inflicting one country after 
another with devastating consequences. 
 
Nigeria with over 250 ethno-linguistic groups was particularly complex. No national party 
emerged before and immediately after independence. The country was plagued by intense 
and complex contestations for power between its three regions, each of which was 
dominated by a major ethnic group with its own political party (Meredith 2005:75). There 
was also a huge development gap between the north and the two southern regions. The 
geographically large North was largely Muslim and Hausa-speaking who looked disdainfully 
on the people of the South. Balewa did not mince his words when writing about the 
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artificiality of the Nigerian national project in 1948:  
 
Since 1914 the British government has been trying to make Nigeria into one country, 
but the Nigerian people themselves are historically different in their backgrounds, in 
their religious beliefs and customs and do not show themselves any signs of 
willingness to unite .. . Nigerian unity is only a British invention (Meredith 2005:8). 
 
In similar vein, Yoruba leader, Obafemi Awolowo, had written a year earlier:  
 
Nigeria is not a nation. It is a mere geographical expression. There are no 
"Nigerians" in the same sense as there are "English", "Welsh", or "French". The word 
"Nigerian" is merely a distinctive appellation to distinguish those who live within the 
boundaries of Nigeria and those who do not (Meredith 2005:8). 
 
A Northern leader visited Lagos (in the west) for the first time in 1949 and wrote: 
 
The whole place was alien to our ideas and we found the members of the other 
regions might well belong to another world as far as we were concerned (Meredith 
2005:75). 
 
Northern Muslims regarded Southerners as “pagans” and “infidels” and were forbidden to 
associate with Southerners on both religious and administrative grounds. Minority groups in 
each region resented the dominance of the three major ethnic groups and the discrimination 
they suffered as minorities and harbored ambitions to obtain their own separate states within 
Nigeria and the resources that would go with them. Control of the federal government 
determined the allocation of resources. Politicians on all sides whipped up ethnic fear, 
suspicion and jealousy for their own advantage and to entrench themselves in power. As 
Meredith (2005:194) points out, tribalism became the ideology of politics. Just five years 
into independence, the military struck, arresting the federal Prime Minister Balewa, 
executing him by the side of the road and dumping his bullet-ridden body in a ditch. The end 
result would be army rule and a slide into civil war. The coups and counter-coups had tribal 
and ethnic overtones. A million people are estimated to have died during the civil war and 
periods of political confusion.  
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The inhabitants of the six thousand chiefdoms that were dismantled by colonialists to form 
Zaire were not easily going to blend and form a nation and a state. At independence in 1960, 
a fragile and shaky coalition government of twelve political parties, which included bitter 
rivals, was formed under President Patrice Lumumba. Within a fortnight of independence, 
Congo was in a critical situation. Internal security had collapsed, the army had degenerated 
into a mob; the exodus of whites had left the administration bereft of expertise; Leopoldville 
was in turmoil; the secession of Katanga threatened to break the country apart and Belgium 
was actively looking for ways of ousting Lumumba who harboured deep resentment for them 
(Meredith 2005:101). Four months into independence, Congo was divided into for regimes, 
each with its own army and foreign sponsors (Meredith 2005:110). A short while later with 
the help of the CIA, Joseph Mobutu seized power. Lumumba was arrested and executed. 
Zaire descended into civil war and a socio-political quagmire out of which it never recovered. 
Mobutu himself, after decades of a brutal dictatorship and raiding of the state coffers willy-
nilly, was overthrown in a coup and his successor, Laurent Desiree Kabila, was also 
murdered in a coup only three years into power. From independence, Zaire resembled a 
combat zone for warring factions, prowling soldiers, foreign troops and bands of mercenaries. 
Equatorial Guinea enjoyed only 145 days of independence before it was pitched into a 
nightmare of brutality and coercion that lasted for eleven years. 
 
From 1963 onwards, coups became a defining feature of African politics, striking not only 
regimes that were inherently weak and unstable but bringing down even the giants of Africa – 
Ghana, Nigeria, and even Ethiopia’s Haile Selassie. Sylvanus Epiphanio Olympio of Togo 
was the very first presidential victim of a military coup when he was toppled and murdered in 
1963. In Dahomey (Benin), Colonel Christophe Soglo set himself up in power. Ten days 
later, Colonel Jean-Bédel Bokassa seized power in the Central African Republic. Three days 
later, on 2 January 1966, Colonel Sangoule Lamizana removed Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) 
President, Maurice Yameogo. The sequence of coups did not stop there but spread across the 
continent, Eleven years after conquering the mighty British Empire, Nkrumah was 
overthrown by his generals in February 1966. In January 1971, Idi Amin staged a coup in 
Uganda. In Ethiopia, Haile Selassie was overthrown by the army in 1974. In the first two 
decades of independence, there were forty successful coups and innumerable attempted coups 
throughout the continent, many of which were accomplished without violence. In Benin, 
there were six coups after independence and all were bloodless. Coup leaders always stressed 
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the temporary nature of military rule. All they required, they said, was sufficient time to clear 
up the morass of corruption, mismanagement, tribalism, nepotism and other assorted 
malpractices they claimed had prompted them to intervene and restore honest and efficient 
government and national integrity (Meredith 2005:218-219). But generally the military rulers 
turned out to be no more proficient, no more immune to corruption, and no more willing to 
give up power than the regimes they had overthrown.  
 
Sudan was a country of two halves which were different in every aspect: the north was hot, 
dry, partly desert, inhabited largely by Arabic-speaking Muslims and relatively advanced; the 
south was green, fertile, with a high rainfall, remote and undeveloped, populated by diverse 
black tribes, speaking a multitude of languages, adhering mostly to traditional religions and a 
small Christian minority (Meredith 2005:35). The historical links between the north and the 
south were a source of friction. In the past century, northern traders had raided the south in 
search of slaves and ivory. The bitterness and hatred that the south had towards the 
northerners still endured. Northerners treated southerners scornfully, referring to them as 
slaves. The British added to this hostility by favouring the northerners over the southerners. 
 
The fault lines dividing north from south became apparent at independence. The departing 
British were replaced largely by the northerners, enhancing southern fears about northern 
supremacy. Of the 800 senior civil service posts, only six were awarded to southerners 
(Meredith 2005:344-345). Furthermore, there was a heavy presence of northern professionals 
and traders in the south and were often rough in their dealings with the local populace. This 
soon rekindled old resentments. The northern elites also promoted Islam as the national 
language and changed the day of rest from Sunday to Friday. Needless to say, all this raised 
intense resentment so that as early as 1955, the army had mutinied and a civil war begun. In 
fact Sudan has an unenviable record of having the longest civil war in modern history, though 
with a few breaks in between. The war finally led to the division of the vast country into 
Sudan and South Sudan in 2011.  
 
 
Just as the British treated Sudan as a country of two halves, so did the French in neighbouring 
Chad. In reverse sequence, the southerners in Chad gained control at independence in 1960 
triggering revolt by northerners. President Francois Tombalbaye, a southerner, dealt 
particularly harshly with the northern Muslims. The Northerners revolted in 1965 and the 
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country descended into a protracted civil war. Some ten years later, President Tombalbaye 
was ousted in a coup. In the early 1980s, already one of the poorest counties on the continent, 
Chad had fragmented into a melee of rival factions, with hordes of armed bands who roamed 
the country holding villagers at ransom (Meredith 2005:355). There was country, a 
population, but no state power; all semblance of central authority had collapsed.  
 
The most chilling example of the potentially explosive nature of ethnic rivalry occurred in 
Rwanda in 1994. The kingdom was occupied by a Hutu majority and a Tutsi minority who 
spoke the same language, shared the same customs and lived together on the same hillsides. 
Although ethnic divisions were well entrenched, what mattered most was status. The Tutsi 
rulers had for long been favoured by both the German and Belgium colonisers, as well as by 
the influential Catholic Church even if they were in the minority. By the 1930s, notes 
Meredith (2005:159), the colonialists had made ethnicity the defining feature of daily life so 
much so that whatever sense of collective identity that had previously existed in Rwanda 
withered and died. By the end of the 1950s, ethnic agitation of the Hutus had taken root. 
Violence broke out in 1959 - even before independence - in which roving bands of Hutu went 
on a rampage, attacking the Tutsi, destroying and looting their property and burning their 
homes. When Rwanda became independent, the Hutu hegemony was fully entrenched. The 
“Hutu Revolution” that happened just after independence led to the mass exodus of hundreds 
of thousands of Tutsi to neighbouring countries.  The Tutsi were viewed as enemies seeking 
to impose their rule on Rwanda again. The dominant narrative became one that the Tutsi were 
invaders who had overrun Rwanda in the pre-colonial era and enslaved the Hutu. Hutu 
politicians continued to use the language of hate and division against the Tutsi to justify their 
persecution and for their propaganda purposes. The massacre of the Tutsi had started.  
 
The Tutsi “Final Question” was solved in 1994 in a slaughter of a scale not witnessed since 
the Nazi extermination programme against the Jews. The human, social and economic costs 
of the genocide were staggering. In 100 days, 800 000 people had been slaughtered, about 75 
percent of the Tutsi population; more people had been killed more quickly than in any other 
mass killing in recorded history (Meredith 2005:523). Over three million Tutsi sought refuge 
in neighbouring countries. In a report published ten years after the genocide, the World Bank 
(2004) suggested that GDP per capita remained much lower than what it would have been 
without the genocide. The Bank added that per capita GDP in 2004 would probably be 
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between 25 and 30 percent higher if the conflict had not taken place and about a quarter of 
the population in poverty could be said to be poor as a result of the genocide (WB 2004:1). 
 
The history of post-colonial Africa can actually be called a history of conflict. In 2000, one in 
five people in sub-Saharan Africa lived in a country affected by conflict and the four decades 
between 1960 and 2000, more than a third of the region’s countries experienced civil strife 
(WB 2004:1). The cost of these conflicts in terms of loss of life, human and social capital has 
been astounding, and the psychological impact of the violence has been enormous.  
 
6.4.3.3 Politics of the belly and politics of patronage 
 
Post-colonial Africa has produced leaders who know what it means to enrich oneself. Before 
independence, opportunities for self-enrichment were very limited. Only the white elite, 
officials and businessmen benefitted from the system. They enjoyed a privileged lifestyle 
which the black elite aspired to emulate but were largely prevented from attaining. 
Independence opened the floodgates. Political power soon translated into economic power. 
The political arena became a site of contestation for scarce and limited resources. Capture of 
state power translated to immediate riches. The state became a site of accumulation of 
resources by the politicians and those who were close to them – families, girlfriends, business 
associates and members of the same clan or ethnic group. They packed the civil service and 
parastatals with members of their own tribes. 
 
As soon as they came to power, politicians wasted no time in accumulating wealth and 
privileges for themselves at a scale unparalleled in modern history. Civil servants who filled 
in positions left by the departing colonial officials insisted on the same high salaries and 
perks. In 1962, a Gabonese Member of Parliament was paid more than her British counterpart 
and earned in six months as much as the average person did in 36 years, while in Nigeria, 
Ministers were rewarded not only with princely salaries but rent-free, air-conditioned 
residences, replete with stewards, gardeners and drivers, generous car allowances, 
entertainment budgets, free telephone and free electricity (Meredith 2005:170-171). Political 
activity was seen by aspiring African leaders as the most direct way of securing wealth and 
social standing. Through it they accessed pensions, housing and transport allowances and 
cheap loans. Proximity to political power also entailed easy access to lucrative government 
contracts and decisions over who gets them.   
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In numerous cases, politicians looted the state treasury, transferring money to their private 
accounts both at home and in Western capitals. In other cases, they had access to cheap loans 
from the state and state-owned banks, which loans were often never repaid. Ghost workers 
were very common and their salaries went to politicians or high ranking civil servants whom 
they worked in cohorts with. Ministers sold to themselves shares in state-owned companies. 
Bribery and embezzlement spread from top to bottom, from politicians to tax collectors, 
customs officers, policemen, postal clerks and dispensary assistants and it affected everything 
from job applications to licenses, food aid, bursaries, foreign exchange and the location of 
factories (Meredith 2005:173). In time, bribery and corruption became a way of life, accepted 
as a means of getting by, earning a living, obtaining a service or avoiding a hassle. 
 
The riches they acquired for themselves were flamboyantly displayed in plush villas, elegant 
apartment buildings and town houses, luxury cars and lavish lifestyles. Countless African 
leaders had several wives, girlfriends and concubines all over the place. Acquiring properties 
in western capitals became very fashionable and attractive. Some of the money was put in 
off-shore accounts. The renowned Swiss Banks became a favourite of many an African 
politician. For many politicians Europe became their shopping destination.  A study of trade 
figures of 14 Francophone countries in 1964 showed that the amount spent on importing 
alcoholic drinks was six times higher than that spent on importing fertilizer and that half as 
much was spent on perfume and cosmetic imports as on machine tools (Meredith 2005:171). 
 
After consolidating his hold on power, Joseph Mobutu next turned to self-enrichment on a 
scale unsurpassed anywhere else in Africa. He seized free of charge thousands of foreign-
owned businesses, took possession of some, and gave others to his family members and 
cronies in exchange for patronage. At a stroke he acquired a vast agricultural empire, which 
became the third largest employer in Zaire (Meredith 2005:297). Seventy five percent of the 
ranch cattle were in his possession. He used the central bank at will as his private account and 
for his family and cronies. Huge sums of money were funnelled into his private bank 
accounts overseas. It was estimated that by the end of the 70s, he had become one of the 
richest people on earth with his fortune estimated at $5 billion (Meredith 2005:299). With 
this fortune, he assembled a selection of luxury villas and other properties mostly in 
European cities, but also in Brazil and other independent African cities. He also built lavish 
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residences in Zaire where he used to entertain foreign dignitaries. At his ancestral home, he 
built a massive complex at an estimated cost of $100 million. Etienne Tshisekedi, one of his 
former ministers described him as a “Zairian Caligula”:  
 
Mobutu truly has a malady. He is a kleptomaniac. Zaire is ruled by an uncontrolled 
thief. It is a kleptocracy (Meredith 2005:307). 
 
As the economy was disintegrating due to Mobutu’s ruinous economic policies, corruption 
spread from the top to every level of Zairean society. Mobutu himself relied on corruption to 
hold the collapsing system together and keep himself in office. He is reported as saying, 
 
If you steal do not steal too much at a time. You may be arrested. Steal cleverly, little 
by little (Meredith 2005:303). 
 
Civil servants went unpaid for months. High ranking civil servants and army officers 
habitually siphoned off government resources. Reports indicated that that as many as two-
thirds of Zaire’s civil servants on the state payroll were in fact fictitious, with their wages 
simply pocketed by senior officials (Meredith 2005:301). Senior army officers often kept for 
themselves their soldiers’ salary and sold army food supplies on the thriving parallel market. 
The soldiers were notorious for extorting money from civilians and confiscating farmers’ 
produce. Air force officers turned the air force into their own air transport company. Nothing 
could be acquired without a bribe. The situation forced Catholic Archbishop Eugène Kabanga 
of Lubumbashi to issue a strongly worded pastoral letter in 1976 against the system: 
 
How many children and adults die without medical care because they are unable to 
bribe the medical personnel who are supposed to care for them? Why are there no 
medical supplies in the hospitals while they are found in the marketplace? How did 
they get there? Why is it that in our courts justice can only be obtained by fat bribes 
to the judge? Why are prisoners forgotten in jail? They have no one to pay off the 
judge who sits on the dossier (Meredith 2005:302). 
 
In a speech delivered in 1983, Houphouët-Boigny who had interests in farming, boasted 
about how he had accumulated millions and admitting that he had bank accounts in 
Switzerland. 
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One of the banks manages my profits from pineapple production. I have 4 billion in 
turn-over from pineapples… I had two sharp falls two years ago when I reached 3 000 
tonnes of pineapples a month, producing a third of the national total. I have stopped 
producing coffee. At one time it brought in very little, perhaps 100 million Francs, but 
that 100 million is today worth billions. I put all this money in my bank accounts in 
Switzerland, and that produced a lot of interest. My deposits account for a quarter of 
deposits in one of the banks in Abidjan. … There is even a bank which manages my 
profits in avocadoes, of which, I think, I am the main producer in Cote d’Ivoire. There 
is another bank which modestly manages my profits from poultry farming (Meredith 
2005:288). 
 
Houphouët-Boigny’s favourite scheme was to transform his home village of Yamoussoukro 
into the country’s new capital city, complete with ostentatious buildings. He built there a 
presidential palace that was sometimes referred to as an “African version of Versailles.” His 
ambition also made him to build himself a basilica modelled on St Peters in Rome, but 
exceeding the height of St. Peters by 37 feet. The basilica was built at a cost of nearly $200 
million, in a poor country where the standards of living were on a free fall, something that 
discomfited the Vatican. Built with almost no African materials, save local sand to be mixed 
with French cement, it had a capacity of 18 000 worshipers (Hiltzik 1989). Houphouët-
Boigny was reported to keep at least one tenth of the country’s revenue from cocoa export 
revenues in his personal bank account for distribution to his huge patronage, and his cronies 
and supporters were reportedly benefiting from the tax and tariff exemptions, high level state 
jobs and subsidised credit for their businesses (Meredith 2005:288).   
 
Jean-Bédel Bokassa of Central African Republic combined not only extreme greed but 
delusions of opulence unsurpassed by any other African leader. His sexual tastes were 
insatiable. He is reported to have had 17 wives, dozens of mistresses and 55 official children 
(Meredith 2005:224). Bokassa married a beautiful woman in each foreign country that he 
visited. He boasted in an interview: 
 
In Formosa, for example, I hustled the most beautiful woman in the country whom I 
later married. In Bucharest, the most beautiful woman in Romania; in Libreville, the 
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most beautiful woman in Gabon… and so on. My criterion was beauty (Meredith 
2005:227).  
 
He raided government coffers at will. From the proceeds he made from diamond and ivory 
deals, Bokassa bought valuable properties in Europe, including four chateaux in France, a 50-
room mansion in Paris, houses in Nice and Toulouse and a villa in Berne (Meredith 
2005:226). To please his ancestors, he built a massive ancestral home and ordered a highway 
to be built to it. He packed his presidential guard with people from his own village. He 
allowed his ministers to make their own wealth and occasionally reprimanding them for 
extreme self-indulgence but unwilling to tackle corruption. 
 
Declaring the Central African Republic an empire and himself as emperor, he was crowned at 
an extravagant ceremony, which resembled Napoleon’s coronation as emperor of France. He 
imported al the finer things fit for the occasion from France: a crown of diamonds, an 
imperial throne, thoroughbred horses, coronation robes, brass helmets and breast plates for 
the imperial guard, tonnes of wine and flowers, and sixty Mercedes Benz cars for the guests 
(Meredith 2005:228). In spite of such conspicuous feasting, there was just about 300km of 
tared road in the whole country. 
 
The first years of independence in Nigeria became a festivity of power being turned into 
profit. The advantages of political offices were used at every opportunity to create huge 
empires of wealth and patronage. Using government money, party and government elites 
were able to reward their supporters and patronage networks with jobs, contracts, loans, 
scholarships and any favour that they could. In Nigeria, government business was regarded as 
no man’s business and likewise government money was “orphaned money”. It was perfectly 
normal to steal state funds especially if they were used to benefit not only the individual but 
also members of one’s community. Those with the opportunity to be in government as 
politicians or civil servants were expected to use their influence to advance private and 
communal interests. Independence did not do away with that attitude. The government 
continued to be seen as a reservoir of free money that could be used for personal and 
community purposes without any sense of shame or guilt. Plunderers of the government 
treasury were often excused on the grounds that they had only “taken their share” (Meredith 
2005:174-175). Eventually every aspect of Nigerian society was permeated by corruption. A 
senior civil servant is reported as saying: 
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You bribe to get your child into school; you pay to secure your job and continue to 
pay in some cases to retain it. You pay a hospital doctor or nurse to get proper 
attention; you pay the policeman to evade arrest. This catalogue of shame can 
continue without end (Meredith 2005:175). 
 
General Ibrahim Babangida who seized power in a coup in 1985 together with his military 
clique and cronies, looted oil revenues, profiteered from drug smuggling and engaged in 
organised commercial fraud on an unparalleled scale. He was considered the most corrupt 
ruler in the history of Nigeria (Meredith 2005:382). 
 
In Ghana, Nkrumah’s ministers were notorious for giving lucrative contracts to foreign 
corporations for a ten percent kickback. Krobo Edusei gained notoriety after his wife bought 
a £3 000 gold platted bed from England (Meredith 2005:173). He confessed to owning 
fourteen houses, a luxurious beach house, a long lease on a London flat, several expensive 
cars and six different bank accounts (Meredith 2005:173). Even Nkrumah himself was also 
allegedly involved in the business of taking bribes from foreign businessmen and others 
seeking government contracts, becoming a very rich man in the process.  
 
Hastings Kamuzu Banda of Malawi established a huge business empire which extended into 
farming, transport, property, oil distribution, pharmaceuticals and finance. His empire, at its 
peak, made up a third of Malawi’s GDP and employed ten percent of the wage-earning 
workforce. Omar Bongo of Gabon presided over the country’s oil riches for over two decades 
and made himself one of the richest men on earth. Francisco Macias Nguema of Equatorial 
Guinea hoarded all foreign exchange along with large amounts of local currency at his 
various mansions. Relocating to his native home in his advanced age, he took with him most of 
the national treasury, storing huge wards of bank notes in bags and suitcases, some of which 
rotted in the ground. In Kenya, Jomo Kenyatta’s young wife, Ngina and his daughter 
Margaret, operated huge business empires and used their link with Kenyatta for personal 
gain. Ngina was believed to be one of the richest people in Kenya with business interests that 
stretched from plantations, ranches, property, hotels and ivory trade. High-level corruption 
was estimated to have cost the country half of its elephant population during Kenyatta’s 
reign. 
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A reliable milking cow for the political elites in post-colonial Africa has been the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs). These covered virtually all aspects of the national economy. Most of 
them were poorly managed, overstaffed, subjected to frequent political interference and 
requiring huge government subsidies to keep going (Meredith 2005:277-278). The personnel 
were in many cases unqualified, tended to be idle, arrogant and corrupt. Fraud and inefficiency 
abounded within the sector. SOEs became the centre of a grid of corruption. Ministers preyed 
on parastatals under their ministries for foreign trips and for providing jobs for their patronage 
networks. Contracts were often awarded to dubious “briefcase” companies that never had a 
record of delivering goods and services, and for the most part belonged to their family 
members, friends and kinsmen. Project costs were grossly inflated to cater for kickbacks. Many 
projects were rendered uneconomical. Company assets were regularly stolen. Payrolls were full 
of ghost workers. State-owned banks were a chief target. They were forced to lend huge loans 
to politicians and their associates without any prospect that they would ever be repaid. 
 
Mali established 23 SOEs after independence, which included garages, repair shops, metal 
works, a printing plant, pharmacies and bookshops (Meredith 2005:278). All of them 
descended into confusion and chaos, with a bloated labour force and accumulating huge 
debts. In Cote d’Ivoire, the number of parastatals rose from five in 1960 to 84 in 1979. These 
were run as private fiefdoms for the ruling elite.  Senegal had more than a hundred, which 
were estimated to employ four times the labour force needed. A report on Uganda’s state-
owned bank was damning: 
 
…. to every regime, the Uganda Commercial Bank was a gravy train. New ministers, 
army officers, and parliamentarians would descend upon it and take out huge loans, 
often with inadequate or non-existent collateral. These people saw the loans as 
rewards for bringing the government to power (Meredith 2005:278-279). 
 
In Guinea, Touré set up a string of SOEs that were poorly managed, heavily in debt, rife with 
corruption and crippled by low production. Writing about Guinea’s SOEs, Claude Riviere 
(cited in Meredith 2005:278) explains some bizarre decisions that were made: 
 
To set up a cannery without products to can, a textile factory that lacked cotton 
supplies, a cigarette factory without sufficient locally grown tobacco and to develop 
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… a forest region that had no roads and trucks to carry its output - all of these were 
gambles taken by utopian idealists and ignoramuses.  
 
Opportunities for the politics of patronage available to African politicians provided them with 
the glue they needed to consolidate their hold on power. Civil servants in most countries 
regarded their positions primarily as a means of settling their obligations towards their own 
kith and kin, an attitude that, far from being condemned, was often shared and actively 
backed by the larger society and most certainly, by those who profited from it. They had 
thousands of appointments to make to cabinets, parliaments and government positions and 
parastatals. Furthermore, in most countries, the state was the largest employer, thus the chief 
distributor of contracts, jobs and benefits. Many appointments were made not on the basis of 
merit but of tribal affiliation or party loyalty. It was not a case of “what do you know?” but of 
“who do you know?” The awarding of tenders and the allocation of development projects 
were influenced by similar considerations. Patronage links radiated outwards from 
presidencies to provinces, districts villages and wards (Meredith 2005:169). At each level 
were “big men” who worked the system, providing followers and friends with jobs, tenders 
and favours in exchange for political support. To be a minister, high-ranking civil servant or 
ruling party official meant to have a lifetime’s chance to accumulate wealth. In Zambia, 
Kenneth Kaunda was said to control over 40 000 patronage positions (Meredith 2005:380). 
Decisions which in western democracies are left to (even) low ranking civil servants and 
technicians are in African countries made by ministers for the purposes of dispensing 
patronage. To retain support, they have to distribute rewards. The politics of patronage and 
patrimonial rule became a very pronounced common political pattern throughout sub-Saharan 
Africa. Meredith (Meredith 2005:169) suggests that a small elite - no more than three percent 
of the national population - used their position for personal gain.  
 
6.4.3.4 Personality cults 
 
Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor (Senegal), Houphouët-Boigny, Touré, Modibo Keita (Mali), 
Sylvanus Epiphanio Olympio (Togo), Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere (Tanzania), Kaunda and 
Banda all enjoyed great prestige and honour as nationalist leaders who had successfully 
challenged and conquered the impregnable imperial forces. They were seen to typify the 
states they led and quickly took advantage to consolidate their power. They established a 
system of personal rule and encouraged personality cults (Meredith 2005:163). They were 
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literally deified. Senghor spoke for them: 
 
The President personifies the nation, as did the monarch of former times his 
peoples. The masses are not mistaken who speak of the reign of Modibo Keita, 
Sékou Touré, and Houphouët-Boigny, in whom they see, above all, the elected of 
God through the people (Meredith 2005:163). 
 
The personality cult around Nkrumah flew above all others. He had the distinction of  
having been the first to successfully confront British rule in Africa and opened the 
floodgates for independence for the rest of the continent. Consequently, he was seen (and 
also saw himself) as a messiah destined to play an even greater role. Even before 
independence, party press built up the image of a man of mystical powers, a new Moses 
who would lead his people to the Promised Land of independence. The Evening News of 
19 June 1954, for example, proclaimed: 
 
Man of Destiny, Star of Africa, Hope of Millions of down-trodden blacks, 
Deliverer of Ghana, Iron Boy, Great Leader of Street Boys.  
 
Ordinary people came to regard him as a messiah capable of performing miracles. His 
veneration in hymns and prayers took religious overtones. Party supporters recited 
phrases like, “I believe in Kwame Nkrumah” (Meredith 2005:23). 
 
His dream was of a United States of Africa that would be a giant economically, politically 
and militarily, as united and powerful as the US or the Soviet Union. He dreamt of 
himself as leader of that powerhouse and believed that he could do for Africa what Marx 
and Lenin had done for Europe and Mao Tse-tung for China. He spent hours on end 
creating an official ideology which he called “Nkrumahism” and built the Kwame 
Nkrumah Ideological Institute which cost millions of dollars (Meredith 2005:162-163). 
The centre was staffed mostly by left-wing expatriates who worked meticulously, 
constructing elaborate political theories. Nkrumah was accustomed to a diet of endless 
praise. Day-in-day-out, the press eulogised his unparalleled intellectual brilliance, his courage, 
his foresight and his integrity. A 1961 official depiction declared: 
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To millions of people living both inside and outside the continent of Africa, Kwame 
Nkrumah is Africa and Africa is Kwame Nkrumah. When the question was asked: 
“What is going to happen in Africa? ’it is to one man that everyone will look for an 
answer: Kwame Nkrumah. To the imperialists and colonialists his name is a curse on 
their lips; to the settlers his name is a warning that the good old days at the expense of 
the African are coming to an end; to Africans suffering under foreign domination, his 
name is a breath of hope and means freedom, brotherhood and racial equality; to us 
his people, Kwame Nkrumah is our father, our teacher, our brother, our friend, indeed 
our very lives, for without him we would no doubt have existed, but we would not 
have lived; there would have been no hope of a cure for our sick souls, no taste of 
glorious victory after a life time of suffering. What we owe is greater even than the air 
we breathe, for he made us as surely as he made Ghana (Meredith 2005:179-180). 
 
Like-wise the Evening News captured the mood of the moment:  
 
When our history is recorded, the name Kwame Nkrumah will be written of as the 
liberator, the Messiah, the Christ of our day, whose great love for mankind wrought 
changes in Ghana, in Africa and in the world at large (Meredith 2005:179). 
 
Nkrumah also assumed grand titles: Man of destiny, Star of Africa, His High Dedication 
and most famous of all, Osagyefo, a name which meant “victor in war”, but which was 
more often translated as “redeemer” (Meredith 2005:180). His presence became 
unavoidable: his image embellished coins, banknotes, postage stamps; his statue stood 
outside parliament; his name appeared in neon lights; his birthday became a public 
holiday; framed photographs adorned offices and shops (Meredith 2005:180). He passed 
legislation to criminalise anyone who disrespected the person and dignity of the Head of 
state. Even as he lay dying in a Bucharest hospital, he wrote his will which began: “I 
Kwame Nkrumah of Africa” and charged his executors to “cause my body to be 
embalmed and preserved” like Lenin and if this was not possible, then he requested that 
his body be cremated and the ashes be scattered all over the continent of Africa (Meredith 
2005:262). 
 
 
However, no other African leader of the independence era was revered so widely as Emperor 
Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. He won worldwide fame due to his defiance against the Italian 
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dictator Mussolini’s brutal invasion in the 1930s. He stood as a symbol of an independent 
Africa that nationalist leaders living under colonial rule all aspired to achieve (Meredith 
2005:206). Added to this was the mystique of the monarchy as descendent from King Solomon 
that was preserved over generations. He was referred to as “Elect of God”. The Orthodox 
Church upheld his divine right to rule. Elaborate rituals and the religious ceremonies performed 
by patriarchs and priests surrounded his daily life. In Jamaica adherents of Rastafarianism 
worshipped him as a living god (Jah). When he visited the country in 1966, reports indicated 
that miracles happened. His image appeared on bank notes and coins and his picture had to be 
displayed in every home, office and most public places. The anniversaries of his birth, 
coronation and his return from exile were made national holidays. In the hall where he met 
dignitaries and officials every morning, they would line up and bow before him. 
 
Mobutu’s personality cult became all-pervasive. He gave himself grand titles, such as “Father 
of the nation”, “Saviour of the people”, “Supreme combatant” and “The Great strategist”. His 
deeds were endlessly praised in song and dance in a way that took on religious overtones. 
Television news bulletins were preceded by the image of the dear leader Mobutu, with a 
leopard skin hat perched on his head, descending as it were, through the clouds from heaven 
(Meredith 2005:296). Places where he had worked and lived were designated as national 
pilgrimage points. His interior minister Engulu Baanga Mpongo once told the party 
supporters:  
 
God has sent a great prophet, our prestigious Guide Mobutu. This prophet is our 
liberator, our Messiah. Our church is MPR. Its chief is Mobutu. We respect him like 
one respects a Pope. Our gospel is Mobutuism. This is why the crucifixes must be 
replaced by the image of our Messiah (Meredith 2005:297).     
 
In Guinea, Touré edified himself in a similar way, enjoying to be called “The Great Son of 
Africa”, “The Terror of International Imperialism, Colonialism and Neo-Colonialism”, “The 
Doctor of the Revolutionary Sciences” (Meredith 2005:164). He depicted himself as an expert 
in every field of human endeavour, from agriculture to philosophy to football. He published 
more than twenty volumes of his speeches and political reflections on Guinea and African 
development and made them obligatory text books for students and learners, who were required 
to memorise them to pass their examinations. He was the source of all authority and no major 
 
 
  160 
decision could be taken without his approval. He intervened at his own discretion in legal cases 
and deciding the verdict when he felt like in the name of the people. Writing of his style of 
rule, Lansiné Kaba noted that Guinea was  
 
a one-man show in which Touré was the sole actor, while others danced, applauded or 
sang in his honour according to his whims (Meredith 2005:164).  
 
Likewise in Malawi, Banda’s stronghold extended not just over the government and the 
economy of the country but even over the moral standards under which the population was 
required to live (Meredith 2005:164). No other African leader imposed his personality with 
such vigour and force on his country as Banda. He demanded not just obedience but also 
obsequiousness. He insisted on directing even the minutest details of the country’s affairs. He 
liked to tell his people: 
 
Everything is my business. Everything. The state of education, the state of our 
economy, the state of our agriculture, the state of our transport, everything is my 
business (Meredith 2005:165). 
 
Bokassa took pleasure in naming after himself a host of schools, hospitals, clinics, roads, 
development projects and Bangui’s new university. The front page of every school exercise 
book in the whole country was decorated with his picture (Meredith 2005:225). He crowned 
himself emperor at an extravagant ceremony estimated to have cost over twenty million dollars. 
He promoted himself to the rank of Marshal, “for supreme service to the state”. He held twelve 
ministries and interfered in all the others. In Uganda, Amin regularly needed to demonstrate 
his power and importance. He gave himself military medals and titles like “Conqueror of the 
British Empire” and he also claimed to be “the true heir of the throne of Scotland.” In his drive 
to control organised religion, Francisco Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea ordered church 
sermons to include references to him as “The Only Miracle”. Priests were forced to reiterate 
slogans such as “There is no God other than Marcias,” and “God created Equatorial Guinea 
thanks to Papa Macias. Without Marcias, Equatorial Guinea would not exist.”  
 
 
Indeed the first generation of African leaders behaved like ancient kings and emperors. They 
portrayed themselves as indispensable. Instead of being grateful to their citizens for electing 
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them to office, the electorate was supposed to be grateful to have been afforded the opportunity 
to be led by them. Their presence was ubiquitous, their faces appeared on bank notes while 
their photographs graced offices, shops and even homes. They named major development 
projects - highways, football stadiums, schools, universities and hospitals - after themselves. 
Everything they did was news. Their speeches and daily activities dominated radio and 
television news and documentaries and newspapers. 
 
6.4.3.5 Descent into tyranny 
 
Once in power, African leaders became pre-occupied with hanging on to power at all cost. 
They swiftly moved to consolidate their power by putting in place measures that would 
ensure that they and they alone would rule for ever, or as President Jacob Zuma of South 
Africa always says “to rule until Jesus comes”. In the heyday of independence, any view 
different from that of the ruling party was viewed as counter-revolutionary. Anybody who 
dared expose corruption and wrong doing of the ruling elite was supposed to be silenced, 
better still, eliminated. Arbitrary measures – arrests, detentions, assassinations and other 
forms of harassment – were employed in dealing with political opponents and any form of 
dissent. In many countries, opposition parties were routinely banned, opposition politicians 
arrested on trumped-up charges while others were executed mostly on grounds of “national 
security” or attempting to “unconstitutionally remove a legitimate government”. Between 
1960 and 1989, 150 elections had been held in twenty nine countries throughout the continent 
and opposition parties had not been allowed to win a single one. The majority of governments 
relied on secret police and agents to track down dissenters and spy on critics. The press was 
muzzled, newspapers were closed and entire newsrooms incarcerated. Constitutions were 
either amended, rewritten or constitutional provisions simply ignored. Elections were rigged 
and extreme violence was meted on the opposition supporters. They increasingly relied on 
fear as an instrument of control. Political activity was reduced to “palace intrigues”, as the 
ruling party elites manoeuvred for their own interests as rival factions competed for 
ascendency. Ministers and senior party officials were often rotated and reshuffled with 
monotony, to prevent them from becoming a threat to the incumbent’s hold on power.  
 
In their quest for greater, unchallenged and unimpeded control, the vehicle that African 
leaders commonly employed was the one-party state system. Almost all the fifty African 
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states were one-party states or military dictatorships in 1989. They argued that the new and 
fragile states, facing a myriad of challenges, needed strong governments which were best 
served by concentrating authority in a single, national party. Only such a party was an 
effective means of overcoming tribal divisions, to inspire a sense of nationhood and to 
mobilise the population for economic development. They argued that multi-party politics was 
a recipe for disaster that would easily deteriorate into fierce competition between rival tribes 
and ethnic groups. Since opposition parties tended to depend on tribal groups for support, 
they fiercely argued that they would destabilise the cause of nation-building and weaken the 
efficiency of the state (Meredith 2005:157). They were thus seen as a luxury which post-
colonial states could ill-afford. Others argued that opposition parties were in fact alien to 
traditional African practices of government and socio-political organisation. It was concluded 
that only a one party-state system would expedite the economic development that the African 
continent badly needed.  
 
The most eloquent advocate of the one-party state system was Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who 
argued that the multi-party system was a Western creature which came about as a result of 
competition between socio-economic classes. But since African society was by its nature 
classless, there was, therefore, no basis for a multi-party and parliamentary system of the kind 
imposed by Europe on Africa. Opposition parties were no more than a distraction, with a 
destructive potential. The only voices to be heard from the so-called opposition parties were 
those of a few irresponsible and misguided individuals who exploited the very privileges of 
democracy, namely, freedoms of the media, association and of speech, to swerve the 
government from its duties to the citizens by creating problems of law and order (Meredith 
2005:167).  
 
In reality, however, the one-party state system was used by African leaders mostly to silence 
and crush any opposition to their regimes and to keep themselves in power. One-by-one, 
African leaders amassed ever greater personal power, spreading the arms of their control into 
the furthest reaches of society. Once in power, parties swiftly moved to amass a fortune from 
public monies, enough for them to win the next election. Banks, businesses and financial 
institutions were set up for that objective. Through dispensing patronage and extreme 
brutality, African leaders prolonged their stay in power. 
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Within a year of independence, Nkrumah passed laws that allowed the state to detain anyone 
without trial for a period of up to five years. The number of detentions kept rising. In 1958, 38 
people were detained, in 1961, 311; in 1963, 586; in 1965, 1 200 (Meredith 2005:176). 
Detention laws were in practice used to silence critics and opponents and even to settle petty 
scores. The “Messiah of Africa” built a citadel of power around himself. He introduced new 
laws which enabled him to rule by decree, to reject decisions of parliament, to dismiss any 
public servant or members of the armed forces or judiciary when he saw fit. He maintained a 
complete grip over the media. Party supporters and his own ministers told him what they 
thought he wanted to hear, to boost his sense of superiority and importance. The civil service, 
trade unions, farmers’ organisations, student and youth groups were subordinated to his 
Convention People’s Party. He purged his own cabinet, axing ministers who were doubting his 
policies. He set up special courts to deal with political crimes, in which there was no right to 
appeal, and he appointed the judges himself. He attributed every set back to neo-imperialists 
plotting against him. He resented even mild criticism and refused to believe that anything was 
going wrong. After a failed plot to assassinate him in 1962, Nkrumah did a witch hunt, in 
which he ordered the arrest of three of his ministers. After another attempt in which a police 
constable was involved, he disarmed the police, sacked several officers and detained others. No 
longer trusting his security apparatus, he relied for protection increasingly on a personal 
security service recruited from his ancestral home. In 1964, through a referendum, Ghana was 
turned into a one-party state. Before the referendum, government newspapers warned those 
who would vote otherwise of the grievous consequences of such a vote: 
 
Those who think that they can hide under the so-called secrecy of the polling booth to 
fool us must know that the days when we could be fooled are gone (Meredith 
2005:189). 
 
The opposition had already been silenced. Ghanaians voted “overwhelmingly” in favour of 
the one-party state, state media boasted.  
 
Like most African leaders of the first generation, Prime Minister Milton Obote of Uganda 
defended a one-party state arguing that tribal loyalties tended to threaten the stability of the 
newly-independent country. What the country needed was a one-party state system to forge a 
sense of national unity. Enjoying power, his rule became increasingly despotic, declared 
himself executive President and suspended the constitution. He jailed several of his ministers. 
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Obote established a secret police largely recruited from his own tribe and allowing it to freely 
arrest and imprison suspected opponents. Taking advantage of Obote’s absence from the 
country, Idi Amin, his army commander staged a coup. Within a few months, Amin feeling 
insecure, began mass killings to eliminate Obote’s followers. He set up death squads to hunt 
down and assassinate army and police officers he suspected of opposing him. 
 
As the country’s economy was collapsing and the General becoming more and more 
unpopular with the populace, he turned his focus on the country’s disliked Asian community 
hoping to revive his popularity. He expelled the Asians with British nationality from the 
country while his army looted their possessions. Some 50 000 people, most of them skilled 
professionals - doctors, technicians and administrators - are estimated to have left Uganda. 
The impact of the exodus on the economy was disastrous. Government revenues dropped by 
a massive forty percent (Meredith 2005:236). 
 
The abortive invasion of Uganda by dissidents loyal to Obote in 1972 gave Amin the reason 
to intensify his repression of dissent. Thousands are reported to have died at the hands of his 
death squads, including the Anglican Archbishop of Kampala, Janani Jakaliya Luwum, who 
was arrested on charges of treason, allegedly tortured and assassinated just days after 
protesting against the regime’s policies of arbitrary killings and unexplained disappearances. 
Makerere University’s Vice Chancellor and the Chief Justice both disappeared without trace.  
When Amin was finally forced to flee, Uganda was ravaged, lawless, bankrupt with the 
stench of death estimated at over a quarter of a million people. Obote regained power in 1980 
and continued his repression in a way not different from that of General Amin. 300 000 
civilians are estimated to have died and by the time he was overthrown in 1985, Uganda was 
one of the poorest countries in the world.  
 
Less than five months into independence, Equatorial Guinea under Nguema was plunged into 
brutality and coercion that lasted for over a decade. His inflammatory speeches made 
thousands of the Spaniards to flee the country for fear of their lives. Seven thousand are 
estimated to have fled the country, mostly business people, civil administrators, technicians 
and farmers. Ten of the twelve ministers in his first government were assassinated. He 
replaced them with members of his own family and clan. Senior security positions were given 
to his nephews and other close family members. His security forces were given infinite 
powers to detain, torture, rape and murder. A particular target was the country’s educated 
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classes which he hated with passion. He also took savage reprisals against any hint of 
opposition. Thousands of suspected opponents were detained and murdered in prison. Two 
thirds of parliamentarians and most high-ranking civil servants were assassinated, imprisoned 
or driven into exile. Son of a feared witch doctor, Nguema reportedly used witchcraft both to 
prop up his legitimacy and to keep the local population in terrified submission. 
 
Before each visit abroad, Nguema routinely killed political prisoners to dissuade other 
opponents from conspiring against him in his absence (Meredith 2005:240). Death sentences 
were carried out with extreme brutality. In one case, he ordered the execution of all former 
lovers of his current mistresses and also ordered the murder of husbands of women he coveted 
(Meredith 2005:240). The central bank was closed after the director was publicly executed. All 
foreign exchange was delivered to him and he hoarded it together with huge amounts the local 
currency in his many mansions. On his orders, all libraries were closed, all newspapers were 
shut down. The last remaining catholic schools were ordered to shut down in 1974 and from 
then on, learners were only taught political slogans. All religious activities and the use of 
Christian names were banned. Almost all churches were locked up or converted into 
storerooms for weapons for use by his militia. Running short of money, he resorted to 
ransoming foreigners for tens of thousands of dollars each. Robert Klintenberg (cited in 
Meredith 2005:242) described the country as “a land of fear and devastation no better than a 
concentration camp - the cottage industry Dachau of Africa”. Over 50 000 people out of a total 
population of 300 000 were killed, while 125 000 fled into exile. His end came when his 
nephew Obiang and other members of his family who feared that unless he was toppled, they 
might go down with him, staged a coup. He was charged with genocide, embezzlement of 
public funds and paralysis of the economy. He was sentenced to death by firing squad. 
 
In Guinea, Touré lived in a world of conspiracies, speaking frequently of a permanent plot 
organised by western powers and other enemies of the “Guinean Revolution”, to overthrow 
him. He used these plots, real or fictitious, as a pretext for liquidating his opponents, whether or 
not there was evidence against them. His regime became notorious for arbitrary imprisonment, 
show trials, the use of torture and public executions, forcing about one fifth of the country’s 
population to flee to neighbouring countries. His own cabinet was not spared. More than fifty 
of his ministers were either shot dead or hanged, or died in detention, or served prison 
sentences (Meredith 2005: 271).  
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First was an alleged conspiracy by French nationals in cohorts with Guinean dissidents to 
assassinate him just two years into independence. Then was the teachers’ plot after teachers had 
gone on strike for more money. Then there was the traders plot after a group of traders had 
formed their own opposition party. When a group of market women marched to the Presidential 
palace in Conakry, government troops opened fire on them. Touré blamed a fifth column. On 
the pretext that a “fifth column of internal stooges of imperialism and neocolonialism” was at 
work, after a plot by the Portuguese from the neighbouring Guinea Bissau to remove him from 
power, hundreds of people including cabinet ministers, ambassadors and party leaders were 
arrested and put on trial before a “supreme revolutionary court”. None of them was given an 
opportunity to defend themselves, or the opportunity to have legal representation, or even to see 
or talk to the judges. Fifty eight of the accused were hanged in public. Touré viewed a medicine 
shortage in 1972 as a plot by doctors to discredit the revolution. He described a cholera 
outbreak the following year as a counter-revolutionary plot. Even Guinea’s defeat to Morocco 
at the finals of the African Cup of Nations soccer tournament in 1976 was viewed as a plot.  
 
In Zaire, Mobutu adopted the one-party state system and made himself the country’s sole guide 
and mentor. He is quoted as saying: 
 
In our African tradition, there are never two chiefs; there is sometimes a natural heir to 
the chief, but can anyone tell me that he has ever known a village that has two chiefs?  
That is why we Congolese, in the desire to conform to the traditions of our continent, 
have resolved to group all the energies of the citizens of our country under the banner of 
a single national party (Meredith 2005:295-296).  
 
He laid down “Mobutuism” as an ideology, to which everyone was instructed to abide by. 
Mobutuism had the full force of law and any form of non-conformity was regarded as an 
offence against the constitution. Mobutu accumulated vast personal power, ruling by decree, 
controlling all appointments and promotions and deciding on the allocation of government 
resources (Meredith 2005:296). He ordered cities, towns and provinces with foreign names to 
be changed to local ones to “create an authentic national spirit”. Congo was changed to Zaire. 
Zairians with European names were ordered to drop them for African ones. Pastors were 
warned that if caught baptising a local child with a European name they would be jailed 
for five years. Mobutu himself changed his name to Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za 
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Manga, which means “The warrior who knows no defeat because of his endurance and 
inflexible will and is all-powerful, leaving fire in his wake as he goes from conquest to 
conquest” (Meredith 2005:296). 
 
To maintain his hold on power, Mobutu relied on a number of personal military and police 
units, which were commanded by an elite group of officers from his home village, to whom he 
dispensed patronage. He kept his ministers and senior government officials in a constant state 
of flux, moving them regularly, firing them or imprisoning them to ensure they posed no 
threats. He had to be consulted on every decision, including petty ones. Nguza Karl-i-Bond, 
one of his former Prime Ministers, remarked: 
 
Nothing is possible in Zaire without Mobutu. He created Zaire. He fathered the 
Zairian people. He grew the trees and the plants. He brings rain and good weather. 
You do not go to the toilet without the authorization of Le Guide. Zairians would be 
nothing without him. Mobutu has obligations to nobody, but everybody has 
obligations to him (Meredith 2005:297). 
 
Within weeks of independence, Banda’s rule had already descended into tyranny. In a fit of 
anger, he dismissed ministers who challenged his authority and went on to run Malawi as his 
personal fiefdom, demanding, not just obedience, but obsequiousness. Declaring himself 
President for life, Banda did not tolerate dissent or criticism of any sort and no one was 
allowed to question his decisions. He is reported as saying: “Anything I say is law. Literally 
law. It is a fact in this country” (Meredith 2005:165). In 1965, he is quoted as saying: “If, to 
maintain political stability and efficient administration, I have to detain 10 000 or 100 000, I 
will do it,” (Meredith 2005:176). By the end of his rule, he had incarcerated tens of thousands 
of Malawians in detention centres and sending out his secret police and militia, the Young 
Pioneers, to deal with opponents at home and abroad. His rule was sometimes likened to that 
of one of the old Maravi kings, who ruled with divine right and absolute authority. Bokassa 
was notorious for brutality and suppressing revolts, leading Western media to dub him the 
“Butcher of Bangui. As he became more and more unpopular, his brutality increased. An 
independent judiciary commission of enquiry noted that the massacre of 100 striking students 
in April 1979, happened under the orders and direct participation of Bokassa (Meredith 
2005:230) (italics ours). Witnesses claimed that the emperor himself showed up in prison and 
participated in the beating and flogging of arrested strikers. Prisoners were severely flogged 
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in public. Some were beaten to death with hammers and chains on the orders of Bokassa. The 
emperor himself was known to hold kangaroo courts in one of his villas, sentencing people to 
be thrown to hungry lions and crocodiles.   
 
Houphouët-Boigny viewed political debate and criticism as impediments to economic 
development. There were no contested elections held for twenty years. Political power was in 
the hands of a small elite group surrounding the President. In Kenya, Kenyatta was ruthless in 
dealing with any challenge to his authority. He fell out of favour with his vice President Oginga 
Odinga who resigned to form his own party. He was harassed at every turn, was arrested, his 
party banned and leaving Kenya a one-party state. In Ethiopia, Major Mengistu Haile Mariam 
launched his campaign of “red terror”, arming civilian vigilantes and unleashing them on his 
opponents. Armed gangs hunted down intellectuals and all those deemed to be “counter-
revolutionaries.” They were all wiped out. Dead bodies were left on road sides labelled 
“oppositionists”. Thousands died and thousands more were imprisoned in the red terror 
campaign.  
 
Two decades into independence, Africa was notorious for its big men, tyrants who strutted the 
stage, tolerating neither opposition nor dissent, rigging elections, refusing to step down, 
interfering with the judiciary, intimidating the media, stifling universities, demanding 
obsequiousness and making themselves extremely rich. Three decades into independence, not a 
single African head of state had allowed himself to be voted out of office. Of the 150 heads of 
state who had trodden the African stage, only six had voluntarily relinquished power: Senghor, 
after twenty years, Cameroon’s Ahmadu Ahidjo, after 22 years and Nyerere after 23 years in 
power (Meredith 2005:379). Some first generation African leaders still hung on to power even 
in old age. At an advanced age of 84 and after 29 years in power, Houphouët-Boigny remained 
as adamantly in charge as before: 
 
There is no number two, three or four. In Cote d’Ivoire there is only number one: that is 
me and I do not share my decisions (Meredith 2005:379). 
 
Since coming to power, Houphouët-Boigny had won all six presidential elections with an 
average of 99 percent of the vote (Meredith 2005:379). After thirty years in power and at a very 
advanced age of 96, with clear evidence of infirmity, Banda showed no signs of willingness to 
leave office. He stood for Malawi’s first truly democratic election in 1994 and was thrashed by 
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Bakili Muluzi. Mobutu had ruled Zaire for 32 years by the time he was overthrown by Laurent 
Desire Kabila. Kaunda ruled Zambia for 27 years until he was ousted by Frederick Chiluba in 
1991. Touré had been the dictator of Guinea for 26 years until he died in 1984. General 
Moussa Traore of Mali had been in power for 23 years until he was overthrown by popular 
protests and a military coup in 1991. In Togo General Gnassingbe Eyedema held power for 38 
years until he died in office in 2005. El Hadj Omar Bongo Ondimba was President of Gabon 
for 42 years from 1967 until his death in 2009, becoming the world's longest-serving non-
monarch ruler. José Eduardo dos Santos, long-serving President of Angola, announced that he 
would retire in early 2018. That would be after 39 years of leading one of the most corrupt 
regimes in Africa and after having amassed a fortune for his family and silencing his 
opposition, while, nearly 70 percent of the population lived below the poverty datum line. 
President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea, snatched power from his 
uncle, less than two months before dos Santos took office. In 2017, he was still in charge and 
would be President for 38 years. Sudan’s General Omar al Bashir was still in power in 2017, 
28 years after coming to power. An arrest warrant was issued for him by the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) on crimes against humanity and war charges allegedly committed in 
the Darfur crisis in which hundreds of thousands have died and millions displaced.  
 
The second generation of African leaders was no different from the first. Only four years in 
office, Daniel arap Moi, turned Kenya into a one-party state. Like most African leaders, he 
harassed and imprisoned opponents with his militia, made extensive use of torture; wiped out 
press freedom; gagged trade unions, stole elections and turned the civil service into a party 
machine. Yoweri Museveni of Uganda came to power after overthrowing the corrupt and brutal 
dictatorship of Obote in 1986, with international acclaim promising to restore security and 
respect for human rights. He ruled the country through a “no-party” system which in reality 
operated little differently from a one-party system. In an interview with Africa Report he 
defended his ideology thus: 
 
Multi-party democracy would have no problem if the parties would polarize themselves 
along lines of principle, on policy issues… But they do not. Most of the time, they 
polarize themselves along sectarian lines - either on religious lines… or on a tribal basis 
as is the case in a number of countries… Our fear of multi-partyism is not in the multi-
parties themselves, it is in the effect that it will have on the unity of our people and 
stability. We want democracy… and we favour the form of democracy without parties, 
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where you more or less have a beauty contest (Margaret Novicki 1983). 
 
Like those before him, Museveni became autocratic, has been accused of rigging elections, 
silencing opposition parties, harassing the media and not willing to relinquish power. In 2005, 
he held a referendum to scrap the constitutional provision that limited the presidential term. In 
2017, he had been in power for 31 years.  
 
Paul Barthélemy Biya'a bi Mvondo (Paul Biya) of Cameroon came to power after the surprise 
resignation of President Ahmadou Ahidjo in 1982. He immediately dismissed calls for a multi-
party system only to give in after domestic and international pressure. He was accused of 
running a reign of terror, characterised by intimidation, violence, fraud, and electoral 
irregularity. In 2009, Parade Magazine ranked Biya nineteenth in its Top 20 list of "The World's 
Worst Dictators.” He changed the constitution so that he would run for another term and to rule 
by decree.  
 
At the beginning of the third millennium, the continent was in a sorry state. Floods, famine, 
war, disease and poverty were wreaking havoc. Sierra Leone and Congo were burning from the 
flames of civil conflict. HIV and AIDS and Ebola outbreak had severe consequences for the 
economy of the region, as they undermined trade and investment. In other parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa, a deterioration of the security situation could also have severe regional spillovers. 
Dubbed “Hopeless Africa” by The Economist (May 2000), sub-Saharan Africa’s prospects, as 
the second decade of the 21st century comes to an end, are as bleak as ever before. Cote 
d’Ivoire has just emerged from a ruinous civil war in which President Laurent Gbagbo refused 
to hand over power to Alassane Ouattara. The country was laid waste by one African leader’s 
obsession with clinging on to power. Somalia has since ceased to exist as a state. It is now a 
failed state that has disintegrated into total chaos. The whole land is like a black patch on the 
vast continent, with no central government and as many war lords as there are villages. Barely 
two years after gaining independence from the Sudan in 2011, South Sudan - one of the most 
underdeveloped countries on earth - descended into a bitter civil war between the government 
of Salva Kiir and his former deputy Riek Machar, a conflict that has now taken ethnic 
dimensions, amid warnings that the country is on the verge of a genocide. An estimated 50 000 
people have been killed so far and millions are displaced and are facing severe food shortages. 
As of 2016, it had the second highest score on the Fragile States Index (formerly the Failed 
States Index). It would be a misnomer to regard the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a 
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state. It is to all intents and purposes, in a state of “suspended statehood”. The central 
government lost control of a substantial part of the country to rebels and dissidents. The rise of 
Islamic fundamentalism has intensified security headaches for African leaders. In Nigeria, the 
militant group, Boko Haram has a free reign in some parts of the country where it raids villages 
at will kidnapping girls and women, freely recruiting boys and executing men, among other 
horrible acts. In Kenya, al-Shabaab militants from Somalia launch raids into the country with 
devastating consequences. Mozambique is on knife edge as opposition leader, Afonso 
Dhlakama of Renamo, is threatening to plunge Mozambique into a civil war once again. In 
Burundi, President Pierre Nkurunziza openly defied the constitution by standing for election for 
a third term, prompting revolts from many Burundians. The disturbances are estimated to have 
claimed over 300 lives by December 2015 with about 215 000 others fleeing the country.  
   
Compounding the plight of Africa has been the scourge of HIV and AIDS. Though strides have 
been made to cut the rate of new infections and AIDS related deaths, the region is still in crisis. 
After more than 30 years of devastation, struggle and loss, Sub-Saharan Africa has the most 
serious HIV and AIDS epidemic in the world. The 2013 UNAIDS report notes that of the 35 
million people living with HIV globally, 24.7 million are living in sub-Saharan Africa 
(accounting for 71 percent of the global total) and that nearly one in every 20 adults is living 
with the virus in this region (UNAIDS 2013:18). In the same year, there were an estimated 1.5 
million new HIV infections and 1.1 million AIDS-related deaths accounting for 74 percent of 
all the people dying from AIDS-related causes in 2013 (UNAIDS 2013:9). 
 
Africa remains the world’s poorest region, falling further and further behind other regions. 
More than half of the population of the huge continent is living below the poverty datum line. 
In fact poverty levels continue to increase. With its enormous mineral resources, the continent’s 
economic output is still less than two percent of the world GDP (Meredith 2005:692). A 2010 
report by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) indicated that there were 239 million 
malnourished people in the sub-region. It noted that the proportion of undernourished people in 
sub-Saharan Africa remains highest, at 30 percent in 2010 (FAO 2010:11). Of the 22 countries 
in a state of protracted crisis and thus needing a lot of attention, noted by the organisation, 
seventeen are from sub-Saharan Africa (FAO 2010:12). While noting that overall, Africa has 
had one of the fastest rates of improvement in human development over  the  past  two  
decades,  the UNDP adds that the region has  the lowest average levels of human development 
compared  to  other  regions  in  the  world (UNDP 2016:3). Abdulqawi Yusuf (cited in Yannis 
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2003:64) summed up the situation of post-colonial Africa observing that so many decades   
 
after 1960, the symbolic year of Africa’s independence, many African countries 
continue to experience serious difficulty in the process of consolidation of their 
statehood… Some African nations have reduced themselves to a state of “suspended 
statehood”  in which there may still be recognised frontiers, but everything inside has 
become anarchy and lawlessness. 
 
Robert Jackson (1987:526) weighs in arguing that post-colonial state-building resulted in the 
formation of what he calls “quasi-states”:  
 
The state in Africa is ... more a personal- or primordial-favouring political 
arrangement than a public-regarding realm. Government is less an agency to provide 
political goods such as law, order, security, justice, or welfare and more a fountain of 
privilege, wealth and power for a small elite who control it ... Many governments are 
incapable of enforcing their writ throughout their territory. In more than a few 
countries... some regions have escaped from national control ... [and the states] are 
fairly loose patchworks of plural allegiances and identities somewhat reminiscent of 
medieval Europe (Jackson 1987:527-528). 
 
The words of Edem Kodjo, Secretary General of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
can apply to any part of the post-independence period:  
 
Our ancient continent is on the brink of disaster, hurting towards the abyss of 
confrontation, caught in the grip of violence, sinking into the dark night of bloodshed 
and death… Gone are the smiles, the joys of life (Meredith 2005:292). 
 
But what might account for this status quo when in fact the coming of independence on the 
continent was greeted with enthusiasm and optimism? What really went wrong after that 
initial promise of taking Africa to stardom? 
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6.4.3.6 Making sense of the senseless 
 
A question that should be asked from the onset is: was independence the best option for 
Africa? Senghor and Houphouët-Boigny, among other Francophone leaders, thought 
otherwise. “Independence has no positive content. It is not a solution,” Senghor remarked. 
Houphouët-Boigny (cited in Meredith 2005:69) added: “It is not the shell of independence 
which counts; it is the contents: the economic contents, the social contents and the human 
contents.” Instead of independence, Senghor advocated a new political federation between 
the former colonial master, France and Africa. His view was that independence for small 
political entities, with weak economies and few resources would be no more than “pseudo-
independence”. The future lay, for him, in large federations of states working together with 
imperial powers to mobilise European resources to help Africa combat poverty, disease and 
ignorance (Meredith 2005:61).  
 
Probably they were right. Most, if not all, of the ten Francophone countries that were granted 
independence in 1960, such as Chad, Niger, Gabon, Benin and Mali, were not economically 
viable. Chad, Niger and Mali were landlocked, mostly desert, thinly populated and 
desperately poor. Mauritania was no more than a desert which, until 1954, the colonialists 
had seen unfit for their habitation and so had ruled it from the Senegal. Upper Volta had only 
become a separate territory in 1947. Even Senegal, the second richest of the French colonies 
in l'Afrique Noire, relied heavily on French subsidies. South Sudan was not prepared for self-
government. The region had no organised political parties until 1953. It also did not have any 
sense of national consciousness that united its incongruent tribes. Despite all this, they were 
candidates for independence and post-colonial statehood. Some of the African leaders, such 
as Amin, had very little formal education. Nguema was of very limited intelligence and had, 
on three occasions, failed to pass examinations that would qualify him for a civil service 
career, only to succeed the fourth time due to Spanish favouritism. Most African leaders had 
not had any experience in government, even at a local level. Some had been freedom fighters 
who emerged from the bush straight to state house on the eve of independence. Lumumba 
was only 35 years old and ill-prepared to manage a complex country as Congo. As discussed 
above, no Congolese had acquired any experience of government or parliamentary life and 
that no national or even provincial election had ever been held in the country. Surely it would 
be too much to expect normal governance from such a scenario.  
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Furthermore, political systems that they were to adopt at independence were recent 
transplants. Africans had little experience of representative democracy, the institutions having 
been introduced by the British and the French (in some cases) too late to alter the established 
character of the colonial state. The more durable imprint they left behind was of authoritarian 
regimes in which governors and their officials wielded enormous personal power. To this 
should be added that the fact that the history of Africa hitherto had been one of violence and 
repression. Colonialism was a very violent process. Africans under colonialism were 
violently repressed and suppressed. State structures were instruments of repression. 
Traditions of autocratic governance, paternalism and dirigisme were embedded in the 
institutions the new leaders inherited. African nationalist leaders inherited these same 
repressive and exploitative states and perfected the art of repression and exploitation. The 
state of the underdevelopment (socio-political and economic) of Africa today can be viewed 
as a result of a history of exploitation, suppression and colonial atrocities perpetrated by 
European imperialists. Thus a study of the period of the partition as well as that of colonial 
Africa is essential for an understanding of the present situation in Africa. 
 
Against this background, Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause (2003:10) argue that in 
retrospect it was somewhat naive to expect that the new post-colonial African states would 
build legitimate nations, provide wealth, and guarantee security within a few decades of 
independence. Such expectation, they argue, could only make sense if the idea of the state is 
plucked out of its historical context, and regarded as an institutional form that owes little or 
nothing to the historical forces that created it (Milliken and Krause 2003:10).    
 
This is an incisive observation. Most of the “states” that were inherited at independence were 
actually pseudo-or quasi-states. These “states” were treated “as if” they possessed the full 
attributes of sovereignty, even if they evidently did not in fact do so (Clapham 2003:32). 
Such states did not qualify for statehood by the criterion of international law in use by the 
1930s, which entailed the existence of effective government, with centralised administrative 
and legislative organs. Statehood was regarded as the only possible form of governance and 
socio-political organisation for the world - and this despite the pseudo-statehood of many of 
the candidate states. Yet they were nonetheless granted independence and their governments 
were recognised by other governments as bona fide representatives of those territories and 
populations. Pseudo-statehood was converted into real statehood, with disastrous 
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consequences for both continent and people. Such pseudo- or quasi-states were never really 
states, to begin with. The puzzle is not how and why they may fail, but how and why they 
exist or persist at all (Milliken and Krause 2003:10). To regard some of these states as if they 
were sovereign players at par with others in the international arena is a travesty of reality.  
 
We noted earlier that the state in Africa is a creation of imperialist powers and was 
established to integrate Africa into the world capitalist system and extract surplus for the 
imperial bourgeoisie. That was its raison d’etre; it was never designed to be independent, or 
to cease being a source of cheap raw materials and labour for the imperial industries (Mentan 
2010:29). Its political and economic structures were conditioned to meet the repressive as 
well as the exploitative needs of the imperial state, leaving the former African territories 
largely untouched by its developmental goals and so unable to develop after the fall of 
colonialism. President Olympio remarked: 
 
The effect of the policy of the colonial powers has been the economic isolation of 
peoples who live side by side, in some instances within a few miles of each other, 
while directing the flow of resources to the metropolitan countries. For example, 
although I can call Paris from my office telephone here in Lomé, I cannot place a call 
to Lagos in Nigeria only 250 miles away. Again, while it takes a short time to send an 
air-mail letter to Paris, it takes several days for the same letter to reach Accra, a mere 
132 miles away... The productive central regions of Togo, Dahomey (Benin) and 
Ghana are as remote from each other as if they were on separate continents (Meredith 
2005:153). 
 
Independence made very little, if any, difference to the colonial state in the era of global 
capitalist expansion. Instead of colonialism, Africa has since independence been in a state of 
what Nkrumah liked to refer to as “neo-colonialism”. This is where formal political 
independence is achieved but economic control - and hence indirect political power - 
continues to lie with overseas powers and companies (Carmody 2011:3). It is also what 
Nyerere referred to as “flag independence”, a situation in which real economic control 
continued to rest with the former colonial powers. The African elites who took power at 
independence did little to structurally alter the economies, as they joined the “club” of the 
imperial bourgeoisie, which they had been prevented from joining by law and colonial 
practise. In reality, they serve as the foremen to keep the peasants producing a surplus to be 
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accumulated by the foreign bourgeoisie and some parasitic native elites. They simply copied 
what was before them. Thus the structure of post-colonial economies remained largely 
unchanged in the post-colonial era. The World Bank (1989:3) arrived at the same conclusion:   
 
The post-independence development efforts failed because the strategy was 
misconceived. Governments made a dash for "modernisation," copying, but not 
adapting, Western models. The result was poorly designed public investments in 
industry; too little attention to peasant agriculture; too much intervention in areas in 
which the state lacked managerial, technical, and entrepreneurial skills; and too little 
effort to foster grassroots development. This top-down approach demotivated ordinary 
people, whose energies most needed to be mobilised in the development effort. 
 
Ibbo Mandaza (1986) argues that the post-colonial African state cannot achieve its 
development goals because it is more an extension of Europe than an independent region. 
While it is sculpted on the template of the European bourgeois state, it unfortunately does not 
have an anchor class, in the form of a national bourgeois that would guide it on a 
developmental trajectory and provide it with an autonomy to institute a truly national agenda 
(Mandaza 1986:82). With regards to the European state, the order was such that the 
bourgeoisie emerged first and the state then emerged around that class. For that reason, the 
state emerged stronger. But with regards to Africa, the order was reversed – the state came 
first and it was hoped that an anchor class would immediately emerge. Quite frankly that is a 
major handicap of the post-colonial African state. The states lacked that strong bourgeoisie 
anchor class because colonialism prevented it from being created. The anchor class would 
have enabled it to craft a developmental agenda that the post-colonial state badly needs. For 
that reason, Mandaza (1986:82) argues, the post-colonial African state is a “hostage state” 
which is naturally weak. It was born weak and dependent. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013) goes as 
far as to deny that the African state can be called a post-colonial state because it is still under 
the same “colonial power matrix” as during formal colonialism, making it highly unlikely for 
it to extricate itself from this snare. The global order is such that weaker countries ought to 
get instructions from the West. Because of their dependent nature, they cannot implement 
policies that have not been approved by the West. The African state is under round-the-clock 
surveillance from the imperial masters. They cannot rebel against the Western imperial 
masters for there will be a very high price to pay. Like Sennacherib’s brutal siege of 
Jerusalem after Hezekiah’s rebellion, Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and 
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Zimbabwean dictator, Robert Mugabe, would be punished severely by the West for defying 
their rules. This point will be expanded in Chapter Seven.   
 
Africanists (e.g. Young 1988; Hyden 1999) have questioned the assumption that statehood is 
an appropriate institutional model for Africa. They question whether Africa would not be 
better served by some political structures different from the state which, after all is an 
imposition from outside. Instead of taking the state for granted, they now treat it as a major 
impediment to development (Milliken and Krause 2003:11-12). They thus suggest that 
African states must be overhauled in order for development to succeed. Mentan (2010:2) adds 
that African developmental goals cannot be achieved by the present state in Africa, and 
suggests that Africans will have to restructure the state away from its client-collaborator 
existential situation if these are to be met.  
 
Indigenous elites cherished the state system because their own claims and qualifications to 
rule, the goals that they sought, and the whole ideology of anti-colonial nationalism which 
they espoused, were intimately bound up with the maintenance of statehood (Clapham 
1996:30). They never challenged the borders themselves. On the contrary, they simply upheld 
their inherited boundaries, since there was no alternative conception of where the borders 
“ought” to be, through which to challenge them (Clapham 1996:46-50).  
 
6.4.4 Conclusion 
 
In this overview chapter the focus has been on the political economy of post-colonial Africa. 
We looked at the governance systems of pre-colonial Africa, the scramble and partition of 
Africa, Africa under colonialism, as well as post-colonial Africa. We also noted the internal 
and external constraints to development on the continent. The African elites who came to 
power at independence, through their inexperience, politics of the belly and patronage, and 
maladministration, dimmed the hope that the world had on the day that Nkrumah was 
inaugurated in Ghana. Most importantly, attention has been given to the foreign state and a 
state in the service of capitalism as an impediment to development. We have thus set the 
context within which the political economy of post-colonial Zimbabwe should be understood. 
In the following chapter we focus on that political economy.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: POST-COLONIAL ZIMBABWEAN POLITICAL 
ECONOMY 
 
 
The reason why the story of Zimbabwe is more than a tale about a remote corner of the world 
is that in a small geographical space and within one life time we have seen acted out a play 
of forces that have characterised our century. It is as if the unities of classical theatre have 
been observed on a historical stage. And the story does have all the makings of a classical 
drama - the inevitability of tragedy (de Waal 1990:v) 
 
7.0 Introduction 
 
At midnight on 18 April 1980, the Union Jack was lowered for the very last time, to the 
applause of millions of Zimbabweans. After so many years of oppression and repression, the 
black majority were finally free and had elected a government of their choice. The country 
was pregnant with promise. Why not, when it had the second most advanced economy and 
the most educated African population on the continent? Immediately, the new leaders did not 
disappoint, announcing the much-praised policy of reconciliation between former oppressor 
and oppressed. Great strides were made as social services were extended to the black 
majority. However, the honey moon did not last long as the realities of being a post-colony 
began to catch up with the country. The economy was deteriorating rapidly as the ruling elite 
resorted to predation. The dream turned into a nightmare. Zimbabwe was a pale shadow of its 
former confident self. It went on to record the second highest rate of inflation in recorded 
history, had a central bank but no currency of its own. Once an industrial hub, the country 
ended up relying on the informal economy. The country had descended into authoritarianism, 
violence, chaos, deprivation and decay. Millions of its people had crossed the borders looking 
for greener pastures. Poverty was wreaking havoc on the land. Never before had a modern 
country outside a war zone collapsed so far so fast. What can account for this phenomenal 
and unprecedented decline? Were solely internal factors to blame or there were other equally 
powerful external factors? What role did the colonial inheritance play in this political 
economy? What was the role of the state in this drama?  
 
In Chapter Six we explored the political economy of post-colonial Africa. The idea was to 
give the broader context within which the Zimbabwean political economy can be situated and 
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understood. Zimbabwe shares many constraints to nationhood and development with other 
post-colonies. This chapter will start with a brief discussion of the political economy of 
Rhodesia. This is done to note the continuities between Rhodesia and Zimbabwe and the 
influence of the former on the latter. A discussion of the key features of the post-colonial 
Zimbabwean political economy from the lofty heights of the euphoria of the defeat of white 
settler colonialism to 2017 - the year in which veteran leader, Robert Mugabe, was forced to 
relinquish power - is the major pre-occupation of the chapter. We will also discuss the 
challenges and constraints that have confronted the state in attempting to build a democratic, 
egalitarian and inclusive society. In so doing, the discussion will determine the extent to 
which this political economy can be labelled a political economy of terror. 
 
7.1 The political economy of Rhodesia  
 
The land bounded by the Zambezi and Limpopo rivers, and by Botswana in the southwest 
and Mozambique in the east, and measuring some 391 000km2, has since April 1980, been 
called Zimbabwe. The name comes from its most spectacular stone structures built by local 
people around the 13th - 15th century (Kriger 1992:1). The beauty of the land always 
fascinated the earliest white missionaries, historians and explorers. The earliest writers wax 
enthusiastic about the grandeur of the mighty Victoria Falls, the haunting beauty of the 
Matopos, the rock outcrops of the plains of Mashonaland, the misty loveliness of the Nyanga 
Mountains and the endless blue horizons, among other splendid features of the land. For 
imperialists, it was the land worth fighting for. The occupation of the land legally 
commenced on 29 October 1889, with the incorporation of the British South Africa Company 
(BSAC) - the embodiment and vanguard of capitalist profitability and imperialist 
expansionism in southern Africa - by Royal Charter, giving it occupation and governance 
rights (Ncube 2001:101). The BSAC was a mining prospecting and landholding company 
whose Directors included Cecil John Rhodes, George Cawston and Alfred Beit. Unlike other 
colonies, the land was colonised, not from an imperial metropolis, but by a private company. 
It became a company asset, paying dividends to shareholders who had invested with excess 
capital that could not find profitable outlets in Europe (Bond and Manyanya 2003:3). The 
colony was named Rhodesia (later Southern Rhodesia) in honour of Rhodes.  
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Inspired by German geologist Karl Mauch who claimed to have discovered a potential 
“second Rand”, the company crossed the Limpopo hoping to profit from gold mining. The 
BSAC invested heavily in infrastructure but the investment in the colony was a financial 
disaster. Gold was not found in large quantities as the company had anticipated. To recoup its 
losses, the company encouraged the immigration of white Europeans to invest their capital in 
the colony, particularly in farming. Within a short period, there was a heavy white settler 
presence, the largest in any colony in Africa north of the Limpopo. Attention was now 
focused on land expropriation on a massive scale. Encroachment on African land by the 
settlers provoked African resistance which has come to be known as the first 
Chimurenga/Umvukela. With the brutal crushing of African resistance by the settlers, 
Southern Rhodesia was firmly in the hands of the company and thus begun the process of 
reorienting the African societies of the colony to the capitalist world (Clarke 1980:15). 
Africans were violently dispossessed of their land as large tracts of the most fertile land were 
parcelled out to white settlers who were coming in their droves from Europe and South 
Africa. Missionaries were also apportioned their own swathes of land, with the Jesuits alone 
eventually possessing 180 000 acres (de Waal 1990:16). The migrants became an instant 
petit-bourgeoisie class on the colony’s finest land. From the occupation until 1923, the 
country was ruled by the company with occasional British Colonial Office intervention 
(Clarke 1980:16). For those three decades, the BSAC was also the state, the company qua 
state (Cokorinos 1984:15). There can be no closer relation between state and economy than 
what existed in Southern Rhodesia under company rule (Cokorinos 1984:15). The BSAC was 
not interested in creating an empire, but in the exploitation of resources to make profits for its 
investors.  
 
At the expiry of the Charter in 1923, the majority in the whites-only election chose the “Self-
Governing Status”, as opposed to amalgamation with South Africa that the company had 
hoped for (Bond and Manyanya 2003:4). Southern Rhodesia became a British colony with 
the right to self-government. Britain, as the colonial power, reserved the right to intervene in 
the country’s legislation. Apart from South Africa, nowhere else on the continent did a 
colonial power give self-government to settlers in its colony (Kriger 1992:2) The state 
replaced the company as the key economic actor. The white farming bourgeoisie formed the 
centre of the class structure and determined the colony’s political and economic development. 
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From the very inception of the colony, the mode of production of Southern Rhodesia was 
strikingly capitalist. The colonial economy was a creation of foreign capital designed to 
supply minerals and agricultural products to Western countries. Duncan G. Clarke (1980:168) 
notes that it is difficult to find a sub-Saharan African country that is comparable to Zimbabwe 
in the way in which the role of foreign capital had been so long established. The large settler 
presence was meant to ensure maximum extraction and exploitation of the resources of the 
land. For the establishment of a viable white settler community, maximum accumulation and 
profit maximisation, systematic racial discrimination against the natives was essential. 
Racism was used by the white ruling elite in an attempt to internalise in Africans the real or 
imaginary differences between the coloniser and the colonised (Zvobgo 1986:319). It served 
to consolidate white settler security and make Africans internalise the idea that they were 
indeed inferior and by so doing, white settlers would be guaranteed dominance in the socio-
economic and political spheres. For the racial project to succeed, it was necessary to 
eliminate all forms of African competition. Brian Raftopoulos (1986:276) notes that the 
“native policy” was meant to ensure the development of the natives in such a way that they 
will come as little as possible into conflict or competition with the settlers, socially, 
economically and politically. The settlers feared that a rapid rise in social mobility of 
Africans would threaten their perceived superiority, power and privilege. The system was 
therefore crafted to create functionaries rather than competitors in any sphere of life within 
the colonial system. By pre-empting competition from natives in all aspects of national life, 
the colonial system was simultaneously pre-empting the rise of an African bourgeoisie class 
(Mandaza 1999:88).  
 
Many obstacles were created to keep Africans out of any meaningful participation in the 
economy except as cheap labour or petty business operators. Purposive and systematic 
measures and policy instruments, including physical and political coercion, legislative 
discrimination and a whole host of direct and indirect economic measures, designed to 
marginalise Africans and serve minority settler class interests were introduced. These 
disadvantaged the native and thus kept him in perpetual dependence on the white settler. The 
key actor on this stage was the state, which was, to all intents and purposes, an instrument in 
the hands of the white bourgeoisie class and over which it had dominant influence. As an 
organ of capital, the colonial state was an apparatus that was essentially repressive to 
anything that was an obstacle to capitalist penetration and the white bourgeoisie accumulation 
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project (Sachikonye 1986:249). Land ownership patterns, agricultural policy, colonial 
education and labour relations all conformed to the general racist nature of separate 
development. 
 
Mass African nationalism in the colony started in earnest in the 1950s. The nationalists 
mobilised around issues of universal suffrage, anti-discrimination and improved standards of 
living for black people. While the nationalist movement was initially reformist, demanding a 
reform of the political economy to make it democratic, it later developed a radical 
nationalism that sought to dismantle white settler colonialism and attain national 
independence. The nationalists took up arms and waged a liberation war. Eventually, the 
colonial government was forced to negotiate with the armed guerrilla groups culminating in 
the Lancaster House Agreement (LHA) that brought independence. It is important to give a 
brief critique of this agreement for it was to later determine the socio-political and economic 
relations in the post-colonial period.  
 
7.2 The Lancaster House Agreement (LHA) 
 
The biggest winner at the Lancaster House Conference was British imperialism. That was 
quite expected because, as Mandaza (1986:3) notes, the conference provided imperialism 
with an opportunity to be a referee in a match in which it had vested interests. Imperialism 
tried to resolve the problem it had created in its own favour. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013:15) 
agrees maintaining that Lancaster House was the “political maternity ward” for the delivery 
of truncated African re-birth with the former colonial masters, Britain and the US, overseeing 
the whole process and channelling it straight into a neo-colonial direction. The two midwives, 
as representatives of international finance capital, were bent on facilitating the birth of a 
“neo-colonial” state rather than a “post-colonial state.” Their aim was that the new-born baby 
should not unlock itself from the grip of imperialism (Mandaza 1986:63). The LHA was, to 
all intents and purposes, a compromise between the transfer of political power to blacks and 
the entrenchment of the economic privileges of the settlers and international capital. Bond 
(2003:64) counts the LHA among the “negotiated elite power-transfers” which did nothing to 
identify and rectify the sins of prior dictatorships but left the economic status quo intact. 
Roger Southall (Unpublished, p. 1) adds that the LHA was an attempt by the British to allow 
independence on minimalist terms which would protect the interests of both international 
capital and the country’s white settler community.  
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Probably the greatest compromise imperialism got from the African nationalist leaders relates 
to the all-important land question. In the first ten years of independence, land reform would 
be carried out on a “willing buyer willing seller” basis. There would be no compulsory 
expropriation of land. Furthermore, compensation for acquired land was to be in foreign 
currency. The new government would also guarantee the pensions of all white Rhodesian 
civil servants. Twenty of the hundred seats in parliament were to be reserved for whites - a 
huge victory for a small group of less than 250 000 people - further entrenching white power. 
When Zimbabwe was granted majority rule, imperialism had already succeeded in creating 
the kind of state in which it would continue to have a stake and wield influence with regard to 
the direction of policy, which remained broadly within the capitalist framework (Mandaza 
1986:57). The white settlers found themselves with such political and economic guarantees as 
would be the envy of any former colonisers in any decolonising process (Mandaza 1986:3). 
Decolonisation in Rhodesia was actually a departure from the orthodox one that handed over 
political power to a black leadership with very few or no political guarantees for the white 
settlers.  
 
7.3 A decade of promise 
 
On 18 April 1980, a nation was born with much excitement and international acclamation, 
after decades of injustice, suffering and deprivation and a prolonged war of liberation in 
which tens of thousands lost limb and life. The victory of Mugabe’s ZANU PF was hailed as 
an incredible victory for African people and a momentous defeat of imperialism in southern 
Africa (Astrow 1983:1). Zimbabwe was a nation full of potential and the envy of most 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa. A beacon of hope and the economic pride of a gloomy 
continent, on it were pinned the hopes for a turn-around in southern Africa. Here was a nation 
that had a real chance of being an example of multi-racialism, an engine of regional economic 
growth, a promising multi-party democracy and a pillar of strength in the struggle against the 
last vestiges of white minority rule (Baker 1984:164). This newfound status among the 
nations created high hopes and expectations of a prosperous life from an excited citizenry. An 
obvious magnet for international finance capital, predictions were rife that FDI would flow 
into the country in substantial amounts. Prospects for fundamental change in the country were 
very favourable. 
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This expectation was not unfounded because the economic structure which Zimbabwe 
inherited from Rhodesia was unlike that of any other newly independent black African 
country north of the Limpopo. It was more sophisticated, technologically self-reliant, 
internally integrated and industrialised than any other in black Africa north of the Limpopo 
(Gordon 1984:130). It had the features not of peripheral underdevelopment but of semi-
peripheral capitalist development (Bratton 1981:459). It had a large pool of skilled 
manpower, good infrastructure and an advanced commercial agriculture economy. At 
independence, the country had by far more educated Africans than any other African country, 
with some 25 000 qualified teachers and thousands of graduates in exile around the world and 
among the forces in the bush. Raftopoulos (1986:283) estimates that there were between 6 
000 and 8 000 Zimbabwean students in overseas universities. While Zambia had just about a 
dozen black university graduates at independence, in contrast, Zimbabwe boasted 12 000 of 
them in 1980 (Good 2002:7). In spite of the small population, it was deemed to have probably 
the most attractive business environment in black Africa north of the Limpopo. Its 
geographical location made it a potential springboard for western capital seeking markets in 
southern Africa, a region that held tremendous economic potential.  
 
Something akin to a contagious investment fever was already rousing among Western 
corporations seeking overseas expansion and export markets. Investors from across the globe 
attracted by prospects of high profitability, jostled to Zimbabwe to actively assess prospects 
for profitable investments. A leading New York banker is quoted as saying, “Let’s face it – 
it’s an oyster. No banker could fail to be interested” (Astrow 1983:164). Turnbull Gibson 
asked: “Who will be first? With France, West Germany and Japan vying with the UK for 
Rhodesian business… the question is - who gets there first?” (Astrow 1983:164). The US 
Department of Commerce described Zimbabwe as “a unique opportunity for American 
investment in a nation eager for new capital and new technology, with material and human 
resources to put them to work profitably” (Sylvester 1991:99-100). Ron Aldridge of the 
Confederation of British Industry argued against sending junior salesmen adding: “This is a 
highly sophisticated and critical market and therefore I emphasise that in the early stages it 
must be a senior representative going out at this time” (Astrow 1983:164). With all this 
interest, it is almost certain that no newly independent African country received as much 
advice as did Zimbabwe on how it should go about the task of economic development 
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(Gordon 1984:121). African leaders were also aware of the country’s potential: “This is the 
jewel in Africa’s crown. Don’t tarnish it,” Nyerere reportedly told Mugabe before boarding 
his flight back home from the independence celebrations (Good 2002:8).  
 
7.3.1 Initial successes 
 
The incoming administration knew that the world’s eyes were fixed on the country and given 
the context within which it was operating and the numerous challenges that stood on the way, 
it did not disappoint. The economy experienced a boom in the immediate post-colonial 
period. Real growth in GDP was officially at 14% in 1980 and grew by 8% in 1981exceeding 
expectations by far; capital investment rose from 13.7% in 1979 to 17.5% in 1983; capacity 
utilisation rose from 76% in 1979 to 91% in 1982; and external financing also rose admirably 
(Southall unpublished, 9). In the first decade of independence, the economy grew on average 
by more than 4%, compared with only 1% for sub-Saharan Africa as a whole (Riddell, cited 
in Weiss 1994:146). The lifting of sanctions boosted industry and saw a net improvement in 
the country’s foreign exchange position. Closer ties with the West resulted in a considerable 
expansion of both imports and exports. Zimbabwe was granted special access to the European 
Economic Commission (EEC) markets and associate membership of the EEC for a year. This 
positively affected exports which went up 65% from January 1979, while imports recorded a 
45% increase and by the end of 1980, exports had gone up in excess of 30% compared to 
1979 (Astrow 1983:165). Agriculture benefitted from a return to production of land 
abandoned during the war and exceptionally good rains during the 1980 and 1981 farming 
seasons. In 1980, a bumper maize harvest was recorded, and despite a devastating drought of 
the 1982-1983 season, Zimbabwe still had enough to feed its people. Productive capabilities 
of farmers in former TTLs were boosted by distributing farming inputs. The agricultural 
technical and extension service was expanded to help farmers and the Agricultural Finance 
Corporation (AFC) was equipped to provide soft loans to communal farmers. These 
developments saw the communal farming sector increase its share of total marketed 
agricultural production considerably. The government also established state farms throughout 
the country intending to transform them into a successful large-scale socialist production. 
Positive pricing strategies for farmers were designed and marketing depots were built in rural 
area. As a result of all these efforts, Zimbabwe assumed the role of food security in the 
Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC). That earned it the tag of 
“bread basket of southern Africa”.  
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The land redistribution programme was unparalleled in Africa. In the first five years, 2.5 
million hectares of white land were acquired for redistribution (Mumbengegwi 1986:212). 
There was a lot of evidence that the resettled farmers substantially improved their yields. The 
British Overseas Development Administration (ODA) praised the programme for making 
impressive strides towards achieving its principal objectives (Sachikonye 2003:230).  The 
Auditor-General also noted that the programme was well planned, that the landless rural poor 
had benefited immensely, and that their level of household income and standard of living had 
improved significantly (Sachikonye 2003:230). 
 
The 1980s saw a dramatic improvement in human development indicators as the country 
made impressive strides in promoting the welfare of the African majority especially in the 
fields of health and education. The backlog of ninety years of neglect of black education was 
immense. By the end of 1979, three quarters of the schools, mostly in rural areas, had been 
closed or destroyed and half a million young people had missed many years of education. The 
government embarked on a massive programme of rebuilding schools that had been 
destroyed by the war and new ones were also built. Enrolment in primary schools shot up 
from 820 000 in 1979 to 2 216 878 by 1985, while it increased in secondary schools from 66 
000 to 482 000 (Mlambo 1997:59). Even with this impressive expansion, the government was 
struggling to satisfy the appetite for education as more and more learners wanted to go to 
school.  
 
There were 22 000 teachers in 1980 and the number increased to 83 000 by 1989. Teachers, 
especially for science subjects and mathematics, were also recruited from western countries. 
New teacher training colleges were built increasing the enrolment of student teachers from 2 
824 in 1980 to 17 665 in 1990 (Mlambo 1997:61). Through bilateral arrangements with Cuba 
and other countries Zimbabwe sent groups of student teachers to training institutions 
overseas. Adult literacy programmes were introduced for those who had not had the chance 
to attend school. Vocational, technical and agricultural colleges were established throughout 
the country. Apprenticeships were introduced to train artisans in the various trades. 
Enrolment at the University of Zimbabwe increased from 1 873 students in 1980 to 9 012 in 
1990 (Weiss 1994:67). New universities were also built and new degree programmes 
introduced. Distance learning was introduced for those who could not study on a full time 
basis. In the ten years, 1980-1990, Zimbabwe had educated more Africans than the colonial 
governments had throughout the ninety year period of colonial education. According to 
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Roger Riddell (cited in Weiss 1994:146), the country experienced the most rapid explosion of 
primary and secondary school places ever recorded in Africa. The Mugabe administration 
was willing to spend resources on educating its people, spending about a quarter of the total 
national budget, making it the largest item on the national budget. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP 1991:58) adds that the share of the budget allocated to 
primary education rose from 38% to 56%, doubling the real expenditure per learner.  
 
As in education, the country made great strides in expanding health care facilities and making 
services easily accessible to the African population. Health expenditure shifted from urban to 
rural areas. Hospital fees for low-income earners and the unemployed, was scrapped. The 
meagre medical facilities built by the colonial regimes in the rural areas and which had all but 
collapsed due to the war were repaired while new ones were established. Primary health care 
facilities were upgraded. The World Bank (WB 1992:x) noted that more than 500 health care 
centres were built or upgraded, and more than a dozen district hospitals were completed or 
were under construction. By 1990 most of the country’s rural population was within a 10km 
radius of a health care facility (Makaye and Munhande 2013:66). Auxiliary nurses and 
Village Health Workers were trained to bring health care closer to people in rural areas (WB 
1992:x). The percentage of children fully immunised rose from 25% in 1980 to 86% by 1990 
while the proportion of women on contraceptives rose from 14% to 36% (WB 1992:x). 
Zimbabwe was reputed to have the highest rate of contraceptive use in sub-Saharan Africa by 
1990 (Mlambo 1997:161). Life expectancy increased from 55 to 59 years while infant 
mortality dropped from 82 to 72 per 1 000 births and maternal mortality fell to 90 per 100 
000 births (WB 1992:x). The Bank lauded Zimbabwe’s achievements in health provision 
during the 1980s as truly impressive, noting that the indicators were significantly better than 
the averages for black Africa (WB 1992:x). A supplementary feeding scheme was introduced 
for children, which, at its peak, 1981-1985, was feeding a quarter of a million children, 
reducing malnutrition from 29% to 16% between 1980 and 1987. Boreholes and protected 
wells were sunk to provide clean drinking water to rural communities. The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP 1991:58) was impressed by these achievements 
commenting:  
The government's commitment to priority areas has resulted in human expenditures 
per person greater than those of wealthier countries and accounts for the country's 
impressive achievements in literacy, child mortality and life expectancy. 
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Due to neglect of black townships by the colonial governments, there was an acute shortage 
of housing for the urban poor, with a backlog of about 37 000 units at independence. This 
shortage manifested itself in overcrowding in the few available houses in black townships 
and hostels near industrial areas, and the prevalence of squatter settlements around urban 
areas. With the coming of independence, there was an influx of migrants into urban areas 
looking for employment opportunities. In 1982, the backlog rose to 62 000 units and was 
expected to get to 380 000 in a decade (Baker 1984:184). The Ministry of Housing was 
created to address issues of urban housing. Among other projects, it built low-cost housing 
units for the urban poor. 103 000 housing units had been built by 1989 (Auret 1990:133). The 
government also made attempts to clear the squatter settlements. In the case of Epworth, a 
squatter settlement near Harare with an estimated 50 000 residents in 1983, the government 
upgraded and developed the area trough construction of roads and provision of sanitation.   
 
At independence, the country had one of the largest income disparities in the world. The 
government enacted the minimum wage policy in July 1980 and adjusted the minimum wage 
periodically, providing substantial increase in the incomes of black workers. There was also 
emphasis on improving the workers’ living and working conditions. The pace of change was 
accelerated and Africans took charge at virtually every level of government. The civil service 
expanded exponentially. Thousands of well-qualified and competent blacks were recruited to 
take over from whites in the civil service and parastatals. Zimbabwe indeed saw some 
significant economic and social gains during the first decade of independence. The country 
was, as a result, internationally acclaimed as a shining example of a developing country 
committed to the progress of its people. But underneath this thin layer of successes numerous 
challenges were lurking and most of the achievements were to prove unsustainable sooner 
rather than later.  
7.3.2 Challenges to development 
 
The difficulties that stood in the face of the new government were daunting. To begin with, 
the relationship between black and white over ninety years had been that of horse and rider. 
Suddenly, the two were expected to be citizens, living side-by-side on equal terms. Would the 
whites acknowledge the black government and give it their allegiance? Added to this was the 
hostility between the military wings of the two guerrilla factions which bordered on outright 
hostility. Both had also fought the white settler army and now the new government was faced 
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with the unenviable task of forming an integrated and united national army out of three 
antagonistic entities. The national economy was in dire straits in 1980. It had been devastated 
by international economic sanctions after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) 
of 1965, and the war of liberation had taken a heavy toll. The destruction of human and 
natural resources, as well as infrastructure was just too great. The incoming government 
inherited what most likely had become the most unequal society in the world in which the 
country enjoyed one of the highest average per capita incomes on the continent, but the 
majority of its population were among the most impoverished in the world (Mlambo 2017:4). 
To make matters worse, the economy was dominated by domestic white and foreign capital 
controlled by white management and white skills. Two-thirds of the small white elite that 
controlled industry was foreign. No less than 300 foreign-owned companies were operational 
in the country in 1980 (Clarke 1980:34). The whole social and commercial infrastructure had 
been designed for a privileged few white settlers. The inherited socio-economic system of 
Zimbabwe was characterised by social, economic and technological dualism. There were two 
broad economic sectors: the modern and the peasant. The former was advanced and 
diversified while the latter was underdeveloped. The challenge was to develop the peasant 
economy without sacrificing the modern sector, or how to redress these imbalances without 
negatively affecting productivity.  
 
As in the other sectors of the economy, the Mugabe government also inherited a dualistic 
structure of land ownership and agricultural production. The 6 000 commercial farmers 
controlled roughly half of the productive land. 800 000 African families controlled the other 
half. The best productive land with higher rainfall and better soils was exclusively in white 
hands. For this reason, the white commercial farmers were strongly entrenched in the 
economy, accounting for two thirds of total farm production and 90% of marketed output 
(Skålnes 1995:150). With these figures, a careful balancing act was needed between what 
was in the interest of the white farmers (what made economic sense) and the need for policies 
that benefitted communal farmers (what made political sense). When the resettlement process 
started, it was the marginal, rather than productive land that was redistributed. The best part 
of commercial farm land was by and large untouched. A redistribution of prime land for 
resettlement was difficult to achieve without affecting productivity. Being faithful to the 
LHA, the government could not compulsorily acquire land for resettlement without the 
consent of the farmer. The willing-buyer willing-seller arrangement was happening at a 
snail’s pace. Initially resettlement proceeded much faster as government targeted abandoned 
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and underutilised land reaching its peak in 1982/83, when over one million hectares were 
acquired (Dashwood 1996:37). But from then on, the programme lost momentum and 
proceeded very slowly. The abandoned and underutilised land had dried up. By 1989, the 
government had resettled only 52 000 families on 2 416 312 hectares of land, way below its 
target of resettling 162 000 families on nine million hectares of land (The Herald, 4 August 
1989). Meanwhile, the purchase price was sky rocketing. By 1985, it had increased by 48% 
(Auret 1990:77). The hunger for land made many to invade and settle on white farms as 
illegal squatters. Manicaland Province alone was estimated to have 90 000 illegal squatters on 
white farms in 1982 (Libby 1984:148).  
 
There was also the issue of the technical and economic incapacity of the incoming African 
petit bourgeoisie that was inheriting power to manage a bourgeois state and its capitalist 
economy, let alone channel the economy towards the desired egalitarianism. The nationalist 
leadership had very little understanding of the operations of a modern economy. Some had 
been school teachers, others clerks, while others had never held a proper job before. The 
majority had never perused a balance sheet all their life and had very little, if any, exposure to 
either statecraft or business (Mandaza 2007:6). Thus, at independence Mugabe heavily relied 
on white skills from the Smith regime. Two whites were given charge of two strategic 
ministries of Industry and Agriculture while Smith’s army commander and head of 
intelligence were retained. The central bank and judiciary was also left in white hands. 
 
All these coupled with a general increase in population made it imperative that a 
comprehensive reconstruction and reform programme be embarked on. This mammoth task 
required a lot of resources which the new government did not have. The economy was 
supposed to grow fast to create jobs and raise the funds for reconstruction. The majority of 
the blacks who had celebrated the demise of colonialism were expecting a sudden 
improvement in the quality of their lives. They expected independence to bring qualitative 
change in their lives that had been dehumanised by the weight of white racist oppression and 
exploitation. They had been mobilised to support and participate in the war precisely on the 
basis of this promise. How were these expectations to be met unless government changed the 
inherited structure of the economy through a radical programme that would give priority to 
redistribution of assets? No doubt, a backlash would be expected from local and international 
finance capital. Mugabe opted to follow a non-disruptive reformist strategy of building on its 
colonial inheritance, seeking to make it more equitable much to the disappointment of the 
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expectant masses. It is within this context that Mugabe’s policy of reconciliation ought to be 
located. 
 
7.3.3 The political economy of reconciliation  
 
When rumours of Mugabe’s victory began circulating on that memorable day of 4 March 
1980, there was panic and pandemonium in the white community. Mugabe’s crushing victory 
and the wild celebration of the blacks cast deep fear into the hearts of the white population. It 
had come as massive shock to a disbelieving white population after years immersed in false 
propaganda and self-deception. They could see the world collapsing right in front of them. 
But as it turned out, the fears were unfounded. That Tuesday evening, they listened to 
Mugabe’s victory speech with growing amazement, as in a reconciliatory tone, Mugabe told 
them to forget the past and invited them to join him in building the country together as 
citizens. More surprises were to come. On the eve of independence, he told an attentive 
nation that they now had to relate to each other as equal citizens, bound one to another by a 
bond of national comradeship and forgive and forget the wrongs of the past (Weiss 1994:5). 
There was going to be no retributions; no loss of private property; no identification of war 
criminals; no truth and reconciliation commission and no Nuremberg trials. It was not time to 
ask who owed what and to whom? A colossal wave of relief swept over the white 
community. The new Premier went on to form a coalition government which also included 
ministers from Joshua Nkomo’s PF ZAPU. By so doing, white settler capital could be 
appeased, international finance capital reassured and the tensions with PF ZAPU eased. 
Mugabe’s policy of reconciliation won him hearts and minds at home and abroad. His 
approval ratings in diplomatic circles soared. He became a darling of the West. White settlers 
soon realised that fears that their social status would be undermined were baseless. Their 
privilege and standard of life remained exceptionally high at the same level as it was before 
independence. Many of those who had fled to South Africa, a country that seemed to embody 
the political ideals of white dominance, soon realised this and wandered back home now 
fearful of the imminent demise of apartheid down there (Mandaza 1986:55).   
 
The ZANU PF policy of reconciliation was embedded in the LHA. Having already agreed not 
to nationalise the means of production and respect property rights at Lancaster House and 
expecting some financial aid from the former imperialist countries, it was all too obvious that 
the power elites were going to take the reconciliation route. The Mugabe government was too 
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eager to reassure imperialist countries that their investments and interests were safe in 
Zimbabwe. Mandaza (cited in Bond and Manyanya 2003:25) argues that international finance 
capital was, since the LHA, the major factor in the country’s policies, both internal and 
external. Mandaza (1986:81) adds that reconciliation represents the class fulfilment of those 
who make it immediately in the new dispensation. The policy should be understood against 
the background of the African petite bourgeoisie wanting to establish its credentials with the 
financial world, without which its existence as a class would be in jeopardy. Having 
succeeded in making it into the corridors of power in the new state after elbowing out the 
white settler colonial bourgeoisie, the African nationalist petite bourgeois is only too content 
to forgive as the price it can pay for achieving the class goal after so much deprivation and 
denial. It is not reconciliation in terms of providing social justice for the majority of the 
masses. It is rather the forgiveness of a tiny elite that inherits state power. It is the black elite, 
not the African majority that was reconciled with the whites. Ruth Weiss (1994:146) adds 
that reconciliation was not between black and white, but between white and a black section: 
the elite. The policy of reconciliation helped cultivate a black bourgeoisie class which a few 
years into independence, had more in common with white settlers than with the proletariat. 
By so doing, left-leaning critics interpreted the policy of reconciliation as petit-bourgeois 
leadership’s abandonment of the proletariat to accommodate finance capital.  
 
Reconciliation was a kind of a ritual through which the African nationalist petit bourgeoisie 
was initiated into the club of the elite which was hitherto a preserve of the whites. After 
paying the necessary price (reconciliation), the new elites were accepted as social equals by 
whites and, as expected, quickly adapted to their lifestyle. The result of the LHA was, in a 
way, the formation of a joint white and black money elite. The original members of the club 
(the whites) did not feel any remorse for their past or their privileges; rather the incoming 
elite was supposed to be grateful for having been granted membership of the club. Whites 
accepted reconciliation as part of a peace treaty (Weiss 1994:xxii). In their view, all that was 
needed was to accept a black in place of a white leadership. They would continue with their 
privileges as before. For the masses in need of improved living conditions, reconciliation was 
not a stepping-stone. Little wonder elitist reconciliation is neither sustainable nor durable.  
 
As shall be seen later, it gradually became untenable as the demands of the proletariat grew 
louder, in an economy that was narrow and shallow. Furthermore, as noted in Chapter Six, 
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the post-colonial African state is a “hostage state” which is weak and dependent. It does not 
have a national anchor bourgeoisie class which would enable it to withstand the heat from 
international finance capital and institute a national agenda. Because of this weakness and 
dependence, radical programmes intended to redress the imbalances of the past cannot be 
implemented by the post-white settler colonial state, even by one born out of a radical and 
socialist-oriented national liberation struggle, like ZANU PF. To expect such a state to 
implement radical policies of its own choice is to ignore its nature and its orientation - it is 
inherently unable to fulfil these popular demands because it is still under the “colonial power 
matrix”. It is caught up in an unenviable dilemma between the demands of international 
finance capital and the socio-economic demands of the masses, and in a tension between 
reconciliation and social justice. This weakness and dependence will compel it to 
compromise its socio-economic agenda, including not demanding reparations and 
compensation for the colonial pain and loss, and therefore takes the reconciliation route. Even 
with the best will in the world, the African petite bourgeoisie leadership cannot fulfil its war-
time promises under this economic order (Mandaza 1986:50). The incoming African 
nationalist bourgeoisie leadership has very limited, if any, power and freedom to decide on 
development policy without approval from Washington or London. Michael Bratton 
(1981:452) questions if the petite bourgeoisie elite has the tactical mobility to pursue policies 
of its own choosing under such conditions, concluding that the wherewithal to effect a 
redistribution of wealth is not presently in the hands of the state. The state would, of 
necessity, continue to reflect white settler colonial interests, and those of all who have similar 
class and economic interests. It might genuinely have wanted to embark on a radical 
economic reform programme to correct obvious past imbalances but it knew the severe 
consequences that would follow. Mugabe himself would be severely disciplined two decades 
later when he defied the rules of the game to embark on the FTLRP. Thus, at independence, 
Mugabe had no option but to forgive, thus turning the “post-colonial neo-colonised” 
Zimbabwe into an era of frustrated dreams and shattered visions. 
 
Furthermore, Mugabe knew that rapid indigenisation would do irreparable damage to the 
economy. ZANU guerrillas had witnessed the destruction of Mozambique’s economy when 
the Portuguese, fearing radical Marxist nationalisation and expropriation, deliberately 
destroyed property and infrastructure before fleeing the country en masse with their skills and 
capital (Weiss 1994:11-12), leaving the country of 12 million people with only 2 engineers, 3 
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agronomists, 5 veterinary surgeons and 36 doctors (Norman 2004:81). That experience gave 
Mugabe reason to fear the loss of white capital and skills. Mozambican President, Samora 
Machel reportedly urged Mugabe to exercise caution, and avoid an exodus of whites (Gordon 
1984:132; Norman 2004:81). Machel is quoted as saying: “Don’t play make-believe Marxist 
games when you get home. You will face ruin if you force the whites into precipitate flight” 
(Meredith 2005:326). Already, the war of liberation had caused thousands of whites to leave 
and in 1980 alone, 10% of the whites (17 000 people), left the country (Norman 2004:91). 
Mugabe knew that thousands more would follow, with devastating consequences for the 
economy. This, of course, bolstered the ideology of settler colonialism, feeding on the settler 
belief in the indispensability of white skills, and the assumption that the continued 
functioning of the economy was tied with white presence. The indispensability of the white 
factor was seen as the goose that lay the golden eggs which had to be preserved, pampered, 
and as far as possible, left alone, undisturbed in its historical God-given role (Mandaza 
1986:47). Thus, for John Mw Makumbe (1996:48), reconciliation was “practical politics.” 
Mugabe was prepared to disappoint and sacrifice the expectations of the masses but not upset 
white monopoly capital. In the end, while the motto during the struggle was “People first”, in 
the post-white settler era, it became “Capital first.” Thus the Zimbabwean state became the 
guarantor of capitalist production. 
 
It is against this background that the African nationalist petite bourgeoisie policy of 
reconciliation should be understood. A weak bourgeoisie which had attained its class goal of 
taking over state power, in an equally weak and hostage state, whose birth had been mediated 
by the midwife of imperialism, had to pay a bit of a price to the white settler bourgeoisie and 
behave itself by listening to the dictates of the imperialist powers. It had to allay imperialist 
fears abroad and dissuade the forgiven white settler bourgeoisie from an exodus and sabotage 
acts that would upset an already fragile economy. But where did all this leave the much 
taunted Marxism-Leninism, or better sounding scientific socialism? 
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7.3.4 A Marxist revolution that lost the fire 
 
ZANU officially adopted Marxism-Leninism as its ideology in 1977. It aimed to achieve a 
socialist revolution in the new era. Mugabe was feared as a no-nonsense Marxist guerrilla 
who intended to implement wholesale nationalisation of the means of production in the post-
white settler Zimbabwe. The masses were mobilised on the promises of a socialist future. 
However, his moderation at independence surprised many. In particular, many were shocked 
by his rapid transformation overnight from a feared hard-core Marxist guerrilla to a 
“respectable” politician of capitalist persuasion. After the first decade of independence, the 
party announced that it was abandoning the ideology.  
 
Mandaza (1986:30) argues strongly that there was no need to be surprised because, contrary 
to ZANU claims, the armed struggle did not have a socialist thrust at all (emphasis added). 
He adds that the claim is contradicted not only by the serious ideological emptiness of the 
nationalist movement but also by its limited capacity when dealing with the white settler and 
imperialist scheming at Lancaster House (Mandaza 1986:30). The nationalists made very 
serious concessions to imperialism which would have been unthinkable had it been seriously 
intending to embark on a socialist revolution. A socialist thrust would have required a clearly 
articulated ideology that would fully explain the historical reality of imperialism; reveal the 
class structure of the liberation movement itself; and constitute the basis for a vanguard party 
that would in turn guide and translate the political gains of political independence into a 
movement towards socialist construction (Mandaza 1986:30). It would also have required an 
acceptance that the peasants and workers were the vanguard of the processes of 
transformation, and then seek to conscientise and mobilise them to achieve the desired 
socialist goal (Mandaza 1986:30). Except for the communist style jargon such as “comrade”, 
“politburo”, “central committee” and “First Secretary” that ZANU PF has retained, the party 
was a far cry from the Leninist party model in both form and content (Mandaza 2007:10).  
For Mandaza (2007:10), the Leninist party model is, in essence,  
 
a unit of social organisation, a political framework founded on a strong proletarian 
ideology in which the interests and aspirations of the working people are paramount, 
and buttressed by structures that project the party as one with a formidable intellectual 
and organisational content. 
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ZANU PF, by contrast, seems to have neglected the interests of the proletariat as it sought to 
appease international finance capital. In reality, “political and economic nationalism” 
characterised the policies of ZANU PF better than Marxist-Leninism (Skålnes 1995:75). 
 
What we have with the ZANU-led struggle is a nationalist armed struggle intended to replace 
the settler colonial system with an African government. Peter P. Ekeh (1975:102) had argued 
that the struggle for independence in Africa was nothing more than “a struggle for power 
between the two bourgeois classes involved in the colonisation of Africa,” namely the 
entrenched white colonial bourgeois and the emerging black bourgeois. It was not a question 
of differences of principles or any other lofty ideal, but rather a question of which of the two 
bourgeois classes should rule. Likewise independence simply meant the assumption of state 
power by the African elite. Mandaza (2007:3) concurs, adding that the raison d'être - and 
practically an end in itself - of the African nationalists was seeking to take over literally from 
the white settler bourgeoisie. Its agenda and ideology had no loftier aim than simply stepping 
into the shoes of the coloniser by inheriting state power and the bourgeois capitalist economy. 
The central goal of the armed struggle was therefore national independence, not the 
establishment of a socialist state. According to Ian Phimister (1978:52), the alliance of rural 
class forces behind the guerrilla struggle was united in opposition to colonialism but nothing 
more. There was no shared vision of the future beyond the recovery of land “stolen” by 
whites (Phimister 1978:52). It was more a reaction to white settler racism and 
disenfranchisement than a well-thought out and clearly articulated socio-political and 
economic vision of the future society. It hardly encompassed within it even the slightest idea 
of a socialist revolution (Mandaza 1986:29). Despite its militant Marxist rhetoric, ZANU’s 
political programme had nothing to offer the masses except a continued period of capitalist 
development. Its political programme did not advance the interests of the proletariat but those 
of monopoly capital. Of course this was in the vain hope that the majority of the previously 
disenfranchised African people would somehow benefit in the process 
 
Mandaza (1986:23) sees African nationalism as an expression of class interests, but only 
appears to conceal the aspirations of the various factions within the African petite bourgeoisie 
class. Andre Astrow (1983:136) also sees the same class interests at play, arguing that the 
aim of the petite bourgeois leadership of the nationalist movement was not to overthrow 
capitalist relations of production as such, but to remove the discriminatory structures of 
settler society preventing its advancement as a class. This, in essence, was not a challenge to 
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capitalism at all, but a challenge only to white privilege. The struggle was waged, not on an 
anti-capitalist pro-socialist basis, but evidently with the aim of democratising the racist 
structures of white settler society that prevented its admission into the elite bourgeoisie club.  
The nationalist desire to democratise Rhodesian capitalism and to reconstitute it with an 
African face and support base, stemmed from the class interests of its leadership (Astrow 
1983:136). The African nationalist petite bourgeoisie was competing with the white settler 
colonial bourgeoisie for political and economic power but not necessarily to challenge the 
unequal and exploitative structures of Rhodesian society. It was the Smith government’s 
arrogance, intransigence and refusal to grant any concessions that led to disillusionment and 
frustration on the part of the otherwise non-violent African nationalists and to the decision to 
finally embrace the armed struggle as the only way to realise their class interests. The petite 
bourgeois leadership of the nationalists saw the war as a means of speeding up political, not 
social, change (Astrow 1983:137). The contention of the African nationalist petite 
bourgeoisie that the struggle for liberation was anti-imperialist, therefore, flies in the face of 
all available evidence. They radicalised and demanded a buy-in from the African masses for 
their class project with a Marxist-Leninist rhetoric while at the same time embracing petite 
bourgeoisie politics. It was necessary to bring the masses on board and entice them through 
socialist rhetoric and promises so that they own the struggle, thus conceal its class dynamics. 
The peasants courageously waged a war under the impression that it was for their liberation. 
Little did they know that they were merely assisting the bourgeoisie class attain its class goal.  
  
That a socialist revolution was not going to happen in Zimbabwe was evident from the very 
serious and calculated pro-capital approach of the Mugabe government. The ruling elite did 
all it could to gain the support of Western imperialist countries and establish conditions 
conducive for rapid capitalist development (Astrow 1983:5). Left-leaning critics argued that 
behind the socialist rhetoric and framework of the government development strategies lay a 
programmatic approach that was reinforcing capitalism and limiting the capacity of 
government to achieve its stated goal of socialist transformation (Gordon 1984:140). 
According to Bond (1998, 2005) what we have in the immediate post-independence era is a 
classic case of “indicating left, turning right”. Mugabe went out of his way to reassure foreign 
companies that their investments and interests in Zimbabwe were safe and secure. He worked 
hard to promote rapid capitalist development to ensure that the country became a stable 
destination for foreign investment. Ties with the capitalist countries were strengthened. But 
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surprisingly (or not) while the ZANU PF officials were flying all over the Western world 
entering into trade agreements, there was no enthusiasm to boost ties with the Eastern 
(communist) bloc. When the government organised the Zimbabwe Conference on 
Reconstruction and Development (ZIMCORD), participants came from 45 mainly Western 
capitalist countries and international donor agencies. From the socialist bloc, only China and 
Yugoslavia were represented. A number of East European countries were not even invited to 
the independence celebrations. The Soviet Union was accused of sowing discord by 
continuing to support PF ZAPU, which they had supported during the war. When it wanted to 
establish an embassy in Harare, the Soviet Union was told outright that it had to support 
ZANU PF first. In fact, according to the International Herald Tribune (25 August 1980), 
Mugabe admitted that the war-time radical Marxist rhetoric was just part of a war-time 
propaganda campaign, designed to increase the morale of the guerrillas and the masses and 
put pressure on the settler regime. He was right.  
 
Furthermore, the first two post-independence budget speeches were in line with the overall 
aim of creating conditions necessary for the growth and stability of capitalism. The Financial 
Mail (2 January 1981) observed: “The first ZANU PF budget of July 1980 was virtually 
indistinguishable from previous budgets presented by the Rhodesian Front Ministers in the 
1970s.” It is also this calculated pro-capitalist turn that made Mugabe agree to pay the 
inherited debt estimated at US$700 million (Bond and Manyanya 2003:15). The debt should 
have been repudiated or the ZANU PF government could have defaulted on what Bond and 
Manyanya (2003:15) call “odious debt” because the black Zimbabwean tax payers had to pay 
twice for this debt; first, when loans were taken to oppress them and second, when the lenders 
demanded their money back. When Britain imposed sanctions on Rhodesia after UDI, Smith 
had responded by defaulting on over Z$82 million in foreign debt (Bond and Manyanya 
2003:15). Instead, not wanting to upset his new-found Western imperialist friends, Mugabe 
decided to repay the repulsive debt. 
 
Probably a question that needs to be asked is why the ZANU PF government kept on 
chanting its socialist rhetoric right into the second decade of independence, when it was clear 
that it was not taking that route? Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:302) suggests that it is due to the 
unique ideological terrain into which Zimbabwe was born in 1980. The young state stood 
astride uneasily the fading socialist world that had not yet entirely faded, and the emerging 
neo-liberal world that had not yet become triumphant (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009:302). The 
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young state was, therefore, forced to think and dream in both socialist and liberal terms, thus 
its political ideology was captive to the two antagonistic worlds. The emerging world was 
more doable in the here and now than the fading world. It should also be noted that ZANU 
received military and ideological support from communist China. Thus, the socialist bloc had 
a lasting impression on the party to the extent that its political organisation was carved on the 
eastern bloc template, complete with a central committee and politburo (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2009:306). This is why it continued to sing from the Marxist-Leninist hymnbook even when 
it became clear that it was no longer possible to implement socialism.  
 
The argument that socialism did not take root, against the wishes of the ZANU PF 
government, because of the restrictive clauses of the LHA, etc. is untenable. Here is a 
deliberate attempt by the African petite bourgeoisie leadership that had attained its class goal, 
to align itself with Western capital for its class interests and self-preservation. The right turn 
was thus not an accident of history. Lenin (cited in Astrow 1983:213) had warned that the 
petite bourgeois, while purporting to support the struggle against imperialism, instead 
degrades it by making a deal that will assure its own position at the expense of the masses. 
Marx and Engels (1986:269-270) likewise observed: 
 
Far from desiring to transform the whole society for the revolutionary proletarians, 
the democratic petty bourgeoisie strives for a change in social conditions by means of 
which the existing society will be made as tolerable and comfortable as possible for 
them. 
 
But while international finance capital was courted, reassured and impressed, little had 
changed for the African masses. The struggle of the blacks for socialism had been abandoned 
in favour of the development of capitalism. Zimbabwe was now securely positioned in the 
Western camp. The state was now a committed servant of international finance capital. Not 
only had it failed to (rather could not) promote socialism, but had, on the contrary, worked 
extra hard to strengthen its ties with imperialism, thus entrenching capitalism in Zimbabwe. 
Labour relations were also to mirror this entrenching of capitalism. 
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7.3.5 Workers under siege 
 
To the ZANU PF petite bourgeoisie government, the working class was a potential threat to 
capitalist stability and thus to its continued existence and prosperity as a class. The post-white 
settler colonial petite bourgeois, by its nature, seeks to crush any mass movement which 
poses a threat to its enjoyment of the fruits of independence. To the African petite 
bourgeoisie, the role of the working class in the new dispensation was that of an effective 
producer. The producers were to be organised to increase their efficiency and thus the 
profitability of capitalism. To the disappointment of an expectant working class, Labour 
Minister Kumbirai Kangai’s message was: “If anything, Zimbabweans must work harder and 
longer hours than before” (Astrow 1983:175). Maurice Nyagumbo, Minister of Mines, put it 
more bluntly: “We never promised instant pay increases. We said the only way to get results 
was by working hard” (Astrow 1983:175). True to that line of thought, when a series of 
wildcat strikes broke out throughout the country in 1980 as workers tried to cash in on the 
promises made during the war, the ZANU PF government took exception to the strikes. 
Thousands were fired. Peter Makaye and Constantine Munhande (2013:65) note that between 
March 1980 and June 1981, there were a total of 177 recorded strikes. With the aim of 
organising, and therefore neutralising, the workers, Minister Kangai formed the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in February 1982, led by the Premier’s brother, Abel. 
ZCTU leadership immediately stated that it would cooperate with the government. One of its 
officials said:  
 
We should all work together to boost the economy…We cannot do this by striking. 
Each time we down our tools, we are ruining the economy of our country (Astrow 
1983:178). 
  
The government could always rely on the support of the labour federation in the maintenance 
of stable industrial relations. This is why ZCTU could not be relied on to articulate workers’ 
demands. Workers who went on strike were described as counter-revolutionary elements bent 
on undermining the people’s government. Kangai called on workers to stop “sabotaging 
Zimbabwe’s newly-won freedom” (Astrow 1983:178). His deputy, Robson Manyika, referred 
to strikers as “agitators opposed to ZANU PF who are instigating these strikes” (Astrow 
1983:178). On his part, the Prime Minister referred to strikers as “dissident elements bent on 
discrediting the government” (Astrow 1983:179). In his view, law and order were central to 
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achieving the objective of his government (read of the development of capitalism). The state 
often used violence and repression, reminiscent of the white settler state, to bring strikes to an 
end. Smith’s draconian laws, which were still in the statute books, were used with ease to 
clamp down on protestors. Prioritising capitalist development justified the colonial slave-like 
wages that were way below the poverty datum line. In Mugabe’s own words, “To push wages 
too high at this stage, before Zimbabwe’s economic recovery has barely begun could place 
recovery in jeopardy” (Astrow 1983:180). That way the post-colonial neo-colonised 
Zimbabwean state was a mediator between labour and capital, siding with the latter and not 
hesitating to use the former coloniser’s instruments of repression, in denial of workers’ 
democratic rights and fruits of their labour. The Mugabe government was prepared to 
sacrifice workers’ rights and demands at the altar of capitalist development. 
 
7.3.6 Challenges of nation-building 
 
In 1980, the two racial groups that had lived uneasily under the same roof for close to a 
century on the white man’s terms and had faced each other during the war, smoked the peace 
pipe, hugged and kissed, and tried to find one another afresh. Whites were not asked to pack 
and go but to remain and participate in the process of nation-building. Those with their own 
fears left. Between 1980 and 1990, half of the white population left the country (Weiss 
1994:49). The reconciled parties continued to live together but suspicions of each other’s 
intentions were rife. Within the black community, there were tensions between the two 
guerrilla factions that date back to the split of ZAPU in 1963. By the 1980s, the two had 
become regionally-based and tribal parties. Inevitably, the tensions between the two spilled 
into the post-independence era. As a result, in February 1982, Mugabe dismissed Nkomo and 
his PF ZAPU colleagues from government accusing them of plotting to overthrow his 
government effectively ending the coalition government. This was followed by the 
disturbances in the predominantly Ndebele-speaking Matabeleland and Midlands regions that 
have come to be known as Gukurahundi, during which conservative estimates put the number 
of civilian deaths at 20 000 (CCJP and LRC1, 1997).   
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This sad episode in the history of the young nation highlights serious challenges of nation-
building in a plural multi-ethnic and multi-racial post-white settler colonial state. Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2013:189) argues that Zimbabwe has been constantly haunted by the question of 
how to transform its various ethnicities into one nation and the former natives and settlers 
into a common citizenship. Masipula Sithole (cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013:70-71) notes 
that throughout the liberation struggle not a single nationalist political formation escaped 
from the ghost of ethnicity that constantly threatened to tear the parties to pieces. These 
various ethnic identities did not have common prehistoric roots that could bind them together. 
This is contrary to the dominant nationalist view that views Zimbabweans as a people who 
existed as a collective before colonialism and once colonialism disappeared, Zimbabweans 
would emerge automatically. He adds that the official 1980s rhetoric of reconciliation (of 
races) and unity (of ethnicities) were minimalist, inadequate and even problematic in a 
society characterised by unresolved economic inequalities and irrepressible ethnic tensions 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013:71).  
 
Mandaza (1999:82) notes that reconciliation, as strategy of nation-building, is often confined 
to white-black relations, to the exclusion of black-black relations. Differences between the 
former colonial masters and the incoming African elites are more easily resolved than is the 
case between the African petite bourgeoisie leaders. As a result, a serious threat to the nation-
building project in the post-white settler colonial state was not posed by the defeated settlers 
but by factions within the victorious nationalist movement itself. The racial nature of the 
struggle for independence had concealed the other dimensions, most notably, the ethnic one. 
Once the racial conflict was overcome, the ethnic problems were bound to come to the 
surface. Competition and rivalry in the African nationalist petite bourgeois is imminent as 
each faction positions itself for the “fruits of independence,” in the name of tribe, region or 
ethnic grouping (Mandaza, 1986:23). He goes on to argue that since the fruits of 
independence and economic capacity of the post-white settler colonial state are naturally 
limited, factionalism and rivalry among the African petite bourgeois can become so severe as 
to threaten not only national unity but even the post-colonial state itself (Mandaza 1986:23). 
This is what happened with Gukurahundi. Thus, due to the capitalist nature of the socio-
economic landscape in which it develops, African nationalism is at odds with its stated aim of 
nation-building and national unity, but is prone to divisiveness and rivalry within the ranks of 
the African petite bourgeoisie. 
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The African nationalist petite bourgeoisie inherited the Zimbabwean state without the 
Zimbabwean nation (Masunungure 2006:3).  With the end of racial segregation in 1980, the 
new government did not show any systematic commitment to nation-building apart from the 
superficial policy of reconciliation, without justice, aimed at hailing the small but powerful 
white community, and the rhetoric of unity aimed at inviting ethnicities into the nation. 
Rather, the jubilant ZANU PF leadership sought to further strengthen the inherited state 
before they invented the nation. Like most African leaders, the ZANU PF government proved 
to be good state-builders but poor nation-builders (Masunungure 2006:3). A state was created 
without a stable nation. Masunungure (2006:7) maintains that the Zimbabwean state-building 
project proceeded as if the nation already existed, without being anchored on national 
sentiment, identity, or consciousness. The result is that the Zimbabwean state became a 
reality while the Zimbabwean nation remained a fiction (Masunungure 2006:7). Zimbabwe 
developed a functional state without a functional nation. 
 
Furthermore, the granting of political and social rights to the previously disenfranchised 
black majority was not accompanied by granting of economic rights in the form of access to 
national resources like the land, mines and factories. This is why the issue of control over and 
access to the land continued to shape and influence post-white settler colonial political 
contestations and imaginations of freedom of the nation decades into independence (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2013:195). The “cheap” reconciliation of 1980 was reconciliation on the surface. It 
did not assist in the process of nation-building because it was reconciliation without justice. 
Reconciliation is only possible between equals. Restitution should have gone hand-in-hand 
with reconciliation.  
 
Instead of resolving differences and bringing together these diverse identities and opinions, 
Gukurahundi and related intolerances sought to eliminate them. Having failed in its use of a 
military solution to a political problem, as seen in PF ZAPU victory in Matabeleland in the 
1985 elections, ZANU PF sought a political solution to that political problem, resulting in the 
Unity Accord of December 1987. The petite bourgeoisie in ZANU PF thought they had 
achieved their aim. In their mind, the nation was now united. But that was not going to be. 
The Unity Accord, argues Masunungure (2006:6), was a unipolar solution to a multi-polar 
problem and as such, there was a misalignment between the nature of the problem and the 
nature of the solution. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008:48) suggests, Gukurahundi violence 
provoked radical Ndebele nationalism and politics that sometimes contested the whole idea of 
a united Zimbabwe state. To the Ndebele, the supposed united nation is a fiction, a figment of 
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Shona imagination. Later, from the 2000 elections onwards, ZANU PF would be completely 
rejected by the people of Matabeleland in national elections. Radical Ndebele pressure groups 
have been formed with most of them virtually distancing themselves from the idea of a united 
Zimbabwe. Others have been cessationist, demanding a separate Ndebele state. 
Reconciliation between white and black would later crumble when “unrepentant” whites 
became the target of attack by ZANU PF as intending to recolonise Zimbabwe; and they 
would be dispossessed of their land in a violent way during the so-called Third Chimurenga, 
silencing them most probably forever.  
 
7.3.7 One-party state as nation-building 
 
Alongside the desire to establish a Marxist-Leninist state, the ZANU PF government also 
wanted to establish a de jure one-party state. However, while Mugabe was advocating a one-
party state, other countries in the region that had been trying to implement it, Mozambique 
and Zambia, were abandoning the idea. For ZANU PF, it was necessary for Zimbabweans to 
transcend tribal, ethnic, and local identifications if a truly national consciousness was to 
emerge (Shaw 1986:380). Unity was necessary if the nation was to be built out of racially and 
ethnically divided communities. The one-party system would provide Zimbabwe with the 
unity that the fragile young nation needed. A multi-party system was a luxury that the young 
state could ill afford for it involved “opposition for the sake of opposition”, as well as 
“useless quibbling”. Unity meant the country being under the one party, ZANU PF, the party 
that brought independence. ZANU PF and it alone, carried that mantle. The party and its elite 
were the true and only representatives of the interests of the people (van Vuuren, 2005:8). 
The vanguard party was to control all the economic, political and social institutions and 
organisations of the state to facilitate a single approach to building a socialist system (South 
African Institute of International Affairs [SAIIA] 1986:2). National unity was the 
precondition for the establishment of socialism.    
 
Despite initial acceptance of diversity at independence, Mugabe gradually became critical of 
multi-party democracy. At independence it was not possible to establish one-party rule 
because of the constitutionally reserved twenty white seats and also because of the decision 
of his party to compete for elections independent of PF ZAPU. There was also a provision in 
the Bill of Rights that guaranteed freedom of assembly and association, in particular the right 
to form, or belong to opposition political parties. PF ZAPU and other parties vehemently 
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opposed the idea of a one-party state. But Mugabe declared several times that he was 
suspicious of people who did not wish to join ZANU-PF, the party that was responsible for 
their freedom. Before the constitutional provision could expire, Mugabe prepared ground for 
the one-party state by harassing and terrorising the opposition into submission, preferring 
their voluntary merger with ZANU PF. The brutality of Gukurahundi was intended to crush 
political dissent rather than an ethnic-cleansing exercise (Phimister 2008:210). 
 
Critics viewed Mugabe’s drive towards a one-party state as an attempt to consolidate his 
power. They argued that Mugabe had become obsessed with power. One critic noted that 
recent African history had shown that the nationalism produced by one-party states “regresses 
into national self-glorification, illusory ideological mongering, paranoid attacks and 
shibboleths directed at external and internal enemies” (Shaw 1986:380). Opposition to the 
system was also heard from his own ranks. Edgar Tekere, a senior member of his cabinet and 
the party’s Secretary General, criticised the idea of creating a one-party state by legislation. 
Instead of a de jure one party state and outlawing rival parties, he favoured a de facto one-
party state through winning all parliamentary seats. He argued that party members who were 
behind the rush towards one-party rule were doing so to protect their positions and by so 
doing were hijacking the revolution (Shaw 1986:391-392). Tekere became even blunt arguing 
that Mugabe was protecting “insider offenders” (Sylvester 1991:86).  
 
As with the 1980 elections, PF ZAPU captured all the seats in Matabeleland in 1985. That 
frustrated ZANU’s desire for one-party rule. But tired of Mugabe’s harassment, Nkomo 
signed an agreement with Mugabe, effectively making the country a one-party state. With the 
merger of ZANU PF and PF ZAPU, Mugabe had effectively eliminated the only viable 
opposition that had remained, and according to Makumbe (2003:35), that had severe 
consequences for the development of democracy in Zimbabwe. The united ZANU PF 
decided to put the matter of a one-party state to a referendum in the March 1990 elections. 
However, that was not to be. Tekere was expelled from ZANU PF in 1988 and formed the 
Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM) in 1989 which became a rallying point for disaffected 
party members, intellectuals and middle class outside the party. He contested the 1990 
elections winning 17% of the vote, a remarkable achievement for a party formed just months 
before the elections and whose campaign was subjected to massive violence and intimidation. 
By so doing, Tekere succeeded in depriving Mugabe a clear mandate to introduce a de jure 
one-party state. Tekere's challenge to Mugabe broke the myth of invincibility and according 
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to Sithole (1993:38-39), this is the contribution which Tekere made at a critical hour in the 
country's political development, when it faced the real possibility of a one-party state. An 
important observation to note is that the spoilt votes were 6% of the total poll, a very large 
percentage, which seemed to suggest that disillusionment with the ruling party was fast 
creeping in. Some analysts called it a “protest vote”. In September of the same year, Mugabe 
announced that he had officially abandoned his desire to transform Zimbabwe into a de jure 
one-party state. Even then, the party still continued to maintain effective monopoly of the 
political space and barely tolerated open political contestation. Thus while the country was 
never a de jure one-party state, it was a de facto one-party state.  
 
7.3.8 Authoritarianism and consolidation of power 
 
An important characteristic of the first decade of independence is the consolidation and 
centralisation of state power The Marxist-Leninist ideology, the call for a one-party state 
system, intolerance of dissent, as well as the reconciliation policy and the unity gospel, were 
part of a broader scheme of power consolidation by the ruling ZANU PF petite bourgeoisie. 
Consolidation of power went hand-in-hand with authoritarian tendencies. At independence, 
the party was concerned more about inventing ways of retaining power. Any form of dissent 
from government policy was not tolerated. Mugabe appointed trusted party cadres, who 
would be loyal to him, to key public service positions. Party deployees who were 
inexperienced and inefficient, replaced able and experienced managers. The appointees held 
the job, the salaries, the perks, but not the responsibilities (Weiss 1994:165). Competence at 
this stage was not important; ideology, a party card and acceptable tribal background were. 
The security of the regime was privileged over the opening up of democratic spaces and 
everything else. In crafting its vision of a post-colonial Zimbabwe, the African nationalist 
petite bourgeoisie paid no attention to issues of individual and civic rights. They were too 
concerned with the transfer of power rather than with the conditions in which that power 
would be exercised (Kagoro 2003:10).  
 
The nationalist leadership had frequently condemned Rhodesia’s institutions and instruments 
of repression, as well as security measures and their practical application in the 1960s and 
70s. Furthermore, opposition to this repressive apparatus was one of the driving forces of the 
guerrilla war. In its Declaration of Policy of August 21 1963, ZANU stated that it would 
repeal all repressive laws enacted by successive white minority governments (Weitzer 
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1984:82). When it came to power, the new government was widely expected to dismantle this 
repressive behemoth. However, ZANU PF retained most of it, ready for use against political 
opponents whenever the regime saw fit. Instead of a sweeping replacement of these 
measures, Ronald Weitzer (1984:82) sees “a striking continuity between past and present 
security patterns”. The Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), which had been formed by 
Smith and had become notorious for its lack of accountability, was carried over into the new 
era with the same modus operandi. The state of emergency, which Smith had used religiously 
since 1965, was renewed biannually after 1980, even for areas that were not related to 
security. The Law and Order (Maintenance) Act (LOMA) of 1960, Smith’s favourite and the 
most repressive piece of legislation, was also retained as the new state’s paramount security 
statute. When the state of emergency was finally lifted ten years into independence, the 
LOMA was not. The same justifications used by the colonial regimes for such measures were 
now being used by the new government. In this regard, at independence, Zimbabwe was born 
as a successor to the Rhodesian state rather than as an alternative to it (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2009:302).  
 
Like the Smith government before it, the new regime aimed at near-total political control and 
aggressively silenced dissent. Mugabe and his party used coercion and co-option to ensure 
complete dominance. The harassment, torture and killings of the opposition and the burning 
of their houses and property that began with the 1980 elections became a key feature of 
elections thereafter. People were being forced by party youths to attend party events and 
meetings. The gospel of unity was used to destroy any pluralism within the body politic. The 
continued existence and flourishing of PF ZAPU (at least in Matabeleland) did not sit well 
with ZANU PF. Through Gukurahundi, ZANU PF demonstrated to the Ndebele supporters of 
PF ZAPU who really was in power. A whole army brigade - 5th Brigade - trained by the 
socialist North Korea, was deployed to Matabeleland to fight “dissidents”. Trained for 
absolute loyalty, it operated outside the normal military hierarchy, and answered directly to 
the Premier. Under Colonel Perence Shiri, the 5th Brigade committed crimes against 
humanity of the mould of General Augusto Pinochet and Slobodan Milosevic (Raftopoulos 
and Phimister, p. 10). Targeting only civilians, the brigade was responsible for mass murders, 
public executions, rape, torture and property burnings. The Unity Accord which resulted in 
the merger of the two parties into the united ZANU PF was viewed by analysts as a move by 
Mugabe to consolidate his power and facilitate the formation of a one-party state (Makumbe, 
2003:35). Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2008:48) describes the Unity Accord as a “surrender document” 
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and a moment in which PF ZAPU threw in the towel and was swallowed by ZANU PF. With 
Nkomo in his armpits, Mugabe moved over to the whites.  
 
The promise for the return of the land “stolen” by whites was a major motivation factor for 
the support of the war effort by the peasants. Yet, the promise was not being fulfilled as fast 
as they had expected. The demand for land became pronounced as many rural folk moved on 
to white farms as squatters. As expected, the government saw them as a threat to stability and 
capitalist development albeit on the heavily underutilised farms. By mobilising themselves 
and invading white farms independent of the party structures, the peasants were becoming an 
alternative centre of power. Police were heavy-handed when called to evict the squatters. In 
creating conditions for the flourishing of capitalism, democracy became a luxury that the petit 
bourgeoisie-led state could not afford, at least for now. Capitalist exploitation went hand in 
glove with the denial of fundamental rights to the African masses. By definition, imperialism 
requires the oppression and subjugation of the masses. This is why the so-called “national 
democratic revolution” that the petit bourgeois so often proclaimed as their goal could not 
materialise. What the undemocratic “democratic revolution” actually did was to force the 
working class and peasants to subordinate their interests to that of a generally unattainable 
democracy under the hegemony of the petit bourgeois and by so doing, condemn them to the 
ruthless oppression necessary for the survival and flourishing of capitalism (Astrow 
1983:214). 
 
After his much praised policy of reconciliation, Mugabe expected the whites to vote for 
ZANU PF in the 1985 election. But when they did not, he was upset. He felt betrayed by the 
people he had forgiven. He denounced them accusing them of not accepting his government's 
generous offer of reconciliation, and so did not deserve any special consideration in the future 
(Sylvester 1991:80). When the constitutional provision that guaranteed white reserved 
parliamentary seats expired, Mugabe quickly abolished them effectively neutralising the 
whites and removing them from the political arena. Furthermore, the electoral system that 
ZANU PF adopted when it came to power was also indicative of its power consolidation 
intentions. Proportional representation was used for the 1979 internal settlement and the 1980 
independence elections. Advocates of this system, among whom were Rhodesian whites 
reasoned that in a plural society such as Zimbabwe, the system prevents one group from 
monopolising power and was therefore more conducive for democratic representation. Many 
analysts on the continent have also preferred proportional representation to the Single 
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Member District (SDM) or first-past-the-post, winner takes-all system on the ground that it is 
more democratic and is most suitable for societies in the process of developing a democratic 
culture (Moyo 1992:156-162). They argue that it is quite effective in managing and 
accommodating ethnic, racial, ideological, religious, and other cleavages in African plural 
societies. At Lancaster House, the nationalist formations indicated that they were going to 
amend the Electoral Act to do away with proportional representation and introduce the SDM 
system (Sithole and Makumbe 1997:124). They felt uneasy with a democratic system, 
accusing it of being a ploy employed by whites to prevent a clear electoral victory by African 
nationalists. ZANU PF wanted an absolute majority which proportional representation would 
not give. The Electoral Act was amended and all elections after 1985 were held under the 
SDM system. 
 
An authoritarian culture was reinforced by the party’s emphasis on unity at all costs. All 
citizens and organisations were to be of one mind and one heart. There was to be one centre 
of power. The various systems of the national life were to pull from that centre. Trade unions, 
churches, civil society and all other organisations had to be subordinated to the party’s 
requirements. All these organisations aligned themselves to the state’s developmentalist 
discourse and the message of national unity (Zamponi 2005:33). Mention has already been 
made of how the ZCTU was created by the regime, to neutralise the potentially powerful 
working class and prevent it from pulling in a different direction. Union strategies and tactics 
were controlled from the ruling party, for the greater part of the 1980s. In the public service, 
no unions were allowed. Any institution that would provide another centre of power or that 
would not toe the party line was to be dismantled. Traditional chiefs who, according to the 
party, had been “unwitting local agents of colonialism,” were relegated to the sidelines 
(Ranger 2001:47). Their political and judicial powers were revoked, leaving them to play 
purely cultural and religious roles (Ranger 2001:45). In their place Ward and Village 
development committees (Wadcos and Vidcos), which, in reality were organs of the party, 
were established in rural areas. These came to be viewed as undemocratic and 
unrepresentative manifestations of vested ruling party and class interests (Ranger 2001:47).   
 
Thus in the first decade of independence, Zimbabwe was a developmentalist state that 
worked overtime to facilitate the development and entrenchment of capitalism. The decade 
was also one of power consolidation by the ruling ZANU PF at the expense of nation-
building and democratisation. There is a marked continuity with the colonial settler regimes. 
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The ZANU PF leadership failed to transform the inherited repressive colonial state into a 
democratic institution. Likewise, it failed to transform itself into a democratic government 
that would deliver the promise of freedom. The regime was less interested in democracy than 
in retention of power. Dissent was not tolerated. The authority of the heroes of the war of 
liberation was not to be questioned. The 1980s ended with economic problems on the 
increase, a labour movement maturing in organisational capacity and mobilisational skills - 
thus an opposition movement in the embryonic stage - and signs of profound damage to the 
notion of national unity imposed by ZANU-PF, while the land question remained suspended 
(Zamponi 2005:34). Before moving on to the second decade of independence, it is important 
to briefly look at a very important aspect of ZANU PF rule which became its key strategy of 
doing politics - violence - which has thus far been mentioned in passing.  
 
7.3.9 Anatomy of ZANU PF violence 
 
Since 1980, coercion and violence have played an important part in ZANU PF’s political 
strategy. Scholars have since noted that this violence, which has become a key feature of the 
Zimbabwean political economy, ought to be traced to the very nature of colonial rule which 
was extremely authoritarian and violent, and to how the liberation war was executed 
(Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009; Kaulemu 2004; Sithole and Makumbe 1997). The colonialists never 
pretended for a second that they were democratic and non-violent. Violence was their modus 
operandi in dealing with any form of dissent to their racist project. Their extreme violence 
and authoritarianism provoked the violence of the African nationalists and went on to 
reproduce itself within the nationalist movement. Likewise, the Second Chimurenga was a 
period when “militarists, sadists, and war mongers, as well as prophets of violence” emerged 
and “soaked up authoritarian, militaristic and violent tendencies” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 
2009:86). Under the shadow of fighting a just war, violence entered into their DNA and they 
internalised it. Violence became a culture; it became part and parcel of their language and 
their way of life. As Norma J. Kriger (1992) has pointed out, coercion was a key mobilising 
strategy of the guerrillas in the rural areas. Support of the war and of the leadership imposed 
by “the boys in the bush” was not optional. Like the white settler colonial state, the 
nationalist movement was highly intolerant of pluralism and dissent, and alternative views on 
how to respond to the colonial system and how to wage the struggle were not entertained. 
Disagreements of any sort could easily lead to death.  
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Their operations and management style were authoritarian and commandist. Notions of 
puppet, counter-revolutionary and sell-out were used to weed out differences of opinion. In 
dealing with these, violence was justified and even celebrated. If possible they had to be 
eliminated. Furthermore, the influence of the one party-state systems of the Eastern bloc and 
the adoption of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, with its democratic centralism, also reinforced 
the lack of tolerance of pluralism. The ZANU elites also made utterance that seemed to 
glorify violence and even seeing it as the guarantor of people’s freedom in the new 
dispensation. Speaking on Radio from Mozambique, Mugabe said, “The gun which produces 
the vote should remain its security officer - its guarantor. The people’s votes and the people’s 
guns are always inseparable twins (Meredith 2005:627).  
 
This culture of violence had an enduring impression on the African nationalist petit 
bourgeoisie that came to power in 1980 and consequently on the nature of the state that it 
created. With all this baggage, it was quite predictable that ZANU PF would have difficulties 
exorcising the ghost of its war-time violence and authoritarianism when it came to power. 
The power elite emerged from the crucible of a violent war and so its political strategies and 
tactics cannot be understood apart from this heritage (Bratton 2014:2). Sithole and Makumbe 
(1997:134) are not far from the truth in arguing that the fate of the opposition was decided 
during the guerrilla war. Thus Zimbabwe was “born with a very bad birthmark” that has 
negatively impacted on the nation-building project (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009:191). David 
Kaulemu (2004:81) has noted that “violence breeds violence and victims of violence become 
violent themselves.” At independence, the former guerrilla movement failed to transform 
itself into a non-violent democratic political party. As Makumbe (2003:33) observes, “the 
guerrillas have still not taken off their uniforms; they have not yet laid down their guns.” 
Rather, the new elites retained and even perfected the salient features of the repressive 
colonial system. Instead of being condemned as anathema to the new political dispensation, 
violence was “canonised and celebrated” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009:191). Party elites have 
boasted of the party’s violent history. Nathan Shamuyarira boasted that the party has “a very 
strong, long and successful history” of violence, while Mugabe himself boasted of having 
“degrees in violence.” Moreover, ruling party electoral candidates have always reminded 
rural constituencies that the war would start again should the party of liberation lose an 
election. For Makumbe (2003:39) it is easy for liberation movements to fall back on their 
wartime tactics once they feel their power threatened. Bratton (2014:73) adds that when 
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confronting existential threats, leaders tend to govern by the methods they first used to ascend 
to power. This explains why the new power elites have constantly resorted to the oppressors’ 
instruments of choice and why the violence and authoritarianism that was an object of so 
much contempt and a major reason for embarking on the war of liberation, was retained and 
even fortified in the post-war dispensation.  
 
For the majority of the people who had sacrificed by enduring the violence and brutality of 
the armed struggle, thinking that it was a sacrifice worth making, the new political elites were 
a huge disappointment. A process that was meant to remove violence and authoritarianism 
has, on the contrary perpetuated them. However, to expect the African petite bourgeoisie that 
inherited the state with its monopoly of the means of coercion to be democratic and tolerant 
when all they learnt in the bush was nothing except maximisation of violence to eliminate 
foes, real or perceived, both from without and from within the movement, is perhaps to 
expect too much. Faced with a threat to their hold on power, the political elites have fallen 
back on the means of coercion.  
 
7.4 The neo-liberal 1990s 
 
7.4.1 Road to economic structural adjustment 
 
Scholars have observed that the weakness of the government welfarist programme of the first 
decade of independence was that it was based primarily on redistribution rather than growth 
and the distribution was of income rather than assets (cf. Davies 2004:23). Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2009:308) agrees, adding that the dependence was on redistribution of what was available 
without clear strategies of increasing production. The gains were thus not sustainable for they 
did not empower recipients of the welfare to continue receiving and expand the revenue base. 
They placed a heavy burden on the fiscus and by so doing they sowed the seeds of their own 
destruction. The economy that had started so well with a boom in 1981-2 was soon faced 
with a crisis. By the middle of the decade, the limitations of a welfarist programme not 
backed by corresponding economic growth soon became clear. The economy was going 
through difficult times: stunted growth, low investment, foreign exchange shortages and 
rising debt levels. The envisaged fruits of “growth with equity” had proved elusive. The state 
was fast running out of money. Clearly the economy needed some form of adjustment. The 
IMF/WB vultures which had begun to court Zimbabwe just after independence when it joined 
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them were already knocking on the door, offering to “help”. In 1990, Mugabe opened for 
them, thus giving the economy a capitalist stamp of approval and completing the pro-
capitalist turn begun at Lancaster House. By turning to the IMF/WB, a party which had been 
at the forefront of the struggle to end colonial inequalities and which had publicly dedicated 
itself to fight neo-colonialism was now involved in a process that would eventually re-impose 
colonial-type inequalities and a new form of imperialism in which the Bretton Woods 
institutions were the new colonial masters.  
 
Although there were strong nuances of neo-liberalism underneath the ruling elite’s Marxist-
Leninist rhetoric right from independence, and that neo-liberalism had become the in-thing in 
global economics at the time, the question that needs to be asked is: why is it that despite all 
that was known already about the deleterious effects of the structural adjustment programmes 
on the poor from other countries in the developing world, the ruling elites in Harare agreed to 
implement the programme? The puzzle is compounded by the observation that when 
Zimbabwe launched ESAP, the country was not in a large-scale economic distress, its 
problems being of a long-term structural nature (Skålnes 1995:118). Even though growth was 
not sufficient to stop escalating unemployment and real incomes had stagnated or fallen for 
many workers, Zimbabwe was far from experiencing the serious economic problems that 
plagued many other countries in sub-Saharan African.  
 
The orthodox answer relates to the poor performance of the economy throughout the 1980s. 
ESAP was therefore seen as a means to give it a boost (Addison and Laakso 2003:460). 
Hevina S. Dashwood (1996) has made an incisive observation. She notes the emergence of a 
core of senior decision-makers in both cabinet and central bank as early as 1985/86 which 
was committed to market-based reforms. The emergence of this core, she argues, suggests 
that within important sections of the government, there was an independent vision about the 
desirability of economic reform (Dashwood 1996:39-40). While in the mid-1980s, this core 
was only within the powerful economic ministries and central bank, by the end of the decade, 
the small core had grown to be the dominant group in both party and government. Added to 
these were the whites who had withdrawn from political life after the revoking of their 
reserved parliamentary seats and were forced to advocate for their interests through business 
lobby groups such as the Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU), Chamber of Zimbabwean 
Industry (CZI) and the Zimbabwean National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) (Southall 6). 
From the mid-1980s, there was a substantial growth in influence of the mostly white agrarian 
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and business elite, especially over the content of economic reforms. Tired of government’s 
interventionism this elite class had long urged deregulation. And so for the adoption of 
ESAP, one must think in terms of an evolution of elite consensus which in 1989 was enough 
to enabled Mugabe to formally decide to implement the IMF-sponsored programme. Thus 
while it is true that there was considerable pressure from the IMF/WB for the country to 
adopt neo-liberal reforms, it is disingenuous to argue that ESAP was forced down the throat 
of a reluctant Zimbabwe. The primary impetus for the shift in development strategy was 
domestic in origin (Dashwood 1996:39).  
 
7.4.2 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) 
 
The ESAP was launched with lofty goals. The missionaries of the programme explained that 
it would stimulate investment activity and remove existing constraints on growth. It would 
“herald a new era of modernised, competitive export-led industrialisation” (Mlambo 2017:7). 
The programme would also “open up” the economy to foreign capital and markets. The 
expected decline in prices of basic commodities and increase in employment due to the 
stampede of players on the market, would improve real incomes for the poor in the long-term. 
The government promised that in five years’ time, the civil service would be cut by 25% and 
that all economic restrictions and controls, as well as government subsidies would have been 
done away with. Manufacturing would generate the much-needed foreign currency. Fiscal 
deficit would be reduced from 10% of GDP (its average during the 1980s) to 5% (Addison 
and Laakso 2003:459). Although the government did not privatise parastatals, it pursued their 
commercialisation vigorously. 
 
The Economic Policy Statement of 1990 stated that government would de-emphasise 
expenditure on social services and emphasise investment in agriculture, mining and 
manufacturing (Dashwood 1996:38). The statement also stated that the government was 
going to do away with economic regulation in favour of an economy in which market forces 
play a greater role. The statement makes no reference whatsoever to the issue of distributive 
justice. Likewise, the 1991 Framework for Economic Reform also makes no reference to 
social justice. Rather than government intervention, faith was now put in the markets to raise 
incomes, generate employment and in the process improve the living standards of the poor. 
The welfare of the poor would be met through the benefits that come from increased income 
growth. Loss of emphasis on social welfare went hand-in-hand with loss of emphasis on rural 
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development. The belief was that the rural poor would benefit from urban remittances. The 
more the economy grows, the more jobs are created in the urban areas, the better for the 
peasants. 
 
There were a few improvements as a result of the programme. Liberalisation eased the 
shortage of some consumer goods on the market. It also marked the end of the state 
monopoly on urban transport system and its opening up to private competitors. The result 
was that passengers received better and faster services. Government deficit and inflation 
came down briefly after having gone up in 1991-1992 (Skålnes 1995:121). The country was 
moving to market-determined exchange rate. Management at parastatals were given greater 
freedom in the hope that commercialisation would remove the need for privatisation. 18 000 
civil service posts were abolished, reducing the civil service salary bill from 15.3% of GDP 
in 1990 to 11.3% in 1994 (Bond 2000:181).  
 
However, in spite of these few positives, ESAP was an absolute disaster for the economy. 
Gains made during the first decade of independence witnessed worrying reversals. The World 
Bank (WB 1992:3) noted that by 1995, Zimbabwe was undergoing what in essence amounted 
to a counter-revolution. The liberalisation of interest rates before the fiscal deficit was under 
control led to the failure to reduce the latter. Parastatals continued to require huge 
government subsidies throughout the implementation period. The ZANU PF government 
could not sell them. It needed them for patronage purposes until the last possible minute and 
then privatise them to cronies (Bond and Manyanya 2003:165). The retrenchment of public 
servants was moving at a snail’s pace. The much-expected growth did not materialise, 
reaching 5% only in 1994, and averaged just 1.2% between 1991-1995 (Bond 2000:175). 
Inflation never dropped to anywhere near the expected 10%. It rose to 23.3% in 1991 and 
shot to 42.1% the following year, before coming down to around 25% in 1994 (Skålnes 
1995:141). The budget deficit was more than 10% of GDP in contrast to the targeted 5% 
(Bond 2000:175). It actually reached a high of 13% in 1994-95.  
 
The lowering of tariff barriers had a shattering effect on the manufacturing sector with many 
factories having to scale down operations or close down, terminating tens of thousands of 
jobs. By 1994, some 20 710 workers had lost their jobs (WB 1992:91). Lower wages did not 
result in the creation of more jobs and unemployment remained rampant. Manufacturing 
output dropped from 32% of GDP in 1992 to a mere 14.5% by the middle of the decade 
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(Martorell 2002). The textile sector, in particular, was severely hit by import liberalisation, 
finding itself competing with cheaper overseas and regional imports. 87 companies in the 
sector had closed down by 1994 (Mlambo 2017:7). ZCTU (1996:49) concluded that 
liberalisation had turned manufacturers into traders as firms tended to stop manufacturing 
products locally, opting to import them directly and then selling them to local consumers. 
Average real earnings of private sector workers were 75% of their 1990 level by the mid-
1990s, while public-sector real earnings fell to 61% of their 1990 level (Addison and Laakso 
2003:461). They were most probably cut in half again in the second half of the decade. 
Zimbabwe’s external debt went up from US$2bn in 1991 to over US$5bn by 1995, 
amounting to 91% of the country’s GDP as compared to only 45% in 1989 (Mlambo 1997:3). 
The current account deficit was US$489 million in 1991 and reached an unprecedented 
US$840 million a year later when the country had to import most of its food requirements 
(Skålnes 1995:141).  
 
Prices of basic commodities skyrocketed in the absence of government controls. While prices 
had more than doubled by the middle of the 1990s, average wages had risen only 45%. The 
ZCTU, which had just broken free from the paternalistic grip of the ruling party, was very 
critical of the programme. Its Secretary General, Tsvangirai, noted an increase in prices by 
40% in 1992, remarking that labour was being cheapened daily (WB 1992:84). In 1996, 
ZCTU stated that their average member was 38% poorer than in 1980 and 40% poorer than in 
1990 (Bond and Manyanya 2003:35). The local currency was devalued by more than 80%. In 
1989, it was US$1:Z$2.113 but by 1994, it had fallen to US$1:Z$8. UNICEF (cited in WB 
1993:86) noted in 1993 that the quality of the country’s health services had decreased by 
30%, that twice as many women were dying in child birth in Harare hospitals than before 
1990, and that fewer people were visiting health care centres because they just could not 
afford to. Brain-drain was accelerated as skilled labour left the country for greener pastures. 
At the University of Zimbabwe, lecturers were forced to become part-time minibus taxi 
operators in order to make ends meet as ESAP eroded incomes. 
 
The effects of job losses and reduction in urban incomes as a result of the collapse of the 
manufacturing sector, spread to rural areas which were still reeling from the effects of the 
1992 drought, through a reduction in urban remittances. Run-away inflation hit the poor 
severely. School fees rose beyond most households’ affordability levels. Clinics and hospitals 
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ran out of medicine. Rural agricultural support systems disappeared. Roads deteriorated due 
to lack of maintenance. The percentage of households living in extreme poverty increased 
from 61% in 1995 to 75% in 2000 (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2003:358). Begging, crime 
and homelessness, indicators of extreme economic hardships, increased dramatically in cities. 
Squatter settlements mushroomed in and around cities throughout the country despite 
repeated efforts by the government to get rid of them. By 1995, Harare had more beggars, 
more children living on the streets and more illegal vendors than at any other time in the 
history of the capital (WB 1993:92-93). The country sank into an intense economic 
depression.  
 
The ESAP did not succeed in reviving the Zimbabwean economy but reversed the gains of 
the preceding decade and created numerous other problems for the country. All the ESAP’s 
targets were missed by huge margins. In all respects, the ESAP failed miserably. Instead of 
lifting the economy out of the quagmire that it was in, the Washington-designed programme 
exacerbated underdevelopment and increased poverty. A representative of the World Bank in 
Zimbabwe admitted that the ESAP underestimated the need to deal with the country’s history 
of economic dualism while the policy of indigenisation was not accompanied by adequate 
development policies (Zamponi 2005:36). With a bit of humour, Zimbabweans started to 
refer to ESAP as “Eternal Suffering of the African People” (Mlambo 1997:xi; Bond and 
Manyanya 2003:84). By 1997 when the ZANU PF government realised how disastrous the 
programme was for the masses and announced that it was abandoning it, it was too late. The 
economy was in a free fall. The government later admitted that ESAP was its worst mistake 
(Bond 2000:181).  
 
Reforms were indeed needed to change the trajectory of the Zimbabwean economy after the 
first decade of independence. Mugabe’s answer to the problems crippling his economy was 
an absolute disaster. The diagnosis was correct but the prescription was wrong. Patrick Bond 
and Masimba Manyanya (2003:xv) argue that Mugabe’s government should not be blamed 
for the failure of the reforms for it broadly adhered to the programme, adding that its failure 
was intrinsic to the model imposed on the country. The World Bank’s own Project 
Completion Report (2005) described Zimbabwe’s implementation of the first stage of the 
ESAP as highly satisfactory. Mlambo (1997:x) agrees with Bond and Manyanya, adding that 
the problem is less to do with the lack of willingness of the ruling elite to defend the interests 
of the poor, but with the very structure and objectives of the reform package itself. By their 
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very nature, the IMF/WB reform packages are unfriendly and decidedly injurious to the poor. 
They favour and benefit big business and wealthy elites at the expense of the poor. Norman 
Girvan (cited in Khadhani 1986:114) argues that the IMF-type programmes are not 
ideologically neutral because their logic is evidently to support the socio-economic elites who 
control capital, and are therefore in a position to take advantage of the market. This explains 
why the local industrial and agrarian bourgeoisie (both white) and a nascent black 
bourgeoisie were the chief advocates of this elitist reform programme. This can also explain 
the complete abandoning of the social welfare policies of the previous decade, including the 
suspension of the land resettlement programme. The bourgeoisie had gained an upper hand in 
policy determination. 
 
As shall be seen in the next chapter, a major weakness of this particular reform programme 
was the blind faith in market forces. Critics questioned whether exclusive reliance on market-
based reforms alone would solve the country's structural challenges of poverty, 
underdevelopment and unemployment in the absence of other policies to accompany them if 
the objectives of the programme were to be met (Dashwood 1996:43). Instead of concrete 
poverty oriented policies, the government relied on neo-liberal faith. The reasoning was that 
the poor would benefit from the trickle-down effects of growth. While adopting market-based 
reforms, the ZANU PF government abandoned its earlier commitment to social-welfarist 
policies. The absence of this consideration for social welfare led to the failure to include rural 
development as a critical aspect of the programme intended for a country in which more than 
half of the population is rural. It also led to the absence of a provision for cushioning the poor 
from adverse effects of the programme. Thus while market-based reforms may not in 
themselves be against the long-term interests of the poor, but without other policies that show 
a concern for the welfare of the poor, chances of them improving the living standard of the 
poor are between very slim and none.  
 
7.4.3 Primitive accumulation 
 
Predatory tendencies in the African petit bourgeoisie that came to power in 1980 were quite 
evident right from the beginning. However, this was concealed by the triumphalist mood, the 
purported Marxist-Leninist ideology and the developmentalist agenda that the elite pursued. 
The rapid pace of Africanisation of the civil service was intended to ensure that the levers of 
power were firmly under the control of trusted party cadres, clients and associates. In the 
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deployment to top positions, party credentials or personal relations were more important than 
qualifications and competences, and more often than not, interests of the power elite took 
precedence over those of the state. The ruling elite increasingly became anti-developmental 
the further the state moved from independence. The hardships, deprivation and suffering 
experienced in the bush, exile and imprisonment became for the power elite a licence to 
accumulate as quickly and as much as possible. It was their “time to eat”. As in the rest of 
post-colonial Africa, the state is the most treasured and reliable site of wealth accumulation. 
In an environment heavily dominated by white capital and so private sector opportunities 
limited, the state is the shortest route to accumulation for the African petit bourgeoisie.  
 
Prior to independence, there was minimal social stratification in the African society because 
of the legislated lack of access to the means of production. But after independence, social 
classes began to emerge as blacks began to be deployed to senior positions in government 
and SEPs, becoming the new elite. Income gaps among the classes of the blacks began to 
widen. As the whites were leaving the country in their numbers, the new black elite moved 
from the townships into former white suburbs where houses were available at very low 
prices. The “chefs” allocated themselves large pieces of land on farms that had been deserted 
by the departing white farmers at bargain prices. Acquired property (low-density houses and 
farms) became a symbol of status. With the new-found positions and fortune, unsurprisingly, 
the former guerrillas’ lifestyle began to match those of the whites. A process of elite cohesion 
was unfolding as the interests of the two groups of the elite began to converge. The new elite 
became comfortable with institutional legacies of the colonial state, collaborating with white 
capital (Shumba 2018:39). They fitted very well into the framework created by the settlers, 
both socially and economically, increasing opportunities for themselves. Race was no longer 
that important; class was. Change was rapid, and almost instantly, riches replaced rags. High 
ranking party and government elites, including those who most loudly claimed to believe in 
socialism, preached egalitarianism during the day while nicodemously diverting public funds 
to private bank accounts at home and overseas, and grabbing farms, mines and companies for 
themselves and their clients.  
 
The Marxist-Leninist rhetoric became a smoke screen behind which the elites pursued their 
own personal interests. They pressed the masses to work hard for socialist development while 
they amassed state resources for themselves, their extended families, girlfriends and their 
clients. Extravagant weekend parties, lavish weddings and top-of-the range imported vehicles 
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became a distinguishing characteristic of the power elite. With this new lifestyle, they quickly 
forgot about the existence of the folk in the townships and rural areas. 
 
In 1984, Mugabe reminded his ministers and party elite to be aware of what he termed 
“bourgeois tendencies” (Bratton and Masunungure 2011:12) because he was aware that they 
used their control of state resources for patronage purposes and to enrich themselves. To 
prevent the power elite from primitive accumulation and corruption, the party introduced the 
much-ignored Leadership Code in 1984, a clear admission that predatory behaviour was quite 
alive among the party elite. The code prohibited the party elite from owning businesses, 
properties for rent and commercial farms. However, the code did not last beyond a couple of 
years as Mugabe and his cabal soon shredded it, acquiring properties and businesses and 
registering them under the names of relatives, girlfriends, associates and clients (Yamamoto 
2008). The Marxist-Leninist rhetoric became a smoke screen behind which the elites pursued 
their own private interests. Obligation to extended families resulted in nepotism as senior 
positions in SEPs were given to relatives. After his expulsion from ZANU PF, Tekere 
labelled his former colleagues in the ruling party a “vampire class” of corrupt leaders 
(Bratton and Masunungure 2011:15). 
 
Shortly into independence, corruption scandals which showed the vulnerability of state-
owned enterprises to political interference began to be reported by the media. In the Paweni 
scandal of 1982, Minister Kangai, the key decision-maker in the saga escaped unscathed and 
continued as minister long after the scandal while the politically unprotected Samson Paweni 
became the “fall-guy” and got a ten-year prison sentence. Kangai would latter land the 
lucrative Ministry of Agriculture, where under his control the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) 
would be looted so severely that it never recovered. He died a respected party cadre and was 
buried at the national heroes’ acre. The public uproar following the Willowgate scandal 
forced Mugabe to set up the Sandura Commission of Enquiry, which found a number of 
senior party officials and cabinet ministers, including Maurice Nyagumbo, Fredrick Shava, 
Callistus Ndlovu, Enos Nkala, Dzingai Mutumbuka and Jacob Mudenda, to have unduly 
benefitted from the Willowvale car sale facility. In particular, Minister Shava was criticised 
by Justice Sandura for "behaving like a car dealer" (Hiltzik 1989). None of them were jailed. 
Shava was later appointed ambassador to China and then to the UN. Mudenda was appointed 
chairperson of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) in 2013, and later elevated 
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to Speaker of the national assembly. Other major scandals that slipped into the public domain 
and rocked the nascent state in the first decade of independence include the National 
Railways Housing scandal (1986), ZISCO scandal (1987) and the ZRP Santana scandal 
(1989).  
 
As the country moved into the second decade of independence, it seemed the political elite 
had perfected the art of primitive accumulation. Under ESAP’s neo-liberalism, caution was 
thrown to the wind as class shenanigans happened openly in broad day light. Wealth 
accumulation became much more rampant than in the previous decade. Jabusile M. Shumba 
(2018:169) observes that the period 1990-97 was one of transition from an emerging 
developmental state towards a predatory state. Rob Davies (2004:29) suggests an alternative 
reason for the adoption of ESAP by the party elite. He argues that the state had reached its 
limits as a site for personal wealth accumulation by the late 1980s. The constraints on state 
expenditure limited the scope for patronage, rent seeking and other forms of personal wealth 
accumulation yet the number of claimants was increasing. Furthermore, the education system 
was churning out young aspirants who also put pressure on the party elite to get their fair 
share of the cake of prosperity. Liberalisation seemed to be the only way that these young 
people would be able to achieve their class aim of getting rich very quickly. It opened the 
flood gates for predation in every sector of the economy and enabled the elite to facilitate 
entry of their clients into their accumulation club under the guise of “indigenisation”.  
 
Brian Raftopoulos and Daniel Compagnon (2003:25) view ZANU PF’s indigenisation policy 
as a means to retain control over the society through patronage, and the role of the state as 
that of a mediator between rival clientele networks of the elite. Instead of being a 
development tool against poverty and unemployment, indigenisation became a tool for 
dispensing patronage. It essentially involved the state-controlled transfer of foreign firms to 
the party elite or to businessmen who were located in or connected to the corridors of state 
power. It was an anti-developmental accumulation project of the ruling class. It was not at all 
about social justice but about the redistribution of wealth and income under the control of the 
political elite to further its ends. The beneficiaries of the policy were the politically-connected 
elite and trusted foreign investors who did not threaten the power elite’s aspirations. The 
ZANU PF government was less interested in promoting a broad-based indigenisation project 
than in expanding crony capitalism to serve the interests of this political elite group and its 
clients (Raftopoulos and Compagnon 2003:25). As it had done previously with white farms, 
 
 
  222 
the political bourgeoisie was simply after seizing white and foreign owned businesses all in 
the name of indigenisation (Raftopoulos and Compagnon 2003:22).  
 
The liberalisation of the economy saw the emergence of groups - such as the Indigenous 
Business Development Centre (IBDC) and the Affirmative Action Group (AAG) - that were 
aligned to the political elite demanding a share of the national cake under the banner of 
indigenisation. Ken Yamamoto describes these groups as “a political mafia elite that 
extensively fuelled network-type corruption”. This small clique of indigenous entrepreneurs 
was initiated by the ruling elite to serve its patronage purposes in a liberalised environment. 
As clients tied to ZANU PF’s patronage structures, they had privileged access to government 
loans and scarce foreign exchange. They became “political businessmen” interested in 
acquiring stakes in big lucrative companies, becoming very rich in the process. Meredith 
(2005:632) quotes the Affirmative Action Group (AAG)’s Philip Chiyangwa as saying, “I am 
rich because I belong to ZANU PF. If you want to be rich, you must join ZANU PF.” Hopes 
that they would form a new “capitalist” class were dashed. Davies (2004:22) notes that these 
individuals who used access to the state to set up business empires were not engaged as part 
of the reproductive circuit of capital because, instead of accumulating capital, they actually 
destroyed it by accumulating personal wealth. He goes on to argue that resources acquired in 
this way are not at all invested in productive assets, but rather in conspicuous consumption. 
Chiyangwa has become notorious for flaunting his wealth in public. 
 
The African petite bourgeoisie is inherently anti-developmental, for it does not facilitate 
economic transformation or development. Because of the parasitic and rentier nature of this 
petit bourgeoisie-cum-political businessmen, this regime of accumulation never engages in 
productive investment or manufacturing. These are completely out of the picture of its 
business interests. Instead, as Shumba (2018:25) argues, the speciality of a typical rentier 
predatory state is resource-based accumulation. Its agenda is personal wealth accumulation 
and power consolidation. For David Moore (2001:258) this mode of accumulating wealth 
cannot be labelled “capitalist” but “feudal” because it does not involve accumulating capital 
in the productive sense. Thus for Davis (2004:27) personal wealth acquisition has not sown 
the seeds for a new capitalist class, but has rather enriched some feudal barons. Yamamoto 
observes that these political businessmen do not have competencies in running businesses; as 
such their business interests will never succeed. The tragedy of Roger Boka is a classic 
example of this group’s limitations. He became the first indigenous businessman to be given 
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a commercial banking licence. His business empire, which he built through huge loans from 
government-controlled financial institutions at low interest rates, crumbled spectacularly in 
1998 due to bad corporate governance. He fled the country and later returned home broke and 
sick, but was never prosecuted. Senior party and government officials, whom he had given 
huge loans, attended his funeral in their numbers. Many other such political bourgeoisie with 
strong connections to the state have followed suit. They have tended to be more parasitic and 
less productive.  
 
It seems genuine capitalists in Zimbabwe, that is, those who have gone on to establish multi-
million dollar investments have emerged in the face of opposition and persecution from the 
state rather than by being close to it. The case of Strive Masiyiwa has shown that. The ZANU 
PF elite ensured that their tentacles stretched to every sector of the economy so as to prevent 
the emergence of autonomous indigenous capital that did not pass through them. 
Autonomous indigenous capital which did not court the support of the power elite was 
repressed and marginalised because the elite feared that it would provide an alternative power 
base and hence challenge its interests. Masiyiwa was to learn the hard way. He wanted to set 
up a cellular phone company outside ZANU PF patronage networks and in open breach of the 
rules of the game, refused to give free shares to ZANU PF elites. The government tried hard 
to prevent him from getting a licence. There were even reports of threats made on his life. 
Without political protection, he fought the battle all the way to the Supreme Court. His 
company later became Zimbabwe’s largest employer. 
 
Numerous high-profile scandals were recorded during this second decade of independence. 
Between 1990 and 1998, the number of corruption cases prosecuted in courts doubled to over 
900 a year (Bracking 2009:42). The looting of the WVCF needs to be highlighted because of 
both the amounts and participants involved. Set up in 1994 to compensate ex-combatants for 
the injury and trauma suffered during the 1970s war, the WVCF was pillaged by the politico-
military elite and their associates through exaggerating their injuries so as to inflate claims. 
Some cabinet ministers claimed to be mentally impaired while other recipients claimed over 
100% disability. Minister Joice Mujuru claimed to be 55% disabled and was awarded a 
massive Z$389 472. Embarrassed when the scandal got into the public domain, she returned 
the money. Reward Marufu, brother to first lady, Grace Mugabe, claimed 95% disability for 
“ulcers and a scar on the left knee” (Bracking 2009: 43) and was awarded Z$821 668. War 
veterans leader, Chenjerai Hunzvi - who was charged with forging his own medical records 
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to claim compensation and was later acquitted - claimed he suffered a 117% disability and 
was awarded Z$517 537. His estranged Polish wife later revealed that Hunzvi was never at 
the battle-front during the war but was studying medicine in Warsaw at the time. Other 
politico-military elites who were compensated include Air Marshal Perence Shiri (50% 
disability and Z$90 249), Oppah Muchinguri Rushesha (65% disability and Z$478 166), CIO 
Deputy Director-General Aaron Nhepera (98% disability and Z$650 901), and Police 
Commissioner Augustine Chihuri (20% disability and Z$138 664) (Anti-Corruption Trust of 
Southern Africa 2012). No one was ever prosecuted for the looting. They all kept their 
positions while others were even promoted. Marufu, for example, was later appointed 
Zimbabwe’s ambassador to Canada.  
 
Other high level corruption scandals include the VIP housing scandal (1996), Harare Refuse 
Tender scandal (1998), the housing loan scandal (1999), National Oil Company of Zimbabwe 
(NOCZIM) scandal (1999) and the GMB scandal (1999). The period also witnessed the 
pillaging of State-owned Enterprises and Parastatals (SEPs) by the ruling elite. One after 
another, SEPs were plundered and left for broke. Top government officials ran down 
NOCZIM, misappropriating billions meant for fuel procurement. They had easy access to 
fuel which they would divert to the black market. Nobody was prosecuted. The Zimbabwe 
Iron and Steel Company (ZISCO), once the largest integrated steelworks on the continent 
north of the Limpopo, was sucked dry by ZANU PF vampires who, according to the National 
Economic Conduct Inspectorate (NECI), included ministers Samuel Mumbengegwi, Olivia 
Muchena, Joice Mujuru, Stan Mudenge and Patrick Chinamasa (Yamamoto). Industry and 
International Trade Minister, Obert Mpofu initially told a Parliamentary Committee 
investigating ZISCO that senior officials had looted ZISCO but later backtracked. The VIP 
Housing Scheme was looted by among others, Grace Mugabe, who went on to build her 
famous “Gracelands” mansion, which could have built middle-income houses for twenty nine 
families (Yamamoto). Police chief, Augustine Chihuri and High Court Judge, Paddington 
Garwe, also got away with their fair share of the loot amounting to millions. The plunder of 
Air Zimbabwe began with the scandal surrounding the construction of the Harare 
International Airport terminal. Cypriotic firm Air Harbour Technologies (AHT) had 
performed very badly in its application to the State Tender Board but still went on to win the 
lucrative contract because of its association with Leo Mugabe, the President’s nephew, who 
allegedly pocketed US$190 000 for ensuring that AHT obtained the contract (Norman 
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2004:103). The company also returned the huge favour by building Mugabe’s iconic “Blue 
Roof” residence. The company reportedly “donated” tens of thousands of dollars to the ruling 
party and to two ministers (Shumba, p. 153). In July 1999, Company Chairman, Hani 
Yamani, was to complain to Mugabe after being asked to pay excessive kickbacks by some 
ministers (Mail and Guardian, 27 September 2013). 
 
As shortages became serious due to the ESAP, some politically connected elites became 
“briefcase businessmen” who used their proximity to the state to access foreign exchange, 
import licenses, or government contracts, which they later sold to other businesses for a 
fortune. Some whites donated huge amounts of money to ZANU PF to court favours. In 
1993, the Economist Intelligence Unit revealed that fraud and corruption in the parastatals 
and public service had reached “epidemic” proportions (Bratton and Masunungure 2011:17). 
Many became asset strippers who took over established businesses and ran them aground, 
affecting thousands of workers. These elites fit perfectly what Moeletsi Mbeki (cited by 
Chirimambowa 2018) describes as “an anti-developmental parasitic elite, only interested in 
their personal accumulation projects and not development of the ordinary person.” The 
former liberation movement had turned into a leviathan, feasting on its citizens. 
  
In the early 1990s, the media reported the corruption that was happening on the farms. Top 
political and military officials were granting themselves leases on farms that the state had 
acquired for resettlement purposes. Other farms were reportedly sold well below market 
value. In 1992, it was reported that high ranking bureaucrats and top government and party 
officials owned up to 8% of commercial farmland (Weiss 1994:187). In 1994, the 
Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) revealed that over half of Mugabe's cabinet were its 
members (Dashwood 1996:33). At the end of the decade, observes Kenneth Good (2002:13), 
a quarter of the members of the CFU were black, most of them wealthy urban business elites. 
A 1994 report showed that a huge farm that had been compulsorily acquired from a white 
farmer for the resettlement of 33 landless families had been leased out to Minister Witness 
Mangwende (Meredith 2005:633). Further reports revealed that over 300 farms acquired for 
resettlement purposes had been handed out to the party and military elite, sometimes for a 
nominal rent and in other cases for no rent at all (Meredith 2005:633). 
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7.4.4 Emergence of serious opposition 
 
The second decade of independence was not only the decade of the ESAP and the problems it 
engendered, more importantly, it also embodied a struggle by students, intellectuals, workers 
and civil society to reclaim and defend the few remaining democratic spaces, as democracy 
made its way into intensive care. It witnessed a rise in class-based and popular protests 
against a government which responded by increasingly resorting to authoritarianism. The 
legacy of liberalisation was the impoverishment of the masses by the end of the 1990s. The 
problems of neoliberalism went hand-in-hand with a serious democratic deficit of the 
revolutionary party creating conditions for a general crisis of legitimacy (Raftopoulos and 
Phimister 2003:357). Disillusionment with and resistance to ZANU PF was seen through 
engaging in apathy to national events (such as Independence and Heroes Day celebrations) 
and party activities, as well as non-participation in national elections. Opposition to ZANU 
PF rule that had been mute during the first decade of independence because civil society 
organisations had been generally supportive of the government’s development programmes 
became pronounced as the 1990s wore out. From 1996 onwards, social unrest in the form of 
mass demonstrations, strikes and riots was the order of the day in big cities. The erosion of 
workers' wages led to intensified strike action that attracted increasing numbers of workers 
from across the sectors (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2003:357). Civil servants also became 
increasingly militant, with the 1996 national strike dealing the confidence of the state a 
particularly hard blow (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2003:357). In black townships, residents 
rioted over food and fuel price hikes. The food riots left dozens of casualties at the hands of 
the police. 1997 saw a record number of strikes and mass actions.  
 
ZCTU, which had just woken up from a deep post-independence slumber and declared 
independence from ZANU PF, was able to organise and mobilise workers - including those 
from the public sector - at a national scale (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2003:357). Enjoying 
massive support from the workers, it began to challenge ZANU PF’s economic and political 
policies. Under the able leadership of Tsvangirai, the labour federation called a general strike 
in 1997 and mass stay-aways in 1998 that were heeded by the workers. In so doing, a major 
social force with structures countrywide and an alternative national vision had arrived on the 
Zimbabwean landscape; a force that could no longer be dismissed as representing minority 
interests, a force with the capability to develop a broad social alliance against the state 
(Raftopoulos and Phimister  2003:358). With the deepening of the political crisis and 
 
 
  227 
economic collapse, the regime remained largely unresponsive and appeared clueless on how 
to arrest the decline. ZCTU filled the vacuum and became a leading political force in the 
country. It eloquently articulated the connections between the crisis and the broader issues of 
democratisation. That way it won hearts and minds, not just of the workers, but also of the 
unemployed, students, civil society organisations and churches, as well as the peasants in 
rural areas who felt the impact of the crisis the most. Seeing Tsvangirai as a rabble-rouser, 
suspected war veterans savagely beat him up in his office (Addison and Laakso 2003:462). 
He was also arrested and kept incommunicado for a week. This persecution earned him 
respect, raised his profile in the public eye and turned him into a national figure (Kagoro 
2003:17). As the national cake continued to shrink, Mugabe responded with increasing 
closure of democratic spaces. ZCTU joined forces with a wide range of civil society 
organisations around the problems of democratisation and human rights, areas in which the 
abuses of the ruling ZANU PF had become blatant. 
 
At about the same time, ZANU PF tasted its own medicine when, from within its ranks, the 
veterans of the war of liberation, who had been neglected by the regime since the end of the 
war, rose up and confronted Mugabe over their welfare, posing a serious threat both to his 
rule and the continued stay of his party in power. Fearing the loss of a key ally that had 
played a significant role in mobilising support for the party in the rural areas, Mugabe gave in 
to their demands and in November 1997 awarded the 60 000-strong ex-guerrillas a once-off 
Z$50 000 and promised them a further Z$2 000 monthly pension plus free education and 
health care for the rest of their lives. He also promised them 20% of the land that would be 
expropriated from whites. These huge amounts - in the range of Z$4.5 billion - had not been 
factored into the 1997 budget. The deal was a budget buster. On “Black Friday”, 14 
November 1997, the Zimbabwe dollar fell from around Z$10 to below Z$30 to the US$, 
losing 74% of its value, over a four-hour trading period (Bond and Manyanya 2003:xi). The 
currency crash was so severe, quite possibly the worst ever experienced in such a short time 
in modern history outside of war time (Bond and Manyanya 2003:xii). Bond and Manyanya 
(2003:38) add that this is the precise moment when the Zimbabwean economy began the 
plunge that would characterise the economy for the next two decades. This agreement 
between the government and the war veterans completely reconfigured Zimbabwe’s political 
economy. By yielding to their demands and giving them a strategic role in the ruling 
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coalition, Mugabe put a definitive end to the era of ESAP and the influence of technocrats on 
policy making in Zimbabwe (Bratton 2014:68).   
 
The fiscal position of the country further deteriorated when in August 1998, Mugabe 
deployed thousands of his troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in defence of 
discredited President Laurent Kabila against rebels backed by Rwanda and Uganda. Mugabe 
unilaterally took the decision without consulting Parliament or his cabinet. Some observers 
speculated that Mugabe got involved in the war out of ego. The shift of the limelight from 
him to South Africa’s Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki led him to look north to the Congo 
to prove that he remained a player on the wider African scene (International Crisis Group 
[1CG] September 2000:6). A cabinet minister claimed in 2000 that the army was in the DRC 
“for the sake of generating the necessary revenue” instead of “burdening the treasury” 
(Addison and Laakso 2003:462).  
 
Critics, however, viewed this cavalier involvement in the war as an attempt by Mugabe to 
buy the loyalty of the army by providing its high-ranking officers opportunities for personal 
enrichment in the mineral trade. Southall (Unpublished 21) argues that the Congo debacle 
was driven by the politico-military elite’s interest in gaining access to that country’s mineral 
resources. Indeed a later UN report (2001) into the DRC conflict underscored that the failing 
mining industry and the severe shortage of energy in Zimbabwe had left few avenues for 
personal enrichment by government officials. The UN accused the Harare elites of 
systematically looting the wretched Congo. Political, military and economic elites were said 
to have been making millions of dollars in the Congo particularly through diamond mining. 
Emmerson Mnangagwa was explicitly mentioned as the key figure in Zimbabwe’s 
commercial involvement (UN 2001:17). But while some members of the ruling elite and top 
army chiefs enriched themselves in the jungles of the Congo, the fiscus appears to have lost 
more than it gained. Estimates indicated that the war was costing the nation around US$1 
million a day (Ferrett 2001:157). Finance minister Simba Makoni stated in August 2000 that 
government had spent US$200 million on the war since 1998, adding that Zimbabwe could 
no longer sustain the costs. 13 000 troops, about a third of the national armed forces, were 
believed to have been in the Congo at the height of the war, while a growing number of 
casualties were being flown back home under the cover of darkness. While authorities 
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claimed that less than 100 troops had died in the Congo, reliable military sources said the 
number was a lot more than that, probably around 700 (Good 2002:19). 
 
Fatigue associated with government’s failures was not restricted to the urban areas, but also 
spread to the rural areas where, in 1998, peasants now tired of waiting for the promised land, 
nearly two decades into independence, started to occupy white commercial farms in a way 
that was spontaneous, peaceful and not determined by ZANU PF. These land occupations 
reminded the ZANU PF government of the need to revisit land reform. To save face, Mugabe 
relaunched the ideology of land redistribution. In the context of social unrest and a 
government that had fallen from popular grace and whose legitimacy was fading fast, the 
issue of land reform acquired a prominent role in the consensus-building strategy of ZANU-
PF (Zamponi 2005:36). Nearly 5 000 white-owned farms were gazetted for compulsory 
acquisition in November 1997. The intensifying economic and social collapse coupled with 
the increased mobilisation of some social groups that had been badly affected by the 
liberalisation of the economy under the ESAP, forced Mugabe to turn his back on economic 
reforms and to resort to authoritarianism and populism in order to re-gain his legitimacy 
especially among the rural voters.  
 
Another key issue that dominated Zimbabwean politics in the late 1990s was the need for a 
new constitution. The Lancaster House Constitution was viewed as a compromise document 
and had been amended several times by the ZANU PF dominated parliament. It was widely 
seen as a source of the governance challenges that the country faced. For instance, too much 
power was vested in the head of state and, without any checks and balances, Mugabe had 
abused it with impunity. A cross-class alliance composed of the labour federation, human 
rights activists, various Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), the inhibited petit 
bourgeoisie, students, sympathetic business liberals, church-based activists, among others, 
emerged around issues of human rights abuses, accountability and abuse of public funds 
(Bond and Manyanya 2003:74). They saw a clear link between the crisis the nation was in 
and the broader problems of democratisation. They formed the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA) in January 1998, advocating a new home-grown constitution. ZANU PF 
could only afford to ignore the NCA at its own peril. It formed its own commission to solicit 
the citizens’ views and draft a new constitution. The NCA boycotted the ZANU PF process 
alleging that the president had too many powers and could amend or reject the commission’s 
proposals. The NCA popularised its campaign vigorously. In February 1999, a National 
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Working People’s Convention was called at which delegates unanimously took a decision to 
form a broad-based, credible opposition party, facilitated by the ZCTU, to contest the 2000 
and 2002 elections. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) was officially launched 
on 11 September 1999. Courageous trade unionist, Tsvangirai, who had scored many 
spectacular victories against Mugabe, was the obvious choice for party leader. 
 
7.5 A new Zimbabwe, a new beginning 
 
Running on the ticket of change, promising a “new Zimbabwe” and a “new beginning”, the 
MDC emphasised civic, political and human rights, pointing to the democratic deficit of the 
ruling party and building on the popular frustration with ZANU PF. Tsvangirai located his 
movement within a post-nationalist terrain (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009:318). The cross-class 
alliance was like one big church composed of people from all walks of life, with all sorts of 
interests and expectations. Contradictions were evident in the multi-class project right from 
the beginning. The workers wanted the party to be an independent voice to fight ZANU PF’s 
neo-liberal policies that had led to their pauperisation. Academics and other professionals 
joined the party probably as a way of going up the ladder of social recognition. The 
emergence of the MDC as a viable alternative to ZANU PF helped politically remobilise 
whites. Seeing their interests threatened by the increasingly radical speeches of the ZANU PF 
government over the land issue, white farmers felt that the MDC was the only political 
formation with a realistic chance of upsetting the discredited ZANU PF. They started to 
support the MDC both financially and otherwise and, more importantly, played a pivotal role 
in determining the party’s economic policies. For example, the MDC's economic advisor, 
Eddie Cross, was a leading member of the Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), 
which was known for its advocacy of neo-liberal policies and had applauded ZANU PF for 
embracing liberalisation in 1990.  
 
The MDC reflected a leaning towards a social democratic transformation agenda within a 
neo-liberal paradigm. The socialists within the movement had a problem with that. MDC MP, 
Munyaradzi Gwisai, for example, was a committed socialist who later clashed with the party 
leadership because of his left-leaning views and expelled from of the party. The Ndebele’s, 
resentful of ZANU PF because of Gukurahundi, wasted no time in finding their political 
home in the MDC. The whole Matabeleland region would embarrass ZANU PF at every 
election thereafter as they would vote overwhelmingly for the MDC. While the urbanites had 
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supported the party even before it was officially born, the rural folk were not left behind. It 
seems the broad base of the MDC was both its strength and its weakness at the same time. It 
seems each of these segments of the party saw the MDC as the only party that would 
safeguard its interests. This led The Insider (Rukuni 2002) to observe that “the MDC is really 
a coalition of different forces which in normal circumstances would not be compatible”. The 
bulletin went on to note that what kept it going was its pursuit of power, adding: “Everyone 
thought the party was going to win the (2002) presidential elections, get rid of Mugabe and 
perhaps they could go their separate ways once Mugabe was out of the way” (Rukuni 2002). 
The party did not wait for Mugabe to go before wide cracks began to emerge in the 
movement. The party was to split a couple of times due to irreconcilable differences within 
the leadership. As a very broad-based movement encompassing varied interests from the 
business elite to the unemployed, it would be very difficult to consolidate its position as, for 
example, only one interest-based political group would do. 
 
7.5.1 Mugabe tastes defeat 
 
The government’s Constitutional Commission undertook countrywide consultations and 
produced a draft constitution which was put to a referendum in February 2000. Unfortunately, 
the draft ignored widespread public sentiment in favour of a limit on the number of terms 
which the president could serve. Government poured a lot of resources in the campaign for a 
“Yes” vote.  The party and government were confident that Zimbabweans would accept the 
constitution and Mugabe would rule forever. The NCA/MDC coalition campaigned hard for 
the rejection of what they viewed as a ZANU PF document that had ignored citizens’ 
submissions. To the government’s surprise and consternation, the draft constitution was 
rejected by 55 - 45% of the votes. The Helen Suzman Foundation [HSF] (2002) alleges that 
ZANU PF rigged the referendum in its favour but still lost. What made the result significant 
is that it was the first time that the party and government had lost an election since coming to 
power in 1980. More importantly, the referendum was widely viewed as a proxy vote for 
Mugabe and ZANU PF’s legitimacy. It was widely seen as a rejection not only of the draft 
constitution but of ZANU PF itself and of Mugabe himself.  
 
Tony Addison and Liisa Laakso (2003:464) observe that in contrast to the 1990 and 1995 
elections, there was a high turnout of urban voters and a low rural turnout, something that 
seemed to reflect increasing disillusionment with the party among rural voters. Equally 
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important, the victory of the “No” vote revived diminishing faith that an election could 
actually bring about the end of Mugabe’s authoritarian rule (Good 2002:24). The myth of 
Mugabe’s invincibility was dispelled. The loss indicated, not only dissatisfaction with the 
ruling ZANU PF, but the capacity to mobilise this discontent into an effective opposition 
(Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2003:346). Things did not look good for ZANU PF. Mugabe 
was restless. The party was confronted with the real danger of losing the general election in a 
few months’ time, as well as the presidential election in 2002. Mugabe knew that his political 
ship was sinking and had to act and act fast to find a quick solution. It was no longer business 
as usual. He was in a defensive mood; complete with the ferocious instruments of repression 
inherited from racist Rhodesia and perfected over the years, ready and willing to show his 
opponents that while control over the economy was slipping through his fingers, politically 
he was firmly in charge.  
 
7.6 The lost decade: 2000 - 2008 
 
We have tainted what was a glorious revolution, reducing it to some agrarian racist 
enterprise; we have behaved over the last few years as if the world owes a living. It does not; 
we have blamed other people for each and every ill that befell us; and as every peasant, 
worker, businessman or woman now stares at the precipice of doom, let us wake up and draw 
back. We must clear the slate, bury everything that has divided us and begin again (Edison 
Zvobgo, cited in Cornwell 2000:6). 
 
The almost instant and widespread support of the MDC and its challenge of the hitherto 
unrivalled dominance of ZANU PF frightened the latter and created a sense of panic in the 
party. The historic defeat marked a crucial turning point in Zimbabwean politics. It signalled 
to ZANU PF that unless drastic measures were taken, its hold on political power was surely 
going to end fatefully. Faced with an election against an MDC that had been buoyed by the 
referendum win and experiencing an upsurge in popularity, the shocked ZANU PF responded 
by unleashing a chain of violent interventions, reviving of its latent leftist rhetoric and 
resurrecting the liberation war mantra. Its most militant and lethal version of nationalist 
demagoguery was also resurrected. The national democratic revolution was now in its final 
phase. The Third Chimurenga had begun. A period marked by racist political rhetoric, 
economic collapse, unprecedented intolerance and erosion of the rule of law had begun. A 
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period of uninterrupted chaos had arrived. The stage was set for a cataclysmic economic 
collapse. 
 
7.6.1 The Third Chimurenga  
 
Smarting from the defeat, the party started looking for scapegoats. The state propaganda 
machinery which had been dormant for years had to be woken up. Mugabe employed an 
expert propagandist in the person of one-time critic Jonathan Moyo, who according to 
Chitando (2005:224) masterminded “one of the most sustained propaganda campaigns in 
post-colonial Africa”. Mandaza (2007:12) adds that Moyo provided a cutting edge to a state 
under siege and a party virtually on the ropes. The NCA/MDC coalition had received 
significant and open support from the white farming community which had increasingly 
come under attack from ZANU PF. Capitalising on this, the ZANU PF propaganda 
machinery crafted a theory of an axis of evil between the MDC, civil society, and white 
imperial interests (Kagoro 2003:21). The “No” vote was interpreted as a vote sponsored by 
white farmers and their kith and kin, mostly in England but also in other Western countries 
against the provision of the compulsory acquisition of the land by the state in the rejected 
constitution. In ZANU PF’s scheming, the white farmers and the Western imperialist 
countries were the brains behind the MDC. Fearing loss of their land, they had created and 
were sponsoring the MDC so that it would defeat the revolutionary party and then they would 
keep their land. The MDC was therefore not an indigenous party that represented the interests 
of the masses who wanted their land back. Rather, Tsvangirai and his party were puppets of 
the West and agents of imperialism. They were a front for white interests and enemies of the 
people, hell-bent on reversing the gains of liberation. The MDC puppets and their white 
sponsors were behind unconstitutional attempts to effect “regime change” in the country. 
 
By associating with imperialists, the MDC puppets had made themselves enemies of the 
people and had to be eliminated by any means necessary. The MDC was not only 
delegitimised, but was also ideologically “denationalised” because of this association with 
imperialist forces and as such they could not be “true” Zimbabweans, and existed merely as 
puppets of the West (van Vuuren 2005:8). Once this narrative was accepted, it was used to 
justify the heartless persecution of known or suspected MDC supporters and the ruthless 
disregard for human rights. Tsvangirai became a favourite whipping boy of state media and 
cartoonists. Far from it being a contest to win votes and retain state power, it was elevated to 
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a struggle against British and American imperialism. The enemy was no longer the MDC but 
the two Western countries and their allies. The MDC and the white farmers were mere agents. 
The beleaguered regime vowed “Zimbabwe will never be a colony again” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni  
2009:332).  
 
7.6.2 The land is the economy 
 
Promises of land expropriation had been reiterated at each election campaign, beginning in 
1980, with the rhetoric becoming more aggressive since the adoption of the ESAP. Yet very 
little was done in twenty years to translate the rhetoric into action. Initially, government 
attributed the slow pace of reform to the LHA. However, the fact that the government did not 
embark on such a programme after the 1990 expiry of the Lancaster House constitutional 
provision suggests other factors at play. With time, the land issue became a political issue 
with ZANU PF electoral candidates resurrecting it during the run-up to elections and then 
allowing it to die immediately afterwards. As long as the land question remained unresolved, 
it served ZANU PF’s election campaigns very well. Addison and Laakso (2003:459) argue 
that ZANU PF hegemony over the rural areas would have declined if greater progress had 
been made in improving rural livelihoods through a progressive land reform programme 
earlier. This may explain why land reform had less priority than the government’s election 
rhetoric would suggest.  
 
But with nothing else to give to the despondent electorate that had lost faith in the nationalist 
project and crushed by the weight of poverty, Mugabe took out his (last) trump card from his 
cabinet. To eliminate the MDC puppet, it was necessary to strike at the heart of the source of 
the wealth of the sponsor. The land which gave them economic muscle had to be taken away, 
thus settling the land question once and for all. The war veterans whose loyalty Mugabe had 
bought in 1997 were mobilised and given the mandate to execute the last stage of the 
revolution. Within days of the referendum, land invasions started. Thus began the Fast Track 
Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). ZANU PF called it the Third Chimurenga, the final 
struggle to complete the total liberation of the masses, reuniting them with their land. The 
land that had been violently grabbed from the blacks by the colonisers was going to be 
repossessed by any means necessary. The programme was popularly referred to as jambanja 
because of its violent and chaotic nature (Masunungure 2006:6).  
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The farm occupiers were transported, sponsored, sustained and paid by the government 
(Hunter et al. 2001:17). Mugabe portrayed the invasions as driven by landless peasants, and 
so could not ask the occupiers to leave the farms. The International Bar Association (cited in 
Good 2002:14) concluded that, a “considerable body of evidence indicated that government 
and party officials assisted the invasions.” Police took no action to protect the lives or 
property of the farmers or their workers. They were under instruction to turn a deaf ear. The 
government encouraged and applauded the violation of its own laws. Some white farmers 
tried to resist eviction, but a combination of the marauding war veterans, the youth militia, 
and the police was too much for them. Around two hundred were arrested for defying the 
order to stop farming activities (Addison and Laakso 2003:465). Some fled their farms under 
the cover of darkness with nothing except the clothes they were putting on. Thirteen of them 
lost their lives together with more than 150 other people, mostly farm workers, while 
thousands were injured (Sachikonye 2003:235). Farming equipment, livestock, crops, 
buildings, including houses and furniture, became property of the leaders of the invading 
mobs.   
 
Aggrieved farmers approached the courts seeking justice. Judgements declared the farm 
invasions illegal and ordered the government to evict the farm invaders. But the ZANU PF 
government would have none of it and refused to comply with the judgements. Instead, party 
officials and war veterans attacked the judiciary. White members of the bench were described 
as legal spill-overs from the colonial era, who were ill-qualified to pass judgments on 
politically sensitive cases such as the land reform. Antony Gubbay, the Zimbabwe-born white 
Chief Justice, in particular, was severely attacked after he ruled that the FTLRP was illegal. 
In November 2000, war veterans invaded the Supreme Court. Gubbay was forced to take 
early retirement. In his place, Godfrey Chidyausiku, a former deputy minister in Mugabe's 
cabinet and a beneficiary of the land reform program known to be sympathetic to ZANU PF, 
was given the job ahead of more senior judges. He did not disappoint, ruling that the land 
reform was a “matter of social justice and not, strictly speaking, a legal issue” (Dansereau 
2005:19). Human Rights Watch (HRW November 2008) reported that as many as eight 
judges resigned with the majority of them fleeing into exile, due to political interference and 
intimidation. These were replaced with judges that could dance according to Mugabe’s tune. 
Thus, the judiciary was reshaped to guarantee greater compliance with ZANU PF dictates, 
compromising the integrity of the once-respected legal system. 
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The Third Chimurenga was not just a violent exercise, but like the second, it also had an 
equally strong ideological side. Likening the development and maintenance of authoritarian 
elite domination in Zimbabwe to that of Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa, Willem 
van Vuuren (2005:13) observed that Mugabe’s authoritarianism was built on a combination 
of terror and intimidation, on the one hand, and on propaganda and mass manipulation, on the 
other.  
 
Chitando has explored the Third Chimurenga’s appropriation of Christian and traditional 
African religious ideas to develop its own “theology of the land” (Chitando 2005:224). He 
observed how the creation story in Genesis 1 was recast and ideologically linked to the land 
question in Zimbabwe. In the beginning was the land, and black people owned the land. God 
set aside Zimbabwe as the sacred space for black people. Black ownership of land in 
Zimbabwe was, therefore, consistent with the divine order of things. The invasion of white-
owned farms was an integral part of the divine plan to ensure black dignity. In this theology, 
Mugabe was the biblical Moses sent to deliver the Promised Land to his people. The lyrics of 
Christian hymns were transformed to convey political messages about the revolutionary 
party, the land, and the obedient Mugabe. For example, a popular Christian hymn whose 
words, “I will never want if Jesus is with me”, was changed to: “I will never want if Mr 
Mugabe is with me” (Chitando 2005:229).  
 
Chitando also notes how during the war of liberation, ZANU consistently maintained that the 
struggle was a fulfilment of the spirit medium Ambuya Nehanda's prophecy that “my bones 
will rise up”, defeat the whites, and repossess the land. The legend of Nehanda was 
resurrected and expressed through songs and literary works. State media - newspapers, radio 
and the sole television station – were used to warn Zimbabweans of the threat posed by the 
MDC and the whites against the recovery of the stolen land. Jingles were played every fifteen 
minutes on all four state-owned radio stations and on television, focussing on the importance 
of the land for the identity of the Zimbabwean (black) people and as part of the broad 
programme of creating a “patriotic citizenry” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009:332). Day-in day-out, 
state media sang the praises of the party, its leader and the war veterans as the sole 
representatives of the interests of the nation, and articulating the basic tenets of the Third 
Chimurenga. Carefully selected intellectuals were used to provide a continuous and repetitive 
ideological message in order to set the parameters of a stable national identity conducive to 
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the consolidation of the power by the ruling party (van Vuuren 2005:15). Musical events in 
honour of some of the “fathers” of the Second Chimurenga (Nkomo and Simon Muzenda) 
were organised during important holidays aimed at mobilising the masses for the Third 
Chimurenga.  
 
The revived nationalism took on a selective reading of history, smoothing the various and 
complex narratives of the war of liberation in favour of its narrow, exclusive, and racialised 
narrative of ZANU PF. The land became the sole authentic signifier of national belonging; it 
became a key marker of African identity and being. Thus the use of the term vana vevhu 
(children of the soil) to refer to black Zimbabweans (Chitando 2005:226). The ZANU PF 
slogan - The Land is the economy and the economy is the land - captured the centrality of the 
land in the party’s scheming. The land was skilfully manipulated to appear as if it were the 
be-all and end-all of the Zimbabwean economy and the sole reason for the 1970s bloody war. 
According to Chitando (2005:223), the nationalists were effectively rewriting the history of 
the struggle and reducing it to one theme, the land. All the other aspects of the struggle, such 
as the right to vote, democracy, human rights, and equality were deleted from the narrative of 
the struggle (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009:237). The liberation war was not about building 
democracy and the institutions and values which sustain it, but about land. Brian Raftopoulos 
and Ian Phimister (2003:378) argue, however, that electoral issues and human rights played 
an important role during the war of liberation and were an important part of the demands of 
the nationalists. Far from being a political issue, the land question assumed immense 
traditional religious significance. With the land issue sacralised, Mugabe was portrayed as an 
obedient son, acting in accordance with the demands of the ancestors.  
 
When the dust had settled, large pieces of land had been given to the political elite, which 
included cabinet ministers, party officials, senior military officers, high-ranking civil servants 
and judges. These became the core of a black proto-capitalist land owning class (Southall 
Unpublished 20). War veterans, party loyalists, and peasants from communal areas were also 
allocated pieces of land. Farm workers and opposition supporters lost out. Originally set to 
end in August 20002, the occupations continued until mid-2003, and then subsided in 2004. 
This final phase of the process was the “land grab” by the black elite. By the end of the 
decade, only around 500 white farmers were left and 14.5 million hectares out of the 15.5 
million in white hands in 1980 had been acquired, making it the largest property transfer ever 
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to occur in the region in peacetime. 7 200 black commercial farmers (A2) were created and 
127 000 blacks received household-based small-scale farms (A1) (p. 32).  
 
7.6.3 Effects of the FTLRP 
 
The effects of the FTLRP were disastrous and did not take long to be noticed. Addison and 
Laakso (p. 464) estimate that as of June 2000 the direct cost of the farm invasions stood at a 
massive Z$430 million. Agricultural production plummeted resulting in a steep decline in 
food output. At the end of 2003, agricultural production was at its lowest since the late 1980s. 
In 2001, agriculture was about 22% of GDP but it had fallen to about 10% in 2008 (AfDB 
2011:5). In a study, John Robertson (cited in Mlambo 2017:25) shows a steep decline in the 
production of maize from 2 million to a mere 600 000 tonnes between 2000 and 2012 and 
wheat production from 300 000 to 10 000 tonnes during the same period. Tobacco, the main 
source of foreign exchange, saw the most severe decline as a result of the FTLRP. Food 
shortages began to be felt as early as 2001. Once a food surplus country and breadbasket of 
the sub-region, Zimbabwe had degenerated into a basket case, importing food to feed its 
starving people.  
 
Most of the beneficiaries of the FTLRP had no farming experience or capital for inputs and 
implements. The idea that farming ought to be a viable business was lost to many. Reports 
were in fact emerging that the newly resettled farmers were selling the inputs and equipment 
that were left behind by the former white owners. The broke government could not afford to 
provide the new farmers with the inputs. The International Crisis Group (ICG September 
2000:6) remarked that the FTLRP was going to be a disaster for the country: “This is not land 
reform; it is a politically driven land grab which will devastate Zimbabwe's agriculturally 
based economy without immediately benefiting those being resettled.” Media reports were 
also emerging that some beneficiaries were leasing their farms to the former owners. Many of 
the new farmers became “cell phone farmers”, directing farm activities by phone from their 
luxurious city homes (Mlambo, 2017:24). The government made it worse by not giving them 
title deeds. That meant that they could not use the land as collateral when applying for bank 
loans. The AfDB (2011:5) highlighted the “lack of security of tenure” as an impediment to 
meaningful investment in agriculture. Denial of title deeds on the land was a political move 
by the regime. Raftopoulos and Phimister (2003:372) suggest that for the ruling elite, control 
of land in general and commercial farm land in particular, is the central platform of a longer-
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term project to control other sectors of the economy, given the dependence of these sectors on 
agriculture.  
 
Farm infrastructure declined, schools and healthcare facilities on acquired farms were shut 
down. Large amounts of land were left unutilised. The collapse of the agricultural sector had 
a devastating impact on the manufacturing sector which led to the inevitable decline of the 
national economy as a whole (Mlambo 2017:22). As Mugabe was punishing the white 
farmers and the MDC, he did not give any thought to the 200 000 farm workers and their 
dependents (about 10% of the population) who would be displaced as new settlers took over 
(ICG, September 2000:6). Three years into the FTLRP, less than 1% of them had been 
allocated land (Magaramombe 2010:361). About two-thirds of the original farm work-force 
had lost their jobs and homes. Many went from being employed to casual work and piece 
jobs, illegal gold-panning, and illicit beer-brewing. Many others went into petty trading, theft, 
and prostitution. Some migrated to urban areas, communal areas, and informal settlements. 
Some tracked their steps back to the land of their ancestors in the neighbouring countries. But 
the majority remained in the farm villages to survive on the charity and goodwill of the new 
owners, or face destitution. Godfrey Magaramombe (2010:361) emphasises that the 
displacement of farm workers was “socio-economic rather than geographical”, that is, in situ 
displacement. Mugabe celebrated the “success” of reform as consisting in the resettling of 
over 135 000 families, while paying no attention to the displaced 200 000 farm workers and 
their families. 
 
The deliberately engineered chaos of the FTLRP provided great opportunities for the petty 
bourgeoisie and comprador classes to engage in ravenous primitive accumulation. Bond and 
Saunders (2005:48-49) observe that the FTLRP was fraught with high-level state corruption 
because it entailed reallocation of large-scale agricultural assets in a climate of low 
transparency and high partisanship. In such an environment, rampant patronage and multiple 
farm ownership were inevitable. The elite and their clients took advantage of the chaos to 
acquire huge tracts of prime commercial farmland. Media reports revealed that the ruling elite 
was allocating itself the best land. A 2010 investigation uncovered that a small group of about 
2 200 politically connected elite acquired 40% of the land redistributed under the FTLRP, 
totalling about 5 million hectares of the best farming land (Shumba 2018:80). The same 
investigation revealed that Mugabe’s wife, Grace, owned 14 farms; then Vice President Joice 
Mujuru and her husband owned 25 farms. It also found out that all of the party’s 56 politburo 
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members, 98 parliamentarians, 35 senators, and all ten provincial governors were allocated 
farms, with four governors having multiple farms; 16 judges also benefitted (Sims 2011:8). 
Thus the elite were the major beneficiaries of a process which was supposed to have aimed at 
poverty reduction and decongestion of communal areas (Sachikonye 2003:236). A leaked 
government land audit revealed the chaos that accompanied the FTLRP: use of hired thugs by 
sections of the party elite to violently remove resettled peasants; elite struggles over prime 
land; and multiple farm ownership among the ruling elite (Africa Confidential, 21 February 
2003). The scramble for land is another indication of the predatory tendencies of the ruling 
bourgeoisie that aims for instant accumulation with state backing. The so-called Third 
Chimurenga was an elite dominated primitive accumulation drive under the guise of black 
economic empowerment (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009:180). 
 
Lloyd Sachikonye (2003:239) critiques the FTLRP on the ground that the government 
adopted a piecemeal approach to the land issue, adding that the land reform should have been 
integrated into a wider agrarian and development strategy (Sachikonye (2003:239). Clever 
Mumbengegwi (1986:219) critiques government’s narrow emphasis on resettlement, which 
simply involved moving peasants from one place to the other, instead of a comprehensive 
agrarian reform. The emphasis on numbers of the resettled has obscured other vital 
dimensions, such as infrastructure and support to make the reform sustainable (Sachikonye, 
2003:238). Probably a major weakness of the land reform programme was lack of the 
realisation that agrarian reform ought to be tied to a vision of industrial transformation. An 
industrialisation programme was needed to accompany the agrarian reform programme. This 
would have entailed that an increasing percentage of employment and contribution towards 
GDP would come from industry rather than agriculture (Sachikonye 2005:43). Furthermore, 
the mass movement of people from communal areas to white farms was never going to 
reduce congestion in the former. Only with industrial growth momentum would people move 
from rural to urban areas, freeing up land for farmers who wished to expand their operations  
(Sachikonye 2005:43).  
 
One comes to the conclusion that while land reform was necessary, indeed overdue, the 
Mugabe regime was not guided by a coherent economic redistribution policy or a genuine 
desire to redistribute land to the landless masses. The government had twenty years, 
especially after the end of the restrictive LHA, in which to plan and implement an orderly 
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“revolutionary” land reform programme that would result in the decongestion of communal 
areas and contribute significantly to agricultural production in particular, and to the broader 
economy in general. When the party still commanded unassailable support, the land question 
was not a priority. It was the MDC threat that made ZANU PF smell defeat and wake up 
from the slumber of complacency. It was only when the tool box of winning elections was 
empty that the majority party suddenly realised that there was an unresolved land issue. To 
blindly praise the FTLRP as a revolutionary campaign is to ignore the fact that the timing and 
method were dictated, not so much by the need to right the wrongs of the colonial past, but by 
a desperate desire by a beleaguered ruling party to starve off the very serious challenge for 
political survival mounted by the MDC and to punish white farmers, its supposed sponsors 
(Mlambo 2005:3). The FTLRP was purely a political smoke-screen that was seized by a 
desperate and bankrupt regime as a populist survival strategy (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2013:181). A 
genuine grievance of the masses was exploited in order to secure political terrain. An obvious 
historical necessity was made political for electoral purposes, unfortunately becoming an 
avenue of predation by the politico-military elite and its clients, and consequently destroying 
a key pillar of the economy. We argue that the very disruptive and violent manner, including 
the loss of human lives, was not necessary and cannot be justified. If land reform had been 
properly carried out, it would have provided an excellent opportunity for the redress of past 
imbalances and set the country on a developmental trajectory. In the end, the FTLRP was an 
elite dominated primitive accumulation drive under the guise of black economic 
empowerment (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009:180).  
 
7.6.4 The predatory military elite 
 
A discussion of the political economy of post-colonial Zimbabwe cannot be complete without 
underlining the role of the military, in particular, and the security forces, in general. The 
executive-military relations have their roots in the 1970s war when the political elites were 
the commanders of their military wings while the military elites were part of the Joint High 
Command and the War Council, the political-cum-military structures which served as links 
between the military and the political leaderships (Moyo 2014:72). The symbiotic 
relationship between the two groups of elites was such that the military always had a say on 
who the leader of the party (and their Commander-in-Chief) was. In addition to military 
training, the guerrillas also underwent ideological training, which made them operate as 
“military cum mini-politicians” who recruited the masses on behalf of the civilian leadership 
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which for the most part was either in jail or in exile. The post-colonial state thus inherited a 
highly politicised and highly indoctrinated military. The top hierarchy of the security sector 
in the post-independence era has been made up exclusively of senior cadres who fought the 
war alongside the civilian leadership and with whom they shared the same ideological 
orientation. Predictably, the war-time civilian-military relations have had a lasting influence 
on the post-colonial state-military relations, leading to the serious politicisation of the 
security sector and heavy militarisation of politics (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2006).  
 
While the two have always been closely linked, initially the military maintained its 
professionalism, not willing to openly meddle in politics. Military commanders had indeed 
sat on the party’s decision-making structures, but by and large, they had been behind the 
scenes. It was only when ZANU PF’s hegemony was waning, with the popular discontent in 
the late 1990s due to hardships caused by the ESAP, that the security organs of the state - the 
military, police and the intelligence - gradually entered the civilian sphere. But it was the 
arrival of the MDC that turned Zimbabwe into a “neo-praetorian state in which the military 
elite rules along with the political elite as a diarchy” (Gorden Moyo 2014:70). This diarchy is 
a symbiotic relationship of mutual benefits in which the executive depends on the military for 
regime survival and, in return, the political elite accords special treatment to the military. In 
actual fact, this client-patron relationship has, to all intents and purposes, turned Zimbabwe 
into a “neo-patrimonial qua neo-praetorian state” (Gorden Moyo 2014:74). The military 
became privatised and started acting as the de facto military wing of ZANU PF, becoming the 
party’s domestic anchor class and a safeguard against threats to its grip on power (Gorden 
Moyo 2014:69). The securocrats became the central nervous system of the Mugabe regime 
that ensured its survival. Michael Bratton and Eldred V. Masunungure (2011:45) argue that 
the military elite have been behaving more like a private army of a warlord than a 
professional army in a constitutional democracy. ZANU PF’s battle for political survival was 
turned into a military operation with Zimbabwe being turned into an “operational zone” and 
military coercion becoming the currency of politics (Chitiyo and Rupiya 2005:359). The 
securocrats openly showed that they served the interests of Mugabe and his party more than 
those of the state and the people, declaring unbending and unbreakable loyalty to ZANU PF 
and describing themselves as an essential vanguard of the state leading Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
(2006) to call them “nationalists in uniforms.”   
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Meeting the needs of the military elite was of paramount importance in this client-patron 
relationship. The party was aware of the dangers of a dissatisfied military. The Standard (3 
February 2002) reported that there was discontent within the military over remuneration and 
working conditions. Media reports from the late 1990s showed that the military had a salary 
structure different from the rest of the civil service and that the security sector was funded 
from the President’s Office, and so its budget did not appear in the Finance minister’s 
statement for scrutiny. The military elite were receiving massive salary increases when the 
lower ranks and the rest of the civil service were getting lesser hikes or none. They were also 
rumoured to be receiving handsome perks, which included top-of-the-range vehicles, urban 
residential stands and farms. But these alone were not enough to allow the military elite to 
lead a life on a par with the political and business elite. Thus the deployment of the 
Zimbabwe army in the Congo, with all the consequent lucrative contracts, should be viewed 
as a way of appeasing and serving the accumulation needs of the military elite. Through the 
tellingly named Operation Sovereign Legitimacy (OSLEG), a subsidiary of Zimbabwe 
Defence Industries (ZDI), the military elites were involved in mining and timber-logging in 
the forests of the Congo. Zimbabwe Defence Force Commander (ZDF), General Vitalis 
Zvinavashe, and then Speaker of Parliament, Emmerson Mnangagwa, were listed by a UN 
report among 54 top individuals responsible for looting minerals during the conflict in Congo 
(UN 2002). The Congo adventure paid dividends because, from then on, the security sector’s 
loyalty to Mugabe became unbreakable. The securocrats would play a leading role in the 
FTLRP and acquired multiple farms in that chaos. They would also be fingered in the 
violence that befell the opposition and pro-democracy activists. For example, after Mugabe’s 
resignation, Jonathan Moyo alleged that General Chiwenga and his securocrats were behind 
the abduction and disappearance of human rights activist Itai Dzamara in 2015 
(Bulawayo24.com, 30 Jan 2018).  
 
The declaration by the service chiefs that they would not salute anybody else but Mugabe 
ought to be understood against the background of an elite that is being well-taken care off. 
Should the MDC be allowed to come to power, it would certainly disturb it in its 
accumulation project. The predatory civilian-military coalition helped to prevent a possible 
MDC takeover. The ageing dictator was pleased and went out of his way to reward his loyal 
client. From then on, critics observed increased “militarisation” of major organs of the state 
through deployment of top military officers into the political economy of the country, in 
government ministries and departments, parastatals, and commissions (The Zimbabwe 
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Institute, 2008:14). The securocrats were becoming increasingly dominant around Mugabe 
and pervading “virtually every aspect of the state’s purview and oversight, including 
monetary and foreign policy, the media and even organisations in civil society” (Mandaza 
2007:12). Gorden Moyo (2016:352) notes that the “politicisation of the military” went hand-
in-hand with the “militarisation of state institutions.” Bratton (2014:81) observes that in 2008 
there were 44 securocrats serving as cabinet ministers (4), permanent secretaries or directors 
(7), ambassadors (4), parliamentarians (7), and managers or board members of parastatals 
(22). This led to the security sector literally taking over the formulation and implementation 
of economic policy. The Economist Intelligence Unit (June 2007) reported that the day-to-
day running of the country was increasingly carried out by the National Security Council, a 
body of top securocrats and the central bank governor established in 2005 to oversee 
economic and food security matters, rather than the cabinet.  
 
The civilian cabinet, line ministries, parliament and the local authorities were being side-lined 
in key decision-making processes. They were reduced to rubber-stamping policies generated 
in the barracks. Critics labelled the Joint Operations Command (JOC) a “kitchen cabinet” 
because of its key role in policy formulation (Shumba 2018:6). In actual fact, the JOC and the 
National Security Council had become the de facto cabinet (Shumba 2018:51). In a letter to 
Mugabe in 2005, Tsvangirai alleged that “the country has witnessed a de facto coup d’état 
and is now effectively run by a military junta.” Tsvangirai also accused Mugabe of creating 
“a civil-military junta, which acts as an illegal bulwark against democratic political 
opposition in general.” Bratton and Masunungure (2011:v) estimate that the politico-military 
cabal that has been running the state consists of slightly over 200 military and civilian 
leaders. The security sector had become a key element of the predatory state-party-military 
alliance. For Bratton and Masunungure (2011:31), it was clear that the coalition was tilted in 
favour of the securocrats as reflected in the use of military-style “operations” to implement 
government policy decisions - Operation, Murambatsvina, Operation Garikai, Operation 
Chikorokoza Chapera, Operation Mavhoterapapi, Operation Reduce Prices, among many 
others. Every intervention of the state became an “operation”. Indeed the very fact that the 
military was to solve the badly handled succession dispute in ZANU PF through a coup 
d’état, code-named Operation Restore Legacy, that swept Mugabe from power, shows the 
extent to which it had become the dominant power factor in the civilian-military diarchy. The 
faction of the politico-military elite that was led by the ZDF Commander Chiwenga won the 
day. 
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The military became omnipresent in the economic, political, public and social spheres in the 
country. Gorden Moyo (2016) calls this presence of the military in the country’s political 
economy “military commercialism”. He describes this as the involvement of military officers 
in state enterprises and parastatals (SEPs), and as owners, managers, and stakeholders of 
enterprises that generate financial resources or goods directly benefiting the military, the 
ruling party and top securocrats (Moyo 2016:354). The first category of military 
commercialism is the military-industrial complex, as represented by the ZDI, which is 
thought to control and manage a huge non-defence business empire that consists of various 
entities and joint ventures, including OSLEG, Sicebo and Sino Zimbabwe that have interests 
throughout the economy and competing with private capital (Moyo 2016:357). Military 
commercialism is known to involve “secret budgets” which are beyond government control 
and which are used for hidden and extra-legal activities. The revenue generated from these 
secretive military ventures has not been handed over to treasury as the Chiadzwa issue can 
testify.  
 
Military commercialism also involves the deployment of securocrats to SEPs and other 
civilian bodies as directors, managers, and labourers. Senior military officials were deployed 
to SEPs to reward them financially and appease them politically. Knox Chitiyo and Martin 
Rupiya (2005:360) observe what they term “civilianisation” of the army high command. This 
is an aspect of the militarisation of politics in which top military commanders, when retiring 
from active service, are deployed to top positions in civilian institutions, such as SEPs, or are 
put forward as electoral candidates. Securocrats have been deployed in electoral bodies such 
as the Delimitation Commission and Zimbabwe Electoral Commission. They became 
“electoral-smiths,” specialising in manipulating the electoral processes on behalf of their 
patron (Moyo 2014:75). Linked to this has been the increased presence of former high-
ranking securocrats in parliament. Scores of ZANU PF MPs came from the security sector. 
Moyo (2014:76) observes that in 2014, 16 of the 21 members on the Parliamentary portfolio 
committee on Defence, Home Affairs, and Security were war veterans and former 
securocrats.  
 
The majority of the country’s SEPs are either led by, or have top securocrats occupying high 
positions. The deployments were intended not only to ensure control over state apparatuses 
for political leverage, but also to serve as a form of reward to senior serving and retired 
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security sector officers for their loyalty (Shumba 2018:46). Bratton and Masunungure 
(2011:iv) add that even the central bank under Gideon Gono was captured to such an extent 
that it became a “slush fund” for the politico-military elite. SEPs have become the most 
lucrative cows and conveyor belts, operating as fiefdoms for accumulation of personal riches 
by top security personnel. The revenue from the SEPs that are controlled and managed by 
security sector elites goes directly to the individual securocrats at the expense of the starving 
citizens. This is why the MDC often complained during the inclusive government that the 
politico-military oligarchy was frustrating efforts to reform SEPs. They could not allow 
reform of their feeding troughs. That way, the securocrats secured political power and 
financial autonomy independent of civilian government resources. Far from living up to the 
initial expectation of cushioning the poor by keeping prices low, SEPs were running massive 
loses, which in June 2017 were in excess of US$340 million or 2.1% of GDP (Newsday 24 
June 2017). SEPs were run with very little, if any, oversight from relevant government 
departments. They became an avenue for looting and plunder by the ruling predatory politico-
military diarchy. The majority of them were stripped of their assets and run down so severely 
that they needed huge bailouts from central government to keep their doors open.  
 
In light of the post-2000 skills flight due to a collapsing economy, military personnel were 
deployed to identified SEPs and ministries to provide labour. The dissatisfaction of the rank-
and-file soldiers was very high and the possibility of mutiny even higher. They would 
continue to receive their military salaries and also receive a second salary from the civilian 
job. In 2005, GMB reportedly absorbed 4 000 soldiers as part of Operation Maguta, while the 
NRZ had more than 2 000 of them (Moyo 2016:361). Thousands of ghost workers have been 
identified in payroll and skills audits of SEPs and municipalities during the 2000s. Critics 
alleged that these are members of the security cluster who had been seconded to the civil 
service for additional income.  
 
7.6.5 Degrees in violence  
 
With the FTLRP, began the era of unrestrained state-sanctioned violence. Against the 
backdrop of a beleaguered state, low transparency and the pervasive influence of securocrats, 
the post-2000 period saw the institutionalisation of elite-organised violence at the centre of 
Zimbabwe’s political economy, which would prove decisive in sustaining the politico-
military ruling coalition (Saunders 2011:128). ZANU PF responded to the MDC threat with 
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ruthless violence aimed at crushing the movement ahead of elections. Murder, torture, rape, 
kidnapping, disappearances and property destruction became a defining feature of the 
Zimbabwean political landscape. Violence became the state's favoured way of dealing with 
its citizens. From rural areas, the violence spilled onto the broader political terrain. It would 
soon be legalised and legitimated by a host of repressive legislation targeting, among others, 
freedoms of expression and association, electoral participation and citizenship. The most 
heinous human rights violations and contempt for the masses shown by the power elite 
unseen since Gukurahundi were all ideologically justified in Mugabe’s form of African 
nationalism. ZANU PF used extreme brutality as a strategy to deal with its opponents all in 
defence of the gains of the war of liberation. The anti-colonial rhetoric was used to justify 
colonial-style repression. The “other” was no longer viewed as a human being but as a 
member of some abstract “enemy” category. Brutality was thus accepted, even celebrated. 
The nationalism that was supposed to restore the humanity and dignity of African people 
degenerated into a dehumanising ideology that degraded Africans with the same kind of 
depersonalising stereotypes used by their colonial masters (van Vuuren 2005:23).   
 
At the centre of this violence were the recently rewarded war veterans and the Border Gezi 
youth militia taking instructions from high-ranking military officials posted in districts 
throughout the country. Several thousands of unemployed youth were recruited under the 
pretext that they were to be trained in patriotism and in the history of the liberation struggle. 
Media reports revealed, however, that they were trained in tactics of torture and violence 
(Makumbe 2006:26). Together with the war veterans, the notorious youth militia became the 
foot soldiers of the party, fishing out “enemies of the people” for torture and political “re-
education”. They set up bases in both rural and urban areas for a campaign of terror and 
violence. Large parts of the country, especially traditional ZANU PF strongholds, were 
declared no-go areas for the opposition and civil society organisations. A ZANU PF party 
card became the difference between life and death. Party youth militia and war veterans set 
up roadblocks on highways demanding party cards from passengers. Those found without or 
with expired cards were not allowed to proceed with their journey, or were tortured. 
Newspapers alleged to be aligned to the opposition, such as The Daily News, were banned in 
the Mashonaland provinces and one would be tortured if found in possession of a “wrong” 
newspaper. Newspaper vendors attempting to sell them in these areas were attacked. The 
occupied farms were turned into bases where opposition sympathisers, among them former 
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farm workers, teachers and nurses, among the rural middle class were tortured and 
intimidated. The war veterans and the youth militia also held all-night rallies (pungwes) in 
various communities where massive political “re-education exercises” on the syllabus of 
“sovereignty and national pride” were carried out (Kamete 2002:36).  
 
Opposition candidates and supporters were subjected to all forms of harassment and 
intimidation. Very often, the police did not investigate reported cases especially if they were 
against MDC supporters. On the contrary, they were heavy-handed in dealing with complains 
against the MDC supporters. The partisan police force often refused the MDC permission to 
hold campaign rallies or public meetings or broke them up. Opposition officials and 
supporters were frequently detained on spurious charges. Tsvangirai and two of his top 
officials were charged with treason just months before the 2002 presidential election for 
“attempting to remove Mugabe from power unconstitutionally”. Because the police could not 
assist them, many MDC supporters were forced to flee their homes to seek refuge in urban 
areas. The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN 2000:8) reported that high levels of 
violence, intolerance and intimidation marked the period leading to the 2000 parliamentary 
elections, claiming that pre-poll political violence claimed 31 lives and caused over 500 
serious injuries. More than 6 000 people were displaced from their rural homes (Makumbe 
2003:36). Amani Trust documented 27 633 victims of human rights violations and 20 853 
victims displaced by violence between January and October 2001 (Bond and Manyanya 
2003:179). Schools were closed in some rural areas and learners spent months without going 
to school because teachers had fled for safety. Makumbe (2006:58) observed that in 
Masvingo Province thirty-five schools were closed in 2002. Sachikonye (2003:237) observed 
that around 100 000 primary school children lost their education on closure of the schools in 
the same year. Between 2000 and 2003, human rights organisations recorded over half a 
million cases of gross human rights violations including murder, abduction, arson, rape and 
torture. Makumbe (2003:38) observed the displacement of more than 70 000 people before, 
during and after the 2002 elections. Dansereau (2005:18) estimates that 100 people, mostly 
MDC supporters, were killed between the 2000 and 2002 elections.  
  
The war veterans intensified their war mantra, often threatening to go back to the bush and 
wage a war should the MDC win. Human rights organisations reported that the army was 
beating up people in towns and cities especially patrons in beer halls and night clubs for 
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having “voted wrongly”. Just weeks before the 2002 presidential elections, ZDF Commander, 
General Zvinavashe, flanked by the chiefs of staff (army, police, intelligence, air force and 
prison service) warned that they would not salute a presidential candidate without liberation 
war credentials. This was viewed as a threat directed at Tsvangirai, who because he did not 
participate in the 1970s war, was unacceptable to them if elected. The experience of torture 
and pain of the liberation struggle was for the executive-military alliance an insurance policy 
against present and future power swings. It became the “rite of passage” without which one 
would not land the position of President.  
 
The worst form of violence was to be seen after Mugabe lost the March 2008 election to 
Tsvangirai. The rumour mill in Harare had it that Mugabe was prepared to accept defeat and 
step down, but the JOC, headed by Minister Mnangagwa, and composed of the top 
securocrats, urged him to hang on (Southall Unpublished 23). The JOC, in partnership with 
the youth militia and war veterans, then took over ZANU PF’s campaign for the run-off 
perfecting the terror of the previous campaigns through Operation Mavhoterapapi? (Who did 
you vote for?) and embarking on a systematic programme of retributive violence in response 
to the defeat. They inflicted upon the electorate the worst violence seen since the 
Gukurahundi genocide. The sheer scale of the terror and brutality put Mugabe firmly in a 
league with some of the world’s worst tyrannies (Partnership Africa Canada [PAC] March 
2009:2). At least 200 people were murdered, thousands tortured and around 200 000 
displaced (PAC March 2009:23). The worst atrocities happened in the former ZANU PF 
strongholds of Mashonaland which had apparently defected to Tsvangirai in the March 
elections. Urban areas were not spared, with Harare getting its fair share of horrible atrocities. 
Doctors in Harare reported that in the six weeks between 1 April and 16 May, they had 
treated 1 600 victims of torture (Solidarity Peace Trust [SPT] 2008:7). The Zimbabwe 
Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR) noted that the commonest perpetrators 
of the violence by far were the uniformed forces, adding that, “the current violence is 
dramatically more intensive and unrestrained” and “the level of brutality and callousness 
exhibited by the perpetrators is unprecedented” (ZADHR 23 April 2008). In the same 
statement, they observed that a Harare hospital had over the previous week treated an average 
of 23 victims of torture per day. Just days before the run-off, Tsvangirai pulled out citing 
massive violence.  
 
 
 
  250 
Election observers have criticised the conduct of every election since 2000 on grounds of 
extreme violence. For example, ZESN (2000:9) concluded that because of the situation 
before, during and after the 2000 elections, it was not possible to declare the elections free 
and fair. The elections were also castigated by the Western observer missions, which 
included the EU and the Commonwealth. Archbishop Desmond Tutu condemned the human 
rights violations and electoral abuses of the 2002 elections adding, “If we had a similar 
situation in 1994, we would have declared the election invalid” (Die Burger, 17 December 
2003). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Parliamentary Forum 
Observer Mission (PFOM 2002:5) concluded in its report: “The climate of insecurity 
obtaining in Zimbabwe since the 2000 parliamentary elections was such that the electoral 
process could not be said to adequately comply with the Norms and Standards for Elections 
in the SADC region. What is most significant is that the PFOM did not just witness violence, 
but that “its mission members were themselves targets of an orchestrated attack 10 kilometres 
out of Chinhoyi on 24 February” (PFOM 2002:3). Mugabe’s victory in the 2008 election was 
rejected by the opposition and the international community, including the usually compliant 
AU and SADC. 
 
The election results were rejected, not just because of the brutality of the regime but also 
because they were conducted in a manner that was methodically designed to ensure a ZANU 
PF victory. The politics of incumbency ensured that the ruling party manipulated elections in 
its favour. There was massive abuse of electoral processes by the state, including vote rigging 
on a huge scale. ZANU PF was in charge of the voters’ role which critics allege was out-
dated. Civil society groups and the opposition alleged that as many as a quarter of the names 
on the voter’s roll were either fictitious, duplicated or those of dead people. The Delimitation 
Commission was accused of gerrymandering in drawing up of some urban constituencies and 
of not utilising accurate demographic figures in determining constituency boundaries 
(Makumbe 2006:52). The distribution of polling stations across the constituencies was tilted 
in favour of rural areas, ZANU PF strongholds, to the disadvantage of the urban electorate. 
The state-controlled ZBC, which had a monopoly of the airwaves, severely restricted the 
appearances of MDC candidates on both radio and television and the little access the 
opposition received was largely negative. In contrast, ZANU PF candidates were given hours 
of air time each time they held campaign rallies. Added to this were the draconian pieces of 
legislation, such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) and the Jonathan Moyo-
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sponsored Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) that restricted free 
speech and regular political activities ahead of crucial elections. Given the way ZANU PF 
has manipulated the elections, most independent observers are convinced that the MDC likely 
won all the national elections since 2000 (Saunders 2011:127). 
 
The state-sponsored violence was not limited to election time. As noted already, the 
securocrats had virtually taken charge of the country and any government intervention was to 
be done by the military, and so became a military operation. One such operation was 
Murambatsvina (clear the rubbish). ZANU PF never forgave the residents of major cities, 
particularly Harare, for their ingratitude and for humiliating the party by voting for the MDC 
in the previous elections. They came to be dismissed as “totemless” and as “filth” that needed 
a clean-up operation. On 19 May 2005, with little or no warning, the government embarked 
on an operation of evictions and demolitions to “restore order and sanity” throughout the 
country’s cities carried out by the police and the army. The operation began with the 
destruction of flea markets and informal trading shops in Harare. It moved to the high-density 
suburbs and informal settlements before spreading to other cities and major towns around the 
country. Zimbabweans called it “Operation Tsunami” because of its sheer speed and ferocity. 
Human Rights Watch [HRW] (September 2005) reported that over fifty towns and 
neighbourhoods were affected by the evictions and demolitions. In a scathing report after the 
fact-finding mission, UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements, Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, 
said 700 000 people in urban areas across the country lost their homes, their source of 
livelihood or both (Tibaijuka 2005:7). She reported that the operation was carried out in “an 
indiscriminate and unjustified manner, with indifference to human suffering, and with 
disregard to several provisions of national and international legal frameworks” (Tibaijuka 
2005:25). She noted that it was a horrendous undertaking based on colonial-era laws and 
policies that were used to segregate and exclude blacks. She witnessed police demolishing 
houses in one township and witnessed women and children sleeping in the open in the cold 
July winter. The operation was unprecedented in the region in terms of the sheer numbers of 
people affected and the extent of economic resources destroyed, and represented a “peak of 
military authoritarianism” (Southall Unpublished 22). The opposition and civil society 
immediately dismissed the operation as a smokescreen for motives that had little to do with 
addressing the problem of informal structures and restoring order within urban areas. For 
them it was punishment for having voted wrongly. Southall (Unpublished 22) argues that its 
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motivations undoubtedly included a desire to smash urban protest and support for the MDC. 
Bill H. Kinsey (2010:339) argues that Murambatsvina shared with the FTLRP the goals of 
intimidation, punishment, displacement and disenfranchisement. Having lost their jobs due to 
company closures, they now found themselves homeless as the bulldozers razed their homes 
to the ground. A great number hopped from place to place until they were invited to 
Chiadzwa, near the eastern border city of Mutare, expecting to finally settle down, dig the 
precious stones from the ground and start their lives afresh. But as fate would have it, the 
worst was yet to come. 
 
7.6.6 Blood diamonds and the predatory politico-military elite 
 
With the so-called Third Chimurenga, Zimbabwe entered “a zone of indistinction” - a space 
“where the frontiers between the rule of law and chaos disappear, decisions about life and 
death become entirely arbitrary, and everything becomes possible (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2009:1149). With this descent into chaos, the nation plunged into a full-blown kleptocratic 
predatory dictatorship. It became a de facto mafia-style lawless kleptocracy. With virtually no 
oversight from anybody, predation and primitive accumulation by the parasitic elite vultures 
spiralled out of control and reached unprecedented levels. Shumba (2018:169) observes that 
this period marks a major turning point of accumulation into outright predation. The state had 
been captured by a corrupt, self-seeking authoritarian politico-military elite with a gregarious 
impulse for accumulation. According to Saunders (2011:129), elite accumulation in the 2000s 
went off-grid: out of reach of transparent regulation by government; primarily benefiting a 
small rapacious cabal and frequently, overlapping with parallel markets and criminal 
networks. He observes that while earlier forms of accumulation were relatively openly 
structured and driven by state-based policy making, from the 2000s, it was often hidden 
behind a veil of secrecy and operating on the edges of the state (Saunders 2011:129). 
Whereas earlier the state had been employed to promote accumulation, from 2000 onwards, 
the state appeared to nurture the consolidation of criminality under the direction of politico-
military interests (Saunders 2011:131). This accumulation was not at all directed towards 
increased production, or towards contributing to industrialisation and the consequent 
economic growth and employment creation. The opaque climate of the period provided the 
politico-military elite with lucrative opportunities to steal and plunder national resources 
virtually unhindered. Chiadzwa was one such example.   
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In the midst of a worsening economic crisis, the ancestors seemed to have smiled on the land 
when one of the largest diamond discoveries of recent times was made at Chiadzwa, near the 
eastern border city of Mutare in 2006. Within a few years, Zimbabwe was the world’s fourth 
largest producer of the gems by volume, exceeded only by Russia, DRC, and Botswana, 
offering the long-suffering economy a rare chance of revitalisation (Global Witness 
September 2017:13). When news of the discovery spread throughout the country, 
impoverished Zimbabweans desperate to eke a living, flocked to Chiadzwa in their tens of 
thousands, and by December an estimated 35 000 people from all over the country had 
descended on the area (Global Witness September 2017:10). From the moment of the 
discovery of diamonds, Chiadzwa became a terrain of contestation. Various class interests - 
from the various arms of the state to mining capital, and from informal traders to artisanal 
miners - converged aiming to exploit the precious germs (Nyamunda and Mukwambo 
2012:148). Political, security and business elites took advantage of the unregulated free-for-
all situation to establish illicit smuggling networks in an “underground economy” to trade in 
diamonds. Aware of the windfall that would come from Chiadzwa, security forces were 
brought to the area to kick out artisanal miners on the ground that diamonds were a national 
resource that should be exploited by formal mining operations (Nyamunda and Mukwambo 
2012 148). 
 
Chiadzwa became heavily militarised. The whole region was declared a no-go area to 
outsiders. From November 2006, the government launched a series of military-style 
operations (Operation Chikorokoza chapera, Operation Hakudzokwi) to rid the area of illegal 
miners. These were brutal crackdown operations led by the security forces in which grave 
human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, beatings, torture, rape, forced labour, 
and child labour were committed (HRW 2009:28). Eye-witnesses narrated how Chiadzwa 
resembled “a war zone in which soldiers killed people like flies” (HRW 2009:31). The dead 
bodies were buried in mass graves because they could not be positively identified (HRW 
2009:28). Hospitals reported turning away military trucks full of bodies because there was no 
space for them in the mortuaries. Medical staff at one hospital said soldiers had brought in 
107 bodies from Marange between 1 and 12 November (HRW 2009:32). Women living on 
the diamond fields narrated how they were sexually abused by the security forces. Other 
female miners said officers would gamble over women and the winner would rape his “prize” 
(HRW 2009:27). HRW also reported widespread torture and beatings of miners and diamond 
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dealers at the hands of soldiers. By January 2009, the diamond fields resembled a military 
base.  
 
In March 2009, the Kimberley Process [KP] Chairperson (Bernhard Esau 2009) issued a 
statement expressing “growing concerns” at the violence and urged authorities to bring it to 
an end. In June, the KP Review Mission saw first-hand military involvement in mining, and 
suggested a six month withdrawal of Zimbabwe from the KP. Tinashe Nyamunda and 
Patience Mukwambo (2012:164) observe that the militarisation of Chiadzwa coincided with 
the establishment of the Government of National Unity (GNU), and they suggest that it is 
most likely that ZANU PF wanted to establish effective control of the sector beforehand, in 
order to forestall any MDC interference. The MDC as partner in government was helpless to 
bring an end to the abuses, as was the KP.  
 
Rich in the alluvial germ as the area was, only a tiny fraction of the proceeds made its way 
into treasury. Gono repeatedly said that huge volumes of revenue were being lost to 
smugglers. In February 2007 he said the country was losing between US$40 million and 
US$50 million per week through the smuggling of precious minerals and in October of the 
following year, he alleged that more than 500 illegal diamond syndicates were operating in 
Manicaland (PAC March 2009:6). Successive budget statements also showed relatively little 
income from Chiadzwa. Experts estimated that the country could have realised as much as 
US$1.2 billion per month from diamond sales, enough to alleviate the country’s serious 
economic challenges (PAC March 2009:6). In March 2016, Mugabe announced that only 
US$2 billion of an anticipated US$15 billion was received from Chiadzwa claiming that 
private companies robbed the country (PAC March 2009:11). Global Witness (September 
2017:16) observed a culture of secrecy and a lack of transparency at all levels in the diamond 
mining sector and argued that it is this secrecy that was critical to sustaining corruption, 
looting and the disappearance of billions of dollars from Chiadzwa. 
  
According to Global Witness (September 2017:7), the tale of Zimbabwe’s disappearing 
diamond wealth is not a story of a fragile developing economy looted by greedy venture 
capitalists and unscrupulous multinationals but is the story of “an inside job”. The mining of 
the diamonds was under the control of the country’s security forces and political elites. 
Research into the three companies digging diamonds at Chiadzwa, namely, Kusena 
Diamonds, Anjin, and Jinan, revealed their links with the dreaded and highly partisan CIO 
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and the military (Global Witness September 2017:20). In an investigation, Global Witness 
discovered that Kusena, thought to be owned by the state, was actually set up by the CIO to 
secure a secret off-the books source of financing (Global Witness September 2017:7) of the 
organisation and its top brass. 40% of Anjin is owned by the ZDI. Several of Anjin’s 
directors are drawn from the military and police. Jinan was effectively run as an extension of 
Anjin. Investigations indicated that the two shared both equipment and staff when operating 
in neighbouring concessions (Global Witness September 2017:33). For all intents and 
purposes, the two appear to have been structured differently but operated as one company. 
Global Witness concluded that the extremely close relationship between the two companies 
suggests a clear risk of Jinan’s assets benefiting also Anjin, and so the ZDI (Global Witness 
September 2017:33). 
 
Through these links, the CIO and military secured themselves a lucrative source of off-budget 
financing from diamonds which gave the highly partisan and oppressive institutions the 
independence that allowed them to operate beyond the oversight of Parliament. Capturing the 
precious germs gave the securocrats a dangerous economic incentive to preserve the Mugabe 
regime in power. The Council of EU Foreign Ministers expressed concern over the growing 
trade in illicit diamonds that provide financial support to the Mugabe regime (PAC March 
2009:9). The Chiadzwa diamonds, concluded PAC (March 2009:2),  
 
are no longer clean because they bear the blood of Zimbabweans, shot down by their 
own government and they are produced from mines that benefit political and military 
gangsters, and are smuggled out of the country by the bucketload.  
 
The diamond discovery of this magnitude could have provided a huge boost to the country’s 
ailing economy but they only benefitted a phalanx of the security, political and economic 
elites. WikiLeaks leaked a US Diplomatic cable which reports how high-ranking government 
officials and their clients were lining their pockets through selling undocumented diamonds 
to foreign buyers who smuggle them out of the country (Global Witness September 2017:36).  
Chiadzwa is a good example of the convergence of political, security and business interests in 
opaque and powerful networks and related to this is the entrenchment of narrowed elitist 
securitised power in the state and economy (Saunders 2011:129). It is an example of the 
depth and extent of political-security-criminal linkages as well as the efficiency with which 
state power and illegal violence have been used in ever growing intensity to achieve the 
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coalition’s objectives. The once promising diamond find failed to benefit the masses. Instead 
of the precious germs being a blessing to the Zimbabwean masses, they became a resource 
curse.  
7.6.7 Our turn to eat 
 
The politico-military diarchy is reported to have facilitated massive economic extraction in 
the chaotic environment during and after 2000. Typical of this petit bourgeoisie, most of the 
proceeds were spent on building mansions comparable to villas in western holiday resorts. 
Former Reserve Bank Governor and Mugabe confidante, Gono, owns a house in a leafy 
suburb of Harare sitting on 4 654 square metres with 47 en suite bedrooms, a swimming pool, 
a gym, a mini-theatre, and landscaped gardens (PAC March 2009:6). He also received 
multiple farms during the FTLRP. In 2013, he gave President Mugabe 89 herd of cattle, one 
for each of his years, as a birthday present and promised to make them ninety the following 
year (Nehanda Radio, 8 December 2013). Towards the end of that year, Gono gave his 
daughter a mansion in the posh Borrowdale Brooke suburb as a wedding gift (Nehanda 
Radio, 8 December 2013) In 2017, he bought a majority shareholding in one of the country’s 
elite private schools (Financial Gazette, 10 August 2017). In its list of the 50 richest 
Zimbabweans in 2015, a local research firm put Gono at number 32 (Nehanda Radio, 24 May 
2015). Mugabe’s last local government minister, Saviour Kasukuwere, whose interests in 
energy and banking were not doing very well, allegedly built a 50 bedroom house which was 
guarded by the army. Obert Mpofu, who presided over the looting of Chiadzwa diamonds as 
mines minister, bought the struggling Zimbabwe Allied Banking Group, an acquisition that 
raised a lot of public interest. He became the face of opulence in Zimbabwe, with some 
calling him the “minister with a diamond touch.” He has been on a buying spree, purchasing 
properties in Bulawayo, Victoria Falls, and Harare, including one of the tallest buildings in 
Bulawayo. Mpofu built a lavish house in his rural home where his neighbours live in mud 
and stick huts.   
 
Mugabe’s co-Vice-President, Phelekezela Mphoko, gained notoriety for staying in the elite 
Rainbow Towers Hotel for two years, refusing to move into the three houses offered to him 
by government, arguing that they were not befitting for someone of the Vice-President's 
stature. His hotel bill cost the tax payer about half a million dollars. He was rumoured to have 
built his own villa in Bulawayo after he finally left the hotel. Emmerson Mnangagwa was 
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also rumoured to have become extremely wealthy from the Congo diamonds. In fact, at one 
time, he was alleged to be the richest Zimbabwean. It is with former local government 
minister, Ignatius Chombo, that one gets insight into how ZANU PF corruption and plunder 
have enriched the political elite. In an acrimonious property-sharing row with his former 
wife, it was revealed that he owned no less than a hundred houses, as well as residential 
stands, in addition to about fifteen luxury vehicles, dozens of tractors and trucks, as well as 
farm equipment (Nehanda Radio, 5 November 2010). 
 
Mugabe was widely believed to have diverted state jobs and contracts to his nephews and 
nieces and to a network of extended families belonging to his Gushungo clan (The 
Zimbabwean, 19 July 2007). Most well-known are his sister, Sabina, and her children. 
Sabina’s eldest son, Innocent Mugabe, was director of the CIO. The most prominent of her 
sons, Leo, was one time Member of Parliament, then Chairperson of the Zimbabwe Football 
Association (ZIFA) and owner of Integrated Engineering Group, a company that benefitted 
immensely from state contracts. Sabina’s third son, Patrick Zhuwawo was appointed Deputy 
Minister and then elevated to minister by his uncle, President Mugabe. Chiyangwa, a distant 
relative of Mugabe, became rich allegedly because of this relationship. According to 
Yamamoto (2008), since the late 1990s, Mugabe was a godfather of criminal bands of a 
political mafia elite that extensively fuelled network-type corruption. This, he argues, is 
because no senior party or government official implicated in corruption scandals has ever 
been prosecuted and even those that he has demoted after scandals bounce back after a few 
years, even occupying higher positions. Mugabe leased the allegiance of his cabal by 
allowing it to plunder and loot national resources.  
 
Accumulation was not limited to wealth but also included acquisitions that give social status. 
High-ranking ZANU PF officials and military elites jostled to acquire degrees including 
doctorates in various disciplines. In Zimbabwe, being educated adds to one’s social status. 
First Lady Grace Mugabe, Deputy President Mujuru, General Chiwenga and Obert Mpofu, 
acquired doctorates. Others also graduated with various Master and Bachelor’s degrees. The 
one acquisition that raised eyebrows the most was the doctorate awarded to Grace Mugabe 
reportedly within two months of registration for the programme. Media reports indicated that 
she might not have had a university degree at all because she had been deregistered at the 
University of London due where she was doing a bachelor’s degree in English, for bad 
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performance in the 1990s (The Zimbabwean, 14 July 2014). Critics saw this as part of the 
primitive accumulation drive where because of her status she could get whatever she so 
wished. They also argue that acquiring a doctorate was a way to position her firmly on her 
way to succeed her husband as President. After Mugabe was swept from power, the Vice 
Chancellor of the University that awarded her the qualification was arrested for abuse of 
office (The Herald, 17 February 2018). 
 
7.6.8 Looking East 
 
In response to the chaotic FTLRP and ZANU PF crackdown on the opposition, the US and 
her allies imposed "smart" sanctions on Mugabe and his ruling politico-military elite, 
including travel bans and a freezing of their assets in those countries. The sanctions were later 
extended to some parastatals and companies owned by the military. Zimbabwe was also 
suspended from the Commonwealth after the 2002 elections. In 2002, the IMF stopped 
lending to Zimbabwe because of its failure to service the massive debt that it already owed. 
The tiny southern African country became an international pariah. Investors ran away with 
their money. The prevailing lawlessness was reported widely in the international media, and 
tourists stopped visiting the country, depriving treasury of the much-needed foreign 
exchange. Business confidence nose-dived to an all-time low.  
 
Feeling the heat, Mugabe intensified his anti-Western rhetoric, skilfully placing the 
Zimbabwean crisis at the centre of a larger anti-imperialist and Pan-African pedestal. He gave 
it the complexion of Africa versus the West conflict. The ZANU PF propaganda machinery 
portrayed him as an innocent victim of Western hegemonic imperialism that is intolerant to 
any leader from the developing world who does not toe the line, a language that had 
resonance on the continent and the post-colonial developing world. He used whatever 
platform afforded him to preach his anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist gospel and to cry 
victim. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:244), Mugabe portrayed himself as a tormented 
self-righteous messiah, whose life was an instance of a mythopoetic narrative of suffering and 
fighting for the people. He presented himself as a Suffering Servant (Isaiah 53) who is 
offering himself to pay for the sins of the developing world. Permeating his many speeches is 
“a cult of victimisation” and repetition of the story of the “native condition” (Achile 
Mbembe, cited in Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:267). Increasingly, he was reading global history as 
a series of conspiracies aimed at re-colonising his country and removing him from power 
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(Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:268). His world had increasingly become reduced to the dualism of 
the West as the oppressor and Africa as the victim. Unsurprisingly, many African leaders 
bought Mugabe’s narrative that there is a vindictive white racist conspiracy to recolonise 
Zimbabwe and turn it into Rhodesia again. According to the Helen Suzman Foundation (HSF 
2013), God-fathers of ruling liberation movements on the continent believe they are locked in 
an endless battle against Western imperialism. Supporting ZANU PF was no longer just a 
matter of solidarity but of fundamental self-interest because Mugabe's struggle to retain 
power became a struggle for their own survival too (HSF 2013). They agreed with him that 
the suffering of the Zimbabweans was caused by sanctions imposed by the Western 
imperialist countries as punishment for standing up to them by addressing an obvious 
historical injustice and applauded his revolutionary consistence and a commitment to fighting 
neo-colonialism. Thus, instead of breaking his hold on power, the sanctions actually boosted 
his profile on the continent, as African leaders chose to ignore his racism, the brutality of his 
regime and his desperation to cling to power, and sought to portray him as an anti-imperialist 
champion.  
 
With the Western world arrayed against him, Mugabe developed what he termed the “Look-
East” policy. He courted Asian countries, such as Malaysia, Singapore, and most importantly, 
China. He reasoned that these countries trade on “equal terms” with African countries, and 
their loan and aid guarantees come with no conditionalities regarding political or economic 
reforms (Youde 2007:11). Zimbabwe entered into numerous bi-lateral agreements with China 
which took advantage of this relationship to gain a foothold in the country. The Look East 
policy should be understood within the context of Mugabe’s anti-Western, anti-imperialist 
narrative. Jeremy Youde (2007:14) argues that the policy represents an attempt by Mugabe to 
trade on his image as a freedom fighter, the political and economic liberator of his country. 
By looking East, Mugabe was trying to prove to the West that it could not push him around. 
He was telling the world that Asia was now the land of opportunity and telling the West that 
its time of dominance was over (Youde 2007:13). In spite of the rhetoric, the Look East 
policy did not succeed in arresting the economic decay. If anything, there was growing 
concern that the flood of cheap Chinese goods into the country was threatening the very few 
remaining jobs and industries, and that Chinese goods that flood stores and roadside stalls 
were of poor quality.  
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Thus, while the government was making citizens believe that Zimbabwe could do without the 
West since it had found new friends from the East, citizens were not convinced. They 
believed that by emphasising sanctions, ZANU PF was taking away its responsibility for the 
crisis. If anything, sanctions cannot adequately account for the crisis of an economy that can 
no longer export because its agricultural sector has all but collapsed while its mining sector 
has been severely plundered by a parasitic elite. However, we doubt if it was out of concern 
for human rights and democracy in Zimbabwe that Western powers punished Mugabe with 
sanctions. Their position towards other countries, especially from the developing world is 
determined by whether or not a country accepts the dictates of imperialism and creates a 
conducive environment for their corporations to exploit its resources (Martorell 2002). In the 
immediate post-independence period, Mugabe was a darling of the West because he had 
reconciled with whites and created conditions for capitalism to flourish. He committed grave 
human rights violations during Gukurahundi that make Operation Mavhoterapapi look like a 
church circus. The West kept supporting him because he was preserving its interests. It is 
when he started to step out of the script written in Washington and London by threatening the 
interests of white farmers - their kith and kin - that he became rogue (Martorell 2002) and 
they had to punish him. Meanwhile, the economy was imploding. 
 
7.6.9 Hyperinflation 
 
Economic indicators showed an economy in serious trouble. The cumulative decline of real 
GDP growth was 50% between 2000 and 2008 while real per capita income fell from US$644 
in 1990 to US$338 in 2008 (Mlambo, 2017:10). The three pillars which had buttressed the 
country’s economy - agriculture, mining and manufacturing - suffered greatly, resulting in the 
near collapse of each of them. Agricultural output plummeted. Mining contracted by a 
cumulative of 81% during 1999-2008, while the manufacturing sector experienced a 
cumulative decline of 92% during the same period (AfDB 2011:5). Manufacturing’s share of 
GDP was half of its early 1990s value. Official foreign exchange inflows declined from 
US$18.5 million in September 2002 to US$ 500 000 in December of the same year 
(Raftopoulos and Phimister 2003:373). In 2002 external debt stood at US$6.6 billion while 
domestic debt was said to be about Z$791 quadrillion by mid-2008 (p. 373). AfDB (2011:5) 
notes that more than two thirds of the foreign debt was arrears to the country’s creditors. 
Foreign direct investment declined from US$440 million in 1997 to a mere $50 million in 
2006. (Raftopoulos and Phimister 2003:373). Zimbabwe acquired the dubious distinction of 
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being the world’s fastest-shrinking economy outside of a war zone, contracting by as much as 
60% in 2000-2006 (Saunders 2011:127). Former United States Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs, Susan Rice, listed Zimbabwe among failing or failed states such as 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Afghanistan (Pierson 2004:168).  
 
The country was bankrupt, and by mid-2005 re-payment arrears amounted to US$295 million 
to the IMF and more than US$1 billion to other lenders (Southall Unpublished 22). The 
government resorted to printing money to finance public expenditure and quasi-fiscal 
spending, resulting in inflation climbing from around 55% in 2000 to about 1 300% in 2006, 
until hyperinflation took over, reaching an official 230%  by the end of 2008 (Southall 
Unpublished 21), making it the first hyperinflation of the 21st century. Official figures 
certainly understated the situation. The African Development Bank [AfDB] (2011:3) 
estimates that it stood at 500 000 000 000% (500 billion percent) at the end of 2008, making 
it the second highest inflation in world history after post-World War I Hungary. Prices of 
basic foodstuffs were adjusted several times a day. The currency was redenominated three 
times by removing zeroes because computers could no longer handle them. In 2009, the 
Reserve Bank issued the Z$100 000 000 000 000 (Z$100 trillion) note - the note with the 
highest number of zeroes of any legal tender in recorded history. After Mugabe’s fall, Gono 
told a weekly newspaper that he resorted to printing money because the government was 
desperate to prevent a coup by hungry soldiers (The Standard, 29 April 2018). Gono also 
raided foreign currency accounts of individuals, corporates and NGOs. Mutumwa Mawere 
likened him to a “gangster” acting with the support of the state machinery (Shumba 
2018:137). Inevitably, hyperinflation spurred a huge and active foreign currency black 
market, bringing huge profits to those who accessed it at very low rates. By late 2008, the 
local currency had been abandoned by the citizens and in February 2009, authorities followed 
suit and established a multicurrency system. 
 
As the freefall of the economy, continued unabated, the central bank chief was acting as a de 
facto Prime Minister, embarking on a number of quasi-fiscal interventions, such as the Basic 
Commodities Supply Side Intervention (BACOSSI) and the Farm Mechanisation Programme 
of 2007. These were to all intents and purposes mechanisms of dispensing patronage to prop 
up political support. Instead of benefitting the masses, the Farm Mechanisation Programme 
ended up benefitting those in ZANU PF patronage networks. As opposition leader, Arthur 
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Mutambara remarked, the Farm Mechanisation Programme was “nothing but a shameless 
abuse of taxpayers’ money in pursuit of cheap propaganda, while satisfying a few cronies to 
the detriment of the generality of the people” (The Zimbabwean, 13 June 2007). Another 
patronage-driven move was giving the GMB the sole right to import and distribute maize 
supplies. This enabled party and government elites to use maize as a tool for dispensing 
patronage in a country where the majority of the peasants were starving. Reports from rural 
areas revealed that ZANU PF supporters were prioritised while MDC supporters were denied 
food aid. Food aid should be viewed in light of the control it gives the governing party over 
the rural electorate.  
 
Most companies had shut down. Unemployment skyrocketed. A gradual reorientation of the 
economy was happening which resulted in a new economy which Jeremy L. Jones (2010) 
calls “kukiya-kiya economy”, an economy of “getting by”, an instinctive response to 
circumstances. The economic hardship stimulated adaptation and inventive strategies for 
survival. In a kukiya-kiya economy, securing a living is a combat with circumstances, and 
survival is a matter of tenacity and outright force. Kukiya-kiya suggests cleverness, dodging, 
and the exploitation of whatever resources are at hand, all with an eye to self-sustenance 
(Jones 2010:286). It is an economy that entails a progressive invasion into the mainstream 
economy of economic styles and tactics formerly relegated to the down-class urban youth 
(Jones 2010:286). Activities formerly associated with urban social margins such as operating 
tuck shops, informal furniture-making, roadside trading in foreign currency and basic 
commodities, as well cross border trading among others, increasingly became the source of 
livelihood for most of the urban dwellers. Artisanal mining for gold also became fashionable. 
Kukiya-kiya grew from its position on the margins of urban life and bottom of society into the 
dominant mode of everyday existence, in fact to involve nearly everyone: from urban youth 
to civil servants to wage labourers, to former farm-workers and the rural poor (Jones 
2010:298). Already in November 2000, CZI reported that an estimated 1.7 million people 
were relying on the informal sector (The Financial Gazette, 12 June 2002). According to 
Mlambo (2017), Zimbabwe had become “a nation of vendors”. It is this economy that 
Mugabe sought to eliminate with Operation Murambatsvina.  
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Life became a nightmare for the majority of citizens. As early as July 2001, CCZ stated that 
74% of the population could not afford basic necessities (Good 2002:16). Wages had fallen to 
their pre-1980 levels, by 2006. Less than 6% were employed in 2008 (PAC March 2009:1) 
while the poverty rate was estimated at 70% in 2008, up from 42% in 1995 (AfDB 2011:3). 
With the majority of the population well beyond the brink of starvation, it is surprising that 
the economy did not collapsed completely. More than half of the population faced severe 
food shortages. For the majority, there were only two options: either engage in kukiya-kiya or 
migrate. Most professionals (and non-professionals too) voted with their feet by migrating, 
seeking less troubled waters in which to fish, with the majority of them going to South Africa 
and Botswana but also to Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi, countries whose economies 
were far below Zimbabwe’s before the crisis. Others went oversea, mostly to the United 
Kingdom and United States. Conservative estimates indicated that about a million 
Zimbabweans were living in South Africa by the end of 2007 (e.g. Kramarenko et al, 
2010:10). Others estimated that the figure could have been as high as three million by 2010 
(Saunders 2011:127). Zimbabweans living outside the country were estimated to be as high 
as 5 million, a no small number for a country with a small population of approximately 13 
million (Mlambo 2017:26). This brain drain severely bled the country’s human resources 
capital. However, it is widely believed that diaspora remittances saved the country from a 
certain collapse.  
 
Back home, citizens experienced the meltdown through crumbling social services and 
infrastructure, everyday power cuts, factory closures and a useless national currency. Around 
80% of the population lived on less than $1 a day and 90% were unemployed surviving 
through kukiya-kiya. Citizens faced standards of living far lower than at the time of 
independence. There was no social services sector to talk about. Civil servants stopped going 
to work for months after their salaries had become valueless, opting instead to go to the rivers 
to become artisanal miners or trade in second hand goods. Basic commodities disappeared 
from the shops. Key infrastructure, particularly the road network, deteriorated rapidly. 
Abandoned workshops and factories that lined the potholed roads in industrial areas became 
an eye sore, providing a hide-out for petty criminals and prostitutes. Electricity supply 
became erratic. Hospital staff could not remember when they last received supplies of 
medicine. The country’s urban water system collapsed, resulting in a horrendous cholera 
outbreak which claimed an estimated 3 000 lives in 2009 (Kisiangani 2009:5). By the end of 
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2008, Zimbabwe’s once admired health and education sectors were in tatters. PAC (March 
2009:1) observes that only 6% of rural schools were open. Life expectancy dropped from 65 
years in 1990 to 43 years in 2006 (World Health Organisation [WHO] December 2008:2). 
 
7.7 Inclusive government 
 
The GNU between ZANU PF and the two MDCs (2009 – 2013) was greeted with a huge sigh 
of relief by an impoverished citizenry. It helped to stabilise the economy for a while. The 
decision to abolish the local currency in favour of a multi-currency regime effectively led to 
the end of hyperinflation. By 2011, growth rate was 10.6%, making Zimbabwe one of the 
fastest growing economies on earth (Mlambo 2017:11). Basic commodities returned to the 
shops and civil servants returned to their work stations. Electricity and water provision as 
well as refuse collection greatly improved. Fuel was available at the pump and transport 
services returned to normal. The power-sharing arrangement also brought about a significant 
reduction in politically-motivated tensions and violence in the country and there was talk of 
re-engagement with the international community after a decade of isolation. However, 
important the changes brought by the inclusive government were, by and large, it was an elite 
pact in which the elites from all sides were vying for ministerial positions. Each faction of the 
elite was focused more on the most lucrative and powerful cabinet posts - defence, home 
affairs and finance. In the end, the Home Affairs portfolio had two co-ministers. It was too 
important to lose. Bratton and Masunungure (2011:34) observe that power in the GNU was 
not shared, but divided because ZANU-PF and the MDCs exercised power separately within 
largely exclusive, and often competing, zones of authority. Zimbabwe remained one country 
with two rival governments. The GNU cabinet was just too big. It was meant to ensure that 
politicians from all parties benefited from government resources. The salaries and perks of 
the ministers and their deputies left a huge dent in the already-empty fiscus.  
 
The power-sharing arrangement was dogged by disagreements, persistent suspicions and 
mistrust among the parties. Furthermore, the inclusive government was tilted in favour of 
ZANU PF. The MDCs were always at a disadvantage against a party that continued to control 
the coercive arms of the state (Raftopoulos 2013:984). It is not far-fetched to argue that the 
MDCs were in office but not in power. The arrangement appears to have been most effective 
in serving the instrumental needs of the ZANU-PF elite. It provided the party with some 
legitimacy while facilitating its continued access to strategic knobs of state power - including 
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the defence, police, security, foreign affairs and information ministries, in addition to control 
over the prosecuting authority and responsibility for strategic resource extraction sectors like 
mining and agriculture (Saunders 2011:130). These were turned to meet partisan ends. 
Mugabe continued to treat the partners in government as if they were junior partners. Many in 
ZANU PF and security forces seemed to want to show at any point that nothing had really 
changed. Mugabe always appeared unwilling to consider reforms that would weaken his grip 
on power. Moreover, Western donor nations and multi-lateral finance institutions adopted a 
“wait-and-see” attitude and were unwilling to offer the government any financial assistance 
for their mistrust of Mugabe fearing that it would prop him and his party (Kisiangani 2009:1). 
According to Raftopoulos (2013:971-972), ZANU PF’s strategy was to manipulate and stall 
the reform process in order to allow it to regroup and reconfigure after the 2008 electoral 
disaster. The MDCs also struggled to position themselves in a state whose structure was 
largely built on a ZANU PF template and shaped by the imperatives of its military-economic 
elite. 
 
Mugabe’s victory in the July 2013 elections stunned many. According to Raftopoulos 
(2013:985), the unevenness of the playing field, though important cannot, on its own, account 
for ZANU PF’s landslide victory. He observes the radical changes in the country’s political 
economy since 2000 which severely weakened the support base of the MDC. Due to de-
industrialisation, informalisation of the economy and the migration of the workers out of the 
country, the trade union movement and the urban middle class that had been the support base 
of the MDC had been severely depleted and was no longer available in such numbers for 
political mobilisation. Furthermore, the two MDCs failed to agree on a deal to mount a united 
front. As a result, ZANU PF capitalised on it and obtained several seats due to a split vote. 
The MDCs entered the political terrain a lot weaker than in the previous election. The politics 
of political and civic opposition that emerged in the late 1990s had come to an end 
(Raftopoulos (2013:986). 
 
The economic recovery of the GNU period was unfortunately short lived. Economic decline 
resumed. Estimates are that around 90% of Zimbabweans were unemployed by 2015, 
surviving through kukiya kiya, mostly through trading in second-hand clothes and other 
items.  There was no formal employment sector to talk about. The Standard (4 November 
2013) reported that only 11% of the country’s employed population was in formal 
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employment. Deindustrialisation was continuing unabated as companies closed due to 
frequent power cuts and a liquidity crunch. The Confederation of Zimbabwean Industries 
[CZI] (2014:6) report noted that deindustrialisation had reached catastrophic levels, with dire 
consequences to the state of the economy. Meanwhile, no one in ZANU PF was talking 
economics. The party elite was busy trying to undo one another as it became obvious the 
Mugabe’s days both on the throne and on earth were numbered. Yet, the succession topic 
remained taboo in the party. At every elective congress, Mugabe’s hold on the presidency of 
the party was never debated. It was taken for granted that he would be the party’s presidential 
candidate even for the 2018 elections when he would be 94 years old. Strategies to outdo 
each other got nasty as one after another of the top contenders got fired from the party. It was 
the military that solved the succession issue when on Tuesday 14 November 2017, it staged a 
coup, installing long-time Mugabe lieutenant Mnangagwa as President, ending Mugabe’s 37 
years of terror. The military that had ensured Mugabe’s retention of power was ironically the 
same military that would knock him out of power. The military had become the king-maker. 
As had happened on 18 April 1980, the nation was ecstatic. 
 
7.8 Archangel Gabriel  
 
At the heart of the post-colonial Zimbabwean political economy spanning nearly four 
decades, has been the figure of Robert Gabriel Mugabe. At the peak of his power, he became 
a subject of the global media to an extent that there was a virtual journalistic stampede over 
him. He became the favourite whipping boy of the western media, social media and 
cartoonists. In the court of global public opinion, he moved from the darling of the world who 
had served his people with distinction, had been awarded the Africa Prize for ‘Leadership for 
Sustainable End of Hunger’ by the US-based Hunger Project and went on to be honoured by 
her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II, with the rank of an Honorary Knight Grand Cross of the 
Most Honourable Order of the Bath, in 1994, to amassing a fortune for himself, his family 
and clients, and presiding over the calculated murder, torture, and starvation of his own 
people (Norman 2004:16). Scholars also took up “Mugabeism”, producing tens of thousands 
of academic works on the phenomenon, trying to understand and explain how the once 
disciplined, learned, and a very shrewd politician had become an autocratic ruthless tyrant 
who rigged elections, trampled over the rule of law, and showed blatant racism and in the 
process taking his country to the depths of misery (Norman 2004:16). To many people 
Archangel Gabriel had become like Lucifer, a fallen angel, who had tragically fallen from 
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being a celebrated revolutionary, the symbol and embodiment of the revolution into a brutal 
African despot. Indeed Mahmood Mamdani (2009) notes how hard it is to find a figure more 
reviled in the West than Mugabe. 
 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:86) traces the deification of the post-nationalist leader to the struggle 
days. According to him, an important impact of the liberation struggle was the prominence of 
the nationalist leader within the movement. Mao, Lenin, Stalin, Fidel Castro, Tito and 
Muamar Gaddafi belong to the same group of nationalist leaders who were literally deified by 
their people. When he ascended to the helm of the party in 1976, Mugabe advocated total 
adherence to the party line (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2009:255). He became a disciplinarian who 
tolerated no dissent. While still in the bush, party songs and slogans at home increasingly 
became framed around him. For example, every political address had to start with “Forward 
with Comrade Robert Gabriel Mugabe” followed by “Forward with ZANU” (Ndlovu-
Gatsheni 2009:255). By the time Mugabe arrived home from Mozambique at the end of the 
war, he had long become a darling of the masses and the central figure in the transition to 
independence. This glorification of the leader gave rise to a cult of personality. From the time 
he was installed as Prime Minister, he gradually established himself as central in the power 
equation. His eloquence, erudition and shrewdness endeared him to the masses who saw him 
as a messiah who had delivered them from the “Smithian Egypt”. It is not far-fetched to 
suggest that it is through him that ZANU PF has remained ingrained in the minds of the 
masses (Sithole and Makumbe 1997:132). What emerged in all this were clear roots and 
trappings of a personality cult. The nationalist mythology had forged an identification of 
nation, party, and leader. The Zimbabwean state was slowly becoming a “commandist state” 
in which Mugabe alone was able to exercise and sustain hegemonic control. According to 
Mandaza (2007:10), Mugabe became unassailable in the party, making him less and less 
democratic and more and more autocratic. Mugabe’s official portrait was in every public 
building. Every city and town had to name one of its main streets after him. Party regalia all 
had his portrait. It was as if he was omnipresent. He canonised himself into the “soul” and 
father of the nation, and elevated himself to a mini-god, saint, angel (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 
2009:349).  
 
With the swallowing up of PF ZAPU and constitutional amendment of 1987, Mugabe quickly 
moved on to accumulate huge personal power. He declared himself Executive President, 
making himself Head of state, Head of government and Commander-In-Chief of the defence 
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forces. That also gave him powers to dissolve parliament and declare martial law and the 
right to run for an unlimited number of times. He controlled appointments to all senior posts 
in the civil service, the army, police and parastatals (Meredith 2005:629). Ruling through a 
vast system of patronage, he gained a virtual stranglehold over the state machinery. One after 
the other, the civil service, the state media, the security sector and the parastatals were 
subordinated to his will. The Executive President became increasingly authoritarian and 
remote. His official and private residences were heavily guarded around the clock. He 
travelled in huge motorcades, with military personnel armed to the tooth. All traffic had to 
freeze and give way to his motorcade. Any gesture at the President’s motorcade was 
prohibited by law. Everywhere he went for a rally, he was greeted by huge and excited 
crowds. The party’s foot soldiers ensured that he addressed huge crowds bussed from far and 
wide. 
 
As one who appointed and disappointed, senior party officials were falling over each other, 
bootlicking and praise-singing the First Secretary of the revolutionary party. As early as the 
1990s, Tony Gara equated Mugabe to Jesus and for that, he was rewarded with a deputy 
ministerial post. In his old age, party heavyweights jostled to endear themselves to the 
nonagenarian. In 2011, Minister Webster Shamu branded Mugabe as “cremora”, a coffee 
creamer that is a favourite with most urban Zimbabweans (Newsday, 14 October 2017). “The 
best was yet to come when two years later Shamu told revellers at a musical bash that he 
would have preferred to be Mugabe’s biological son (Newsday, 14 October 2017 . Not to be 
outdone, Obert Mpofu always signed off letters to Mugabe as "your ever-obedient son" 
(Newsday, 6 December 2010). Another cabinet minister, Saviour Kasukuwere, joined the 
bandwagon of bootlickers describing Mugabe as “God-given” and should be given an 
“endless” mandate to lead Zimbabwe (The Standard, 8 February 2015).  
 
Even when the economy was on its knees, his followers continued to see him as a visionary 
and a liberator. His position as First Secretary of the party was neither discussed nor 
contested. It was taken for granted that he would be the party’s candidate for presidential 
elections. The praise singing became worse in the 2000s when age had clearly taken its toll 
on Mugabe and he was increasingly out of touch with reality, yet refusing to step down. His 
wife told a cheering crowd at a rally that Mugabe is an unparalleled leader and that she would 
push her 93 year-old husband to work in a special wheelchair (Newsday, 26 May 2016). 
Addressing another rally, she said her husband was irreplaceable as President and that he 
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would be fielded as presidential candidate even from the grave (Newsday, 26 May 2016). Not 
to be outdone, the party’s youth Secretary, Kudzanai Chipanga, said Mugabe is “Archangel 
Gabriel” who will be next to God vetting people to see who goes to heaven and who goes to 
hell (The Standard, 4 June 2017). Mugabeism had become a semi-religious revolutionary cult 
with Mugabe as the High priest and Grace, the High Priestess. The state-controlled media 
routinely heaped profligate praise on the High Priest and High Priestess in sycophantic 
articles and programmes. In this cult, “undermining the authority of or insulting the 
president” was a criminal offence punishable by a jail sentence. Scores of people were 
arraigned before the courts for “insulting” the High Priest.  
 
MDC ministers in the inclusive government revealed that ZANU PF ministers knelt before 
Mugabe at cabinet meetings. For the young MDC Information Communication and 
Technology (ICT) minister, Nelson Chamisa, it was a “culture shock” to see male ministers 
kneeling before another man. “They all kneel! You have to wonder if their wives know they 
kneel for another man. Mugabe has total power over them,” Chamisa said (Zimbabwe 
Situation, 2 October 2017). It became a common sight to see ZANU PF bigwigs kneel or bow 
before the High Priest and Priestess at public events such as rallies and funerals. Zimbabwean 
novelist and poet Chenjerai Hove remarked: “The president has, all of the sudden, been 
transformed into a religion, a demi-god. The propaganda machine is in overdrive” (The 
Sunday Times 9 March 2004). An economy of terror has been sacralised.  
 
7.9 Conclusion 
 
The end of white settler colonial rule did not, unfortunately, result in a stable, peaceful, just 
and democratic Zimbabwe. A country whose birth had been mediated by imperialism which 
ensured that it should not unlock itself from its grip, found itself struggling to implement its 
own policies that would result in a redress of colonial injustices and imbalances in a global 
order that does not tolerate resource-rich developing states that try to defy the dictates of 
imperialism. The young nation did all that it could to create conditions for the flourishing of 
capitalism. Instead of being an alternative to the political economy of the colonial period, 
post-colonial Zimbabwe became a continuation of Rhodesia. With the petit bourgeoisie in 
intimate alliance with white and international capital, it was becoming clear that socialism 
could not be built on the superstructure of capitalism. The resilient proletariat that had 
endured years of deprivation, oppression, and injustice had to wait for another day. However, 
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it would be disingenuous to attribute all the crises that have bedevilled Zimbabwe to the post-
colony. It is in the complex mix of neo-colonialism, government policies and elite primitive 
accumulation that the answer to the fall from grace ought to be found.  
 
The heroes who had “died” for their people soon turned on the people they had liberated not 
hesitating to use the instruments of repression inherited from the white settler regime to get 
consent and to silence dissent. Tens of thousands were murdered by the state that was 
supposed to protect them. The years of suffering during the war became for the African petit 
bourgeoisie leadership a licence to enormous opportunities for class aggrandisement. They 
became extremely wealthy within a very short space of time. They had “arrived.” The petit-
bourgeoisie leadership abandoned its pre-independence alliance with the proletariat as it 
dished out state contracts and positions in government departments and SEPs to its clients 
through vast patronage networks. Most SEPs were severely plundered that they became 
empty shells. With increased discontent because of unfulfilled promises, the security forces 
were brought on board to be the vanguard of the revolutionary party. Violence and predation 
became the two defining features of the feared politico-military alliance. The Zimbabwean 
dream had turned into a nightmare. From being the second most industrialised country in sub-
Saharan Africa with a very promising multi-party democracy, the last vestiges of the 
developmental state lie in ruins as the country ranks among the poorest on earth with a very 
serious democratic deficit. The political economy of post-colonial Zimbabwean clearly fits 
the description of a political economy of terror. The picture that emerges from the tiny 
southern African country is of a terrified citizenry, scared of the state that has terrorised and 
impoverished them. 
 
In the next chapter the focus is on economic ethics. From a dialogue between the ancient 
monarchic Israelite political economy and the post-colonial Zimbabwean political economy 
we determine the nature of the ethics that emerges.   
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CHAPTER EIGHT: TOWARDS AN INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ETHICS 
 
The "poor person" is not the result of an act of fate. One's existence is not politically 
neutral or ethically innocent. The poor person is the product of the system in which 
we live and for which we are responsible. He is on the margin of our social and 
cultural world. Even more, the poor person is the oppressed, the exploited, the 
proletarian, the one deprived of the fruit of his labour and despoiled of being a 
person. For that reason, the poverty of the poor person is not a call for a generous act 
that will alleviate his suffering, but rather a demand for building a different social 
order (Gutierrez 1973:291). 
 
8.0 Introduction  
 
In looking at each of the political economies separately, we have pointed out markers that 
qualify them to be labelled political economies of terror. A question that needs to be 
discussed at this point in this work is to what extent are the two comparable? How is the 
ancient monarchic political economy designed for a simple agrarian society comparable to a 
complex system of a modern territorial state under capitalism? In this chapter, we will 
construct a dialogue by noting their basic structural similarities and differences. We also note 
the limitations of such an economic ethics, and indeed any ethics that emerges from the 
biblical text. Finally we explore the economic ethics that arises from the dialogue. As we will 
see, the economic ethics is relevant, not just for local communities, but the global human 
community.  
 
8.1 Monarchic Israelite and post-colonial Zimbabwean political 
economies in dialogue 
 
Ulrich Duchrow (1995:213) asks if it is possible at all to compare the social configurations of 
ancient polities with those of the modern capitalist states. There are numerous differences 
between the ancient monarchic Israelite political economy and that of modern Zimbabwe. To 
begin with, over three millennia separate the two. The historical and social distance between 
the two societies is simply too great. So much has happened since the Israelite kings 
(literally) walked the dusty pathways of the land that they ruled. The mass production and 
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mass consumption introduced by colonialism catapulted Zimbabwe from a subsistence pre-
modern economy (like that of ancient monarchic Israel) to a modern capitalist economy of 
abundance. No longer is subsistence living the norm; it is now the exception (Barrera 
2008:294). Modernity also brought with it humane laws, human rights, systems and 
institutions that are supposed to make life enjoyable, something which the ancient Israelite 
communities never imagined. 
 
Should the reincarnated Israelite monarchs come back to life and land in Zimbabwe (albeit in 
its miserable state), they would think that Zimbabweans are gods, or that the Ark of the 
covenant found its way to the southern African country. They would even regret having lived 
earlier. Taken on a tour of Harare, and seeing hundreds of thousands of people on the streets, 
going about their business every day and being told that there are millions others scattered 
throughout the land, the ancients would be amazed by the sheer numbers in comparison to 
their subjects. They would inquisitively ask their tour guides where the farmlands of all these 
millions are or how they earn a living. They would wonder how the Zimbabwean king 
controls such numbers. We can hear them enquiring who the king is, for how long he has 
been on the throne, for how long his father was king before him, for how long his dynasty has 
been in power, how many wives and concubines he has, how many of them are of foreign 
origin, how many sons he has and which one he has designated to inherit the throne. We can 
almost see them visibly disappointed to hear that all-powerful monarchs are extinct and have 
been replaced by a President who is elected by all adults, male and female, from all over the 
country. Further disappointment would await them when told that the laws of the land are not 
made by the President but by a legislative body made up of representatives elected by the 
people. For a moment, they would feel they were much better than this powerless President. 
They would question the extent of his powers. 
 
Taken on a tour bus ride, they would be looking at each other and smiling all the way, failing 
to believe that the movement of goods and people has been made this easy. They would 
certainly be amazed by the bridging of distances by modern transport systems. Entering the 
departmental stores and seeing all the wares on sale, they would not believe their eyes. They 
would be surprised to find that the luxury goods that they had to send convoys of caravans to 
collect from long distances and taking weeks, if not months to arrive, are now common in the 
shops and that anyone with money can purchase them. They would be surprised to find a 
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currency which is exchanged for goods. If they are told about the modern Zimbabwean 
market economy, they would never cease to be amazed by how it operates. They would not 
understand a thing when told about the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). Perhaps what 
would fascinate them the most are the technological developments, for example, that at the 
click of a mouse one can see and communicate with people tens of thousands of kilometres 
away as if they were right next to them. They would definitely be surprised that every 
Zimbabwean child goes to a formal school, something that was a preserve of the children of 
the elite when they ruled their kingdoms.   
 
From the city centre, the tour takes them to an industrial area to see what happens in the 
factories. Getting into David Whitehead, the garment manufacturer, the sheer size of 
machines busy at work and the scale of industrial mass production would impress them. We 
can visualise them casting their eyes all over the factory and inquisitively asking who owns 
all this property, what each machine is called, what it is doing and what they do with the 
finished products. We can see them touch and feel different types of garments trying to 
compare them with the ones that they wore and even attempting to fit them. As they are busy 
marvelling at these monster machines, the grand-daughter of David Whitehead, Michelle, 
aged 32, walks in, head uncovered, extends her hands to greet them and introduce herself as 
the owner of the factory. This is unbelievable; such a woman and a young girl at that, owning 
such property and supervising hundreds of mostly male workers. What happened to her male 
relatives? Could they not inherit it when Mr Whitehead passed on? Meanwhile, all her 
employees are smiling and waving at their boss as if to a friend. As if the shock is not intense 
enough, sadness descends on their faces when they are told that these employees have rights, 
sign legal employment contracts, earn a fixed salary monthly, work fixed hours and can join 
trade unions. We can see them nodding their heads in disagreement vowing that such would 
not have happened to their workers in their life time. For a moment they would consider 
themselves lucky to have lived at a time when human beings could be sold for debt. 
 
Still trying to process this, the tour guides take them back to the bus on the way to Little 
England, one of the very few remaining white-owned commercial farms on the outskirts of 
Harare. Unlike the factory, the farm might be familiar territory. Expecting to see masses of 
farm workers sweating to death, they would be surprised to see just a handful of them 
operating different types of farm machinery as they harvest wheat and cotton, spray 
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insecticides, milk thousands of cows and irrigate the tobacco crop. They would be so glad to 
recognise the familiar wheat crop. We can hear them wishing that had they had such 
equipment, they would have become even richer, to be the envy of the kings of the 
neighbouring polities. We can visualise them pointing at the ripe cotton crop asking what it is 
and admiring the “white field.” As they are about to leave, the owner of Little England,  John 
Fischer Klepperton, informs them that before the FTLRP, he owned eight farms and that 
other farmers has as many as ten commercial farms.  
 
The tour would not end without a visit to the President’s official residence. As he takes them 
on a tour of state house, they would for a moment feel jealousy of his standard of living. He 
pours them a glass of fine sweet red wine. It is nothing like they have ever had before. As 
they walk around sipping their wine, they expect that at some point he will take them to his 
royal chapel where he worships and sacrifices to his gods. They are shocked that he does not 
even believe in a god. With the wine getting into their heads, it is time to get back to the bus 
and go. On the way, they pass through a toll gate. Traffic is heavy. Again they wish that 
during their time they had had such busy highways. They ask the tour guides how life is for 
the majority of the citizens, especially those in the rural areas. The guides try to be as 
balanced as possible. As the bus speeds off, they sit quietly processing their experiences to 
share with one another when they get home. Has everything been new to them? Have they 
not been able to recognise a few familiar things on this tour? From what the tour guides told 
them of life in the rural areas and in the townships, they were able to identify a thing or two. 
They were told of a familiar bartering of goods where, for example, for a goat one gets a 
bucket of maize. But was everything else really new?  
 
Clearly, there are some important and obvious differences between the two contexts as the 
imaginary story of the tour of the ancients suggests, so much so that they are not comparable 
in all respects. However, there is a strong case for comparing the two societies. Robert 
Wafawanaka (2012:8) argues that although ancient Israel and modern Zimbabwe are different 
cultures, there are enough strong parallels to warrant a serious cross-cultural comparative 
study. For Walter Brueggemann (2009:5), while there are certain specifics peculiar to the 
modern economy, the fundamental issues of economics are the same from ancient to modern 
times; constants such as the endless tension between haves and have-nots, credit and debt, 
and loans and interest. For Gottwald (1993:346), what links these two worlds, is a “common 
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thread of economic inequity and oppression and a common thread of struggle against 
needless economic suffering.” In comparing cultures that are separated by millennia, our 
interest is in the issues, rather than the content of the issues. The content varies from time to 
time and from place to place while the issues remain the same throughout human history. 
Furthermore, economies of most of the developing world show features which are very much 
like the tributary economies of the ancient Near East (Gottwald 1993:351). Thus the question 
of the comparability of the two contexts can be answered in the affirmative. 
 
To begin with, both communities had lofty ideals of social justice for all during their 
formative years. After the overthrow of the city-state elite in ancient Israel, the freed agrarian 
communities deliberately rejected the exploitative tributary mode of production and 
consciously chose the familial mode of production. The aim of this choice was to promote the 
ideals of freedom that they had been denied by the city-state elite. Economic power was 
retained in the hands of villagers who were in charge of their own production, distribution 
and consumption of the surplus labour value. This was an amazing experiment for antiquity. 
After nearly a century of oppression and repression, as well as a bloody war, the black 
majority were finally free to govern themselves in Zimbabwe. The atmosphere was pregnant 
with promise. Reconciliation with the former oppressor, a government of national unity and a 
Bill of Rights, Zimbabwe was on course to becoming a free and prosperous socialist society 
that respects human rights, democracy and peace. Had both followed these ideals religiously, 
they could have become bastions of social justice. 
 
But the honeymoon could not last for long in both contexts, as “ubuntu took flight” (Boesak 
2017:118). It became apparent that there were “Pharaohs on both sides of the blood-red 
waters” (Boesak 2017).  It became a time of the betrayal of the cause of freedom and social 
justice. Both soon turned away from their noble ideals, descending into political economies 
of terror. Two centuries after independence day, ancient Israel found itself heading back to 
Egypt when she adopted a monarchy and its tributary mode of production. The end result 
would be the serious exploitation of the peasants by their own leaders and their networks. Just 
months after the exodus from the Egypt of a racist and brutal colonial system, the opposition 
in Zimbabwe came face-to-face with the reality of an intolerant leadership drunk with the 
wine of power. Before the noise of independence celebrations had even subsided, the 
working class was already being harassed for demanding fair wages. It got worse with time 
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when the country descended into a predatory state that impoverished, tortured, maimed and 
killed its own children.  
 
Concerning ancient Israel, we have noted that unequal access to resources was the essential 
condition for the “return to Pharaoh.” The intensification of inequality led to the formation of 
patron-client relationships in which some wealthy and influential men in the tribal alliance 
who had ambitions to leadership could easily mobilise their clients for political support. 
These wealthy men could have welcomed the monarchy as a way to strengthen and legitimate 
their privilege, something that was very difficult under the current arrangement. Thus at the 
heart of the “return to Pharaoh” was the need to protect the class system, rather than to 
promote the common good. This is not unrelated to the abandonment of the ideals of 
independence, democracy, freedom and social justice in Zimbabwe. Right from Lancaster 
House, it was quite apparent that what was going to drive state policy was the development of 
capitalism, not the upliftment of  the masses. This was to be made manifest when Mugabe 
opted for reconciliation without justice, paid lip service to a socialist revolution, went at 
length to court monopoly capital and delayed an agrarian reform process. If capitalism 
flourished, the elite and their clients stood to benefit. Thus greed sums up the real reason 
behind the “return to Pharaoh” in both ancient Israel and Zimbabwe. It was because of greed 
that the noble ideals were abandoned in both societies.  
 
What is also intriguing is that over and above the lofty ideals of freedom, the common good 
and justice during the formative years of the two societies, there were various attempts by 
reform movements and social justice forces to return the society to its founding ideals. There 
were impulses within the monarchic system itself that were aware of injustice. Gunther 
Wittenberg (2007:97) notes that Israel’s theological reflection on her experiences mobilised 
resistance against autocratic tendencies of the monarchy. The am ha’aretz seem to have 
supported Absalom’s insurrection against David (2 Samuel 15). The very humane laws in 
Deuteronomy appear to have been developed during the monarchy in an attempt to reform the 
nation. So was the criticism of the prophets. In Zimbabwe too, civil society organisations and 
church bodies such as the CCJP, protested state policy and even suggested alternatives. But 
like the prophetic critique in ancient Israel, the protest fell on deaf ears. This seems to suggest 
that once the powers-that-be in a political economy of terror are in overdrive on the road to 
self-destruction, they are difficult to stop.  
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Another common feature of the two political economies is the ownership of the means of 
production by a tiny elite at the expense of the majority. In Ancient Israel, a tiny fraction of 
the population controlled virtually all the land, the chief means of production in an agrarian 
society. More and more land accumulated in fewer and fewer hands of wealthy landowners 
through latifundialization. The peasants lost their family lands through mounting debt and 
had no option but to hand themselves over to the new owners as slaves, working to repay the 
debt. Landless and with only their labour for which they were not even in charge, they 
hovered perennially on the brink of economic ruin. In post-colonial Zimbabwe, ownership of 
the land continued as it was in the pre-independence era. A tiny white minority controlled 
virtually most of the best agricultural land until the FTLRP. Most of the best land that had 
been redistributed hitherto, had been grabbed by the elite for themselves and their patronage 
networks. Even during the FTLRP, the elites seized the best land with most of them 
reportedly owning multiple farms. As was the case with the land, most of the country’s 
industries were in the hands of a few TNCs and white families. The ownership patterns 
inherited from the colonial regime continued with a few strategically positioned black elites 
entering the elite club. It was extremely difficult for anybody without connections in ZANU 
PF to climb the ladder and own big business. The party deliberately put obstacles for upward 
mobility in business in spite of its policies that sought to significantly increase the number of 
black people that own and control the economy. Nyikahadzoi et al. (2010:673) note that by 
2010 little had changed for the black majority as they continued to be systematically excluded 
from owning big business while white business owners largely retained their dominant 
economic positions. 
 
Another feature that is common to the two political economies is that both are forms of 
surplus acquisition by those who control the means of production, at the expense of the 
majority. By their very nature, centralised polities survive on extraction from the proceeds of 
the sweat of the citizenry. In Chapter 4, mention has been made of extractive economic 
patterns in which the elite who were not at all involved in production appropriated the surplus 
labour product of the peasant majority through taxation, debt instruments and corvée labour. 
This resulted in mass impoverishment of the peasant majority while the non-producers 
enjoyed life in conspicuous consumption. Making a fortune out of the labour of the 
producers, the elites retreated to the cities where they were far removed from the grinding 
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misery of the peasants. This has also been demonstrated in post-colonial Zimbabwe, right 
from the heyday of independence when, due to the need to prioritise and appease 
international finance capital, the ruling elite sacrificed workers’ rights to living wages and 
embarking on strikes. No doubt, the ruling elite stood to benefit if capitalism was allowed to 
flourish and the economy grew. When the crisis hit the nation, most of the workers who had 
toiled all their lives were laid off while their meagre pensions were devalued by run-away 
inflation. They left with nothing. A much-needed land reform process to redress obvious 
historical imbalances and reduce overcrowding in the former TTLs was deliberately delayed 
and slowed down by the elites. That was after they had dished among themselves most of the 
fertile farms that had been abandoned by fleeing white farmers in the early 1980s. Instead of 
being rewarded for all their hard work, the peasant farmers were met with low prices for their 
produce and being denied fertile arable land. Farm workers were also known to receive bad 
treatment from the farmers. The farm workers and peasant farmers who had contributed 
immensely to making the country the bread basket of southern Africa had nothing to show for 
all their hard work. They lacked the very basic services such as electricity, running water and 
proper housing. In fact, the World Bank notes that in 2016,2 only a mere 15.5% of the rural 
population had access to electricity.  
 
Due to the fear of open rebellion from the lower classes and thus losing their socio-economic 
position, the elite in both contexts do not always resort to violence, though it is one of their 
beloved instruments for getting consent. Rather they readily rely on hegemony, which 
attempts to justify  the exploitation of the masses. The exploited are pacified into submission 
and will continue to cooperate with the oppressor even to the point of starving themselves to 
death. This is why despite their sorry economic status, the rural peasant farmers continue to 
vote  to retain ZANU PF in power. 
 
The state in both contexts is at the service of, and is a site of accumulation of, wealth by the 
elite. The surest avenue to accumulate wealth for oneself in both contexts is to gain state 
power. The power elite in both contexts suck the surpluses from the lower classes to sustain a 
privileged lifestyle for themselves and their patronage networks. They do not hesitate to 
display their ill-gotten wealth through conspicuous consumption, which reinforces their 
social position, power and authority. Sadly, instead of evoking bitterness, such conspicuous 
                                                          
2 World Bank at https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.ACCS.UR.ZS?locations=ZW 
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consumption evokes admiration from the lower classes. In the Zimbabwean context, such 
people become heroes who are literally deified. The elite like to be praised and worshipped. 
Occasional acts of charity must be noticed and applauded by all, for that reinforces their 
position. The elite is prepared to do all that it takes to protect its socio-political and economic 
interests and position. It is stubborn and does not tolerate dissent. If need be, it resorts to 
violence to coerce consent. The state’s instruments of repression are easily mobilised to 
defend the interests of the power elite when they are under threat. The state in a political 
economy of terror is responsible for maintaining the overall structural integration and social 
cohesion of this stratified society. It is a captured state that has no logic of its own, or a 
reason for existence apart from being at the service of the oppressor.  
 
Another characteristic feature is the stratified nature of these polities. They are characterised 
by a rigid class structure which is easy to tell but nearly impossible to dismantle. By their 
very nature political economies of terror are characterised by inequality. The gap between 
classes is so vast. The majority of the members of these societies are in dire straits while the 
tiny elite are living in obscene luxury. Upward mobility for the lower classes is extremely 
difficult. Differences between social classes are all too obvious to notice. Class is more 
important than kinship or any other social relations.  
 
What this dialogue has shown is that the modern political economies seem to have retained so 
many traits of the old exploitative order (Mortensen 1994:13). The political economies in 
both contexts are marked by a paradox: it is the best of times for the elites, but among the 
worst of times for the poor (Hollenbach 2002:41).  
8.2 Limits of the ethics 
 
Our argument in this work is that we can develop an economic ethics informed by biblical 
principles. The biblical vision of economic justice that the pre-capitalist, ancient agrarian 
society of Israel developed for itself can, and does apply, to a modern capitalist economy.  
Gottwald, however, cautions that no ethical model or prescription from the bible can be lifted 
out and employed in our contemporary context to meet our needs without considering its 
context and ours (Gottwald 1993:345). To begin with, even though the economy is a central 
concern of the bible and while ethical judgements and injunctions are the essential foundation 
of the biblical law, history and theology, with almost every page of the text expressing ethical 
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values and judgements, there is clearly no scientific economic theory in the modern sense in 
the biblical text (Meeks 1989:3). The bible does not display an elaborate ethics and given this 
reality, Gottwald argues, the ethical force of the bible on issues of economics will have to be 
perspectival and motivational, rather than prescriptive and technical (Gottwald 1993:341). 
 
We will not for a second imagine that the bible can solve any of the technical economic 
problems facing us today. We are not proposing an ideal or a magical wand that solves all the 
world’s economic problems in a grand thought experiment. No theologian is in a position to 
lay down a blue print for the transformation of a national economy (Langan 1987:265). Our 
concern is to outline an ethical framework that can guide the economic life of a contemporary 
state. While this ethics provides no direct solution for all the huge challenges of the world 
economy, it does, however, provide the moral foundation for a better individual and global 
order (Parliament of the World’s Religions 1993:4). We are simply pointing the direction in 
which a modern economy should be moving. The goal of this economic ethics is to lay down 
principles for the creation of a more humane society. As David Hollenbach (2002:213) 
argues, it is to provide direction toward a significantly improved state of well-being for the 
global population in ethically challenging but feasible ways.  
 
It can orient public decisions towards a form of social interdependence in which the poor and 
marginalised begin to participate in the commonweal in a way that enables them to escape 
their plight (Hollenbach 2002:173). It might guide human action in ways that lead to better 
lives for all of humanity, especially those who are on the margins. This work will not provide 
a detailed blueprint of what an alternative economic system should look like. Our 
contribution will be seriously undermined if we were to offer recommendations about 
specific policy issues. Such are extremely complicated issues which lie outside the scope of 
this work. As we shall propose in a moment, our inclusive economic ethics is a visionary 
statement of what it means to extend one’s hand to a needy member of the human community 
(Wafawanaka 2012:6). Its role and function is to offer a vision, not to offer concrete 
particulars (Williams 1993:930). It is aimed at a new economic architecture that embraces 
ethics and justice (Kobia 2010:13). It is an ethics that offers the possibility of a better 
economic order that will lead human beings and communities away from despair, 
hopelessness and chaos. 
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Herman E. Daly (1996:205) suggests that any ethical principles emerging from this dialogue 
must be general and fundamental enough to be translated from the pre-capitalist agrarian 
economies of ancient Israel and Judah to the modern industrial economies under capitalism. 
He adds that if we are to try to influence the economic institutions and policies of our 
communities, then we need to discover basic principles that underlay economic situations of 
biblical Israel and then give those principles a new institutional body through which to 
influence our modern economy (Daly 1996:205). Limited though the role of the bible is, we 
believe that knowledge of its economics is necessary if religious resources are to be called 
upon to deal with economics intelligently (Gottwald 1993:341). The broad ethics that we will 
sketch out below is part of a much broader conversation and reflection on the economy of 
both a modern state and the world, and how this reflection can be a motivation for further 
reflection and scholarly research. We are continuing with the task of thinking in a systematic 
way about how the inadequacies and inequities within the post-colonial African economies, 
and indeed within the global economy, are to be understood and resolved. 
 
8.3 Liberation and formation of community 
 
The Exodus is the foundational tradition in the history of Israel (particularly when read from 
a Marxist perspective). It shaped the socio-political, economic and religious life of Israel for 
centuries to come, and even that of the Christian movement. In our reconstruction of the 
emergence of Israel in Canaan, we suggested that Israel burst onto the scene as an assortment 
of various groups from the underclasses that had each experienced its own type of “exodus” 
from its own “Pharaoh”. The Israelites are depicted variously as enslaved, exploited, 
impoverished, socially and politically disempowered and marginalised. According to the 
Exodus tradition, Yahweh heard the piercing cries of these lowly people and came down to 
liberate them. Yahweh is portrayed as a God who fights for and chooses those on the margins 
to be agents of Yahweh’s new creation. According to Miguel A. De La Torre (2002:160), the 
God of the Exodus is not some “abstract, impassive cosmic being that utterly transcends the 
human dilemma”, but is a God who actively enters human history to side with the oppressed 
and lead them personally towards the promised land of their liberation. Thus Yahweh is 
characterised by his preferential option for the oppressed and marginalised. That 
consequently has enormous implications for the way in which the emerging community 
structures itself and develops its laws, welfare systems and modes of protection (Miller 
2005:21). From now on, Yahweh’s concern for those on the margins becomes a central 
 
 
  282 
feature of the biblical narrative. As R.S. Sugirtharajah (2006:209) observes, Yahweh’s option 
for the oppressed as an integral element in the Exodus narrative, which has a foundational 
character for Israel, exercised a basic influence over virtually all the books of the bible.  
 
In Yahweh’s preferential option for those on the margins, Duchrow (1995:145) sees a 
difference with other deities of the rest of the ancient Near East, a difference that is relevant 
to our economic ethics. While they were the guarantors of the oppressive economic and 
political systems, by contrast, Yahweh was experienced as the one who liberates those 
oppressed and enslaved by the system (Duchrow 1995:145). Furthermore, unlike those other 
gods that tied themselves to a place, for example, a temple, a mountain or a city, Yahweh ties 
himself to a group of people from the margins. 
 
To the Exodus should be added the Mosaic covenant which provided the guiding principles 
for the socio-economic, political, and religious life of the emerging community. The laws of 
the Torah were intended to preserve the political and economic egalitarianism that Yahweh 
was creating as deliverer of Israel. Jonathan Sacks (2003:222) argues that the release of the 
Israelites from bondage was only the first stage on the journey to freedom. He sees the 
second stage as the making of a covenant with Yahweh, which changed them into a 
“covenant community”. The economics of this community, likewise, would become 
“covenant economics” (Horsley 2009). The Mosaic covenant is a central theme of the 
Deuteronomistic history. The actions of the Israelites, both ruler and ruled, are in this corpus 
evaluated according to their observance of the stipulations of the covenant. The classical 
prophets also pronounce Yahweh’s judgement on the upper classes for oppressing the 
peasants, in violation of the covenant. In the aftermath of the destruction of the temple, the 
various theological groups that reflected on the meaning of this catastrophe of unprecedented 
magnitude, attributed it to violation of the covenantal stipulations and so urged the dispersed 
and restored populations to learn from it so as to embark on a new beginning and be restored 
to their past glory. 
 
The origins of Yahwism are indissolubly linked to this Exodus-Mosaic covenant tradition. 
Mark Glanville (2017:2) observes that this covenant was all about creating a new community, 
under a new king. For Richard A. Horsley (2009:23), the most striking feature of the 
covenant is that it established a relationship between this emerging community and its 
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liberator God, Yahweh, a relationship that was inseparably political, economic and, by 
definition, religious.  The Exodus-Covenant episode dismantled the politics of oppression and 
exploitation and countered it with one of justice and compassion and simultaneously 
dismantled the economics of affluence and countered it with the economics of equality 
(Brueggemann 1980:16). According to Brueggemann (1980:16-17), the reality emerging out 
of the Exodus-Covenant tradition is not just a new religion or a new religious idea or a vision 
of freedom, but the emergence of a new social community that had to devise laws, patterns of 
governance and order, norms of right and wrong, and sanctions of accountability. The 
Israelites found themselves involved in the deliberate founding of a new social community in 
line with the vision of Yahweh’s freedom and discontinuous with Egypt and the Canaanite 
city-states. The program of the Exodus-Covenant was not the freeing of little groups of slaves 
as an escape from the empire as such, but as Brueggemann (1980:18-19) argues, it was an 
assault on the consciousness of the empire, aimed at nothing less than the dismantling of the 
empire both in its social practices and in its mythic pretensions. 
 
After the breakthrough from an oppressive system to a more egalitarian society of freedom, 
the formerly lower classes were made into a community whose cry was “liberty and justice 
for all” (Meeks 1989:4). James P. Bailey (2010:46) argues that prior to the Exodus, the 
various groups that came to form Israel, lacked a community. They were simply a dispersed 
group of people living on the margins. By liberating them and making a covenant with them, 
Yahweh made community life possible. That Yahweh went to such great lengths to establish 
a community, not just for a few of the elite, but for all of Israel, indicates that Yahweh 
intended community to be an essential part of human life. The resulting community was one 
that would stand at the opposite extreme to what they experienced in Egypt and under the 
city-states (Sacks 2003:222).  It was to become a community of mutual care that lives as a 
family. 
 
When Yahweh delivered the Hebrew slaves from Egypt and helped the exploited Canaanites 
to overthrow the city-state elites, it was not just a political liberation from enslavement, but 
was also an economic liberation from an exploitative economic order. Economic welfare is at 
the core of covenant life. Rebecca M. Blank (1992:15) observes that Yahweh leads the 
Israelites out of the oppressive “household” of Pharaoh (and that of the city-state elites) into 
freedom, establishing a new “household” of mutual support and a new economic system. 
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Douglas M. Meeks (1989:11) adds that what Yahweh’s household seeks to abolish is 
domination and exploitation, which prevents others from accessing what they need in life. 
Yahweh is concerned about the socio-economic welfare of the covenant people, free of 
exploitation and oppression by those who manage to consolidate political and economic 
power in their own hands (Horsley 2009:18). Thus the covenant focused on stipulations 
meant to keep them from sliding back into economic and political slavery. 
 
From this discussion, we can identify two things that were central to this foundational 
episode of Israel’s life, namely, the establishment of a community and Yahweh’s preference 
for those on the margins. Ancient Israel, henceforth, was to regard herself as a “covenant 
community” in a relationship with her liberator God, Yahweh, and since Yahweh had shown 
his love and preference of those on the margins of society, so were the Israelites to do 
likewise to the poor among them. In short, Israel was to live as a community with a 
preferential option for those on the margins. These two lie at the heart of the biblical 
economic ethics. They, as it were, set the tone for the nature of the community Israel was 
going to be. They were to be the characteristic traits of this covenant community.  
 
8.3.1 Communitarian living 
 
The form of economic order that the freed peasants felt charged to create can best be 
described as “communitarian”. Likewise the economic ethics was a communitarian ethics.  
Biblical economics more generally centres on the covenant in the sense that God-given 
economic rights are inseparably connected with public communal values (Horsley 2009: xvi). 
The covenantal ethos is basically a community ethos. According to Williams (1993:920), the 
existence of this new community was henceforth to be characterised by “communitarianism.” 
Consequently, the need for others, for community, was a constitutive dimension of the human 
person (Williams 1993:920). Brueggemann (2009:6) argues that the formation of the 
community was an invitation away from autonomy to covenantal existence that binds the self 
to the holy, faithful God and to neighbours who are members in a common economy. The 
Israelites were summoned to live as a community of mutual care where every member could 
flourish, especially the most vulnerable. It was a community that, because of its past 
experiences, was to ensure that none of its members lacked the basics for survival. Each one 
was responsible for the other in that one family. According to Sacks (2003:222), it was a 
community premised on רִדק (tzedakah). What רִדק signified is that no one should be 
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lacking of the basic necessities of life, and that those who had more than they needed ought to 
share with those who had less or nothing (Sachs 2003:222). Thus sharing was at the heart of 
the economic life of the covenant community and is consequently at the core of biblical 
ethics. Whatever resources were in the community were for the benefit of the whole 
community. 
 
James C. Scott (cited in Horsley 2009:30) has studied peasant societies and observed what he 
calls “the moral economy of the peasant”. This refers to the cooperative arrangements of 
sharing resources, mutual aid and the spreading of risk among villagers in agricultural 
societies (Horsley 2009:30). He notes that standard across peasant societies are social 
pressures on the better-off families to share their resources with the less fortunate neighbours 
and to sponsor community celebrations and projects (Horsley 2009:36). Such moral 
obligations and expectations are often rooted in religion, as the commands of the deities. He 
sees the same obtaining in ancient Israel. The covenantal law codes of Israel were vigorous in 
encouraging generous lending to needy neighbours. This was strongly rooted in the spirit of 
sharing and cooperation engendered in peasant communities. The sharing and cooperation 
that enabled needy families to remain economically viable was the result of commitment to 
communal values represented in the covenant with Yahweh. The covenant society was 
charged with the responsibility of securing the economic rights of its members to an adequate 
living. In this way the covenant community of Israel was to be kept intact. Communal 
interdependence and mutual liability stand at the core of biblical economics. 
 
Patrick D. Miller (2005) studied the Ten Commandments and observed that they offer a 
definition of the community that seeks the good of all. He writes: 
 
The commandments create, in effect, a defining community. By its structure, the 
questions of values and norms, the patterns of interaction among members and in 
relation to others, and the fundamental definition of one’s self are determined as 
provided by the Ten Words. The very definition of the community and the identity of 
its individual members are all wrapped in and shaped by the moral space provided by 
the commandments (Miller 2005:32).  
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He further noted that the way in which they provide a structure and space for the moral life is 
not in terms of rights but in terms of responsibilities (Miller 2005:20). Their positioning is 
always towards the other. He also noted that while the rights of the individual are assumed, 
however, the way to those rights is always by way of obligation to the neighbour (Miller 
2005:20). He concluded that the preference of responsibility (for the other) over (individual) 
rights is inherent to the vision of the common good of the Ten Commandments. 
 
Glanville (2016) also sees the biblical significance of community in the book of 
Deuteronomy. For him, over and above addressing the individual, Deuteronomy goes further 
to offer a vision for the whole society. It does not merely challenge injustice, but rather brings 
the whole of human life within the scope of the covenant life. As God’s people learn to love 
Yahweh, embracing Yahweh’s life-giving rule in the Torah, they will live as family in 
thanksgiving, joy, justice, and generosity (Glanville 2016). 
 
8.3.2 Concern for the margins  
 
Just as Yahweh had pity on those on the margins and swiftly moved to rescue them, the 
biblical text is clear, so the covenant community that God creates must have a preferential 
option for those who have fallen through the cracks of the economy - the vulnerable and 
marginalised among them. From the Pentateuch, through the writings to the prophets, the 
Hebrew Bible states over and over again that Yahweh, the God of the covenant, has a special 
concern for those who are poor, downtrodden, marginalised and oppressed. The Exodus 
tradition explicitly shows that justice means siding with the oppressed and those on the 
margins. Yahweh listened to the voice of the poor and excluded slaves and liberated them; 
therefore Yahweh’s redeemed people should open their ears and show the same 
responsiveness towards the poor and marginalised in their midst (Ex 22: 21; 23:9).  
 
8.3.2.1 The law and ethics 
 
There are numerous pro-poor laws and regulations throughout the Pentateuch and there are 
also measures throughout the Hebrew Bible specifically intended to help the poor, the 
enslaved, the impoverished and the dispossessed, and to protect them from further 
dehumanisation and give them a semblance of dignity. Laws favouring the weaker members 
of society reveal the ethos of the Exodus tradition wherein Yahweh rescues helpless slaves; 
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thus the poor and vulnerable Israelites were given the identity of brothers and sisters to 
encourage society to care for them (Meeks 1989:75). The Torah intends to ground laws that 
defend the poor, for it is only in defending these that order and justice can be realised in this 
community (Meeks 1989:75). The protection of the weak and oppressed was from the start 
not understood as a sociological or “social ethical” problem, but as a theological one 
(Duchrow 1995:147). Meeks (1989:75) argues that the fact that Israel rooted the defence of 
the poor in theology (that is, in regard for God’s being and acts) rather than in the mere 
concern for order explains why its laws sought to afford greater protection for the poor than 
did those of her neighbours.  
 
There are three principal groups of the poor which the laws and prophets say must be given 
special care and protection: the stranger, widow and orphan. Other vulnerable groups include 
the Levites, slaves, hired labourers and disabled persons. The community of Israel is 
commanded to tend to the needs of these personae miserabiles and to ensure that they get 
their fair share of the community's resources. The stranger or the resident alien, אשוב הג, (ger 
toshav) was someone who, for any reason, was displaced from their own land and found 
refuge in the tents of another clan or village (von Waldow 1970:186; Glanville 2016). For 
Wafawanaka (2012:41), the picture of the אשוב הג in the three law codes is of someone who is 
poor, vulnerable to oppression, dependent and in need of communal caring. Thus the law 
codes endeavour to protect the הג by appealing to the nation’s historical conscience (they 
were once aliens in Egypt), an experience which should make Israel identify, and therefore 
sympathise, with the אשוב הג among them (Wafawanaka 2012:37). Due to his insecurity and 
vulnerability, the law stipulates that he should be accorded special protection. Eberhard H.  
von Waldow (1970:186) argues that although this did not make the הג a person of equal 
rights, but at least it assured him the protection of an ethical rule which was sanctified by the 
tradition.   
 
Both the widow and the fatherless (orphan) lacked a male provider and protector. They could 
thus be easily excluded and exploited. In the law codes, Yahweh establishes a particular order 
in the community where הג, widows and orphans become a kind of "tabu-person" put under 
the special protection of God so that oppressing them gives offense to Yahweh (von Waldow 
1970:189). In the Deuteronomic Code, the הג is mentioned especially with the widows and 
orphans, but also with other lower classes in need of special protection, hired labourers and 
Levites. The formulaic expression “alien, orphan and widow” is characteristic of the book of 
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Deuteronomy (e.g. 10:18; 27:19; 24:17). The predominant picture in the Deuteronomic Code 
is that the הג, alongside the fatherless and the widow, are in such a precarious economic 
condition as to deserve the generosity of others. The Levites seem to have lost their means of 
subsistence due to the closure of the sanctuaries in the countryside (cf. Deut 12:lff.). The 
Deuteronomic Code contains the prime example of Deuteronomy’s famous humanitarian 
provisions for the poor and disadvantaged (Wafawanaka 2012:37). 
 
The law codes contain various measures of protecting these vulnerable groups. The wages of 
the אשוב הג and the other poor are to be paid on the same day before sunset because 
withholding them would worsen their predicament (Deut 24:14-15). There is a prohibition on 
charging interest on loans to the poor (Ex 22:25; cf. Deut 23: 19-20). If a family member or 
neighbour is in dire straits, it is prohibited to make a profit out of their misfortune The 
widow's garment should not be taken in pledge (Deut 24:17). A brother is supposed to marry 
his brother’s widow and raise children (Deut 25:5-10). This comes with economic 
responsibilities, that way she will have someone to provide for her. The הג and the orphan are 
not to be denied justice (24:17). A special ordinance was imposed against forsaking the 
Levite within their towns (Deut 12:19; 14:27). The widow and the fatherless are not to be ill-
treated (Ex 22:22-24). The corners of the field, the gleanings and the fallen grapes are to be 
left behind for the הג, the orphan and the widow (Deut 24:19-22). That way, the poor are 
given access into Yahweh’s economy of life through the right to share in the harvest. The 
first fruits of the soil shall be eaten by the whole nation, including the Levites and the הג 
(Deut 26:1-11). The tithe collected in the third year shall be for the הג, orphans, widows and 
Levites (Deut 26:12-15). That meant the poor ones, those who have nothing to tithe and 
accordingly cannot afford their own meals, are the guests at these meals. These verses show 
the importance of availing the goods of God’s blessings to all members of the community.  
 
One of the most compelling mechanisms meant to make the exploited cope was the 
introduction of the Jubilee Year, רמְהש (shemitah) (Lev 25:8-55, Deut 15:12-15). The 
humanitarian trait of this idealistic legislation is obvious. It proclaimed debt forgiveness or 
cancellation, liberty from bondage, and return of property to its original owners, in the forty-
ninth or roughly fiftieth year. That way it prevented the continuous accumulation of wealth or 
debt. According to Brian Griffiths (2003:163), an important consequence of the return of the 
land and property to the owners during the רמְהש was that each family regained a position in 
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the economic life of the community. The Jubilee offered a new beginning, a second chance, 
and a path to recovery for those who had lost their land and freedom due to unbearable 
interest rates. The idea was to periodically restore a level playing field, a clean slate, and give 
those who had been forced to sell either their labour or their holdings of land a chance to 
begin again (Sachs 2003:224). It was a measure meant to prevent the development of a 
permanent underclass. For the law codes, there must be no irreversible poverty and no 
unlimited acquisition of lands and houses. The purpose of the commandment, according to 
Brueggemann (2009:6), was to subordinate “money matters” to the future of the 
neighbourhood.  
 
The Sabbath day (Ex 23:12) was another measure of remedying the miseries of the poor. On 
that day, the slave and the הג were to take a break and rest and be refreshed from hard toil. 
Sacks (2003:222) avers that on that day, all “economic and political hierarchies were 
suspended.” The primary function of the Sabbath was to protect the most vulnerable from 
harsh and exploitative labour practices. The issue was no longer how to prevent people from 
being impoverished, but, rather, how to ease the fate of the poor fellow citizens (von Waldow 
1970:189). 
 
This brief survey of the legal codes, across their redactional histories, has shown that their 
concern was to maintain the dignity of those on the margins in what was already a crushing 
situation. These laws intended to create a support mechanism for these groups which would 
help them from becoming too poor. The responsibility to alleviate the plight of those on the 
margins fell on those who had the capacity and resources to ensure that such a move from 
dependency to Yahweh’s household of good living was carried out. The laws were designed 
to protect these vulnerable groups from further abuse and exploitation. The authoritativeness 
of these laws lies in that they were mandated by Yahweh. Von Waldow (1970:189) suggests 
that the pro-poor laws must be considered within the context of the relationship between 
Yahweh and Israel:  
 
They are part of the religion of Israel. To pull them out of this relationship would 
make them nothing else than common humanism or general moral laws.  
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Yahweh is presented as having special concern for those on the margins. Just as Yahweh 
delivered them from bondage and oppression, Yahweh expects redeemed Israel to be aware 
of this marvellous deed in their relations with the poor among them. 
 
8.3.2.2 Prophetic vision of economic justice 
 
One of the most striking characteristics of the message of the prophets in the Hebrew Bible, 
according to De La Torre (2002:161), is the connection they make between Yahweh’s 
judgement and the nation’s neglect of those who are most marginalised. Horsley (2009:68) 
adds that the core of the message of the classical prophets is Yahweh’s denunciation of the 
elites for violating the covenant by their ruthless repression and oppression of the poor. This 
they saw as having no place in Yahweh’s household. The prophets recognise the deteriorating 
social and economic condition of the poor and match it against the will of God, which was 
from the beginning, the basis of the social order in Israel. They use the contradictions they 
see as a foundation for the disaster pronounced by Yahweh (von Waldow 1970:203).  
 
For the prophets, poverty is not something that is beyond explanation. Quite the contrary, it is 
a situation that human beings have created through greed, exploitation, dishonest and 
unethical business practices, as well as other forms of injustice. To them, poverty does not 
just happen, but it happens because people make it happen (Wafawanaka 2012:161). They 
attribute its existence to the exploitation and oppression of the poor and powerless by the rich 
and powerful landowners. The poor are battling a system that is designed to keep them in 
perpetual poverty. The lavish lifestyles of the rich are achieved at the expense of the peasants. 
According to Leslie Hoppe (cited in Wafawanaka 2012:109), for the prophets, poverty is an 
evil created by the wealthy who engage in immoral practices to enrich themselves in land and 
property. 
 
The prophets proclaimed Yahweh’s horror at a covenant community in which wealth and 
luxury were built on the backs of those who suffered economic misery. What enraged their 
God was that a small segment of the supposed covenant community lived in complacency, 
blind to the plight of their fellow countrymen and women, enjoying the security of wealth 
accumulated through a social structure designed to enrich themselves at the expense of the 
majority (De La Torre 2002:163). The prophetic assessment was that it is unjust that in the 
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middle of plenty, some have nothing while others have everything. Most importantly, they 
argued that the abundance going to the rich had been gained from the well-calculated 
exploitation and oppression of the poor. The orthodox position regarding poverty in ancient 
Israel was that it was a mark of having sinned. The prophets turned it up-side-down, arguing 
that it was a result of being sinned against. The poor are thus the source of the fortune that 
has been appropriated from them by the rich. Consequently, justice is guaranteed only when 
what has been stolen from those on the margins of society is returned to them (Hobgood 
2000:68). Those who obstruct others from getting justice; who treat others unjustly (the 
wicked), will also reap what they deserve. 
 
In the prophetic literature, the economy is seen from the perspective of the poor and those in 
need. The prophets acted as advocates and spokespersons for the poor and oppressed. They 
gave a voice to the silent poor peasants whose voice had been silenced by economic 
developments, by articulating their cause so eloquently. They proclaimed that God identifies 
with those who suffer under unjust structures. They deliberately took the side of the poor, 
warning of the dangers of wealth.  
 
Instead of hoarding, they demanded sharing of Yahweh’s blessings with those on the weaker 
side of the power equation. In Yahweh’s household, the hoarding of wealth cannot be 
justified in the face of grinding poverty for the majority. According to Mary Elizabeth 
Hobgood (2000:68), while the prophets can rightfully be critiqued for their negative images 
of women and warrior-like images of God, their class analysis is compelling. She adds that 
prophets derided religious practices that had lost touch with a God who had enabled ordinary 
people to triumph over the claims of entrenched ruling elites (Hobgood 2000:68). Yahweh’s 
concern is on the socio-economic welfare of the people, free from exploitation and 
oppression by those who consolidate political-economic power in their own hands. In all 
biblical literature, the prophets are the most vicious critics of the socio-economic situation. 
Their oracles call for justice and they appear to have shaped the social consciousness of the 
law codes (Wafawanaka 2012:109).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  292 
 
8.4 Money-theism has come to stay: biblical critique of global neo-
liberalism 
 
From the foregoing discussion we can identify perspectives emerging from the biblical 
understanding of economics that will orient our reflection on and can be an ingredient in 
shaping our contemporary economic system. The perspectives from the law codes and the 
prophets provide the base for and shape our overall perspective on economic ethics. The bible 
is thus powerfully generative in imagining an alternative economic system (Brueggemann 
2009:6). The ethics that is informed by the prophets and law codes is one that underscores the 
importance of community and urges for a preferential option for the poor. It is an ethics that 
is both local and global, and at both levels, community and preferential option for those on 
the margins are central. 
 
The various human sub-systems and institutions, including the economy, exist for the sake of 
the human community, not the other way round. This seems to have been the view of the 
prophets and the spirit behind the law codes. The relationship between humanity and the 
economy as shown in ancient monarchic Israel as well as in contemporary Zimbabwe, and 
indeed in any modern society that is in free market capitalism based on neo-liberal 
economics, seems to suggest that humanity is at the service of the economy. Instead of the 
economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic 
system (Daly and Cobb 1994:8). In this understanding, humanity and all about it count for 
nothing; the only goal is increased production and maximisation of profits. Free market 
ideology puts profit before and above people. It is a system driven towards expansion and 
unending accumulation of wealth, resulting in the commodification of all life, a situation in 
which all the values and choices of life are transmogrified into commodities exchanged in 
line with market forces (Childs 2000:5). In a pure market economy, nothing has value unless 
it has a price tag. In its drive for efficiency, the non-economic goal of economics is forgotten. 
Efficiency increases the predominance of purely economic ideas at the expense of other 
values, and subjects everything else to the economy (Moeller 2004:15).  
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The Gross National Product (GNP) and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that the system uses 
to measure economic growth do not reveal how the quality of life is faring under prevailing 
economic conditions. They do not show how the income is distributed, that is, whether the 
benefits of that growth are shared widely among the population or restricted to a tiny elite 
(Litonjua 2013:95). Numerous studies show that the quest for aggregate growth has in fact 
worsened the lives of millions of the world’s population. According to M.D. Litonjua 
(2013:98), it is evident that a rising tide of growth lifts yachts while capsizing and sinking 
smaller boats. 
 
In global neo-liberal capitalism, human beings are seen in relation to their commercial value. 
They are turned into mere commodities to be used and disposed of. Neoliberal capitalism 
commodifies and commercialises human life and everything it touches, without moral 
moorings, without human values and considerations, without humane intentions and 
aspirations (Litonjua 2013:104). When human meaning is based purely on the material, the 
role and place of material things is perverted, making material things primary within human 
life rather than subservient to larger questions of meaning associated with love, trust, and 
flourishing (Day 2016:43). Social values that should sustain social relationships, such as 
human dignity, mutual respect, and personal worth, become meaningless. Every social good 
is transferred into a commodity. Michael Walzer (1993:120) calls this “market imperialism.” 
Worshiping the market values such as hyper-competition and commodification mirrors what 
Day (2016:43) calls a “perverted anthropology,” the human self is defined by material things 
rather than by the inherent human dignity and worth that streams out of being made imago 
dei.   
 
Under neo-liberal capitalism, money has assumed total power and has become the focal point 
around which everything else seems to revolve. As Metropolitan Geevarghese Mor Coorilos 
(2010:66) asserts, “Money-theism has come to stay.” The current global order creates a 
craving for more and more money, possessions, power, privilege and pleasure and in the end 
people become dehumanised by deifying these. In a system that regards property as a symbol 
of status, influence, and power, one’s possessions constitute her sense of self and identity 
(Day 2016:46). The more one has, the more powerful and socially validated one feels (Childs 
2000:111). Without a clear sense of self, a strong identity, and a community of purpose, it 
seems our default mode is to identify ourselves with the things that we own (Wallis 2011:48).  
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The market and its values become idols as people exceedingly direct their energy towards 
earning and accumulating financial and social capital in order to find meaning and worth, and 
be successful and happy (Day 2016:42). People seem to worship those who are “successful” 
within society - such as celebrities, politicians and even charismatic pastors - to the point of 
wishing to be like them (Day 2016:42). These have substituted real heroes. We are in no short 
supply of stories of millionaires and billionaires who seem to have no other passion or 
motivation in life than to amass money and assets as quickly and as much as they can (Wallis 
2011:41-42). The power that wealth creates, allows the rich to influence the rules of 
economic life in ways that extend that power. 
 
While the owner possesses those riches, she is, in a way, also possessed by them insofar as 
they offer her a sense of identity and status. Thus, if I am what I possess, then my worth is 
reduced to a thing, a mere commodity (Day 2016:46). Human dignity does not feature at all 
in the vocabulary of neo-liberal capitalism. Pope Francis calls this a “liquid economy” in 
which financial flows matter more than people, in which technical efficiency and productivity 
trump human dignity (The Catholic Community Television Network, 13 September 2016). 
The financial bottom line is seen as more important than the human bottom line and figures 
matter more than human beings (The Catholic Community Television Network, 13 
September 2016).  
 
Economic expansion in this system has been increasingly driven by greed. By its very nature, 
the current global neo-liberal capitalist system promotes and tolerates greed. In its various 
manifestations, greed has a toxic effect on everything from personal relationships to the 
distribution of goods through to the environment (Childs 2000:v). It is not difficult to 
understand why the wealthy think they do not yet have enough, and those with less imitate 
the ravenously greedy super-rich, so that there is collusion between those who have much and 
want more and those who have little but long for much (Brueggemann 2009:6). Egoism and 
the desire for more and more possessions, either for enjoyment or as a status symbol is at the 
root of the unjust distribution of wealth and of the exploitation of the poor. Greed is often 
associated with excessive self-concern and excessive self-aggrandisement. In its drive to 
produce, acquire, spend and hoard, greed manifests itself in unbridled competitiveness. It 
thrives on callous competition and egoism (Dibeela 2008:191). As Musa W Dube (2000:615) 
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argues, it is characterised by the ethics of “competitiveness, domination and indifference” as 
opposed to the ethics of cooperation, solidarity and compassion. To be Number One is more 
important than anything or anyone else. 
 
At the heart of neo-liberal capitalism lies the selfish craving to make more and more profit, 
even at the expense of others. Greed breeds selfishness and greed excludes; other people are 
not seen as human beings, but as cost factors (Prank 2010:27). The neighbour is seen as the 
object of exploitation. Greed is a mind-set that prevents a person from seeing beyond the self, 
and everything else is valued and evaluated only in terms of possession (Filibus 2010:48). As 
a result, this greed-based culture impoverishes human life, erodes the moral and ecological 
fabric of human civilisation and intoxicates our psyche with materialism (Perera 2010:216). 
In its most polished form, greed involves not only the hoarding of money and material goods 
but also of political power and prestige.  
 
The high priests and imams of neo-liberal globalisation argue that the market, and only it, 
should be the organising principle of society. It is argued that we must follow the market 
wherever it leads us, because it will guide us to a better future for all. Left to its own devices, 
the logic goes, the market will conduct itself in a perfect manner and, in fact, only it can 
provide the moral framework in which everything else ought to operate (Wallis 2011:118). 
That way, the free market is the sovereign god who operates by means of the “invisible hand” 
to ensure that everyone gets their due. In reality, the oft-repeated notion that the market is 
“free” is a myth. Actually, there is no such thing as a “free market.” It is just a system driven 
by some powerful people who want to run the world unbridled (Filibus 2010:47). 
 
The market has acquired an autonomy of its own, accountable only to itself, not to the wider 
global population. It has literally become like Yahweh, the jealous God of Deuteronomy, who 
allows for no competitors; not just one superior deity fighting against other deities for 
supremacy but the Supreme Deity, the one and only true God, whose rule must be universally 
accepted (Cox 1999). Or as Jim Wallis (2011:26) notes, the market has become our “golden 
calf,” our idol of ultimate allegiance. It is the market now that has all the qualities formerly 
attributed to God - all-knowing, all-present, all-powerful, even eternal - unable to be resisted 
or even questioned (Wallis 2011:28). It and it alone, knows what we need, what we want, 
how much we should pay for it, and how much we should get paid for selling it to others. 
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Like a god to be feared and worshipped, we can even know the market’s “moods” on a daily 
basis. We hear that the market is “anxious”, “relieved”, “jittery”, or even “jubilant,” and like 
the devouring gods of pre-modern times, the markets must be fed and kept happy all the time 
(Cox 1999).  
 
However, the claim that the “invisible hand” of the market a priori functions for the well-
being of all citizens and guarantees constant progress, is now just a myth that has been 
refuted by reality (Küng 1997:174). It is a fallacy to argue that when the market is allowed to 
do its work (without any interference from external forces, such as, government), then the 
poor have the chance to get out of poverty. Actually, a self-regulating market is an oxymoron. 
That the privatised and competitively unrestrained market is capable of governing itself is a 
false ideology (Filibus 2010:50). All evidence points to the contrary. Deficiencies in market 
processes and outcomes underscore the point that the market cannot be left to operate on its 
own without oversight or without clearly defined boundaries (Barrera 2011:211). The idea of 
the free market is deceit and hypocrisy; the assumption is not just questionable, it is seriously 
misleading. The 2008 global financial crisis effectively debunked the neo-liberal economic 
myth that deregulated financial markets are “efficient” (Kobia 2010:15). It not only shook the 
foundations of the global economy but more importantly, it questioned our belief in endless 
economic growth. It was government intervention that brought the world back from the verge 
of the abyss of another great depression. The US government intervened to save the market 
from itself (Litonjua 2013:104). Free market capitalism becomes a beast which first devours 
the poor and then itself (Brubaker 2010:35). By bailing out troubled banks, the injustice of 
the system was made evident - the poor were fundamentally subsidising the rich. To use the 
prophet Isaiah’s perspective, the crisis points to a trust and dependence on the work of human 
hands.  
 
Markets by their very nature are transactional, not moral; they are about prices, not values 
(Wallis 2011:111). As such a market is a wrong place to look for answers about morality. It is 
not designed to regulate itself or rid itself from sin. To believe in a market that does not need 
regulation from outside, a market that is exclusively capable of regulating itself, is to believe 
in essence, in a market that is not subject to human fallibility, folly and sin (Wallis 
2011:188). A pure market system leaves no room for ethics. It is about service to an 
impersonal, objective goal: that of making money (Duchrow 1995:122). The name of this 
reality is greed and greed begets evil and evil leads humans and other living beings to 
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destruction and death (Yong-Bock 2010:202). The market knows neither justice nor mercy, 
but rewards the strong (efficient) and punishes the weak (inefficient) (Moeller 2004:17). For 
the market, means are not important. What is important is the end. The end can even justify 
the means. It is not a moral agent in and of itself but a collective of market participants. It is 
not an organised group of moral agents, but a random aggregation of individuals in search of 
welfare-enhancing exchanges with one another (Barrera 2011:211). 
 
Neo-liberal global capitalism excludes and leaves behind more people than it takes along. 
Entire populations that cannot fit into the system are left in the lurch (Childs Jr 2000:4). It 
excludes large segments of the population from productively contributing to and benefiting 
from socio-economic life. As Cardinal Turkson notes, those excluded are no longer society’s 
underside or its fringes or its disenfranchised - they are no longer even a part of it. The 
excluded are not the “exploited” but the outcast, the “leftovers” (The Catholic Community 
Television Network, 13 September 2016).  Instead of extricating themselves out of structural 
poverty, many will pass it on to their children.   
 
Left to themselves market economies lead to serious inequalities of income and wealth which 
distort the market by directing scarce resources to what the rich want and away from the basic 
necessities of the poor (Grenholm 2004:52). The system furthers the gap between the super-
rich and those who have nothing except their lives to cling on to. The middle gets 
increasingly squeezed and those at the bottom are completely forgotten. The world’s poor do 
not exist in the minds of the wealthy and even if they live around the corner, they seem very 
far away and dispensable. The free market is designed to benefit a few and exploit billions, it 
is designed to privilege those who are already privileged (Dube 2000:616). Left on their own, 
market processes do trap the poor in a cycle of poverty. By their internal logic of “survival of 
the fittest and fastest” market processes are self-destructive in that genuine vibrant 
competition is ultimately replaced by monopolies or by oligopolies at best (Barrera 
2011:210). The winners in this economic set-up are enjoying their sweet victory while the 
losers (the poor) feel powerless and hopeless as the world market monster gets mightier by 
the day. 
 
The contemporary global economic order encourages people to pursue individual self-interest 
at the expense of community and neighbourliness (Goudzwaard and de Lange 1995:122). 
Those at the bottom of the ladder are forced to live as less than humans. The poor are pushed 
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into destitution, starvation and hopelessness. Scenes of people living in shacks and of people 
searching rubbish dumps for food are testimony to this. Weber captures its essence well when 
he argues that capitalism is “masterless slavery” where the masters are made invisible behind 
the mechanism of the market (Duchrow 1995:214). The paradox is that while we live in a 
world that is increasingly interconnected because of the wonders of modern technology, we 
seem to be drifting further and further apart from each other as human beings (Wafawanaka 
2012:xix). The irony of human progress is the increase in levels of poverty; it is deep poverty 
in the midst of lavish wealth. Undreamt of personal wealth exists side-by-side with the most 
abject poverty (Goudzwaard and de Lange 1995:1). We would expect that as material 
affluence increases, poverty would be reduced rather than increased. 
 
At the global level, this economic order has also increased the gap between developed and 
developing nations. Neo-liberal globalisation is not a system of mutual advantage, but one in 
which developed states have imposed and continue to impose economic policies that 
disadvantage developing states (Shapcott 2010:214). In this global order, the distribution of 
goods and services remains a one-way traffic in favour of the rich and powerful. The 
wealthier nations impose an unjust institutional order which consistently disadvantages and 
harms the poorer nations. In short, the global economic set up is immoral, exploitative and 
causes a great deal of suffering in the developing world. Far from it being a solution to 
ending poverty, the contemporary economic system has actually become an obstacle to the 
eradication of poverty. 
 
We are not, however, unaware of the good that the market has done in transforming human 
lives for the better. The market can indeed be a good thing and even necessary. But it now 
commands too much, claims ultimate significance, controls too much space in our lives, and 
has gone far beyond its proper limits (Wallis 2011:28). It has assumed religious dimensions. 
In the market, we have substituted moral values for “market value” and all that is good and 
right is attributed to the power of the market. It has replaced the practice of citizenship with 
the rituals of consumption, and the identity of the consumer has replaced the identity of the 
citizen (Wallis 2011:26). The market has outdone everything else and replaced much of the 
moral space of society, evening questioning the value of having “moral space” where the 
market does not reach (Wallis 2011:26). Neoliberalism has, in all intents and purposes, 
created not only a market economy, but a “market society” (Litonjua 2013:104). 
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It is, therefore, an undeniable fact that the present market oriented economic system benefits 
only a tiny minority and worsens the plight of the majority. An economic order that operates 
in such a way as to push the majority to the margins of society and keeps them from fully 
participating in community, and thus, from fully experiencing their humanity, is an economy 
of death which has reached a point where it must be renewed (Bailey 2010:47). The 
prevailing global economic system is a totalitarian, plutocratic and therefore undemocratic 
system. It is a system of terror characterised by survival of the fittest and fastest. It is a 
distortion of human life which has led the world to the brink of abyss.  
 
It is a system based on fear, exploitation and greed. The free-market economy has failed to 
achieve a democratic and socially just allocation of global resources (Tourres 2010:115). The 
forces of selfishness in the global economy have all but removed the possibility of appeal to 
our neighbour. It is a system that creates individuals at the expense of community and 
represents the victory of individualism over community (Childs 2000:89). It creates what J F 
Freie (cited in Childs 2000:111) refers to as “counterfeit communities”, arrangements that 
give the illusion of community but are not at all genuine. It is anti-people and anti-community 
and as such should be rejected. It enslaves people to greed, accumulation and consumption 
rather than to communal share and care. Clearly the modern economy needs an “exodus” 
from its own modern day “Pharaohs” who include transnational corporations such as banks, 
the media, governments of Western states, as well as the Bretton Woods institutions, that 
dominate and criss-cross it in their race to the top for more and more power and profits. The 
current crisis in the global economy is an opportunity ripe for an exodus from this parasitic 
system of anxious acquisitiveness that is rooted in autonomy. Under this system, which is 
continuously sowing the seeds of its own destruction and now seriously under siege, the 
continued existence of all forms of life on earth is threatened. Meanwhile, those who hold the 
keys of the system continue to amass more and more of the world’s wealth. 
 
8.5 Economy at the service of life 
 
The foregoing critique of global neo-liberal capitalism has brought to the fore the urgency of 
an alternative economic order, an economy at the service of life. From now on we look at the 
substance of the inclusive economic ethic, the normative ethical guidelines of what an 
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economy at the service of humanity ought to be. The two notions of community and 
preferential option for the poor, as inspired by the prophets and law codes, are at the heart of 
this ethics.  
 
8.5.1 Homo economicus as person-in-community 
 
In the face of an economic globalisation that reduces human beings to their value in the 
market, a political globalisation that marginalises them from effective access to power, and a 
cultural globalisation that rides roughshod over the communal patterns by which people make 
meaning and give expression to their values and beliefs, it is crucial that we advocate an 
ethics that puts human dignity at the centre, and emphasises the importance of the human 
community for the full realisation of individual member’s potential (Himes 2008:275). A 
biblically inspired ethics views a person as a person-in-community and likewise, human life 
is life-in-community (United States Conference of Catholic Bishops [USCCB] 1986:16). 
Every individual has the right to community. Human dignity can be realised and protected 
only in community and it is in community that one finds fulfilment as a human being (Himes 
2008:275. In contrast to the dominant global neo-liberal autonomous and separate “I”, this 
alternative view sees the self as essentially in-relation-to-others and thus “I”, as a self-in-
relation, am in some real sense also a “we”’ (Hobgood 2000:21). We argue strongly that 
human beings are more appropriately understood as persons-in-communities rather than as 
individuals-in-markets (Cobb 1994:8). The individualistic view of homo economicus which 
regards society as an aggregate of individuals should be substituted by a view of homo 
economicus as person-in-community (Daly and Cobb 1994:159). Instead of defining 
competing individuals as its starting point, the new economy will be based around “the 
person in community.” We can go a step further and consider humankind as one big family. 
 
Meeks (1989:12) argues that there is in reality no such thing as a radically individual and 
isolated human being. He adds that we are human as a result of being constituted by our 
relationships with the other members of our human communities (Meeks 1989:12). We come 
into being through these relationships and we do not have an identity apart from them (Daly 
and Cobb 1994:161). We are who we are in relationship to others. In other words, who we are 
comes into being socially. Community is not an option for humanity; rather it is part and 
parcel of the essence of being human. 
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If a human being is human only in a community, then it follows that the role of the economy, 
and indeed any other social institution, is to be at the service of the human community. The 
real end of economic activity, argue Thomas A. Klein and Gene R. Laczniak (2009:235), is 
the development of the entire human community, especially those members who are at the 
bottom of the pile. This, as we saw, is in line with biblical ethics that conceives the world as a 
“site of struggle” for the realisation of a community in which all members will have a secure 
and fulfilling place (Gottwald 1993:341). According to Gottwald, the communitarian 
yardstick - which is the biblical measure of political economy - is whether that mode of 
production, and the power relations governing it, build up the whole community, providing it 
basic services and creating opportunities to realise the life possibilities of the greatest number 
of people (emphasis added) (Gottwald 1993:361). The goal of economy is the building up of 
communities, rather than the expansion of markets. An economy which allows that to happen 
is a just economy. A just economic system builds, strengthens and enhances human 
communities; it is inclusive, involving all able members in responsible, participatory, and 
economically rewarding activity (Blank 1992:39). Our economic systems ought to recognise 
this common humanity and thus give all members of the human community access to 
material necessities of life. The Second Vatican Council of the Catholic bishops noted: 
 
… the subject, and the goal of all social institutions is and must be the human person 
which, for its part and by its very nature, stands completely in need of social life. This 
social life is not something added on to man. Hence, through his dealings with others, 
through reciprocal duties, and through fraternal dialogue, he develops all his gifts and 
is able to rise to his destiny  (Gaudium et Spes, Para. 25). 
 
Two decades later, the United States Catholic Bishops summed it up thus: 
 
The dignity of the human person, realised in community with others, is the criterion 
against which all aspects of economic life must be measured… Economic life must 
serve and support this dignity which needs to be realised in relationship and solidarity 
with others. To be human is to hear the call to community… Human wisdom and 
experience confirm this religious conviction that human life is essentially 
communitarian… Wherever our economic arrangements fail to conform to the 
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demands of human dignity lived in community, they must be questioned and 
transformed (USCCB 1986:8). 
 
Simple justice then, demands the setting up of minimum levels of involvement in the life of 
the community for all its members. Justice demands that social institutions be organised in a 
way that ensures that all human beings can participate actively in the economic, political, and 
cultural life of their community (USCCB 1986:18). A just economic order is one in which 
every member in society has an equal chance to reach their full potential as a human being. 
Social justice means that human beings ought to be active and productive participants in the 
life of society and that society in turn has an obligation to enable them to participate in this 
way (USCCB 1986:17). Injustice is for a person or a group of persons to be treated as if they 
do not belong to their community, by being denied the opportunities for such participation. 
 
Our understanding of the role of economics in society tallies well with the original meaning 
of οἰκονομία, which refers to the “management of a household.” The implication of 
οἰκονομία is that economics is deeply embedded in communal relationships (Childs 2000:64). 
The economy of the household is planned specifically to provide the basic needs of all the 
members of the household. Meeting basic human needs is the prime goal of an economy. It is 
therefore imperative, argues Duchrow (1995:231), that the focus of the economy be shifted 
from money accumulation to meeting people’s needs. In the alternative economic system we 
propose, human beings are players, not economic objects. What is needed is a community 
that shapes an economy, rather than expect an economy to generate a community according 
to its own values and principles. The economy should be a servant of the community rather 
than the community being dissipated by economic forces. If our approach is centred on 
community, then markets are only important because of the benefits that they bring. Seeing 
the economy as embedded in communal relationships means seeing it as just one among 
many “orders” in human society, such as, politics, religion and culture, all of which are 
interrelated for the purpose of serving its general well-being (Childs 2000:96). The economy 
is only a sub-system of society, alongside other sub-systems, all of which are indissolubly 
connected. It does not travel on a separate pathway from all other institutions, neither does it 
move in a separate orbit. Rather, it is tightly woven together with the other “orders” of life. 
This is the economics of the household - οἰκονομία - the economics of community which 
looks at economic activity in relation to all aspects integral to human community (Childs 
2000:88).  
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The problem, notes Hans Küng (1997:211), is that the sub-system of the market economy 
under global neo-liberal capitalism, has in fact been elevated to become the total system, so 
that the other sub-systems are not only analysed with economic instruments, but are in 
practice subjected to the economy, domesticated by it and depotentiated. The measure of a 
nation’s economic success is not so much its total assets (wealth and property), as the 
equitable distribution of these assets (Bailey 2010:34). The appropriate question is not "how 
much is a nation producing?" but "how are its citizens faring?" Thus the progress of the 
economics of community must be measured by a more comprehensive index than GNP 
(Childs 2000:88). GNP measures only some aspects of welfare, and to treat it as a general 
index of national wellbeing is a fallacy (Daly and Cobb 1994:63). Increase in GNP does not 
necessarily imply improvement in the quality of human life. Economic advancement is not 
the full story. Economics is not a separate part of reality on its own. Human welfare has 
dimensions other than the economic. Human progress is much more inclusive and much 
broader than mere material progress. The assumptions of economists that the stronger the 
economy, the greater the contribution to human welfare and that total welfare and economic 
welfare always move in the same direction are clearly not true (Daly and Cobb 1994:63, 
146). If it were so, poverty could have been eradicated a long time ago. The kind of 
community we envision is one in which human dignity is emphasised more than anything 
else. Every available instrument of well-being - government, charity, private sector - must be 
mobilised in order to mediate the resources of the community for the sake of the good of all 
(Brueggemann 2009:12).   
 
Following from this social nature of humanity is the supremacy of communal welfare over 
individual achievement. The Second Vatican Council (Gaudium et Spes, Para. 25) 
emphasises that man’s social nature makes it evident that the progress of the human person 
and the advancement of society itself hinge on each other. In contrast to the dominant neo-
liberal view of an inherent contestation between the demands of community and individual 
freedom, we argue that the good of the community and the individual good are integrally 
related. Barrera (2008:306) argues that far from being at odds with each other, the good of the 
individual and of the community are necessarily interdependent. Hobgood (2000:23) 
maintains that there is no opposition which exists between “I” and the “others”, between my 
self-interest and the commonweal. The good life of an individual and the common good are 
for Hollenbach (2002:3), inseparable. For him, the good of the community should have 
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priority in setting direction for the lives of individuals, for it is a higher good than the 
particular goods of private persons. Ronald Modras (1985:140) adopts a Thomistic 
perspective and argues that the good of the individual must be subordinated to the common 
good but not so as to disvalue the individual or to cancel out individual human rights. Putting 
individual welfare above the good of the household constitutes individualism, out of which 
neoliberal capitalism has emerged. 
 
8.5.2 Preferential option for the margins 
 
We have already seen that in the Exodus-Covenant narrative, Yahweh deliberately chose to 
align Godself with those on the margins of the Canaanite and Egyptian societies. The 
prophets also adopted this one-sided approach. The law codes that they inspired also spoke 
for and sided with those on the underside of the economy. This is a very important insight 
and a second pillar of this economic ethics. The characteristic contribution of the notion of 
the preferential option for the poor is to call attention to the importance of giving primacy to 
the needs of the poor (Bailey 2010:52). It contributes to inclusiveness. It is a commitment 
undertaken, not by the poor, but by the non-poor. Correspondingly, the preferential option for 
the poor exercised at a global level is a commitment undertaken not by the poor peoples of 
the Global South, but by the rich of the world. The concept views the good done for the poor 
not as “an addition to” but worked out in the everyday activities of human life (Miller 
2005:22).  
 
Human dignity dictates that every member of the human community has a right to material 
goods that are necessary to live a minimally decent existence. As Brueggemann (2009:5) puts 
it, “all members of society - including the poor, even the ‘undeserving poor’ - are legitimate 
recipients of enough to live in dignity, simply because they are there.” This means that all 
members of the human community have a special responsibility to the poor and marginalised 
to ensure that they live such a life. Every member is responsible for the welfare of the others 
in this one human family. Pope John Paul II described this special obligation to the poor as  
 
a call to have a special openness with the small and the weak, those that suffer and 
weep, those that are humiliated and left on the margin of society, so as to help them 
win their dignity as human persons and children of God (USCCB 1986:20). 
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The needs of the poor are more urgent than those of the rest of the community. Assisting the 
poor is not just an obligation of charity, but a firm demand of justice. Justice, in this case, 
implies that the poor have a superior moral claim on the community’s resources (Velasquez 
1987:59) and have the most urgent claim on the conscience of the nation (Biedenkopf 
1987:209). Establishing justice implies that one must give preference to members that are 
excluded from fully participating in the life of the community.  
 
An inclusive ethics maintains that all human institutions, including the economy, must be at 
the service of all human beings, especially those whom the prevailing social order does not 
acknowledge as persons: the poor, the exploited, those systematically and lawfully stripped of 
their human status, those who hardly know what a human being is (Litonjua 2013:89). This is 
because according to the market law, the weakest suffer the most. In making economic 
decisions and policies, we should be most concerned about those who are most threatened 
with death, injustice, poverty and oppression. According to the US Catholic Bishops 
(USCCB 1986:viii), any economic system is judged by what it does for and to people and by 
how it permits all to participate in it. In other words, it must be judged in the light of what it 
does to and for the poor, and what it enables the poor to do for themselves. Thus, an economy 
is just when it has established minimum levels of participation by all persons in the life of the 
human community (USCCB 1986:viii). Social policies are to be evaluated according to how 
they affect the poor and marginalised. Consequently, those policies that benefit the better off 
at the expense of the least well off are unjust. How the poorest members of society are 
managing is the litmus test of the correctness of an economic system (USCCB 1986:viii).  
This, as we have already noted, cannot be measured by GDP/GNP.  
 
A biblically inspired economic ethics adopts what Prince Moiseraele Dibeela (2008:195) 
calls the “Eucharistic model” of economy, which, for him, is a social agreement that all shall 
be included in this economy. This model is one of sharing resources with everyone, 
regardless of one’s ability to compete. It views human beings, not just as individuals required 
to make only self-focussed decisions, but as members of a community, called to invest 
resources, time and effort in responding to the needs of others (Blank 1992:23). It means we 
are to work towards the inclusion of all human beings into one common household, so that all 
members have access to resources necessary for a decent life and that everyone is allowed to 
participate fully in the life of the community (Blank 1992:22). This ethics holds that in a 
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genuine human community, the basic needs of all members are met so far as the community 
is able to do so. 
 
The notion of preferential option for the weak and marginalised is not against growth qua 
growth. There are types of growth that are genuinely needed in many poor places. What is 
needed is a different type of progress, one that is “healthier, more human, more social, more 
integral” (Pope Francis LS 112). It is against growth as the be-all and end-all of economic 
life. Human development is not simply about economic growth, but is in the last analysis, 
about human well-being and meeting basic human needs. A society is not really developed 
unless it provides opportunities for all its citizens, especially the poor, to meet their basic 
needs (Litonjua 2013:107). It is antithetical to an economic system preoccupied with 
maximising profits and concentrating wealth in the hands of a tiny minority, leaving out of 
that growth large segments of the human population (Mor Coorilos 2010:65). Pursuing riches 
is what ruins and destroys communities and nations. Emphasis on growth, by its very nature, 
operates on the basis of unbridled competition, over cooperation, and is aimed at satisfying 
the wants of the rich over the needs of the poor.  
 
Priority must shift from economic growth and financial health to human flourishing so that all 
members of the community can live with dignity. The notion of preferential option for the 
poor recognises that meeting essential human needs must come before the fulfilment of 
desires for luxury consumer goods. It aims at meeting people’s needs in a sustainable way. 
This option involves a reorientation of our value system, from placing a higher value on 
things to people, so that everyone in the household will have access to what it takes to live. 
Further, it rejects the notion that the best economic conditions will be obtained so long as the 
market is left to its own manoeuvres. It argues that respite for the poor cannot be left to the 
calculations of the marketplace. Economic systems are not governed by impersonal and 
unalterable laws but are human institutions which need to be subordinated to the good of all 
(Bailey 2010:85).  
 
This ethics agrees with John Ilife (cited in Wafawanaka 2012:11) who argues that the 
majority of the poor in our modern societies, as in ancient Israel, are the “structural poor.” 
Structural poverty is caused by structures that inhibit the poor from accessing goods, 
resources and services that are available to others in the broader society. As we saw in the 
opening quote, the poor are the product of the system we live in and for which we are 
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responsible (Gutierrez 1973:291). These structures have economic and class dimensions. 
Because they are put in place by human beings, the very same human beings can dismantle or 
reform these structures if they have the will to do so. The concept of preferential option for 
the poor does not call for the giving of our “spare change” to the poor, rather it calls for the 
radical restructuring of economic structures which privilege one percent of the world’s 
population with the greatest riches ever known to humanity while the ninety-nine percent 
survive on the crumbs that fall from the tables of the rich (De La Torre 2002:79). It is not a 
call for a generous act that will alleviate their suffering, but is rather a demand for building a 
different social and economic order (Gutierrez 1973:291). It does not just concern itself with 
bandaging the wounds of the many injured people left on the road-side by the global 
economic system. Rather, it urges us to confront the real problem: the thieves and robbers on 
the highway (Rivera-Agosto 2004:69). It calls for a serious challenge of the dictatorial 
policies of the global neo-liberal economy. 
 
The alternative economic ethics we are advocating requires transformation of both local and 
global socio-economic structures that trap and keep billions in poverty, perpetuate scandalous 
inequalities and cut off the poor from fully participating in the economic and social life of the 
human community. As Jonathan Sachs (cited in Wafawanaka 2014:117) argues, extreme 
poverty could be ended by 2025 if the developed nations of the global north assist the 
developing nations of the south in achieving economic independence and removing barriers 
to fair dealings. Pogge (cited in Shapcott 2010:187) weighs in, noting that “for the first time 
in human history it is quite feasible, economically to wipe out hunger and preventable 
diseases worldwide without real inconvenience to anyone.” Indeed the persistence of global 
poverty in the world of plenty is contradictory. Justice means challenging these economic 
arrangements and exploring ways to enable those who have been impoverished to recover 
from their situation. The rich individuals and nations who have gained most from the current 
economic arrangement have a moral obligation to transform it in such a way that the needy 
can also access the resources of the earth. Social justice calls for action to pull down the 
artificial walls dividing the poor from the rich at both local and global levels. To do this, what 
is needed is a cultural orientation that places higher value on interdependence and solidarity 
than the predominant “each-one-for-himself-God-for-us-all ethic” (Hollenbach 2002:41). 
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An important aspect of the option for the poor is what Litonjua (2013:90) calls “solidarity”. 
Solidarity helps us to see the poor not as carriers of symptoms, but as our neighbours, to be 
made sharers, on a par with ourselves, in the banquet of life and deserving of our aid (Himes 
2008:276). It enables one to listen to the voices from the margins and to seek reform and 
redress for injustices that they suffer. It is experiential and allows one to put oneself in the 
shoes of the poor. It pitches tents among the homeless and identifies with the oppressed (Mor 
Coorilos 2010:65). By so doing,   
 
one begins to experience not only their pain and struggle but also their hopes and their 
joys. Experiencing the situation of the poor leads to solidarity with them to a new way 
of thinking, a new way of seeing social reality, a new way of living. Without the 
virtue of solidarity, the poor are "they," the objects of our pity and generosity. In 
solidarity, the poor are "we," sensitive to the needs and feelings of others, devoted to 
their common welfare. With the virtue of solidarity, we are open to be challenged by 
the poor and to challenge them in turn (Litonjua 2013:92-93). 
 
At the global level, the concept of solidarity translates to partnerships between the developed 
and developing nations, for the benefit (mostly) of the latter. The participation of the 
voiceless (including the developing nations) in economic decisions that affect them is of 
paramount importance. Globalisation has bridged distances and reduced the world to a small 
village. For this reason, there is no excuse for the West’s indifference to the plight of the 
poor. As members of a global village, we are family members responsible for one another. 
Those family members, who have more than they need and are in a position to help those in 
need, have a responsibility to do so. A biblically inspired economic ethics sees extreme 
inequality, as we have in the world at the moment, as a threat to the solidarity of the human 
community, and a fertile breeding ground for deep social divisions and conflict.  
 
We end this ethics with a categorical imperative: an economic system is ethical and just if it 
is geared towards meeting the needs of those on the margins. It is unjust and unethical if it 
does otherwise. 
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8.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have discussed the possibility of comparing the political economies of 
ancient monarchic Israel and post-colonial Zimbabwe and we argued that it is indeed possible 
to compare the two, the numerous differences between them notwithstanding. We also noted 
the limitations of the economic ethics that emerges from a reading of the law codes and the 
preaching of the prophets, noting that we cannot provide a detailed blueprint of what an 
alternative economic order should be like. Rather we made a modest suggestion that the 
economic ethics is only perspectival and motivational. In our critique of the dominant global 
neo-liberal market economy, we viewed it as a political economy of terror, death and fear, 
which is ruled by endless growth, accumulation and consumption by the minority at the 
expense of the majority on the margins. We suggested that an alternative economic order is 
needed as a matter of urgency, both at the local and global levels. Two notions of community 
and preferential option for the poor emerged as the fundamental pillars of the economic 
ethics. These two, as we saw, emerged during the Exodus-Covenant tradition as defining 
features of the emerging community. Taking a leaf from that tradition, we argued that an 
alternative economic system should view all human beings as members of one family, a 
community. A person is by nature social, not by choice and so fulfilment and flourishing of 
human life takes place in community. In that community, each one is their “brother’s 
keeper,” and in this community, the needs of the poor take precedence over the wants of the 
rich and powerful. The justice of any economic order, we argued, is judged by what it does to 
the weak and marginalised.    
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
Introduction 
 
In Chapter One we asked a set of questions that we have been attempting to answer. This part 
is going to give an overview of how we have attempted to answer these questions. There are 
some issues that have not been dealt with adequately while others have only been mentioned 
in passing. These will be recommended for further research. 
 
Summarized overview of the project 
 
The Late Bronze Age was characterised by cataclysmic upheavals throughout the ancient 
Near East. When Iron 1 period dawned, a reconfiguration of the politics of the region had 
taken place. The superpowers of the day had weakened. Egypt had deteriorated considerably 
and subsequently withdrew from Asia. With the withdrawal, smaller polities in Syria-
Palestine emerged. The polity known as Israel which emerged on the highlands of Canaan 
was one of them. Following Gottwald’s hypothesis, it has been argued that Israel emerged as 
a social revolution in which the peasants mobilised themselves and overthrew the exploitative 
city-state elites. The majority of the Israelites were native Canaanites, that is, geographical 
insiders, as opposed to outsiders. Only a tiny percentage came from Egypt. But it was this 
tiny group that gave the new emerging society its religious impetus. With the overthrow of 
the city-state system and its tributary mode of production, it has been argued that the coalition 
introduced its own familial mode of production, in which all had more or less equal access to 
the land, the chief means of production. The coalition deliberately refrained from forming a 
central political organisation for the sake of enjoying its freedom. Likewise it did not have a 
central legal or cultic authority. It also refrained from setting up a taxing apparatus. 
Tendencies towards forming a petty chieftainship were deliberately resisted. 
 
But after two centuries of freedom, Israel was ready to go back to the tributary mode of 
production. It does seem that there was fierce contestation among the men of Israel on 
whether or not to adopt a monarchy. Finally, the pro-monarchy group won the day and Israel 
became a monarchy like the other nations around her. However, the coming of the monarchy 
was not an event neither was the monarchy something that they woke up with one morning. 
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Rather, there is evidence of creeping in of state institutions accompanied by the fading of 
tribal structures and institutions. 
  
The political economy of ancient Israel has been described as hierarchical with the king at the 
top of the pyramid. He was surrounded by his advisors and bureaucrats. Appointment to key 
positions in the kingdom depended on one’s relationship with the monarch. The state had a 
taxation apparatus in which officials collected tax from the peasants. Given the limited nature 
of the pre-capitalist agrarian economy of ancient Israel, the “surplus” was not real surplus. It 
was the little that was left over and stored for the future to cushion the household against 
likely bad harvests in the near future. It is these little surpluses that were taxed by the ruling 
elite. 
 
Should natural disasters occur for two or three consecutive years, their crops failed and their 
animals suffered or died. They were forced to take survival loans from the rich landowners 
who charged usurious interest rates. Debt instruments led to the peasants losing their property 
and plots of land to the rich landowners and money lenders. The legal system was captured 
by the elite and could not stop them from acquiring properties they targeted. More and more 
land was getting into fewer and fewer hands. Ultimately, they would give their family 
members and themselves to slavery for debt. It led to impoverishment of the masses. For the 
absentee rich landowners and urban money lenders it was a time to acquire more and more 
land and to get richer and richer. Their wealth was consumed in the city which was primarily 
a site of consumption. The elite lived in splendid town houses and displayed their wealth in a 
way that was envied by the peasants and debt slaves. They made extravagant sacrifices to 
their gods and the temples became a site of wanton display of wealth. Through systematic 
exploitation of the peasants, the upper classes became extremely wealthy while the majority 
of the toiling peasants were in a quagmire.  This is the situation that the prophets of 
judgement condemned. 
 
To make the peasants continue to pay their taxes even when they were so impoverished, the 
ruling elite relied on a combination of force and persuasion. They made the peasants believe 
that it was in their best interest and also that it was the will of the gods that they should 
continue to make those sacrifices. But, it does appear that the upper classes’ persuasion was 
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not always successful. It does seem that when class consciousness developed, the peasants 
would revolt against this political economy of terror. 
  
When discussing the emergence of the state, we utilized the Marxist theories that emphasise 
conflict, warfare and class. It has also been argued that ancient polities cannot be called 
“states” because states are a modern phenomenon. Thus ancient Israel cannot be a state as 
modern Zimbabwe is a state. Rather it was suggested that these ancient pre-capitalist polities 
should be called monarchies or kingdoms. Among some of the characteristics of the modern 
state that differentiates it from the ancient polities are sovereignty, territoriality and 
citizenship. 
 
A discussion on the future of the state has also been entered into. In spite of the many 
eulogies of the state, that it might go the way of the city-state or empire, it has been 
concluded that the state as a form of socio-political organisation will be around for a long 
time. Despite the emergence of federations and groupings of states which seem to want to 
take over the role of the state, the state has shown that it is resilient and probably now more 
than ever before.   
 
With regards to Africa, it has been noted that the state boundaries were crafted to prevent 
imperial powers from fighting with one another during the scramble for the continent. People 
of different ethnicities, cultures, even races woke up one morning to find that they were 
henceforth citizens of one state. That it has been noted had enormous implications for the 
stability of the many African states. African states were created not for self-determination but 
to supply cheap raw materials to the Western world. They were made in such a way that they 
would not wean themselves from dependency on imperial powers. From the lofty heights of 
the independence of Ghana, one African after another descended into tyranny, civil strife and 
poverty. A number of states became failed states while others became quasi-states, existing 
only in name. In some states, there was no difference between the state coffers and the 
leader’s personal bank account. But we also questioned the appropriateness of the state 
system to Africa and the readiness of the first generation of African leaders to take over state 
power. Perhaps most important was the suggestion that Africa and the developing world are 
caught up in the global colonial matrix of power. They were made in such a way that they 
continue to be trapped in the global economy in which they have no say. If they try to raise 
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their heads and deny what the imperial powers want, their heads will be chopped off 
immediately. Thus it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for African and developing 
countries to implement their own policies independent of or without the approval of imperial 
powers.  
 
Zimbabwe became a good example of an African country that was “reduced to size” by 
Western imperialism when it tried to take away the farms from white farmers to redress an 
obvious historical imbalance. The country became a pariah in the world of international 
diplomacy, went on to rank among the poorest in the world and register the second highest 
rate of inflation in recorded history. Its best brains had migrated far and wide. Citizens were 
dying of such curable diseases as cholera. Things fell apart. However, as noted above, it was 
not as simple as that. The African nationalist petite bourgeoisie that came to power in 1980 
should also shoulder the blame for the sorry state in which the nation now finds itself in. The 
country was full of potential at independence in 1980. But somewhere along the line, the 
African nationalist petite bourgeoisie leadership veered the vehicle off the road and with only 
twenty years after the fall of white settler colonial rule, the nation was in deep trouble. The 
power elite and their patronage networks milked the state coffers and the SOEs dry. The 
socialist democratic ideals got lost somewhere on the way as the former heroes competed to 
outdo one another in converting state resources for their own personal use. The state was a 
predatory state that skinned alive its own citizens. The power elite celebrated and did not 
hesitate to use violence to get compliance from the citizens who were not happy with their 
policies. The fact that it took a military intervention to remove the founding father of the 
nation after thirty seven years in power shows the extent to which power was entrenched in 
one person and partly explains the socio-political and economic ruin that the land is in.  
 
The last set of questions had to do with the dialogue of the two political economies and the 
inclusive economic ethics that emerges from the dialogue. It has been argued that despite 
their geographical and spatial differences, the two have points of similarity. The point has 
been stressed that it is the content that is different but the issues are basically the same. 
Economic inequality and oppression, as well as the struggle against needless suffering by the 
lower classes - key features in any economic situation - are strong enough parallels to warrant 
a cross-cultural comparative study. Furthermore, the essential issues of economics are the 
same through the passage of time: the endless tension between haves and have-nots, credit 
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and debt, as well as loans and interest. We were thus justified in making a comparative study 
of the two political economies.  
 
We have argued that an inclusive economic ethics inspired by biblical principles is feasible 
from this dialogue. It is an ethics that has its roots on the Exodus and Sinai traditions. At the 
Exodus event, Yahweh showed his option for the poor by choosing the people on the 
margins. The Sinai tradition (Mosaic covenant) provided the guiding principles for the socio-
economic, political and religious life of this emerging community, making them a covenant 
community that practises covenant ethics. When Yahweh delivered Israel from whatever 
bondage, it was not just a political liberation from enslavement, but was also an economic 
liberation from an exploitative economic order. Since Yahweh had shown his preference for 
those on the margins of society, so were the Israelites to do likewise to the poor among them. 
The Israelites were summoned to live as a community of mutual care where every member 
could flourish, especially the most vulnerable. Just as Yahweh had pity on those on the 
margins and swiftly moved to rescue them, so the covenant community that he created must 
have a preferential option for the vulnerable and marginalised among them. The concern of 
the legal codes was to uphold the dignity of those on the margins in what was already a 
crushing situation. The biblically-inspired ethics is one that underscores the importance of 
community and urges for a preferential option for the poor. 
 
Scholarly honesty dictates that we admit the limits of the ethics. We cannot provide a detailed 
blueprint of what an alternative economic order should be like. That is the task of economists, 
not theologians. Rather our modest suggestion has been made that the economic ethics 
analysed here is only perspectival and motivational. But, as Gottwald reminds us, this kind of 
ethical force is considerable. Notwithstanding the very real differences and the distance 
between the monarchic economic systems of the ancient Israel and modern day economic 
systems of Zimbabwe, what connects these two economies of terror “is a common thread of 
economic inequity and oppression and a common thread of struggle against needless 
economic suffering” (Gottwald, 1993:346). 
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Areas for further research 
 
In this work it has been noted that ancient kings claimed to be responsible for the common 
good in their kingdoms. But from the findings of this work it seems that was not the case. In 
similar measure the modern state claims to be at the service of the common good. It collects 
taxes from the citizens so that it provides services to all its citizens. But from the findings of 
this work, it is clear that the Zimbabwean state in particular and the African state in general 
have challenges in this regards. The area of the state and the common good is a good area for 
further research. Is the state at the service of the common good or it is there to serve the 
interests of the power elite? The Old Testament prophets expected the “state” to serve the 
interests of all the people especially the poor. But was that the raison d'être of the state to 
begin with? Another area that can make an interesting research is that of the praise singing of 
the political leaders in both situations. Strong cross-cultural comparisons can be made in the 
way in which political leaders were viewed by their people. This might have had an effect of 
pacifying their people preventing them from mobilising and rising up against them. 
 
An issue that this work has not dealt with at all is the gender aspect of these political 
economies. It would be important to investigate the role of women in, and to what extent 
women were victims of, these political economies of terror. 
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